Who first thought of "Blitzkrieg" and when was the word first used ?

Discussion in '1940' started by Tommygunner1309, Mar 26, 2011.

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  1. Now I know that a lot of you guys on here have enough knowledge of WW2 to write several encyclopedias about it so I wanted to pose a question. Born in 1945, I have a huge interest and as a boy and young man growing up, I always believed that the Germans were the first to think of 'Lightening war' or Blitzkrieg, and then I came across this in a book.

    "After the First World War, two men, Captain Basil Liddell Hart and Major General J.F.C. Fuller, preached that the future lay in massed formations of fast tanks, supported by mobile self-propelled artillery and infantry carried in tracked armoured vehicles. Instead of hammering away at a wide sector of front, as in 1914-18, the armoured formations would exploit a weak spot in the enemy defences and pour through in what Liddell Hart and Fuller called an 'expanding torrent', to attack vital points in the enemy's rear and paralyze him. In 1926, the British Army set up an experimental mechanized force to practise and develop these theories of armoured warfare. But two years later the conservative element within the army disbanded the force."

    The author was Major General Julian Thompson. What do you think? Is this another British 'invention' discarded and picked up with some effect by the Wehrmacht?
     
  2. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Guderian got the idea from the British pre war after they dropped the idea. I think the actual term Blitzkreig comes from the American press that were reporting on what was going on at the time. New York Times rings a bell. I'm sure someone else will be along to fill in the details and correct any areas.
     
  3. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Depends how you define Blitzkrieg. The Germans had equally bold schemes of manouevre in 1914 (and maybe 1877) but without the benefits of the internal combustion engine they didn't work quite as well.

    A lot of the mechanics of Blitzkreig - armour and air in particular - were in place and working in 1918 in the British Army. Before the Armistice, Fuller was drawing up Plan 1919. Those skills lapsed after the war as we had no clear idea what the next war would be. The Germans, on the other hand, did settle on a clear objective and could work towards it...
     
  4. BFBSM

    BFBSM Very Senior Member

    The origins of the term blitzkrieg are obscure. It was never used in the title of a military doctrine or handbook of the German army or air force.[20] It seems rarely to have been used in the German military press before 1939. Recent research conducted at the German military historical institute at Freiburg has found only two military articles from the 1930s in which it is employed. Neither article advocates any radically new military doctrine or approach to war. Both use the term simply to mean a swift strategic knockout. The first, published in 1935, deals primarily with food (and to a lesser extent with raw material) supplies in wartime. The term blitzkrieg is here employed with reference to Germany’s efforts to win a quick victory in the First World War and is not associated with the use of armoured or mechanized forces or with airpower. The argument is that Germany must develop self-sufficiency in food supplies because it might again prove impossible to deal a swift knockout to her enemies and a protracted total war might prove unavoidable. The second article, published in 1938, states that launching a swift strategic knockout has great attractions for Germany but appears to accept that such a knockout will be very difficult to achieve by land attack under modern conditions (especially in view of the existence of systems of fortification like the Maginot Line) unless an exceptionally high degree of surprise is achieved. The author vaguely suggests that a massive strategic air attack might hold out better prospects, but that topic is not explored in any detail


    From Blitzkrieg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
     
  5. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Tommygunner1309,

    The book is 'DUNKIRK Retreat To Victory'... I enjoyed the book!

    The answer is "Yes". Guderian studied the ideas of Liddell Hart and Fuller, and in 1932 published his own work on the use of tanks called 'Achtung - Panzer!'... The rest is, as they say, history!!

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  6. Vitesse

    Vitesse Senior Member

    Playing around with a few news archives, the first use in an English-language publication looks to be the Los Angeles Times on April 6th 1939, followed by the New York Times on April 16th and the Hartford Courant on April 22nd. However, there are no further occurences until July, when the Baltimore Sun, Spokane Spokesman-Review, Youngstown Vindicator, New York Times (again) and the Straits Times (first outside the USA, but see below) used it. There are more usages in August, by which time it had spread to Canada (Ottawa Citizen) and Ireland (Irish Times). By mid-September the Melbourne Age was using it, as were the Glasgow Herald and Illustrated London News.

