Passively observing a smidge of disagreement elsewhere has got me thinking about this again. Anyone know of any good memoirs by Italian WW2 soldiers who served in the Desert (In English) ?
Someone is trying to get me confused here - but they have failed - Takrouna says the Italians stopped Monty in his last battle in Africa - so which Battle was that ..? Then Fabian Cardenas comes up with the Gazala battle - yikes - that was BEFORE Monty took over in the August '42 - the Gazala Gallop finished up at EL Alamein in the July of 1942 - Churchill fired Auchinlek and Ritchie - wanted Strafer Gott for 8th Army but he was killed so Alexander and Monty took over - 12th August 1942 Monty's FIRST battle was Alum el Halpha - his last was Enfidaville - when he was resting his mainn corps for the Sicily Invasion - BUT - he still won that one - AND designed the final battle from Medjez to Cap Bon by sending Horrocks to take charge along with 7th AD and 4th IndianDiv and 201 Guards to join 1st Army.... Cheers
.... Couple of minor quibbles re Luigi Durand de la Penne (later Amiraglio di Squadra and a hero of mine!)- De la Penne is a good example of the early X-Mas, led by Teseo Tesei that was killed during the abortive raid on Malta and that included lots of exceptional men. My favourite remains Straulino, a great "man of the sea" that went on to win an olympic gold medal for sailing and to terrorize generations of navy cadets as captain of the school ship Amerigo Vespucci (ex: manouvering the 4000t ship backwards to reach the assigned berth in crowded Copenhagen harbour without using the auxilidary engine but just the sails , my brother in law still has nightmares on that one). The "battle" may refer to some tactical reverses suffered by the allies during the last stages of the campaign, some Italian units fought on while the Germans were surrendering "en masse" but it was local episodes. There is a tendency by the British to belittle Italian successes, helped in this by Rommel that blamed all his failures on his allies, the pattern of calling German successes "German" and Italian ones "Axis" is so widspread that I suspect it was a policy. Because of poor leadership and weapons, the Italians performance was often below average, but there were plenty of exceptions. Anyone know of any good memoirs by Italian WW2 soldiers who served in the Desert (In English) ? Can't think of many off the top of my head, possibly some more of Caccia Dominioni's books have been translated, he was with the the 33 guastatori (assault engineers) in the Folgore area at El alamein. Paolo Caccia Dominioni - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This is a very fascinating topic. I would like to underline the desperate fighting will of the Italian expedition corp in Russia, cut off during the long retreat from the Don line, and the last horse-mounted cavalry charge of Isbuscenskij (August 24, 1942). I mean, it's not easy to charge modern infantry with automatic weapons and tanks on your brave horse, like during the Napoleonic era. Furthermore, as many of you know (and kindly helped me in!), I am working on a research concerning Allied POWs escaped on the Western Alps, helped and hidden by the mountain people and partisans. I discovered many acts of bravery from the partisan forces, part of which made by former Army officers and troops. Even if the guerrilla warfare could not be compared to great victories or losses between officially recognised Armies, there have been great moment of sacrifice, bravery and firm resistence against one of the best trained Armies in the world - the German one. Thank you for this interesting topic. I think we were not prepared or willing such a terrible war, and our armed forces simply tried to do the best they could, fighting a modern conflict with post-800 equipment and leadership. The main mistake was to follow an unstable, foolish, arrogant mind as Benito Mussolini; when I read the equipment, valour and training of the Australian, New Zealand and British troops in the desert, I simply can't understand how he dared to declare war on these countries.
I would also discount most tales of "Italians fighting well under German command" by Rommel, he had a big personal agenda there and AFAIK there were no Italian units with German officers in NA. I think he was referring to higher level command (Corps and above), not tactical command (division and below), although cross-attachments certainly happened, in particular of artillery and specialised units. Rommel early on had time for the Italians. E.g. he had the Knights Cross awarded to General de Giorgis, GOC Savona Division, after his surrender at Halfaya on 17 Jan 42. All the best Andreas
I think he was referring to higher level command (Corps and above), not tactical command (division and below), although cross-attachments certainly happened, in particular of artillery and specialised units. ...... Andreas "Corps and above" in the NA context really means Rommel vs Bastico, IIRC there less than a handful of axis "corps" (the DAK had been renamed PAA but was still roughly corps sized and the Italians fielded one mobile (CAM) and one or two foot infantry corps, so we are talking about half a dozen commanders making all the difference? not likely. Many Italian generals were barely competent or worse but that was the top of the iceberg, most of the officer corps was also very poor as the "officer caste" was just too far removed from what moderm warfare required. Cross attachments were common and by El Alamein Rommel had effectively "paired" Italian and German divisions but by then the Italian equipment quality disadvantage had widened to unmanageable, Folgore was so short of effective AT weapons that it considered "normal" attacking tanks by placing AT mines under their tracks.
