Stereotypes About The Red Army And Russia

This is a pretty old thread. Was the poster named "Stalin" just trying to be shocking ? I doubt he's a regular around here. Is that right ?
Kids..what are we gonna do with em ?

 

we sometimes forget to read the old book. in the book of revelation, stalin is one of the four angels who will smite the earth...and of course hitler, churchill and roosevelt.
don't be shock kids....these angels of death are the fulfillment of the prophecy.

 

No offense taken Boykin. read "Panzer Battles" by Von Mellenthin, "Lost Victories" by Erich Von Manstein, "Panzer Leader" by Heinz Guderian. You will find some of these myths and stereotypes being alluded to either directly or indirectly. And who said Glantz was a bad author? If he is then who would you suggest is better?

I've just got to ask, if it's written by a German author does that make it, by default, untrue? It seems that your agenda is to vindicate the poor perception of the Soviet military machine by Western authors, and so you automatically disregard any testament of accounts from a German source as false and misleading because these accounts don't correspond to the perception of events as you wish them to be. From what I can discern, according to you the Germans were all self-serving liars and any Russian declassified document is gospel.... blah, blah, blah.

I appologize for the tone of this post, but I decided not to go back and revise it because it reflects how I feel about the methods you employ to make arguments for the revisionist history you propose. You are incensed that the Western view of history is disproportionately taken from the German perspective, but how can any arguments you make be taken seriously when you dismiss German sources out of hand as untrue? To a certain extent there is validity in all of the "myths and stereotypes alluded to" (as you describe it) by the German authors. Certainly other factors than the generally accepted were at play in any operation, and it is inevitable that men writing memoirs will skew their recollection of some events to show themselves in a more favorable light, but to make the claim that an explanation of events cannot be true or accurate because it comes from a German source (and therefore must be some type of cover-up) makes, for me at least, any argument you might make specious.

 

we sometimes forget to read the old book. in the book of revelation, stalin is one of the four angels who will smite the earth...and of course hitler, churchill and roosevelt.
don't be shock kids....these angels of death are the fulfillment of the prophecy.

Your prophecies maybe, not mine. Anyway, I'm only responding because I wanted to get to the 100 post mark.

 

I've just got to ask, if it's written by a German author does that make it, by default, untrue? It seems that your agenda is to vindicate the poor perception of the Soviet military machine by Western authors, and so you automatically disregard any testament of accounts from a German source as false and misleading because these accounts don't correspond to the perception of events as you wish them to be. From what I can discern, according to you the Germans were all self-serving liars and any Russian declassified document is gospel.... blah, blah, blah.

I appologize for the tone of this post, but I decided not to go back and revise it because it reflects how I feel about the methods you employ to make arguments for the revisionist history you propose. You are incensed that the Western view of history is disproportionately taken from the German perspective, but how can any arguments you make be taken seriously when you dismiss German sources out of hand as untrue? To a certain extent there is validity in all of the "myths and stereotypes alluded to" (as you describe it) by the German authors. Certainly other factors than the generally accepted were at play in any operation, and it is inevitable that men writing memoirs will skew their recollection of some events to show themselves in a more favorable light, but to make the claim that an explanation of events cannot be true or accurate because it comes from a German source (and therefore must be some type of cover-up) makes, for me at least, any argument you might make specious.
Ok, first of all I would never discount any source of history - I merely pointed out that I have found certain German Memoirs to be "loaded". I never said they shouldnt be read but caution should be taken reading ANY history relating to the German-Soviet War as both Soviet and German sources can be flawed. By flawed I mean that although there is good historical data contained within, the author may have an axe to grind. you've said it yourself, they wanted to put themselves in a more favourable light. Let me further explain it. Most German sources will allude to the fact that in 1941 the weather defeated the Wehrmacht, that General winter ensured that Moscow was held and that, just as the Germans were freezing to death, The Russians were only then able to make a counterattack. No mention is given of the fact that the Russians also had to fight in the same conditions as the Germans. The Generals were quick to blame Hitler over the lack of winter clothing yet no winter clothes were mentioned by any German Army study before the Campaign. The Generals agreed that the Russian Army could be beaten before the end of the Autumn. This explains why Halder began to worry after the end of Summer 1941 when they had captured more troops than the initial German study had planned for. He couldnt understand how there were so many russians still fighting. Now a lot of blame can be placed at Hitler's door but when you read the memoirs of some of those Generals you would think that it was all his fault.

