DAVIES, Albert Stanley

Discussion in 'Commandos & Royal Marines' started by Mavis Williams, Jul 9, 2019.

  1. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    Hi Everyone, I am rather confused, so any help appreciated. I have :-
    Commonwealth War Graves Commission
    Service Number PLY/X 104395
    Died 02/11/1944
    Aged 23
    No. 47 R.M. Commando. Royal Marines

    Son of Samuel and Annie Davies, of Hawarden, Flintshire.


    I know that No 47 R.M. Commando. Royal Marines was incorporated into 4th Special Service Brigade (Nos. 41, 47 and 48 [Royal Marine] Commandos and have found some information about
    No. 4 Commando at Uncle Beach, Flushing – Walcheren, the Netherlands. Is this the same Unit?

    want to tell the story of Albert Stanley Davies, but of course as an amateur, it is all confusing as they sound as though they are one and the same, but I need to be sure. I would like to know where he died and also how he died, but any help that you can give, would be most appreciated. Kindest regards, Mavis Williams
  2. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    No. 47 (Royal Marine) Commando - Wikipedia
    On 2 November No. 47 passed through No. 48 and took over the advance to the Flushing gap. Meeting slight opposition until they reached the artillery battery W11, and made an unsuccessful attack that evening losing all five of their Troop commanders. Digging in for the night they repulsed a German assault and finally captured the artillery battery and the rest of the island on 3 November.

    1 November 1944: No. 4 Commando in assault on Flushing

    Operation Infatuate - Wikipedia
    Finally No. 47 (Royal Marine) Commando, under Lt-Colonel C.F. Phillips, landed behind 48 Commando and drove on to meet up with 4 Commando near Flushing.
    This shows that 47 Commando, 48 Commando and 4 Commando are seperate units

    No. 48 (RM) Commando pushed on at first light and took Zoutelande, meeting only light opposition. 47 Commando took over the advance but soon came up against a strong fortified position with an anti-tank ditch and Dragon's Teeth. The weather had closed in and no air support was available so they attacked supported only by artillery. They came under heavy mortar fire and suffered several casualties. The other half of the Commando having moved along the dyke were confronted by another 150 mm (5.9 in) battery at Dishoek.[12] Their approach was obstructed by pockets of resistance to the front of the battery which were not cleared until nightfall. The three Troops halted in front of the battery and repulsed a German counterattack just after they had been replenished with much-needed food and ammunition.

    Google searches provided the above
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  3. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    This found from Google search
    DAVIES, Albert Stanley | ͏
    Rank: Marine
    Unit/Base: 47RM Commando
    Regiment/Corps: Royal Marines
    Service: Royal Navy
    Service number: PLY/X 104395
    Died : Thursday, November 2, 1944
    Killed in action or died of wounds
    Age: 20
    Cemetery/Memorial: Bergen op Zoom War Cemetery, The Netherlands
    Roll of Honour: '47RM Cdo. Roll of Honour'
    Operations: Operation Infatuate
    Marine Albert Davies died during operations at Walcheren.
    He died during the period when his Commando were clearing the enemy from a series of gun batteries along the dunes at Westkapelle from Zouteland to west of Groot Valkenisse and Klein Valkenisse. Snipers and enemy mortar fire resulted in many casualties.

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  4. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    Thank you so much TD., especially the last information,I had googled so much and had so many websites that in the end I was confused as to whether 4th Special Service Brigade (Nos. 41, 47 and 48 [Royal Marine] Commandos was the same as No. 4 Commando at Uncle Beach, Flushing – Walcheren, the Netherlands. Are they completely different? Kind regards,Mavis. BTW I have started putting the stories on Hawarden.
  5. Mne AS DAVIES was part of Q Troop. No detail is known about the circumstances or the cause of his death. Here is the account of the events on 2 Nov 44 (from the 47 RM Commando Report, formerly posted on the 47 Royal Marine Commando Association website but not accessible anymore), including Q Troop's actions (I have kept the parts related to the other troops for completeness' sake):


    The next day, 2nd November, our task began in earnest.

