How close were the Soviets to collapse, if at all

With the launch of Operation Typhoon the Germans caught the Soviets off guard, and destroyed much of the Soviet forces in front of Moscow in October 1941. Indeed the 16th October is referred to as Moscow's "Blackest Day" when panic set in following the sighting of German tank columns 180 kms or so from the Capital. But where the Soviets ever in danger of running out of men given that the Germans were effectively running out of steam?

 

I have read a lot of accounts over the years and a couple of things stand out in my memory that I cannot now corroborate, but perhaps other erudite members will know the answers.

The first was that Stalin actually put out peace feelers.

The second is that Stalin had a special train on standby to evacuate him and the upper echelons from Moscow to a safer place East.

It would not have been the first time if Moscow had been abandoned, as I seem to recollect this happened when Napoleon invaded Russia.

But we all know what happened then and also later to the WW2 German offensive.

Perhaps running out of steam was actually the front being too wide and supply lines too long, plus weather conditions.

As for the Russians running out of men, I think not. They had plenty of spare soldiers waiting to be shipped west if required.

Regards
Tom

 

I have read a lot of accounts over the years and a couple of things stand out in my memory that I cannot now corroborate, but perhaps other erudite members will know the answers.

The first was that Stalin actually put out peace feelers.

The second is that Stalin had a special train on standby to evacuate him and the upper echelons from Moscow to a safer place East.

It would not have been the first time if Moscow had been abandoned, as I seem to recollect this happened when Napoleon invaded Russia.

But we all know what happened then and also later to the WW2 German offensive.

Perhaps running out of steam was actually the front being too wide and supply lines too long, plus weather conditions.

As for the Russians running out of men, I think not. They had plenty of spare soldiers waiting to be shipped west if required.


Yep, agree 99%. As I've read some amount of ex-nazi/german soldiers memoirs, according to them they were fast, they were strong, they were offensive but.. they were spread very wide on the front, our soldier fought VERY hard and of course! they were not ready for -40 C at winter. I think winter was our secret weapon raised by Mother Nature .

 

Which was the closest place to Moscow that the Hun reached before being definitively stopped by the Red Army and General Winter?

I once read it was a small hamlet called Krasnaya Polyana, a mere 35km from the Kremlin.

 

I believe that the forward units could actually see the spires of the Kremlin, but I am sure DB can put the record straight on this.

Regards
Tom

 

They made it as far as the outer most station of the subway as far as I can remember they were only a few miles from the city centre , but it was isolated units only - the main army was some way back about 20 miles.

Hitler rejected out of hand the feelers put out by Stalin , in 1943 peace feelers would again be rejected.

The German view once said "We were stopped by the mud" but Zhukov was held his hand and when it came to the crunch played it very well and at just the right time.

The Geman line was so over extended that reaching Moscow put them out on a limb , a position which given their resources was untenable.
Apart from reaching Moscow Typhoon called for the city to be surrounded and taken - an impossible call as time went on.

 

James,
Well done, always spot on.

Regards
Tom

 

I believe that the forward units could actually see the spires of the Kremlin, but I am sure DB can put the record straight on this.


Yep, I looked over my books and russian web-sites and here is how it was: german forces were managed to take town Krasnaya Polyana (Red Clearing) that is standing 27km from Moscow but further advance to Moscow were stopped by flooding from reservoir storages of Istra, Ivankovo and Moscow's channel - soviet forces opened locks at this reservoirs and raised water flood up to 2,5 meters deep and 50km long from initial point in south direction. This was at late November 1941.

EDIT: germans reached last tram station at Leningrad, not the Moscow.

EDIT2: at the first of December germans tried to advance to Moscow in direction to town Aprelevka that is 25km south-west from Moscow but were stopped and pushed back.

EDIT3: at 3-5th of December soviet forced managed to push germans back from Krasnaya Polyana.

 

DB,
Thanks for clearing that up, I had forgotten about the flooding aspect.

A tactic the Germans used later in the west in an attempt to stop the Allied advances.


Regards
Tom

 

DB,
Thanks for clearing that up, I had forgotten about the flooding aspect.

A tactic the Germans used later in the west in an attempt to stop the Allied advances.