Speaking of the fact that you accuse me of disregarding certain works, lets take for example "Panzer Battles" by Maj General FW Von Mellenthin. A fascinating book and very readable and indeed he was one of the few Wehrmacht officers to serve in North Africa, in the east and in the Western Campaign of 1944. He devotes an entire chapter to the psychology of the Red Army and the make up of the Soviet Soldier. In the second paragraph he refers to them as "these Asiatics". If I may quote a paragraph he says "With the same indifference the Russian soldier endures heat and cold, thirst and hunger. Unheard of Hardships make no impression on his soul.He lacks any true religious or moral balance, and his moods alternate between bestial cruelty and genuine kindness. As part of a mob he is full of hatred and cruelty yet alone he can be friendly and generous. These characteristics apply to the Asiatic Russian, the Mongol, the Turkoman and the Uzbek as well as to the Slavs west of the Urals". Now I dont know about you but that is borderline rascism. "Lacks any true moral or religious beliefs", "Bestial Cruelty", "Part of a mob". Who are we talking about here because that could be applied about the Germans under Hitler as well. I'm not saying dont read Von Mellenthin's book or that it lacks merit but that paragraph shows how little he thinks of the Soviet citizen and that extended right through the whole of German Society. He thinks they are inferior!! They werent inferior. By the way by you accusing me of revisionism, exactly what do you mean? Are you suggesting I am pro-Soviet? My area of expertise is not the Soviet State, and as regards revisionism I have no time for "revisionists" like Suvorov and his ilk. I do not believe that Stalin was about to attack Hitler at least not right away and the dispositions of the Soviet Armies back up my opinion of this.

The Soviet Army was a powerful and potent weapon which almost got destroyed in the terrible losses of 1941 but managed to pull itself back from the brink and reforged itself. By the time of june 1944 the Wehrmacht was facing a brave and determined enemy who was capable of long reaching strategic offensives. Its soldiers might not have been as well trained as the "landsers" of 1939 and 1940 but their men were able to fight well.

Once again I do not say to anyone not to read the German General's memoirs but I would advise that they be taken with a pinch of salt and if you disagree then show me your evidence to the contrary.

 

I've just got to ask, if it's written by a German author does that make it, by default, untrue? It seems that your agenda is to vindicate the poor perception of the Soviet military machine by Western authors, and so you automatically disregard any testament of accounts from a German source as false and misleading because these accounts don't correspond to the perception of events as you wish them to be. From what I can discern, according to you the Germans were all self-serving liars and any Russian declassified document is gospel.... blah, blah, blah.


Please tell me where I have said that they were liars -self -serving well in some situations yes that was the case. I never said that the Russian historians were any better by the way. Have a look back at the thread - I'm not pushing the Soviet side at the expense of the Germans, merely commenting that for 50 years the west has had to rely on German testimonies only and if you only read one side then you can only see half the picture.

 

Gotthard Heinrici. The crux of our discussion is essentially the legitimacy of the explanation of events described in the memoirs of the German generals, so I am going to comment on that topic alone rather than delve into any specific topics covered in said memoirs. First off, we agee that a reader should excersice caution when reading historical accounts of this type (or any type for that matter). It is easy to fall into the trap of believing something simply because it was written down in a book. Everyone falls into this trap on occasion, although the people most prone to taking things at face value are the ones least knowledgable about a subject - whatever that subject may be. As a person learns more they form their own opinions, and of course we all have the tendency to form and solidify opinions based on what we want to believe, for whatever reason we want or need to believe them. This long-winded setup leads me to my point: If you and I are motivated to lean towards different viewpoints based on what we would like to believe (which we probably are), then we will assign different degrees of relevance to any source material related to the subject. Whereas I may be guilty of being overly tolerant of the viewpoints expressed in the memoirs, you, I believe, are equally as guilty of dismissing the assertions of the authors as false or misleading, when it is just as possible that they truly believed that their assessment of events were legitimate and correct. Unless there is hard evidence to the contrary, any disagreement with their assertions is speculation.

