How close were the Soviets to collapse, if at all

Discussion in 'The Eastern Front' started by Gerard, Mar 3, 2009.

  1. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Yeah, especially considering the lack of fuel, ammunition, disrepair, etc, etc. Look at the Red Army performance in Barbarossa. Look at their performance, tripping over their shoelaces in the Polish invasion in Sept. 1939. Most of all, look at the absolute fright Stalin was of provoking Hitler over anything prior to Barbarossa, heck, he even forbade his AAA to fire at German planes even after the invasion had begun!

    "A conspiracy theory a day keeps the shrink away." :)
     
    BADHAK likes this.
  2. L J

    L J Senior Member

    Yeah, especially considering the lack of fuel, ammunition, disrepair, etc, etc. Look at the Red Army performance in Barbarossa. Look at their performance, tripping over their shoelaces in the Polish invasion in Sept. 1939. Most of all, look at the absolute fright Stalin was of provoking Hitler over anything prior to Barbarossa, heck, he even forbade his AAA to fire at German planes even after the invasion had begun!

    "A conspiracy theory a day keeps the shrink away." :)
    For Hitler,Stalin could mean a dange for the oil wells:we know that there is no proof that Stalin would attack Germany in 1941.
    But my post was to answer the statement that the best place for Stalin to attack Germany was White Russia ;IF Stalin wanted attack,he could do this with more result in the South .
    The SU was also a potential ally of Britian,if Hitler eliminated the SU,he had won,or one should believe in the feasiability of Overlord with the bulk of the German army in the West:) ;):lol:
     
  3. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Hitler rejected out of hand the feelers put out by Stalin , in 1943 peace feelers would again be rejected.

    In 1943? :huh: Are you sure? I thought that by that year the USSR wanted only to crush Germany and take over of all Europe.
     
  4. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    *delete*
     
  5. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    In 1943? :huh: Are you sure? I thought that by that year the USSR wanted only to crush Germany and take over of all Europe.
    View attachment 25639
     
  6. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Where did it become apparent that the Soviets wanted to take over Europe in 1943? In 1943 the Germans were still far from beaten and victory was not assured by any means.
     
  7. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Where did it become apparent that the Soviets wanted to take over Europe in 1943? In 1943 the Germans were still far from beaten and victory was not assured by any means.

    :huh:

    I thought that after Stalingrad, the Soviets thought that victory was pretty much assured.
     
  8. guaporense

    guaporense Member

  9. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Any good Communist would tell you that victory was certain since day 1, so more or less rethoric doesn't make any difference. :rolleyes:

    I would be hard put to find any writing stating that the SU wanted to "take over all of Europe" but...

    As for peace probings, yes, I used to play poker in the past, and found bluffing to be a fine method -_-

    Now addressing a more serious point. 1943, meaning Zitadelle, was among other factors important in that it inaugurated a new phase in more realistic thinking. This was the first time the Stavka, after looking at a series of previous disasters - admittedly caused in part by irrealistic planning - decided the Red Army was mature enough to stop a full blown German operation in its tracks, something it had never been able to do before, the consequences being known. After K. no German offensive action had more than local scope, they were never again able to regain initiative.

    Responding to Gott. H., if victory was not automatically assured, then at least it finally was seen as within the realm of realistical possibility.
     
  10. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    :huh:

    I thought that after Stalingrad, the Soviets thought that victory was pretty much assured.
    Not at all Guaporense and in response to Za, I would concur that post-Kursk the feeling grew that victory was a question of when rather than if!
     
  11. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Responding to Gott. H., if victory was not automatically assured, then at least it finally was seen as within the realm of realistical possibility.
    I should clarify Za, in January 1943 victory was far from assured but by the end of the year yes it was clear that the Germans were beaten both Tactically and Strategically. Also by the end of 1943 the Soviets were becoming much more proficient at co-ordinating attacks at the Strategic Level.
    I was responding to Guapronese's assertion that after Stalingrad all the Soviets wanted to do was crush Germany and take Europe which is a ridiculous statement to make about the Soviet position in February 1943. :huh:
     
  12. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    I should clarify Za, in January 1943 victory was far from assured but ...

    We might split a few hairs here, pro and con, but then we would be going into speculation mode ;)
     
  13. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    I do think we are essentially in agreement Za, give or take a few months!! :D
     
  14. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Any good Communist would tell you that victory was certain since day 1, so more or less rethoric doesn't make any difference. :rolleyes:

    I would be hard put to find any writing stating that the SU wanted to "take over all of Europe" but...

    Stalin wanted to take over the world. The most land he controls, the better. He was like Hitler, but smarter.

    Stalin always sought to maximize the territory he controlled. He only liked the opening of a second front in 1944 because it maximized his chances of winning the war.