    The Advance to Zouteland

    I held an ‘O’ Group at 0700 hrs. and the Dutch Troop, 10 (I.A.) Cdo (really not much more than a section) was ordered to join B Tp, which had been depleted in the landing.

    Immediately after my ‘O’ Group one mortar was carried forward on the seaward side of the dunes to an area forward of 48 Cdo’s mortars and the MMG’s were mounted to fire on W.288, just South of Zouteland.

    During the advance to Zouteland, when carrying 3” mortar ammunition forward along the beach to the mortar in action, a track came off one of the two Weasels and it had to be abandoned. The other Weasel broke down.

    Ammunition then had to be carried forward to the mortar on the beach and to the MMG’s on top of the dune. This ammunition was never used.

    47 Cdo left its bivouac area about 0900 hrs. and moved along the seaward side of the dunes, B Troop along the top of the beach, to a Forward Assembly Area where the units paused for only about 15 minutes before continuing their march along the dunes towards Zouteland.

    When the unit left the bivouac area I went ahead with my ‘O’ Group to 48 Cdo’s H.Q. and controlled the move of the unit by radio. The Troop Commanders were with me.

    When the unit left the Forward Assembly Area the order of march was Q, X, B, Y and A. As they advanced along the seaward side of the dunes, they came under artillery fire and crossed over into the low ground on the landward side of the dunes. During the shelling, Y Tp became somewhat disorganized and Cpl Potterton was wounded (by blast?). They missed Capt. Flowers leadership.

    X Tp had also become a little disorganized by the shelling and Lieut. Brooker, with Nos. 13 and 14 Sections, lost contact with the forward sections. So B Tp passed through X Tp. However, about 400 yards short of Zouteland X Tp had pulled themselves together and went ahead again.

    During this advance to Zouteland the mortars and MMG’s were in position ready to give us covering fire.

    47 Cdo passed through 48 Cdo on the northern outskirts of the village of Zouteland for which there was no fighting and appeared to be undefended.

    Our order of march through Zouteland was still Q and X Troops leading, with A, B and Y Troops in rear. Then we reached the far side we paused for about 55 minutes and removed our small packs which we dumped in some houses.

    The 3” mortars were ordered forward to the northern outskirts of Zouteland but it was a long time before one 3” mortar and about 9 bombs arrived. It was heavy going along the dunes and everything carried on the man. The Mobile Fire Controller had been ordered to report to Q Tp but he did not join them until much later.

    The MMG’s were ordered to follow behind the rear troop; they had no transport and were carrying everything.

    The two mortars and one MMG were carried to the area just beyond the house later occupied by Bde. H.Q.

    I told Capt. O’Connell to remain behind in Zouteland and tell Major Wiltshire (O.C. LVT Sqn.) that his failure to get ammunition forward would result in a serious handicap. A little later, one LVT belonging to the H.W. Tp went forward into Zouteland followed by two other LVT’s.

    No. 20 Section of Y Tp arrived in Zouteland after the remainder of Y Tp had left and this section was turned over to the H.W. Tp. This section, however, rejoined Y Tp before the attack on W.11.

    Air Support

    About 1230, when passing through Zouteland, I was asked if I had any targets for air attack. I replied “Not at present”. At about 1600 hrs. when teeing-up our attack on W.11, I noticed fighter-bombers putting in an attack beyond the objective. About 30 minutes later, having asked for air support as part of the fire plan, I was told that none was available.

    This was the only request made by me for air support on 2nd and 3rd November.

    In Zouteland we had our first glimpse of the inhabitants of Walcheren. Peering through their windows at first, then from doorways and later coming out into the streets, they were clearly delighted to see us. The girls and the women were wearing their national costume with white linen and lace headdresses and the elaborate gold hatpins which are the girls’ dowry on the island.

