David Glantz, in his paper American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II puts forth the theory that the following sterotypes prevailed about the Red Army and the Eastern Front. Do you agree and also do you think some of these still exist? Here is the link to the whole article: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm Here is a part of the paper dealing with the stereotypes. I'd be interested to read what people think: The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows: - Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims. - Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority. - Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses. - Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal. - Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative. - Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible. - The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes. - Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured. - Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend). - The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.