    Now addressing a more serious point. 1943, meaning Zitadelle, was among other factors important in that it inaugurated a new phase in more realistic thinking. This was the first time the Stavka, after looking at a series of previous disasters - admittedly caused in part by irrealistic planning - decided the Red Army was mature enough to stop a full blown German operation in its tracks, something it had never been able to do before, the consequences being known. After K. no German offensive action had more than local scope, they were never again able to regain initiative.
    Kursk was quite a suicide attack, the Germans attacked a numerically superior enemy.

    In France, the Germans attacked 3.3 million allied soldiers with 3.3 million soldiers. At Barbarossa the Germans attacked an enemy with numerical equality, 3.3 million Germans vs 3.3 million Russians. At Operation Blue, the Germans attacked in the souther part of the front with 2 million soldiers versus 1.8 million Red Army soldiers. All the cases of successful blitzkrieg involved numerical equality or superiority. At Kursk the Germans had 800,000 soldiers vs 1.4 million soviets, a numerical superiority of 1 to 1.75 to the soviets. Failure was to be expected.
     
  15. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    Stalin wanted to take over the world. The most land he controls, the better. He was like Hitler, but smarter.


    Thank you for that profound psychoanalyse :) I wish historians could be so trenchant!
     
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  16. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Stalin wanted to take over the world. The most land he controls, the better.
    Where did he ever say this? Its one thing taking over Eastern Europe but world domination? Not unless it fell into his lap - Stalin was an opportunist. Sure he wanted power, at any cost, and he used the defeat of Germany to the Soviet Union's advantage but he wasnt after world domination.
     
  17. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    [​IMG]


    You really have no idea what you are talking about, have you?
     
  18. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    [​IMG]


    You really have no idea what you are talking about, have you?

    Who, me???
     
  19. James S

    James S Very Senior Member

    guaporense
    Stalin wanted to take over the world. The most land he controls, the better. He was like Hitler, but smarter.

    In 39-40 Stalin was up for local land grabs bullying his neighbours securing his own position and was if anything into extending his ( local ) political influences , making those close to him aware that he carried a big stick - the Red Army.
    His focus was internal trying to cement control for himself (his ever paranoid and aggressively defending himself against perceived threat posed by others ) .
    I don't think he ever intended to take over the world and wage war in the way Hitler drifted into.
    Stalin was more streetwise than Hitler and was the more stable of the two.
    He only liked the opening of a second front in 1944 because it maximized his chances of winning the war.

    Stalin wanted a a second front from 41 onwards when he was especially threatened , in 44 he knew he would win and was already exerting his political influence in shaping what would be the post war world.
    By 45 he largely had what he wanted and was content to support other communist regimes in the same way America courted and supported those whom she perceived to be potential Allies against communism.
    Cold war was what it was
    In France, the Germans attacked 3.3 million allied soldiers with 3.3 million soldiers. At Barbarossa the Germans attacked an enemy with numerical equality, 3.3 million Germans vs 3.3 million Russians. At Operation Blue, the Germans attacked in the souther part of the front with 2 million soldiers versus 1.8 million Red Army soldiers. All the cases of successful blitzkrieg involved numerical equality or superiority. At Kursk the Germans had 800,000 soldiers vs 1.4 million soviets, a numerical superiority of 1 to 1.75 to the soviets. Failure was to be expected.


    Numbers were not everything.
    The plan to defeat France came from a professional soldier , Barbarossa did in part but it largely discounted that which highlighted the risks involved and by September was still a long way short of ending - this was Blitzkrieg with no finishing line , no end zone and Barbarossa was not a successful "Blitzkrieg".
    Germany lacked the manpower ,raw materials , industrial base and military resources to attack Russia and had from the word go to slow down or stop actions in one area to provide the resources to attack forcefully in another area.
    The same was true of Blue and of Citadel , the underlying issue always remained Germany was always punching beyond her weight and a smaller yet superior army in terms of training and organisation could never compensate for this as in time that army dissolved - the Germany Army of late 1943 was not the same Army as stood in the field in 1940/ 41.

    In 1941 - the attack on Moscow or towards Moscow halted as everything was turned South , the attack towards Leningrad was largely and infantry attack followed by a siege - a stalemate the Germans able to pin down but never able to take the city although the situation was desperate.
    When the move towards Moscow resumed it did so too late and under resourced with the Army unprepared for what was ahead.
    "All or nothing".
    Blue was much the same they attacked with superior numbers but did so because they threw everything into one pot including any strategic reserve which may have existed.
    Kursk was a similar situation and all had the basic hall mark of Hitler - his leading great Armies , his will being exerted and "going for broke" , all on one turn of the card.
    The principles of Blitzkrieg as per 39/40 had been largely lost as the situation on the battlefield had moved on.
     
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  20. Sloniksp

    Sloniksp Junior Member

    [​IMG]


    You really have no idea what you are talking about, have you?


    Ah... I miss this.
     

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