Montgomery

Shouldn't that be Dempsey? Montgomery was commanding three armies at the time.

Whilst Montgomery was a firm believer in morale and the explanation of plans, I'm not sure his 'press releases' were always intended to be taken at face value. Whether they were intended to distract, divert or deceive his superiors as much as his opponents (perhaps sometimes the same people) is another argument.

His communique around the time of Villers-Bocage referring to 7 Armd's and 51 HD 'pincer' around Caen is a case in point. Two divisions 20-odd miles apart enveloping the city? Why would anyone claim that was remotely possible given the prevailing force density?

He's often portrayed as a glory-hunter but his cavalier announcements sometimes look like the work of someone who was largely disinterested in the public record while there was a battle to fight. He was smart enough to know that 'spin' would come back and bite him, so why do it?

 

I am amazed anyone can say that. This is the typical US view of Montgomery.
82nd Airborne Division

The comments show most of those who reply are insane.

 

Maybe if GOODWOOD and COBRA have been launched at the same time the outcome would be different. They were meant to be but Bradley could not get to the start line on time and Monty had to go alone. Not a lot of people know that.

 

My original post was poorly worded, sorry. I wasn't asking about the progress of the battle but about a possible misleading message to Brooke and Eisenhower that led them to believe that the battle for Caen was almost over before it really was. Going though my books looking for the source of that now but was just wondering if anyone in the had any information on the incident.

 

Deleted.

 

[.........

 

No problem, I was too busy waffling while you were clarifying...

 

I do think he was ahead of most of the British army in his approach to training, and especially in his insistence tactically on a 'combined arms' approach to battle - the great failing in 'Battleaxe' - and which went not much further than small mixed columns - 'jock' columns - in Crusader. Gazala was a disaster waiting to happen - he would have sacked most of the senior commanders before it started, I reckon.

 

Senior officers and politicians lie to each other all the time.

Montgomery undoubtedly mislead the air-forces with the stated aims of Op Goodwood. The emergent strategy was that the British and Canadians pulled the Germans to the Caen sector and denuded St Lo Sector. Monty did explain this in April at the St Paul's school briefing. Op Goodwood was timed to be just before Op Cobra - originally scheduled for 20 July.

The strategic air forces were reluctant participants in land operations. I suspect Montgomery needed to promise a breakthrough to get air support at tactical nuclear levels.

Montgomery would not be the first or last general to provide optimistic reports from operations.

 

... the great failing in 'Battleaxe' - and which went not much further than small mixed columns - 'jock' columns ...

Really???

I appreciate that you have kept your words brief and avoided going into detail, but in doing so you have managed to completely misrepresent historical reality.

BATTLEAXE was a miserable failure for many detailed reasons but all flowing from the same start point that the British way of doing things was simply not good enough. The existance of "Jock Columns" had virtually no impact on the outcome. Perhaps zero.



Edited to add.

On rereading your comment, perhaps you were not connecting "jock columns" with "great failing in Battleaxe". Perhaps you were trying to suggest that "jock columns" were the best that they could do in respect of "combined arms approach to battle". But that is equally misrepresentative of historical reality too.

 

Sorry, the punctuation was misleading, the comment on jock columns was meant to refer to 'Crusader' rather than 'Battleaxe'. But the problem in Battleaxe was that the Support Group, with the bulk of 7 Armd Div's artillery, operated quite separately from the armour, and so was unavailable to take out German atk guns when British tanks encountered them. There's a very revealing map in their war diary showing just that. It wasn't until Alamein that armour & artillery really cooperated satisfactorily.

 

I knew it would make more sense when some detail is added.

However, I remain in disagreement with your analysis of the issue surrounding artillery, infantry and tank cooperation. Jock Columns were not the problem. There were a symptom of the problem (poor grasp of how to win contemporary battles) and an expedient attempt to solve another problem (how to dominate huge expanses with limited resources).

To get a bit of flavour of where my thinking lies, study the organization of Savoury's Coast Force at the very same time, BATTLEAXE. If that organization were German it would be called Kampfgruppe Savory, would be lauded as an excellent example of combined-arms organization and much success would be expected from it on the battlefield. And yet......

Failure to deliver combined-arms success on the battlefield was founded in flawed thinking. Jock Columns came from that flawed thinking.