I want to give an example of my point by exploring something you quoted:

"... lets take for example "Panzer Battles" by Maj General FW Von Mellenthin. A fascinating book and very readable and indeed he was one of the few Wehrmacht officers to serve in North Africa, in the east and in the Western Campaign of 1944. He devotes an entire chapter to the psychology of the Red Army and the make up of the Soviet Soldier. In the second paragraph he refers to them as "these Asiatics". If I may quote a paragraph he says "With the same indifference the Russian soldier endures heat and cold, thirst and hunger. Unheard of Hardships make no impression on his soul.He lacks any true religious or moral balance, and his moods alternate between bestial cruelty and genuine kindness. As part of a mob he is full of hatred and cruelty yet alone he can be friendly and generous. These characteristics apply to the Asiatic Russian, the Mongol, the Turkoman and the Uzbek as well as to the Slavs west of the Urals". Now I dont know about you but that is borderline rascism. "Lacks any true moral or religious beliefs", "Bestial Cruelty", "Part of a mob". Who are we talking about here because that could be applied about the Germans under Hitler as well. I'm not saying dont read Von Mellenthin's book or that it lacks merit but that paragraph shows how little he thinks of the Soviet citizen and that extended right through the whole of German Society. He thinks they are inferior!!"

Clearly you take offense to Mellenthin's description of the Soviet Soldier. He was, however, giving his impression of what he believed he witnessed. Was Mellenthin a racist - I don't know. Was his description accurate - I can't say, although I do believe that the impression he has written was truthful in his eyes. For me, making these observations does not discredit Mellenthin in any way.

After re-reading your follow-up post I don't think our opinions on this subject (at least) differ that much. Your main point seems to be that people should keep their mind open to alternatives to the traditional explanation of events because the viewpoint of one side has been disproportionately represented - and I am all for the search for truth, so yay you! The point I am trying to make is that the recollections of the authors of the memoirs and the conclusions they have echoed about the course of events during the war and the implications of those events shouldn't be dismissed out-of-hand as propoganda or self-serving, when it is possible they are providing the most legitimate fundamental explanation of an event (even if that explanation is overly simplified as a whole).

Since we're claiming allegiance to football teams, GO PACK!!!

 

... making these observations does not discredit Mellenthin in any way...
yes, it does; because that shows how little he knew about life; ..no wonder the Germans, led by the commanders like Mellenthin, lost the war.

 

Ok, first of all I would never discount any source of history - I merely pointed out that I have found certain German Memoirs to be "loaded". I never said they shouldnt be read but caution should be taken reading ANY history relating to the German-Soviet War as both Soviet and German sources can be flawed. By flawed I mean that although there is good historical data contained within, the author may have an axe to grind. you've said it yourself, they wanted to put themselves in a more favourable light. Let me further explain it. Most German sources will allude to the fact that in 1941 the weather defeated the Wehrmacht, that General winter ensured that Moscow was held and that, just as the Germans were freezing to death, The Russians were only then able to make a counterattack. No mention is given of the fact that the Russians also had to fight in the same conditions as the Germans. The Generals were quick to blame Hitler over the lack of winter clothing yet no winter clothes were mentioned by any German Army study before the Campaign. The Generals agreed that the Russian Army could be beaten before the end of the Autumn. This explains why Halder began to worry after the end of Summer 1941 when they had captured more troops than the initial German study had planned for. He couldnt understand how there were so many russians still fighting. Now a lot of blame can be placed at Hitler's door but when you read the memoirs of some of those Generals you would think that it was all his fault.

Speaking of the fact that you accuse me of disregarding certain works, lets take for example "Panzer Battles" by Maj General FW Von Mellenthin. A fascinating book and very readable and indeed he was one of the few Wehrmacht officers to serve in North Africa, in the east and in the Western Campaign of 1944. He devotes an entire chapter to the psychology of the Red Army and the make up of the Soviet Soldier. In the second paragraph he refers to them as "these Asiatics". If I may quote a paragraph he says "With the same indifference the Russian soldier endures heat and cold, thirst and hunger. Unheard of Hardships make no impression on his soul.He lacks any true religious or moral balance, and his moods alternate between bestial cruelty and genuine kindness. As part of a mob he is full of hatred and cruelty yet alone he can be friendly and generous. These characteristics apply to the Asiatic Russian, the Mongol, the Turkoman and the Uzbek as well as to the Slavs west of the Urals". Now I dont know about you but that is borderline rascism. "Lacks any true moral or religious beliefs", "Bestial Cruelty", "Part of a mob". Who are we talking about here because that could be applied about the Germans under Hitler as well. I'm not saying dont read Von Mellenthin's book or that it lacks merit but that paragraph shows how little he thinks of the Soviet citizen and that extended right through the whole of German Society. He thinks they are inferior!! They werent inferior. By the way by you accusing me of revisionism, exactly what do you mean? Are you suggesting I am pro-Soviet? My area of expertise is not the Soviet State, and as regards revisionism I have no time for "revisionists" like Suvorov and his ilk. I do not believe that Stalin was about to attack Hitler at least not right away and the dispositions of the Soviet Armies back up my opinion of this.