"Corps and above" in the NA context really means Rommel vs Bastico, IIRC there less than a handful of axis "corps" (the DAK had been renamed PAA but was still roughly corps sized and the Italians fielded one mobile (CAM) and one or two foot infantry corps, so we are talking about half a dozen commanders making all the difference? not likely. D.A.K. remained a formation in its own right after Panzergruppe was formed. Cruewell succeeded Rommel in its command. Furthermore there was KoRueck 583. There were also two (and then three) Italian corps that were at times subordinated to Panzergruppe (or indeed D.A.K.), X.CA, XX.CAM and XXI.CA. Individual divisions or parts thereof were also subordinated to German commands. E.g. Savona at Halfaya, or parts of Trieste in the Tobruk corridor to Gruppe Boettcher (I think). The comment was really about temporary subordination, not permanent insertion of German officers. All the best Andreas
Many Italian generals were barely competent or worse but that was the top of the iceberg, Maybe, but the same applies to many German and allied generals too. On the other hand there were also very competent Italian generals. All the best Andreas
Gallabat in East Africa, 1940. Has that been mentioned here yet? It was William Slim's first fight in independent command, and he did not do very well. The Essex Regiment had an especially bad day, I think.
Maybe, but the same applies to many German and allied generals too. On the other hand there were also very competent Italian generals. All the best Andreas According to the book I was reading this morning, we had 3.000 generals during WWII. The book is L'onore d'Italia, by Alfio Caruso.
... Unfortunately, on November 3, 1942, the Folgore Div. was essentially destroyed as a large unit after yet another panicked Rommel withdrawal (once again achieved thanks to his disregard for logistics, and the strength of the Commonwealth forces). This caused the rout of the Italo-German Army, during which, Italian and German units who could not be autotransported (mostly the Italian divisions) fell prey, in a slow withdrawal march through the desert, to the pursuing Commonwealth units. But before the final days, the Folgore Division was to cover itself in the "against all odds" glory reminiscent of Balaclava, Picket’s Charge, Vittorio Veneto and Omaha Beach: Operation Lightfoot launched on October 24, 1942, was designed to break through the supposed "weak" Italian-held southern sector of the Alamein line where the Bologna, Brescia, Folgore and Pavia Divisions anchored the right flank. The British attack began with a devastating artillery barrage, followed by an all out assault by the 7th Armored and 44th Infantry divisions. However, all that was achieved by the Commonwealth at a high cost of life and equipment was a small lodgment, which was soon to be regained. In the following assaults between October 25 and November 4, 1942 units such as the 50th, 7th, 44th divisions, 1st and 2nd Free French and the Royal Hellenic Brigades, supported by artillery and armor, had not broken nor would they break through the southern sector. The Folgore used all the means at their disposal including the tactic of letting the enemy advance into a "cul-de-sac" and then counterattacking from all sides. They also used their 47mm AT guns from enfilade positions and Molotov cocktails to knock out even Matildas and Grants. In the initial British assault alone the Folgore had managed to destroy over 120 armored vehicles, inflicting over 600 casualties... source: http://members.tripod.com/nembo/nembopage.html This was posted at Message # 6 over seven years ago; and I believe it flawed. Just looking at matters from a Fifty Div - 50th (Northumbrian) Division - perspective, it's inaccurate. The purpose of the attack in the southern sector of the Alamein line was a feint to draw German armour south, so to allow other Commonwealth forces to make the main attack in the north. The plan for the southen sector was for the 44th (Home Counties) Division to force a bridgehead that the 7th Armoured Division would then exploit, moving north rolling up Axis forces. Fifty Div had an attacking task, to take place on an unspecified day later than the 44th Div attack, but only if the 7th Armoured Division had exploited a 44th Div bridgehead. The 44th Div attack failed, so the Fifty Div attack was cancelled. Fifty Div never subsequently had a task that involved trying to break through Axis defences in the southern sector during the main battle. 1) The Greek Brigade - which was attached to Fifty Div, carried out local patrolling and harrassment tasks; 2) 69th Infantry Brigade - attacked the Munassib features of 'The Cape' - 5th Bn East Yorks - and 'The Moor' - 6th Bn Green Howards - on the 25 October, with the limited purpose of relieving pressure on/assisting the 44th Div. Neither attack was wholly successful, however, both battalions remained in the Munassib Depression - neither was ejected; and 3) 151st Infantry Brigade - initially carried out local patrolling and harrasment tasks. It was then taken out of the line on 28 October and moved north to take part in Operation Supercharge on 2 November 1942, along with the 152nd Infantry Brigade of 51st (Highland) Division and the 28th (Maori) Battalion - the latter which put in a local attack to protect the open flank of the 151st Infantry Brigade. It was Operation Supercharge that finally irrevocably breached the Axis defences and started the route of the Axis forces in the Western Desert. It would be interesting to see if the reports attaching to other British/Allied units, other than 44th Div, in this attack are accurate... Best, Steve.