7 Armoured Brigade would not have succeeded at Pt.208 by doing away with the Jock Column concept and having the artillery and infantry in a more traditional organization and closer geographically.

 

I think the significant difference between Savory's mixed arms brigade group and a Kampfgruppe is the doctrine and combined arms training of the Wehrmacht, and the lack of it in the British desert army, which at this time was following Hobart's principle of a mobile armoured force best unhampered by the wheeled vehicles of the other arms. Although for Battleaxe German records do mention artillery fire, it was not effective in suppressing their anti tank guns, and even in June 1942 not every British armoured formation worked closely with the artillery assigned to it - how far the reasons for this were cultural or doctrinal is an interesting question.

 

Hello James,

Again, I fear the brevity of your words does more to misrepresent historical reality than advance knowledge and understanding.

All of the major European Powers understood the need for combined-arms formations, doctrine and tactics. All of the major European Power developed, trained for, and practised, combined-arms doctrine and tactics. There really was not much between them all.

How they delivered combined-arms on the battlefield varied considerably and that was a key - but far from exclusive factor - in determining who prevailed on the battlefield.

The word "Dunkirk" has come to dominate any discussion of the BEF in France 1939-40 to the detriment of knowledge and understanding of campaign. "Dunkirk" does nothing to help us understand how the BEF north of the Somme came to backed up the coast; "Dunkirk" does nothing to help us understand what the BEF was doing in France during June 1940.

In a similar manner, the two words "Jock Column" have come to dominate any discussion of early war British combined-arms effort. Your brief initial post on the matter grouped BATTLEAXE, CRUSADER, combined-arms, and failure altogether with "Jock Column" as the reason. I am sure you think it goes far deeper than that, but the posting only of the old saw does more to mislead than educate.

Another, albeit less common, disrupter to good understanding is the word "Hobart" when discussing armoured forces, doctrine, battles and outcomes.

You wrote:
I think the significant difference between Savory's mixed arms brigade group and a Kampfgruppe is the doctrine and combined arms training of the Wehrmacht, and the lack of it in the British desert army, which at this time was following Hobart's principle of a mobile armoured force best unhampered by the wheeled vehicles of the other arms.

Do you have any evidence that Hobart's thinking had any influence whatsoever on Savory's Coast Force effort in June 1940? I suspect not. Yet you have felt comfortable in making a public statement eliptically suggesting one was a causal factor in the other.

You wrote:
Although for Battleaxe German records do mention artillery fire, it was not effective in suppressing their anti tank guns, and even in June 1942 not every British armoured formation worked closely with the artillery assigned to it - how far the reasons for this were cultural or doctrinal is an interesting question.

In respect of suppressing ATk guns, the question that can be easily answered with a fair degree of accuracy and reliability.

Here are two excerpts from the WO Notes from Theatres of War No.2 pubished March 1942. They are British observations of how the Germans dealt with the issue you mention.




In summary, the Germans approach the ATk line but stand off, encourage the ATk gunners to reveal themselves, then, with FOOs spotting the positions, use directed artillery fire (Field and Close Support tanks) to destroy the ATk guns.

Nothing particularly revolutionary about that. Did the British do it? No. Why?

An excerpt from Middle East Training Pamphlet No.2 Part VI (regrettably undated):



In otherwords, doing it the German way was considered a waste of ammunition and unlikely to be successful.

Pages and pages and pages of contemporary documents discuss the issue of artillery and infantry cooperation with tanks. What is written suggests the British were unwilling or uncomfortable with doing it the way the Germans did, and so never made much effort - from a doctrinal perspective - to really change their ways. They tinkered when a conceptual reset was required. The tinkering suggests they remained convinced their ways were right, but just not working for some reason. Cue scapegoat identifying and blaming.

Circling back to your words:
...the problem in Battleaxe was that the Support Group, with the bulk of 7 Armd Div's artillery, operated quite separately from the armour, and so was unavailable to take out German atk guns when British tanks encountered them. There's a very revealing map in their war diary showing just that.

7 Armd Bde failed, repeatedly failed, to take Pt.208. They had artillery support, but either refused to use it or used it ineffectually.

What leads you to believe having all of the artillery (and infantry) in 7 Spt Gp closer (ie not separated as you suggest was the problem) to 7 Armd Bde would have made a difference to the outcome?