The Soviet Army was a powerful and potent weapon which almost got destroyed in the terrible losses of 1941 but managed to pull itself back from the brink and reforged itself. By the time of june 1944 the Wehrmacht was facing a brave and determined enemy who was capable of long reaching strategic offensives. Its soldiers might not have been as well trained as the "landsers" of 1939 and 1940 but their men were able to fight well.

Once again I do not say to anyone not to read the German General's memoirs but I would advise that they be taken with a pinch of salt and if you disagree then show me your evidence to the contrary.
The weather defeated the wehrmacht :wrong,of course.General Winter ensured that Moscow was held:wrong ,of couse. The Germans freezing death:wrong ,of course :all excuses invented after the war .On the other hand :some are exagerating the quality of the Red Army :Combat losses 1941:Germany:830000 Red Army :4160000 1942 :1060000 6590000 1943 1530000 6900000 1944 1950000 5690OOO Ratio :1941 1-5 1942 1-6 1943 1-4.6 1944 1-2.9

 

The weather defeated the wehrmacht :wrong,of course.General Winter ensured that Moscow was held:wrong ,of couse.

Of course we all know that on the Eastern side of the FEBA temperatures were at a balmy 22ºC as recommended by any decent air-conditioning equipment supplier.

The Germans freezing death:wrong ,of course :all excuses invented after the war .On the other hand :some are exagerating the quality of the Red Army :Combat losses 1941:Germany:830000 Red Army :4160000 1942 :1060000 6590000 1943 1530000 6900000 1944 1950000 5690OOO Ratio :1941 1-5 1942 1-6 1943 1-4.6 1944 1-2.9

In a kindler, gentler way:

..................Germany....Red Army
1941 :..........830,000....4,160,000
1942 :.......1,060,000....6,590,000
1943 :...... 1,530,000....6,900,000
1944 :.......1,950,000....5,690,000

Ratios :
1941: 1/5
1942: 1/6
1943: 1/4.6
1944: 1/2.9

I'm not even going to dispute your figures to which you don't supply a source, but it is interesting that figures for 1945 are not shown.

1943 onwards were the years of Soviet victories as the decreasing ratio also shows, and any army that is on permanent offensive against a tough opponent must expect heavy losses. Also these figures show that the Soviet Union was prepared to pay a frightful price for the defeat of Nazism, and also they had the means to pursue the effort through to victory.

These figures or any other similar set can be twisted around in any way, but the final result was as illustrated in a previous thread in this forum and to that there is no twisting around.

 

Of course we all know that on the Eastern side of the FEBA temperatures were at a balmy 22ºC as recommended by any decent air-conditioning equipment supplier.



In a kindler, gentler way:

..................Germany....Red Army
1941 :..........830,000....4,160,000
1942 :.......1,060,000....6,590,000
1943 :...... 1,530,000....6,900,000
1944 :.......1,950,000....5,690,000

Ratios :
1941: 1/5
1942: 1/6
1943: 1/4.6
1944: 1/2.9

I'm not even going to dispute your figures to which you don't supply a source, but it is interesting that figures for 1945 are not shown.

1943 onwards were the years of Soviet victories as the decreasing ratio also shows, and any army that is on permanent offensive against a tough opponent must expect heavy losses. Also these figures show that the Soviet Union was prepared to pay a frightful price for the defeat of Nazism, and also they had the means to pursue the effort through to victory.

These figures or any other similar set can be twisted around in any way, but the final result was as illustrated in a previous thread in this forum and to that there is no twisting around.
The Sources are from BA-MA,III W 8O5/5-7 . About the Russian Winter :Sarcasm is a shortage of arguments . If you will look at 'Russia at war' 'General Winter' ,sarcasm will probably disappear and if you consult any standard work you will notice when the German army was ordered to go defensive . The reason why the figures of 1945 are not shown is that there are no German figures,only Russian (30135O7 ),thus there is no ratio possible .

 

Dear LJ, the argument underlying my sarcasm -I assumed it was clear enough for everyone to understand but I'm sorry I was mistaken - was that extreme cold and snow would have affected both sides. I am under the impression that the Red Army soldier used to belong to the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens, same as the German Landser and as such would have the similar reaction to similar weather conditions, hence weather bad as it was by itself is an insufficient excuse.