    The Times didn't actually use Blitzkrieg until May 1940 and even then it was in an a report by "a Dutch correspondent": it would be October 1940 before a Times writer used it!

    Interestingly, the first usage may have been a day or so earlier than the LA Times, in a business briefing by a City of London company called Robert Bensons - see the Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser of April 7th, quoting a Reuters report datelined London the previous day.

    Additionally, almost all the above pre-date the OED's first citation, which is from War Illustrated on October 9th 1939!

    edit: "Robert Bensons" should actually be "Robert Benson & Co", which is the Benson bit of the merchant bank Kleinwort Benson.
     
  7. Alan Allport

    Alan Allport Senior Member

    Hi,

    One of the problems with the question is that it presupposes that something called 'Blitzkrieg' actually existed - that is, that Blitzkrieg was a conscious, coherent doctrine deliberately practiced by the Germans. It's far from clear that this was ever the case. There's been a lot of scholarship devoted to this issue (the wiki page is quite good on this) and there's a strong case to be made that Blitzkrieg has been a concept applied retroactively to decision-making that was in reality far more ad hoc and improvisational than it was subsequently made to seem. Crucially, the Germans themselves did not coin the term and AFAIK never used it to describe what they were doing at the time.

    Best, Alan
     
  8. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    AS I Understand it - the Guaderin lifting of the Hart- Fuller ideas took on after he had read their books on the subject and was entitled "Schwerpunkt und Aufrollen" which meant the attack on a lightly defended point to break through that area with an expanding torrent though the gap- if you note that the RAC cap badge illustrates this idea perfectly and was the basis of the I tank and Cruiser concepts of British Tank manufacture.....
    Cheers
     
  9. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Careful:

    According to legend Liddell Hart saw his theories, similar to or even developed from his own, adopted by Germany and used against the United Kingdom and its allies during World War II with the practice of Blitzkrieg.[6] In recent years historians have uncovered evidence that Liddell Hart distorted and falsified facts to make it appear as if his ideas were adopted.[7] After the war Liddell Hart imposed his own perceptions, after the event, claiming that the mobile tank warfare practiced by the Wehrmacht was a result of his influence.[7] Blitzkrieg itself is not an official doctrine and historians in recent times have come to the conclusion it did not exist as such:It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight - and with some help from Liddell Hart - this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design.[8]

    By "manipulation and contrivance, Liddell Hart distorted the actual circumstances of the Blitzkrieg formation and he obscured its origins. Through his indoctrinated idealization of an ostentatious concept he reinforced the myth of Blitzkrieg. By imposing, retrospectively, his own perceptions of mobile warfare upon the shallow concept of Blitzkrieg, he created a theoretical imbroglio that has taken 40 years to unravel".[9]
    The main evidence of Liddell Hart's deceit and "tendentious" report of history can be found in his letters to the German Generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian, as well as relatives and associates of Erwin Rommel. Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of Blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula".[10] When Guderian wrote his memoirs, the edition published in Germany differed from the one published in the United Kingdom. In the German version no mention is made of the "English" influence. The German version was published before the British copy. An explanation can be found in the correspondence between the two men. In one letter to Guderian, Liddell Hart asked the German General to give him credit for giving the Wehrmacht its tactical-operational method in 1940:You might care to insert a remark that I emphasized the use of armoured forces for long-range operations against the opposing Army's communications, and also the proposed type of armoured division combining Panzer and Panzer-infantry units - and that these points particularly impressed you.[11]

    Guderian did as Liddell Hart requested, "hence the planted paragraph".[12]Quick answer from Wikipedia, but what matters is that these are quotes from sources which are available.