The contemporary reports by the personalities, units and formations involved identified a number of scapegoats and issued blame accordingly. Map makers were blamed, recce troops from BREVITY were blamed. And so on.

Later, others have looked at the battle and wondered how any competent commander would repeatedly launch Cruiser Tanks against a defended location and focus on this being contrary to established doctrine that Cruiser Tanks should not attempt to perform such antics. Blame then gets thrown upon the commanders who, reading between the lines, recognised this too hence their original blame shifting tactic.

Some, and you seem to fall into this category, look at why more artillery was not there to help out and seek conclusions based around Jock Columns not being a good way to deliver combined-arms success. Perhaps the excerpt I posted above helps a bit in the understanding of how the British approached the ATk problem.

However, none of these attempts to understand why 7 Armd Bde failed so spectacularly address the elephant in the room.

At the very same time 7 Armd Bde was getting battered at Pt.208, there was an attempt to take the Halfaya position. Not so?

Whilst, in doctinal terms, 7 Armd Bde was doing it all wrong, Halfaya Gp did it all right. A combined-arms attack on a defended position with Infantry Tanks leading an infantry battalion supported by Field Artillery. And yet they fared no better. Similarly, Coast Force had Infantry Tanks leading two infantry battalions supported by Field and Medium Artillery also directed upon Halfaya and did no better.

Hence the mental gymnastics. If using all the right tools, and using them the way that doctrine procribes, fails at Halfaya, from both directions, on what basis should anyone assume success could be achieved at Pt.208 simply by regrouping 4 RHA in toto alongside and supporting 7 Armd Bde?

The old refrains of "Jock Column" and "Hobart" do not address the questions, they deflect analysis away from the causes.

 

You're not changing my mind yet! I have an interest in the matter, Beresford-Peirse was my uncle, I do recall meeting him when aged 4 or 5, he made an impression. My father was also in N Africa (W Yorks Regt, 5 Ind Div) but never really spoke about it. Anyway, thanks for the discussion - Round Two!

combined-arms doctrine

I don’t think one can assume the British army in 1939 had any doctrine at all. Ironside lamented the lack of it on the outbreak of war, and Wavell, one of the most thoughtful of the senior officers, decried the notion even of ‘principles’ of war, writing that it was all a matter of common sense. They seemed to rely on regimental esprit de corps, the virtues of the amateur and belief in their capacity for improvisation. Montgomery,saw further, but even he, when he used the word ‘doctrine’ in 1942 in a letter home, meant by it no more than his practice of pre-battle training and sound management, rather than a philosophy of war as one finds in ‘Truppenfuhrung’.

Surely method of delivery of combined arms tactics was absolutely key to battlefield success? The intimate and well drilled cooperation of armour, anti-tank guns and artillery was at the heart of the DAK’s tactical strength. Messervy reported on it in detail when he was briefly a prisoner in May 1942.

Re Jock columns – one cannot ignore the fascination they held for British commanders right up to July 1942. Auchinleck’s wrote to his chief of staff in Dec ’41: ‘Jock columns of which more and more are being organised are just what we want. They piquet his movements and give him no rest … They seem to suit our peculiar genius for fighting, and are certainly going at the enemy with the greatest relish and vigour… I think the Hun finds them somewhat unorthodox’. 8th Army’s frontline troops in Jan 1942 were split up into jock cols and defeated in detail, and the army was riddled with jock cols the following summer. By then some joker had defined a Jock column as a brigade group that had been overrun by a panzer division.


Hobart's influence on Savory?

Would be surprised if Savory followed Hobart’s precepts since his force was an infantry brigade supported by infantry tanks, and Hobart was focussed on mobile armour to the exclusion of the other arms. But Hobart’s policy of ‘tank heavy’ formations remained a factor in much of 8th Army’s thinking and training right up to the Gazala battles, when 8th Army’s scattering of its armoured brigades behind the Gazala line is consistent with Hobart’s belief that the mobility of armour permitted dispersal since units could, in theory, concentrate at will. Also the armoured brigades operated quite separately from their divisional Motor Brigades, heirs to Support Groups. 22AB didn’t even operate with its integral arty regt or inf bn, which were duly isolated and destroyed, though its sister bde, 2nd Armoured, learned from the January debacle and its armour & guns were well integrated.


Did the British do it? No. Why?