On the other hand, the decision to wittingly or otherwise exposing the troops to such operational conditions without due preparation may call into question the judgment of the higher command.

Anyway, if I may quote a better authority than myself, here is something I happened to have on hand, from Robert Forczyck's "Moscow 1941 - Hitler's First Defeat", 90-91.

THE WEATHER FACTOR

The entire issue of the impact of poor weather conditions upon the conduct of Operation Typhoon has been distorted by decades of disinformation from both sides and gross oversimplification. Operation Typhoon was fought over a large area - 500km from north to south - and weather conditions often varied considerably along the front. It is clear from both German and Soviet weather data that while the offensive was hindered by passing periods of poor weather, that the worst winter weather did not arrive until after Typhoon had culminated. German weather data collected from all six armies involved in Typhoon demonstrate that the first snowfall, about 5cm in the period 7-13 October, fell mostly in the southern areas where Guderian was operating and did not affect Ninth Army, in the north around Rzhev, at all. Although the October snow melted quickly, it did not render every road impassable. On 10 October Fourth Panzer Army noted, 'here and there, the roads are hardly passable' and Guderian's own command recorded that 'motorized movement is partly impossible in some areas'. German records also indicate that the roads began drying out after four days and the mud phase in early October lasted for only about one week. Rain from 27 October to 3 November produced more mud, as well as a rainy period on 19-24 November, but in each case the effect of mud was fairly temporary and localized. It was never the case that all the roads in the AGC area were simultaneously impassible due to muddy conditions. The greatest impact of the mud upon German operations was to add further strain to the impoverished Wehrmacht logistical system.

The impact of cold weather upon ill-clad Wehrmacht troops has been cited as a primary factor in stopping Typhoon. In October, daytime temperatures were mostly in the range 0º to 15º C (32-59º F), with frost on about one-third of the nights. It was coldest in the Third Panzer Army area around Rzhev. Temperatures did drop significantly in November, with daytime temperatures in the range 13º to 30º F and with frost on 80 per cent of nights. While the German front-line troops were certainly miserable in this cold, damp weather, temperatures in this range did not begin to cause significant amounts of illness and frostbite until the end of November, at which point Typhoon was already culminating from supply shortages. Snowfall in November was about 20cm and the freezing conditions actually improved German mobility. The terrible freezing temperatures and heavy snowfalls did not actually begin until 4 December, at which point Typhoon was over. During the onset of the Soviet Winter Counteroffensive. temperatures fell below 0º F from 4-7 December, which had a great impact upon the morale and health of the front-line German troops and helps to explain how the Soviets were able to achieve some of their breakthroughs. The intense cold drove German infantry indoors, allowing Soviet infantry and cavalry to infiltrate and envelop units that ceased to maintain continuous fronts. The worst freezing temperatures were around the Moskva-Volga Canal, which makes the Soviet breakthrough on the Klin Bulge more understandable. The weather did warm up during 8-12 December, which helped the Germans to mount a tenacious defense of Klin but fell below 0° F again on 13-15 December. To sum up, the debilitating and casualty-inducing cold temperatures did not arrive until the point at which Typhoon had failed anyway, but this weather did assist the Soviet Counteroffensive.

And my congratulations on the use of BA-MA, III W 805/5-7, I myself was never able to set my eyes upon it.

 

It is interesting to note that in memoirs and veterans interviews from the Winter War, some Finns think they have an advantage fighting in the winter over the Soviets.

To be honest I haven't read through all pages.
But in response to the validity of the streotypes today, I'd say that they have been said so many times over, and coupled with the revisionism so popular in certain parts of the world, that many hold them as truths today.

I don't rate ANY stereotypes. Possibly because I come from a country with 4-5million people, and all we can agree on is that we are not like our neighbours. (bloody easterners, getting everything for free and have a handsome four months of poor skiing weather...)

 

Dear LJ, the argument underlying my sarcasm -I assumed it was clear enough for everyone to understand but I'm sorry I was mistaken - was that extreme cold and snow would have affected both sides. I am under the impression that the Red Army soldier used to belong to the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens, same as the German Landser and as such would have the similar reaction to similar weather conditions, hence weather bad as it was by itself is an insufficient excuse.

On the other hand, the decision to wittingly or otherwise exposing the troops to such operational conditions without due preparation may call into question the judgment of the higher command.

Anyway, if I may quote a better authority than myself, here is something I happened to have on hand, from Robert Forczyck's "Moscow 1941 - Hitler's First Defeat", 90-91.