    BLH by this time was an author and a journalist, so asking people to put in a good word for him would be a way to remain visible. Now if this ethical or not, to me it seems like a shameless plug.
     
  10. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    So Za, are you saying that (shortly after WW1) Liddell Hart did not promote the theory that in future wars would not be conducted in static trench warfare and would instead be undertaken in massed formations of fast tanks, supported by mobile self-propelled artillery and infantry carried in tracked armoured vehicles? And in addition are you saying that Manstein and Guderian did not study his theories and that his theories did not influence their - and the German - method of warfare in WWII (whatever one may call it)?

    And what of Fuller?

    Even if Liddell Hart was a self publicist, it doesn't mean he wasn't the original exponent, along with Fuller, of this method of warfare!

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  11. Yes Steve it was indeed Dunkirk - Retreat to Victory. I enjoyed it too, couldn't put it down.
    Thanks guys, brilliant response and given me a lot to think about and research.
    Regards
    Tom
     
  12. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    As said in Alan's post #7 above the question is whether Blitzkrieg was indeed an doctrine concept or not, but since you question me directly on my post #9 I will have some comments to make on the matter.

    What do I have? From Capt. Liddell Hart - as for the use of rank outside the service there is this separate thread - I have Strategy of Indirect Approach, The Other Side of the Hill, Scipio Africanus, Defence of the West, The British Way in Warfare. From Fuller all I have is his Julius Caesar. Also Guderian's Panzer Leaser (2 diff. editions), and von Manstein Lost Victories. So I think I have read at least the basics. I am sorry to say that I have not read the more recent historiography on this subjecty as I have concentrated on a different theatre as my username shows.

    So, Guderian. There is this matter of the the difference between the German and English editions, where this reference to BLH appears. In my quotes above it is argued why. Still I am left curious. If G read BLH, Fuller, Martel, de Gaulle, etc. (and I don't doubt he did) then why are these left out of G.s book? Did they simply neglect to write to Guderian asking him the favour? Indeed, the wording in the book seems so out of place, outside the context of the paragraphs before and after, the resemblance to a later insertion is inescapable.

    Von Manstein's book is foreworded by BLH, at least in the Greenhill Books edition that I have. Fine, if you consider that BLH was a published author and might be an excellent go-between in facilitating the publication in Britain. Why would an exhalted Feldmarschall address a captain unless there were some interest involved?

    Now looking at "Armoured Warfare", Harris and Toase 1989, on pages 27-28, if the Mods will forgive me the extended quotes...