    The Advance from Zouteland

    The axis of our advance lay along the top of the dunes which, in places, were 200-300 yards wide.

    The unit advanced with Q and X Tps leading, Q on the left on the lower slopes of the dunes on the landward side and astride the road, and X Tp more on the top of the dunes. Both troops moved abreast of each other.

    Behind Q and X Tps came B, Y and A. I moved a little ahead of B Tp.

    Q and X Tps, in the lead, moved by bounds from ridge to ridge, always with two sections on the ground.

    At this time, Y Tp consisted of only 3 sections; the majority of No. 20 Section, who had been late arriving in Zouteland, had been ordered by me to help the H.W. Tp forward. They rejoined Y Tp before the attack on W.11.

    For the advance from Zouteland, one MMG was taken forward along the dunes with the advancing troops, the gun numbers of the other gun being used to carry ammunition.

    One 3” mortar was taken out of the LVT in Zouteland and carried forward about 250 yards down the road. The other mortar, which had been in position on the seaward side of the dunes, had been brought forward and was in action on top of the dunes (abreast W.288 ?) about 300 yards in rear of the C.O.’s Command Post.

    After going less than 400 yards, Q Tp moved up on top of the dunes and the unit thereafter advanced on a one-troop front.

    They reached the dunes abreast the anti-tank obstacle without meeting opposition.

    P.W. were constantly coming in, the first about 400 yards South of Zouteland. They were passed back to X Tp, just behind, without escort. Q Tp had now acquired the services of an English-speaking P.W. who called upon his countrymen to surrender. This they did without more ado until Q Tp reached a position on the dunes west of Klein Valkenisse (0629).

    Lieut. Thompson, who was leading with Nos. 11 and 12 Sections, went down into a hollow to search some bunkers and collect P.W. A sniper shot and killed Sgt. Puddick and wounded Lieut. Thompson. The opposition was quickly overcome and Lieut. Adam took over command of Nos. 11 and 12 Sections. The advance was continued, still with two sections on the ground.

    The enemy were next seen by Lieut. Adam, with the leading sections on the far side of a ridge just beyond the anti-tank ditch on the landward side of the dunes and fire was opened.

    Major Vincent came forward with his support section under the TSM. They fired 2” mortar H.E. without effect. Any exposure over the ridge brought enemy MG and rifle fire.

    Lieut. Adam, with Nos. 11 and 12 Sections, was ordered “right flanking”.

    There were one or two bursts of MG fire and then both Q and X Tps came under heavy mortar fire.

    Major Vincent was wounded. This was reported to the C.O. by radio and Q Tp were ordered to re-organize behind the anti-tank obstacle.

    Casualties had also been inflicted on Nos. 9 and 10 Sections, the rearmost sections.

    Capt. McCormick (X Tp Comdr) having heard the firing had already gone forward to contact Q Tp when he and L/Cpl. Sillett, RAMC, were wounded. L/Cp1. Sillett had been sent forward to assist with Y Tp’s casualties.

    Lieut. Adam went back to Lieut. Armstrong (X Tp - next in support) and asked for stretcher-bearers. He sent Sgt. Webb forward, with about 9 or 10 marines. Sgt. Webb was killed. He was the only casualty in this party but the remainder never re-joined X Tp but stayed at the R.A.P. for the night. They may have been ordered by the M.O. to stay but there is much doubt about this. The stretcher-bearers were without the necessary equipment.

    The Medical Officer arrived and the casualties were pointed out to him by Lieut. Adam.

    Lieut. Armstrong told Lieut. Adam and the Medical Officer that X Tp would remain where they were until all Q Tp’s casualties had been evacuated.

    X Tp occupied a position indicated by the 2 i/c as a firm base. Actually, X Tp were in rear of the command post when the troops crossed the start line.

    Lieut. Adam disposed Nos. 11 and 12 Sections on the ridge ordered, just in front of the Command Post. He then went forward to contact the I.O. and, on return, found that Q Tp. had withdrawn at least 630 yards without orders, including Cp1. Northmore. There was clearly a lack of control and the troop, including the junior NCO’s, had become disorganized.