IMO PAA was a "empty shell" organization (it makes no sense to create an army for controlling just one corprs, until Rommel won his fight with Bastico and got operational control of most axis units, IIRC that happened sometime after Gazala, at Gazala I believe CAM was subordinated to Rommel (PAA) but I'm not so sure about the foot infantry. Cooperation at lower level units was difficult due to very few Italians having sufficient German language skill and vice versa so I don't think it was all that common. Looking at "message #6" were there still Matildas around in November 1942? I would expect Shermans to be mentioned rather than Matildas especially as I see no army tank brigades listed amongst the attacking allied units. The story that Folgore was stranded by Rommel who took all the available trasport to save German troops needs looking into, AFAIK Folgore had practically no organic trucks so there was nothing to "steal", Trieste was the only truly motorized division Italy fielded in NA, on paper Trento was motorized but most of it's trucks were reallocated to army supply columns after arrival while the "Autocarrabili Africa" (often called semi-motorized divisions) were really foot units that could be lorry borne. I think the only real difference was in the artillery that had the "truck towable" instead of the "horse drawn" version of the guns and the presence of an Autosezzione (truck group) that barely had enough vehicles to transport the heavy equipment. A "feint" is a bit inconsistent with a plan that involves a breakthrough and exploitation, looks more like the allied plan at El almein was "attack along the whole line" and reinforce success. AFAIK 21st panzer and Ariete, that were the armoured reserve for the southern sector were actually commited north as the southern flank held. I would love to see a list of "very competent" Italian generals ... the only one above divisional level that comes to mind is Messe and possibly a couple of names from AOI (East Africa) though the way the occupation of British Somaliland was managed doesn't show great skill.
...A "feint" is a bit inconsistent with a plan that involves a breakthrough and exploitation, looks more like the allied plan at El almein was "attack along the whole line" and reinforce success. AFAIK 21st panzer and Ariete, that were the armoured reserve for the southern sector were actually commited north as the southern flank held... This is what I consistantly read was the 'plan' in books about El Alamein. Pressure to be applied all along the line, but with a purposeful 'jab' in the south and a knock-out 'punch' in the north. The jab in the south had to be substantial in order to draw the Axis armour south. The 44th Div's attack in the southern sector failed, so the plan was changed. The 9th Australian Infantry Division had forced a salient in the north anyway, this became the focus and was exploited in Op. Supercharge by the 151st and 152nd Infantry Brigades... Best, Steve.
Passively observing a smidge of disagreement elsewhere has got me thinking about this again. Anyone know of any good memoirs by Italian WW2 soldiers who served in the Desert (In English) ? Not exactly a memoir, but a biography written whilst the subject was still alive, but 'Amedeo' by Sebastian Kelly is very readable, someone mentioned his cavalry charge earlier in the thread.