    …The first major treatments of the subject were the works of Sir Basil Liddell Hart. His The Tanks (The Royal Tank Regiment's official history) Volume I, published in 1959. and Memoirs, published in 1965.1 dominated the interpretaXtion of the subject until the 1980s. Liddell Hart, who had served as the military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph from 1925 to 1935 and of The Times from 1935 to 1939 was one of the most prolific writers on military subjects Great Britain has ever produced. He knew, personally, practically all those who shaped the development of British armour between the wars and had privileged access to the War Office for much of the period. He had a great personal influence upon the writing of twentieth-century military history in Britain, and to a lesser extent in North America, until his death in 1970.2 The authority of his interpretation has been challenged by scholars only recently and then only with very great caution.3 But challenges were undoubtedly needed and need to be pressed still more resolutely. Liddell Hart, while enormously knowledgeable about the development of British armour, was not an objective observer of it. Indeed, as well as reporting it for his newspapers he played the game of military politics, having at times a very substantial influence on events. His personal prejudices, and the concern of this very vain man to secure a favourable place in history, resulted in a presentation of the facts that was in some ways misleading.
    The view that Liddell Hart presented to his readers was, to put it simply, that the advances Great Britain made in the evolution of armoured formations and armour doctrine in the 1920s and early 1930s were due to a small group of enthusiasts for the tank that included J. F. C. 'Boney' Fuller, George Lindsay, Charles Broad, Giffard le Quesne 'Q' Martel, Percy 'Patrick' Hobart and, of course, outside the Army, Liddell Hart himself. These radicals constantly had to struggle with a hidebound military officialdom, and particularly with certain notorious reactionaries who resisted reform at every opportunity. Of these, Sir Archibald, A. Montgomery-Massingberd, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), 1933-6, was the most prominent. His successor, Sir Cyril Deverell, is presented as little better. Liddell Hart conveys the impression that hostility to tank enthusiasts and their ideas was the norm with most senior officers and that the career prospects of pro-tank officers were deliberately wrecked or restricted. The British Army's inability to wage armoured warfare effectively against a first-class opponent in 1939-41 is presented as the result of the military authorities' failure to give this gallant band of armour advocates their head. This failure, in turn, is seen as stemming from innate conservatism and the desire to protect established interests. But the British prophets of armoured mobility, amongst whom Liddell Hart presents himself as prominent, while without honour in their own country did find their ideas accepted in Germany. The German adoption of concepts that the British prophets had promoted led. ironically and tragically, to the Anglo-French defeat in the western campaign of May and June 1940.4
    The above paragraph represents, it is hoped, a fair summary of the myth that Liddell Hart established. Like all good myths, it contained elements of the truth and struck resonant chords in some of those who received it. For example, anyone who has dealt with the British Army over a considerable period of time is aware that it is innately conservative on some issues, is concerned to protect established interests within its own ranks and is suspicious of the military intellectual or zealot. Yet the Liddell Hart myth has to be dispelled if we are to achieve real understanding of the subject. Its defects have, however, never been fully exposed even in the most up-to-date scholarship.
    [FONT=&quot]The scholarly works that have contributed most to our knowledge and understanding of the subject since Liddell Hart's are Brian Bond's British Military Policy Between The Two World Wars (1980;, Robert H. Larson's The British Army and 'the Theory of Armoured Warfare 1918-40 (1984) and Harold Wintons To Change An Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine. 1927-1938 (1988). Brian Bond's two chapters covering the mechanization of the Army do not challenge Liddell Hart's interpretation directly or explicitly but they do show that the General Staff was generally less reactionary for most of the inter-war period than Liddell Hart had tended to suggest. Bond emphasizes more strongly than Liddell Hart the crippling financial restraints under which the General Staff laboured and is particularly good at illustrating the severe problems, to which Liddell Hart himself contributed, caused by the Cabinet's refusal until February 1939 to allow the General Staff to prepare the Army to fight on the Continent. [/FONT]


    Not to extend the argument longer, I'd say if wish to defend BLH, fine, but be prepared to face the critics as well.
     
  13. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Found in Google books:

    blitz3.jpg

    Also the former head of the History Dept. at the US Military Academy in uncomfortable with the term. link.

    Despite the wealth of information about Blitzkrieg,
    much of our common knowledge pertaining to the 1940
    campaign and to the concept of a Blitzkrieg is pure myth.
    “[A]s an operational design,” Michael Geyer has said, “it was
    a make-believe spectacle that was put together in hindsight
    for public consumption.”5 Sam Lewis has added, “Contrary
    to popular belief, there was no ‘Blitzkrieg Era’ in the history
    of the German Army.”6
    ...

    they owed much of their success to the infantry, not the tank
    or aircraft, and achieved victory by relying more on
    traditional aspects of tactics, operations, strategy, and
    leadership than on any revolutionary new ones. The
    crushing nature of the victory nonetheless enabled the
    Germans to manufacture and advertise for political and
    military purposes a “make-believe spectacle” that bore little
    resemblance to their actual experience.
    ...

    Moreover, though Guderian
    was a leader in the development of armored warfare, he was
    not alone in an oasis of ignorance and conservatism.14 A
    lively debate occurred in German military literature in the
    1930s over the role of armored and air forces, and the
    General Staff was well aware of the opportunities afforded
    by the tank and airplane
    ...