Exactly! )

 

Tom
The first was that Stalin actually put out peace feelers.
Hitler could almost have written his own shopping list - it would have been interesting to see what Stalin's bottomline might have been.

Most German losses were caused by the lack of equipment and the utter unpreparedness for fighting in winter , Hitler having cancelled the requests ( on the grounds of ecomony) before Typhoon was ever launched , yet he still expected the army to advance and the city to fall.

Before Typhoon was launched the Germans were in trouble - spare parts for trucks and tanks just didn't exist - much of the army's strength existed only on paper and whilst the Generals later blamed Hitler - I think they lost sight of what was possible for "one last big effort".

The mud did slow them but when the ground froze they could move again and made good progress but as the temperature kept falling things started to fall apart.
Oils and lubricants failed - fires were lit under tank engines to try and keep them warm , straw placed around engines to ward of frost attracted mice - and the soviet mice feasted on German insulation rubber.
Summer uniforms lined with newspaper , is no way to survive let alone attack and frostbite depleted the ranks even further

Relocation of industry did put the Russians at a disadvantage and for a time they had little to block the advancing Germans with but what they had was enough - they didn't have the Germans problems , and for all the ground that the Germans had taken they got little out of it in real terms.

 

I think I have to clear the topic's theme further and post this map that shows last german offence line at Battle For Moscow (how it called in history of Great Patriotic War):


You can see Krasnaya Polyana as dot at 3rd square from the left (it called here Кр. Поляна).

EDIT: if someone needs a translation of this map - just leave a comment.

 

Thanks dead btch for the map and details of the furtherest advance - the tram station Lenningrad - had thought it was Moscow but I stand corrected .

I have often ponder ed that an internal collapse of the Soviet system would have been the only way for Germany to have takne the city but it was nevber likely to have happened that way.

 

James,

I had just been reading a book purely on the German Halftrack, the SDKFZ 251.

It was particularly vulnerable to the weather conditions.

Even in ideal conditions it required careful maintainance especially with the track needle bearings which required frequent maintainance.

The interleaved wheels on the track system was a nightmare (also true of the tanks) due to mud etc freezing between the inner and outer wheels causing cracking and complete fractures of wheels, which meant changing in less than ideal conditions.

When you have soldiers that are not equipped for winter conditions, the writing was on the wall.

It wasn't just 'General Winter' that was the problem it was lack of understanding by those in charge and not being prepared for the conditions.

Regards
Tom

 

Yep, I looked over my books and russian web-sites and here is how it was: german forces were managed to take town Krasnaya Polyana (Red Clearing) that is standing 27km from Moscow but further advance to Moscow were stopped by flooding from reservoir storages of Istra, Ivankovo and Moscow's channel - soviet forces opened locks at this reservoirs and raised water flood up to 2,5 meters deep and 50km long from initial point in south direction. This was at late November 1941.

I stand informed, DB!

 

I think we need some good thread to discover all aspects of Battle For Moscow or Operation Typhoon as it known to western world.

 

What part did Richard Sorge's intelligence to Stalin on Japanese intentions regarding Russian Asia play in the battle for Moscow? It has been said that once Stalin was made aware by Sorge that the Japanese did not have plans to march into Soviet territory, he was able to switch 250.000 Siberian soldiers to the defence of Moscow.

Again it has been said that Stalin vacillated continually when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow and it was only the collective spirit of the Red Army leadership which motivated him to be determined to hold Moscow.

After the Russians counter attacked,the blitzkrieg failed in front of Moscow.Hitler said to Jodl "Victory cannot be achieved in this war".The Russians, to everyone's surprise,including Stalin's had proved too strong for Hitler.The Red Army did not disintegrate as Hitler had thought and the only way that Germany could lose the war had been enacted when Hitler invaded Russia.

Certainly,Churchill must have thought that Russia might be forced out of the war at this stage and his intentions to seek an alliance with the US were clear.With the US involved, Churchill thought that it would motivate the Russians to be optimistic for the outcome.Hitler, for his part thought that the US would give priority to the Pacific War and he turned out to be wrong.