IMO PAA was a "empty shell" organization (it makes no sense to create an army for controlling just one corprs, until Rommel won his fight with Bastico and got operational control of most axis units, IIRC that happened sometime after Gazala, at Gazala I believe CAM was subordinated to Rommel (PAA) but I'm not so sure about the foot infantry. CAM was first subordinated a few days after the start of CRUSADER (I think 23 November), and it (or what was left of it) participated in the battles until the end of the counter-offensive under operational control of Panzergruppe. XXI. C.A. was under Rommel's command before CRUSADER. In any case you are right however, the upgrading to Panzerarmee is a bit inexplicable, although the same happened in Russia at the time, i.e. the Panzergruppen were turned into Panzerarmeen. It was a propaganda exercise with no meaning in the real world other than a promotion (or sacking) to the commander in place. Nevertheless, before CRUSADER Rommel's Panzergruppe Afrika controlled four distinct commands (working from memory): - Deutsches Afrikakorps (15. and 21. Panzerdivision) - XXI. Corpo Armata (Brescia, Bologna, Pavia infantry, Trento motorised infantry, and German Division z.b.V. divisions - the latter to become 90. leichte Afrika Division a few days after CRUSADER started) - Festung Bardia/Halfaya (about 1.5 divisions, elements of Division z.b.V., 15. Panzer, Oasenbattalion 300, and Italian Savona infantry division supported by other Italian elements) - Arko 104 (Boettcher's siege artillery - a divisional command equivalent) Cooperation at lower level units was difficult due to very few Italians having sufficient German language skill and vice versa so I don't think it was all that common. South Tyrol, and apparently Friulia as well. In any case, at divisional and corps level there were German and Italian liaison officers who spoke the lingo. Happy New Year! All the best Andreas
The eastern front panzergruppe were multiple corps organizations, it made sense calling them armies, the DAK was the equivalent of an Eastern front corps (their TOE varied but 2xPanzer and 1xMot division plus some arty and specialist troops was typical), IIRC z.b.V was created by gathering what should have been the second mot infantry regiment (IIRC not yet redesignated panzergreadier) of 15Pz, turning it into a binary unit, (standard pannzers had two inf regs), and adding other assorted units (main one was 361reg made up of ex Foreign Legion troops and the rest were probably those intendended for the second regiment of 21Pz that IIRC never had one), to create a motorized division, so the Crusader era DAK was a rather understrength Panzer corps. Friuli is almost entirely Italian speaking, and Alto Adige/South Tyrol is split between a German (Bolzano/Bozen) and Italian (Trento) area, but that has always been the traditional recrouting area for the mountain troops (alpini), BTW I believe there is no link between a division's name and it's recruiting area, the Italian policy was to use the army to intergrate the population, so Trento was not recruited in Trentino but had recruits from all over Italy, the Alpini were the exception to the rule. I doubt many German speakers were in the units sent to NA, there obviously were some in the higher levels HQs but not enough to make widespread lower level (below division) integration possible.
Well the pre-CRUSADER era Panzergruppe was a 2+ -corps (D.A.K./XXI.C.A./Fortress Bardia), and then from 23 November 41 a 3+ -corps (D.A.K./XX.C.A.M./XXI.C.A./Fortress Bardia), and then from mid-January 42 a 4-corps organisation (D.A.K./X.C.A./XX.C.A.M./XXI.C.A.). Division z.b.V. was assembled out of S.R.155 (3 battalions, and I believe the regiment was independent, and had nothing to do with 15. Panzer, but I maybe wrong), Afrika-Rgt. 361, (two battalions and an Afrika-Art. Abt. with 7.62cm captured Russian guns which were delivered in January 42) and two independent battalions III./I.R.347 and III./I.R.255,, and Panzerjaeger 605. It lacked proper artillery, motorisation, etc. so clearly wasn't much (and didn't perform that well either in CRUSADER). On the language, I fundamentally agree, except that apparently there are still quite a few German speakers in Friulia. I am aware that the Trento division had nothing to do with Trento. All the best Andreas
I know some may guffaw at the title of this post, but take a moment to consider the Japanese army. Many would say that Japan was primarily a sea power, but its army was formidible as well. They defeated many European powers, notably in the Philippines, HK, Malay and Singapore, despite being what some have termed as a "world war one army". Despite having virtually no armor or heavy weapons, the Japanese managed to come up with a winning model. They had no logisitics, depended on foraging and looting instead, they made many of their kills by sword or bayonet instead of bullets, and managed to route Western armies. Could the Italians then have come up with a military model and doctrine that would make them an effective fighting force? The main element they lacked was not arms or numbers but leadership and a strong underlying vision. I thought it may be an interesting thought-experiment to try and come up with one. Let's deal strictly with the resources they had or could produce since it was beyond their means to mass produce tanks or APCs. When one considers the environment though, it is no easy task; as Lawrence of Arabia noted, the desert is an ocean in whcih one dips no oar; with its vast expanses, foot soldiers were useless. Mobility was key. How then could the Italian army be effective in these conditions? Perhaps if they fielded an army of motorcycle riding infantry? (Yamashita used bicycles in Malaya, but i don't think a bicycle would work in the desert!). You can fire from a motorcycle, so the spectre of 5,000 Italians riding toward you firing machine guns is a daunting image! Or.... how about a different concept. Convince Il Duce to give up on holding far-flung desert territory. The new Roman empire could be symbolic. Italy could play to its strengths by making a Mediterrannean empire centered on islands of the Med and a few port cities in Libya. These could be held by an expeditionary force specialized in urban warfare and supplied/reinforced by the Italian navy. These are just two thoughts.... any others? Or are the two models i proposed highly unfeasible? thx and the very best