And my congratulations on the use of BA-MA, III W 805/5-7, I myself was never able to set my eyes upon it.
I think there was an misunderstanding my point was also that the winter was harmfull for both parties and that the stories of the winter to be responsible for the German defeat were excuses and inventions . But about the harshnessof the winter ,i am not convinced . My source(Russia at war suggest that the winter was not that harsh .A proof is that 'only' a third of the German non combat losses(120000 ) were caused by the winter and that only 14000 of them belonged to category 4 (with amputations ). Cheers

 

Ah, sorry if I misunderstood you.

Being from a place where you have to go to the neighbouring country for decent skiing and where a rainy Christmas is a rarity, any thought of a real winter gives me the shudders

 

Za Rodinu :forgot to thank you for your source about the winter factor ;about my reply of yesterday evening ne should never reply if one is irritated ! I was irritated ,having recieced on some forums a lot of negative answers ,from insults to personal attacks and negative remarks on my incapacity to type correctly (English is not my first languagebut there is another reason ) . It seems there is a lot of people who cannot discuss in a civilised matter and have to use aggressive methods . the result was you beying the victim of my pent-up rage .

 

Do I look like the Dalai Lama to you?

One thing I like about this forum is the good level of civilised behaviour. Having divergent opinions is normal, even some amount of controversy can be positive, but the rule should be if what you are going to write is something you would not say in your living room to a visitor, then don't write it! But once in a while some of us will tend to go a bit over the top, especially a Latin hothead like me

 

Stereotypes of Russian soldiers have existed pre-war and were put out by the Nazi party. After all, you cannot be superhuman and let the other side be superhuman aswell can you? What is not mentioned is the fact that many German generals upon hearing of Hitlers intentions to invade Russia were worried that the German soldiers were not as tough as the Russian Soldiers. From as I see it the Russian soldiers were let down by the leadership, not by thier own fighting abilities.

But this has to be seen in the light of the allies efforts in the west during the fall of France and the low countries. The Germans were simply waging a new method of warfare and Tactics had yet to be developed to counter it.

I think that the winter of 1941 did have a huge impact on German troops, offensive operations were cut back as the armour and men could not simply perform, though it has to be remembered that this would have benefitted the Russian defensive operations.
The fact is by the time of operation Typhoon the Germans were in a horrendous position. Supply lines that could not supply, the germans were now fighting on a much wider battelfront, the Russians had a shorter supply line aswell and were at a logistical advantage.

But as to the soldiers themselves, who always get a hard time of it, the Russian soldier was no more subhaman or ignorant than the German soldier was super human and blonde haired and blue eyed!

 

A soldier in the Russian Empire and later in the USSR has never been
- trusted
- seen as a high-value asset.
This pretty much defines the treatment of soldiers as expendable and easily replaceable material by the officers and generals. Having "many" always took precedence before having "skilled", in fact there were Russian proverbs widely used to supoport this view such as "either way the women will give birth to plenty of the new ones".
For the officer corps the main merit was always loyalty to the Party. Skills, knowledge, ability and initiative came very distant second - if any. On top of that every unit commander until 1943 had a co-commander - infamous komissar - ensuring that commander's orders were in line with the party requirements at the time (in fact the commander's order only became standing after being signed by the komissar). Imagine the operational, tactical and even strategic consequences of this way of commanding the troops in battle!
Generally the stereotypes are correct with an obvious note that they cannot be applied in 100% of cases.

 

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.
Weather is vital in any military operation. If the Germans had a perfectly favorable weather for them they would be in a much better position (i.e.: when attacking, always have summer like weather, when defending, always have terrible muddy weather).
- Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.
They were able to win battles losing 5 times more men than the Germans. I think that this characterizes numerical superiority, and kind of a massive one.
- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.
The soviet union had impressive capabilities to replace lost soldiers. Any other power could not suffer 8 million casualties in 1 year and still maintain the strategic initiative after.
- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.
Well, that myth has some foundations: The operational performance of the Red Army was nothing very good, however, they won the largest war ever, so their strategic leadership must have been quite decent.
- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.
That is simply wrong. Strategic offensives are nearly always envelopment operations.- Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured. I agree partially with that. Even if it was small, Lend-Lease was important in a front were warfare had a very close outcome.
- Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).
Germany had very good operational and tactical leadership. But had bad grand strategic performance. Why? Well, i think that the fact the while in the operational levels there were military genius running the show while in the grand strategic level they had a corporal in charge can explain those events.
- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.
They were very hard men. However, with the rest of this sentence I disagree.