‘Why?’ is absolutely the question. My view is that the culture and regimental traditions of the British army had a great deal to do with it. Cavalry regiments claimed and were generally given, up to Montgomery’s arrival, a ‘cavalry’, tank v. tank, role rather than the (somewhat riskier) infantry support role that involved taking on well concealed anti-tank guns. And they were quite regularly reluctant to consort with gunners who (unless they were Royal Horse Artillery) were considered not quite top drawer by many of the cavalry regiments, a view that lingered long after 1945. I think by March 1942, as British armour began to appreciate that German armour’s effectiveness owed a great deal to the firepower of accompanying German anti-tank guns, one sees a more determined effort by the British brigades to integrate with their support groups, and by the time of Alamein, according to Roberts commanding 22 AB, even 88s could be routinely disposed of by accompanying artillery.


Blame shifting tactic.

I don’t think there was that much of a blame game, except from Churchill. Defeat was at the time put down to inferior tanks and numbers, neither true of course, but it took a while to discover that 88s had been so decisive. Interestingly, contemporary reports naively interpret German battle drills and co-ordinated manoeuvres as a sign of Teutonic rigidity.


I think basically it was a bad plan. Dorman-Smith had suggested to Beresford-Peirse’s chief of staff Harding that Halfaya should be isolated with a strong anti-tank screen forcing Rommel to counterattack, keeping 7 Armoured Div on the flank in reserve for the moment when the counterattack failed. Sounds good to me, it could have brought the Matildas into play against the Mk IIIs, and the Halfaya garrisons would have been powerless to intervene, but Harding didn’t care for Dorman-Smith, and may not have passed this on.


I notice your book list, with an interest in the Indian Army - do you have a connection there?

 

Hello James,

This could be shaping into a very discussion.

For my own sanity, I'm going to break this down into manageable chunks.

I don't know what you mean by my book list. I don't think I have one. I have an interest in various aspects of military affairs and conflict. If the Indian Army is involved in one of those aspects, then it gets equal treatment to any other party involved.

Not making any attempt to do so.

You have written a series of very brief posts which I believe do more to misinform than help others understand historical reality. I have responded as counter-balance.

Everybody defines "doctrine" in a different way.

If one defines "doctrine" in such a way that it does not exist, then it doesn't exist.

The way I define "doctrine", the British had it in abundance during WW2.

For me, British military "doctrine" is the disseminated wisdom of the brain trust of the British officer corps on how to practise war. Usually, but not exclusively, written down. At the top level, there were the Field Service Regulations (FSR), at lower levels there were Army Training Instructions (ATI), Military Training Pamphlets (MTP) as well as more directed circulas, memos, precis etc etc.

The point of all this was that the army should, in theory, be all singing from the same hymnsheet chosen by the brains trust as the best set of hymns.

One of the keys to success, but not exclusive, nor even necessarily the final determiner of the outcome.

One should not obsess themselves over their fascination with "Jock Columns".

Jock Columns were created to perform a very limited, and in my opinion, single capbadge role. They performed that role admirably and probably did it far better than a force organized around more traditional and doctrinal precepts. And they also did it with minimum resources.

When commanders of the day, and commentators long after the event, try to rerole them into tasks for which they were completely unsuited, then it all goes pearshaped.

The manner in which you use anecdotes, such as Auchinleck's above, hinders understanding rather than helping.

Auchinleck has correctly identified that they are punching far above their weight in what they achieved for the resources employed. When employed on the task(s) they were designed to perform, they generally did just that. Auchinlick's words only become problematic when you lift them out of context and drop them into the combined-arms discussion.

I wrote previously the two words "Jock Column" have come to dominate the combined-arms discussion. It certainly seems to dominate your understanding of the issue.

The word "Dunkirk" should rightly be used in association with the incredible feats and quite unexpected results achieved by the matelots - military and civilian. It is not a word that should dominate the narrative of the British Army. Just what is so special about the performance of hordes of green uniformed men sitting around on beaches, waiting for, queueing for and then boarding a boat? Understanding the performance of the BEF means studying how and why the got themselves backed onto the beach in the first place and what they were doing in June.

Similarly, the discussion about "Jock Columns" is a discussion about dominating large tracts of land with limited resources. It is a footnote in the discussion of combined-arms effort.

A serious discussion on combined-arms cannot be had if the only topic put up for discussion is the performance of a non combined-arms adhoc formation.