    Even the notion of General Erich von Manstein’s selling
    to Hitler the idea of a Blitzkrieg across France fades when
    examined carefully, as does the notion of Hitler’s having
    developed almost by himself the strategy and tactics
    enabling the Germans to race across France.16 Though
    Manstein started flooding the headquarters of Chief of the
    General Staff General Franz Halder in late October 1939
    with self-serving suggestions for Marshal Karl von
    Rundstedt’s Army Group A, of which he was Chief of Staff,
    to make the main attack,17 Hitler had asked about the
    possibility of attacking through the Ardennes long before he
    learned of Manstein’s proposal.18 Despite Hitler’s interest,
    an energetic assessment of an offensive through the
    Ardennes did not begin in earnest until the French obtained
    portions of the German plan from a downed German aircraft
    in Belgium on January 10, 1940,19 and preparations for such
    an offensive began only after extensive war games revealed
    the strategic possibilities.20
    In the final analysis, German strategy in May 1940
    emerged after a long and careful assessment and planning
    effort, not from a prophet of armor convincing Hitler at a
    dinner party to seek a breakthrough at Sedan.21
    ...
    etc, etc, etc...
     

    Attached Files:

  14. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Interesting - if not exactly helpful - definition of blitzkreig by Fuller in the 1944 book Warfare Today:

    Strictly speaking, the term "blitz" should be applied only to the assault of a fortified zone, or an area packed with anti-tank obstacles, made in such a way that like a stream of water it wriggles round the obstructions in its path. By this worm-like movement, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the advance assumes the zig-zag form of a flash of lightning.

    :confused:

    So blitzkrieg is a frontal assault by tanks on a probably tank-proof position! There was me thinking it was all to do with the indirect approach.
     
  15. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    From Light Tanks M1-M5

    "If fast tanks can operate in this (aggressive striking) manner ,we will greatly aid in restoring mobility to warfare :in keeping with the doctrine of operating on the flanks and rear and through the gaps .and in forcing the enemy to make detachments to guard his lines of communications and bases ,we would so considerably weaken his main forces in battle that a quicker decision will be reached.

    Lt-Col Adna R.Chaffee (later first Commanding General of the US Armoured Force) writing as executive officer of the Experimental Mechanised Force 1932."
     
  16. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Za, the original questioner asked:

    ...I always believed that the Germans were the first to think of 'Lightening war' or Blitzkrieg, and then I came across this in a book...[that mentioned]two men, Captain Basil Liddell Hart and Major General J.F.C. Fuller, [who] preached that the future lay in massed formations of fast tanks, [etc. etc.]

    ...What do you think? Is this another British 'invention' discarded and picked up with some effect by the Wehrmacht?


    His question was not about, as you say "whether Blitzkrieg was indeed an doctrine concept or not," it was about whether what became known (rightly or wrongly) as Blitzkrieg was an idea of British origin and aped by the Germans.

    You then went on to put information on this thread that seeks to taint Liddell Hart's reputation. Why? The questioner wasn't seeking information about Liddell Hart.

    I tried at Message #10 to get you to answer the original question:

    So Za, are you saying that (shortly after WW1) Liddell Hart did not promote the theory that in future wars would not be conducted in static trench warfare and would instead be undertaken in massed formations of fast tanks, supported by mobile self-propelled artillery and infantry carried in tracked armoured vehicles? And in addition are you saying that Manstein and Guderian did not study his theories and that his theories did not influence their - and the German - method of warfare in WWII (whatever one may call it)?

    And what of Fuller?

    Even if Liddell Hart was a self publicist, it doesn't mean he wasn't the original exponent, along with Fuller, of this method of warfare!

    Best,

    Steve.

    You then put further information on the thread that seeks to taint Liddell Hart's reputation and prove why you are right, but you have still not answered the question.