 

What part did Richard Sorge's intelligence to Stalin on Japanese intentions regarding Russian Asia play in the battle for Moscow? It has been said that once Stalin was made aware by Sorge that the Japanese did not have plans to march into Soviet territory, he was able to switch 250.000 Siberian soldiers to the defence of Moscow.

Again it has been said that Stalin vacillated continually when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow and it was only the collective spirit of the Red Army leadership which motivated him to be determined to hold Moscow.

After the Russians counter attacked,the blitzkrieg failed in front of Moscow.Hitler said to Jodl "Victory cannot be achieved in this war".The Russians, to everyone's surprise,including Stalin's had proved too strong for Hitler.The Red Army did not disintegrate as Hitler had thought and the only way that Germany could lose the war had been enacted when Hitler invaded Russia.

Certainly,Churchill must have thought that Russia might be forced out of the war at this stage and his intentions to seek an alliance with the US were clear.With the US involved, Churchill thought that it would motivate the Russians to be optimistic for the outcome.Hitler, for his part thought that the US would give priority to the Pacific War and he turned out to be wrong.
John Erickson's book "The Road to Stalingrad" talks about the forces stationed on the Border with Manchuria and the forces in Siberia. Sorge had access to the meeting of the Japanese High Command which had taken place that Summer. In it the decision was made to focus on a Southern attack against the Western Colonial powers and the nations in South East Asia. The defeat at Khalkin-Gol takes on a whole new importance in this decision by the Japanese.

Anyway Erickson quotes a figure of 750,000 troops stationed in the East. Whilst this may seem excessive in the light of the Attack in the West two things must be considered:

1. Its an awfully long border to defend
2. Stalin was not aware of Japanese intentions up to October - November 1941.
Wikipaedia states about Richard Sorge: On 14 September 1941, Sorge advised the Red Army that the Japanese were not going to attack the Soviet Union until:

• Moscow was captured
• the size of the Kwantung Army was three times that of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern forces
• a civil war had started in Siberia.

Toward the end of September 1941, Sorge transmitted information that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union in the East.
"This information made possible the transfer of Soviet divisions from the Far East, although the presence of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria necessitated the Soviet Union's keeping a large number of troops on the eastern borders..."

So according to this particular piece of information Stalin supposedly knew about Japan's intentions before the Kiev Pocket was reduced. So why didnt he act upon it? This is only a opinion but Stalin was notoriously para noid and distrusted all but a select few. His refusal to believe warnings about the German attack are well known. And Sorge did not correctly predict the date of the attack.

Certainly up to the 18th of October it seemed that Stalin was not sure of what to do. Following the declaration of Martial law though, it seemed that Stalin seemed to regain his composure. Towards the end of October, beginning of November the decision seemed to be made to bring some of the eastern armies westward. But the Soviets faced a race against time. I would suspect that Stalin threw formations into the line in front of Moscow piecemeal trying to buy time to get the Siberian Divisions Westwards. It proved to be the death knell of the pre-Barbarossa Soviet army.

 

Tom
I had just been reading a book purely on the German Halftrack, the SDKFZ 251.

It was particularly vulnerable to the weather conditions.

Even in ideal conditions it required careful maintainance especially with the track needle bearings which required frequent maintainance.

The interleaved wheels on the track system was a nightmare (also true of the tanks) due to mud etc freezing between the inner and outer wheels causing cracking and complete fractures of wheels, which meant changing in less than ideal conditions.

When you have soldiers that are not equipped for winter conditions, the writing was on the wall.

It wasn't just 'General Winter' that was the problem it was lack of understanding by those in charge and not being prepared for the conditions.

Good point Tom , doing this unecessary work with frozen stiff fingers would have been energy and survival sapping.
The Jerries seemed to over engineer almost everything they made and only managed to learn overcome this through the expereince of seeing the much simpler construction methods of their enemies.
Excellent equipment but dirt , mud , and dust brought them down.

 

To be mentioned: in defense fase of Battle For Moscow soviet command used only available units except 1st Shock army and 20th Army from strategic reserves.

From 5-6th December 1941 soviet forces begun offence operation (as ordered by army HQs), at the begining at this front USSR had about 1 million soldiers.

EDIT: so I might consider this date the first turning point of nazi-german compaign in Russia, the last one was Battle Of Kursk of course.