 

In Gunners at War Shelford Bidwell praised Beresford Peirse , the former CRA, then commander of 4th Indian Division as a brilliant trainer and commented that "It is a great misfortunate to be too senior at the beginning of a British war."

He wrote "BPs forte was training, His two great achievements were to humanise instruction
and raise the plane of gunner thinking." "Much indeed of what he taught was retained by his audience of pig stickers and polo players.. General Tuker, an infantryman... maintained that the best Gunner commanders were brought up in India... Beresford Peirse made his contribution. His influence was felt long after he left the field." There is a more in that vein.

BP's use of artillery in the attack on the Italian forts with artillery commander by Mirrlees anticipates many of the advances in artillery C2 during the war. The divisional artillery group was fought as a concentrated force through the BRA's HQ in borrowed signals vehicles. It is a case study in Pemberton's classified artillery tactics and equipment.

Bidwell regards the criticism of BP's conduct of Battleaxe as largely justified. Not just for being unduely complex, but for the underlying concepts. The dispersal of artillery was "uncharacteristic of his methods, and there appeared for the first time the doctrine that armour was going to seek out unaided the enemy armour and destroy it as a preliminary to the defeat of his whole force. To make matters worse the support group was to be used as a mobile brigade in its own right, and thus in an armoured division the tanks were deprived of their guns and their infantry, the essential means of defeating their deadly enemy the vulnerable towed anti tank gun"
.
Would Montgomery have done any better?

Before WW2 Montgomery had thought about the encounter battle and wrote a paper - IRRC for the RE Journal. The British Army did not, and maybe still does not, have a doctrine for the encounter battle or meeting engagement. One up to Monty for thinking in advance about this typical problem encountered in mobile war.

In early 1941 Montgomery was commanding the Vth Corps with the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions under command. Between Dec 1940 and May 1941 he carried out a series of corps exercises. At least one of them was in a western desert setting. This used fake maps omitting cultivated terrain features and towns marked as impassable rocks. The aim was to see if an infantry division could achieve by night a task that might be set for an armoured division by day. The exercise called for support from the RAF.

One set of PXR notes concerns offensive operations in mobile war. When the battle is fluid centralised control from supporting arms will not provide successful action. artillery tanks and so on must be placed under command of infantry brigades.... There will come a time when further progress will not be possible. The decentralised resources will need to be gathered in so that a good blow can be delivered at the selected point. Lots about infantry and artillery co-ordination.

My guess is that although your uncle would have been a great man to serve under as a gunner, Monty was better prepared to fight an all arms battle in 1941 - and had the ego to impose his will on those around him.

 

The trouble with that analysis is that it is largely based on falsehoods.

The use of the Support Group as a flank protection force was written into the doctrine extant. Whether the precise manner in which it was deployed was right or wrong can be discussed both in general terms and in terms of whether the commander had got it right or wrong. But any notion that having the Support Group operate in an independent manner on the flanks was a completly flawed idea needs to be adressed at the level of doctrine.

Nevertheless, 7 Armd Bde had under command, and travelling with them, one of the columns. Commander 7 Armd Bde thus had, used and offered arty support to his subordinates. 2RTR used arty support but it was ineffectively delivered off target. 6RTR declined the offer.

What was the doctrine then extant?

The 'new' doctrine for the "Handling of an Armoured Division" was issued in May 1941. The work was done in the UK and it is a matter for speculation the extent to which ME opinion and experience influenced its gestation. It was the doctrine which followed on from the post-BEF reorganization of the armoured division.

In the 'new' organization, the armoured division contained three infantry battalions. One motor battalion in each armoured brigade and a single lorried battalion in the support group.

The doctrine states:
The main task of the motor battalion is to restore mobility to the armoured units when they are engaged by anti-tank defences which cannot be dealt with by armoured action alone. This task involves the quick deployment of an adequate force of dismounted troops equipped with their own mortars, anti-tank weapons, and light automatics, and supported by the fire of armoured units in the vicinity.

In the ME both motor battalions were in the support group and no lorried infantry was provided.

For BATTLEAXE, both motor battalions, in their entirety, were given the role of protecting something else. They had no offensive role whatsoever. Of the 8 companies, 4 were providing protection to artillery batteries in columns, 2 were detailed to protect the forward FSDs, 1 was detailed to protect the B Echelon of 4 Armd Bde and 1 was split between protecting the Forward and Rear HQs of 7 Support Group.