    I am no apologist for Liddell Hart. I don't really care whether he was an original thinker on the subject, or a 'hack' that made a few dollars out of second hand information. However, there are a few facts that should be brought to the fore.

    Fact 1. Liddell Hart collaborated with Fuller in the 1920's in developing new ideas for the mechanisation of armies.

    Fact 2. Liddell Hart's first book on his theories was published in 1929, Guderian's in 1932.

    Fact 3. In the 1930’s, the Wehrmacht implemented tactics similar in many ways to Fuller's analysis, which became known (rightly or wrongly) as Blitzkrieg. Indeed, in 1939 Fuller was an honoured guest at Adolf Hitler's 50th birthday parade and watched as "for three hours a completely mechanised and motorised army roared past the Führer." Afterwards Hitler asked, "I hope you were pleased with your children?" Fuller replied, "Your Excellency, they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognise them."

    On the basis of these facts, I would say that German armour/mechanised led warfare tactics were based on theories first put forward by the British; otherwise why did Hitler honour - if that's the right word - Fuller.



    ...I'd say if wish to defend BLH, fine, but be prepared to face the critics as well.

    I have not sought to defend Liddell Hart, I have sought to get you to answer the question. Regardless, I don't scare that easy!

    Best,

    Captain Steve.
     
  17. Vitesse

    Vitesse Senior Member

    I found this interesting snippet, which seems to suggest that in early 1939 the Germans were perhaps rather keen to play down the concept of Blitzkrieg:

    [​IMG]

    Source: Straits Times, January 14th 1939
     
  18. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Senior Member

    I don't read German so my copy of Achtung Panzer is suspect, it's likely that BLH, probably while gathering materials for the other side of the hill, did push the Gernan generals to enphasize the influence of his writings, but all I have is secondary sources.

    But I think it's mostly irrelevant to what we are discussing, there is little doubt that Fuller's experimentation did influence Guderian and the creation of the Panzer divisions that made the early German victories possible.

    Reading Guderian's memoirs one gets the impression the Germans didn't go far into operational planning, some really big decisions look very "seat of the pants", and if we consider how important keeping up the tempo of the attack is for mobile forces it's a big flaw, but there is little doubt the Panzer division was designed for independent extended operations, something the tank heavy contemporary allied formations couldn't do for lack of supporting arms.

    IMO the British took a long time to adopt the "attack weakness" theory, in the early desert battles it looks as if they are more attempting to go head to head with the panzers with a naval like "decisive battle" approach.

    BTW don't get me started on De Gaule, AFAIK he was even worse at altering books "after the fact" than BLH but can't prove it until I manage to get my hands on pre war copy of vers l'armee de metier.

    What is really new and interesting is that apparently blitzkrieg was initially used not to describe the technical means but the end result, high intensity wars of short duration, if German expectations of that sort of war turn out to be true it would explain a lot of things. Basically they had no chance of winning an attrition war and WW1 seemed to "teach the lesson" that wars between major powers were going to be attrition affairs.
     
  19. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    I have one problem with the statement, the british did not launch one single approach to combined arms warfare. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Broad and Martel had their own interpretations of how this should be done.

    Of the theorists Liddell Hart was the one who saw the use for infantry in the new formations and the broader view of a new doctrine of fighting.

    Martel, Fuller saw the all tank army as a fleet of drednaughts dominating the battlefield. After the exercises in 1927 Martel saw the use of mechanised infantry in the future. This is clearly seen in his book "In the wake of the tank" (1931) The theorising and trials in the 1920ies put Britain in the front as far as development of a new doctrine is concerned. Brigader Charles Broad advocated all-arms mechanised formations and emphasised army/air force cooperation. In his book "mechanised and Armoured Formations 1920 (Provisional) he also pointed to the crucial role that modern communications would have to play in the control of the fully mechanised formations. (quoted from John Delaney)

    As the 20ies drew to a close the British army had all the pieces of the puzzle bar mission command (Aufdrags taktik) The army cuts hit the Royal Tank Corps and the rest is as we say history.