As mentionned, 7 Armd Bde had a column under command. That column contained one of the infantry companies. But that company was tasked to protect the artillery guns of the column, not be used in the main role assigned by doctrine.

The creation of "Jock Columns" had an effect on the delivery of combined-arms operation in the sense that they denuded the armoured division of many of its support assets and its ability to deliver better combined-arms.

But again, the obsession with the "Jock Column" and the role assigned to 7 Support Group masks the elephant(s) in the room. Both combined-arms grouping tasked with taking the Halfaya position also failed. What has their failure got to do with the "Jock Column", the location and role of 7 Support Group and the non-doctrinal organization and tasking of 7 Armd Division as a whole?

And finally, in respect of the "The dispersal of artillery was "uncharacteristic of his methods, .." comment, I suggest it was the pragmatic need to provide artillery across a far greater georgraphical area than the more characteristic non-dispersal method could possibly cover.

 

I’m hoping that when you say, ’this could be shaping into a very discussion’, the word ‘interesting’ or ‘agreeable’ or something similar was intended!



Booklist - sorry, confused your thread with someone else’s.


Doctrine – I do think that doctrine must have a singe fount. If it is simply a collection of individual opinions, it will lead only to confusion – as it did in N Africa for 8th Army, in contrast to the centrally directed doctrine of the German army, Truppenfuhrung of 1928, to which every German officer subscribed. The British ATIs and MTPs and ‘Notes from the Theatre of War’ were all admirably intended, but by their very nature risked being out of date by the time they got to the troops. One of the most valuable, Middle East Training Pamphlet No 10, Lessons from Cyrenaica (Nat Archives WO201/2586), probably authored in part by Dorman-Smith, held all the lessons O’Connor would have passed on had he not been captured, but it seems it was not circulated for months during which time the failings identified (shockingly insecure wireless procedure and insufficient concentration of forces), as well as potential improvements (more delegation to front line commanders) and positives (combining inf & arty with tanks was beneficial), remained lacking in the British army. And there was no reason to suppose that UK produced pamphlets, often based on UK training and with their occasional absurdities, would hold much credibility with hot and dusty junior officers whose priorities were a few days leave in Cairo, and failing that, enough water to bathe in once a week. I was once told by a serving officer that ‘you should never underestimate the reluctance of the British officer to read training pamphlets.’ Auchinleck even wrote to Brooke on the subject, hoping an expensive colour cover to his latest pamphlet would stir interest. A unifying doctrine did not begin to appear in 8th Army until the appointment of Harding as Director of Military Training in the spring of 1942.

Columns – They remained an 8th Army staple for two years, until July 1942, which is why they cannot be ignored. Initially they helped save track mileage on 7AD’s tanks when faced with the Italian advance, but they seem to have gained traction by conforming to aspects of Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s predictions of the shape that mechanised war would take. They set a precedent, after the defeat of the British armour in June 1942, for the ‘brigade battle groups’ which Dorman-Smith and Auchinleck hoped would counter German tanks, and were revived during 1st Alamein. In the words of Maj-Gen Oswald, a future Director of Military Intelligence, they were useful as harassing agents but ‘Unfortunately, as with many other innovations in the British Army, they came to be regarded as the only suitable organisation for desert war long after they had ceased to serve any useful purpose’. So as long as they were there, up to July 1942, one can’t ignore their existence. They certainly weren’t the sole reason for the failure of Battleaxe, which I think is where we started. Other reasons for that failure which you don’t mention are failure to concentrate armour, appalling wireless security, remote leadership by Beresford-Peirse and (in my view) a poor plan.

I don’t think you can credibly dismiss a letter written by a Theatre CinC to his Chief of Staff as an ‘anecdote’.

I’m afraid I don’t quite follow the relevance of Dunkirk in this context. Unless you are alluding to that dreadful film that appeared a few years ago?

Cheers!

 

Good morning Sheldrake – Tks for the info on BP. My father had great respect for him, and admired his enthusiasm and broad interests. I remember him telling me to ‘Stop bellyaching!’ when intimidated by a steep flight of stairs. Brooke suggested him for 8th Army at one point, but Auchinleck decided to stick with Ritchie.

Very much impressed by Bidwell’s books, sober and reflective and insightful. I wonder why he didn’t progress further in the army.