    I don't read German so my copy of Achtung Panzer is suspect, it's likely that BLH, probably while gathering materials for the other side of the hill, did push the Gernan generals to enphasize the influence of his writings, but all I have is secondary sources.

    But I think it's mostly irrelevant to what we are discussing, there is little doubt that Fuller's experimentation did influence Guderian and the creation of the Panzer divisions that made the early German victories possible.

    Reading Guderian's memoirs one gets the impression the Germans didn't go far into operational planning, some really big decisions look very "seat of the pants", and if we consider how important keeping up the tempo of the attack is for mobile forces it's a big flaw, but there is little doubt the Panzer division was designed for independent extended operations, something the tank heavy contemporary allied formations couldn't do for lack of supporting arms.

    IMO the British took a long time to adopt the "attack weakness" theory, in the early desert battles it looks as if they are more attempting to go head to head with the panzers with a naval like "decisive battle" approach.

    BTW don't get me started on De Gaule, AFAIK he was even worse at altering books "after the fact" than BLH but can't prove it until I manage to get my hands on pre war copy of vers l'armee de metier.

    What is really new and interesting is that apparently blitzkrieg was initially used not to describe the technical means but the end result, high intensity wars of short duration, if German expectations of that sort of war turn out to be true it would explain a lot of things. Basically they had no chance of winning an attrition war and WW1 seemed to "teach the lesson" that wars between major powers were going to be attrition affairs.

    Blitzkrieg is as old as warfare itself. Any selfserving powermonger promise a short bloodless war. I was told that the origin of the term stemmed from Hitler, where he described that if he was to go to war he "would strike like a bolt of lightning" or something to that effect.

    The early german campaigns were nothing more than a repeat of old Prussian methods. Vernichtungsgedanke (destruction thought) and Kesselslacht (cauldron battle) Basically encircling the enemy and destroy them. This is decisive battlethinking, not manouvre warfare thinking. Liddell Hart's expanding torrent and the role of the Sun Tzu's extraordinary force is. Manouvre warfare consider the pshycological factor.

    However the internal combustion engine allowed the germans to make pockets (Cauldrons) of a size which would have been unthinkable in the past.

    My views on the German Army is as follows.

    The methods of fighting was first rate. The germans had a high level of combined arms training in their armoured divisions. The deployment of Luftwaffe Officers to the spearheads ensured an intimate cooperation between Army and Air.

    The command and control of the fighting was first rate too. The Aufdragstaktik ensured decentralised command that sped up the tempo of operations and allowed for exploitation of windows of opportunity. The High ratio of Radios in the armour and motorised formations enabled the commanders to use their initiative.

    The doctrine was poor. On the operational level there were a lot of backwards men in control. The failiure to convert tactical victories into operational victories (let alone strategic victories) cost the germans the war. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the planning for Barbarossa. Both plans for Barbarossa (two and three pronged attack) focused on source of strength rather than critical wounrability.

    The experience of fighting European wars on their borders gave the germans a serious disadvantage with regards to logistics.
     
  20. Vili Garvin

    Vili Garvin Member

    Language
    Blitzkrieg = Lightening War

    Concept of operations
    Mass forces at a certain point, create a breach in the enemy line and pour forces through to exploit the rear etc etc etc.
    Hasn't that concept been around for eons albeit, perhaps, at the tactical level if two armies facing each other across a field or valley rather that at the operational level?
    In effect, the concept pre-dates armoured warfare, despite the obvious attempts to conflate the two.

    The actual word

    The term was invented after the invasion of France in May 1940 by the Nazi propaganda machine to explain retrospectively, in the most favorable light, what had happened more by “Risiko und Wagnis” (risk and venture) and “Miracles on the Meuse” than by any grand design.
     

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