    I sent Lieut. Adam to collect Q Tp and bring them forward. He found 21 men and, bringing them forward, again, he was told by the 2 i/c to provide left flank protection with one section down on the anti-tank obstacle and one section in front of where the Command Post had been.

    Then the advance was checked by the enemy fire, Capt. Moys (B Tp) ordered two sections under Lieut. Lloyd to clear up the enemy positions on the dunes and in the houses on the road. These sections were down in the bottom by the road during the heavy mortaring.


    N.B. The following account is based on some very rough and incomplete notes made after we returned to Wenduine. It should be appreciated that because most of the troop commanders became casualties and as there was a good deal of intermingling of troops in the growing confusion on the featureless dunes, ending up in darkness, the accounts (and my notes) are at times contradictory. It is extremely difficult to paint a complete picture and I have relied more on my notes than on my memory. As a result the story is far from complete. A complete and accurate account can never be written so great was the confusion.

    When Y Troop was held up, it was apparent that the opposition was not to be lightly brushed aside or outflanked without a properly staged attack, with full fire support.

    I gave out my orders for the attack at about 1550 hrs. at a Command Post that I had established in the area of 061296.

    My plan was to attack on a one-troop front Y Troop to lead closely followed by A Troop. B Troop’s task was to follow A Troop and mop-up. X Troop was in reserve; Q Troop had disintegrated.

    Two intermediate objectives were given, namely:

    (....part of report missing!!!....)

    The second was 100-200 yards beyond the searchlight platform (a feature on the seaward side of the dunes) Bty. W.11 was the final objective.

    A start line was pointed out on the ground and H hour for this attack was fixed for 1700 hrs.

    The delay was necessary because of the time taken to get our requirements through to the supporting batteries.

    As regards the unit’s own support weapons, Capt. O’Connell asked if he could register and was told “no, the doctor is out in front”. He tried unsuccessfully to get a field telephone for communication to the base-plate position from the O.P. but none was available. He was unable to establish communication with the base-plate position because he could not get through on his No. 18 set.

    The MMG was used to engage targets on the landward side of the dunes including the enemy mortar position in Koudekerke.

    Only one 5” mortar was in action the other one was back abreast W.268 just south of Zouteland.

    Just before H-hour for the attack on W.11, the mortars were ordered to engage an enemy mortar position in Koudekerke. At this time, only one mortar was in action forward. It was very flow into action, about 40 minutes, owing to an unsatisfactory base-plate position and poor communications. Difficulty was experienced in identifying the target on the map. The target was out of normal range and could only be engaged using 4 secondaries. Later charge 3 (5 secondaries) was used. Spotting became very difficult in the fast growing dusk.

    Y Troop’s plan was to advance with Nos. 17 and 18 Sections, under Capt. Flower, 1eap-frogging with Nos. 19 and 20 Sections under Lieut. Winter with Lieut. Whenham. The Support Section, under Sgt. Wroe, was ordered to give what support they could with the 2” mortar.

    Y Troop crossed the start line at 1700 hours. They had passed through Q Troop’s casualties when they were held up on a forward slope by fairly heavy enemy artillery fire. One enemy shell landed in a gully among Nos. 19 and 20 Sections, inflicting several casualties. (Mnes. Griffin, Hopper, Wain, McMurtry, Sgt. Breme (?) and Cpl. Unsworth (?)). Lieut. Winter was knocked out but later pulled himself together and came forward.

    From this time onwards, no attempt was made to leap-frog and the troop advanced as one body, moving as quickly as they could to get into dead ground. They were helped to get forward by 2” mortar smoke from the Support Section which was following up.

    Y Tp. captured the first objective without much difficulty, taking a number of P.W. They met more resistance on the second objective and, about 100 yards beyond it, Y Tp. checked and asked A Tp. to carry on.

    During this attack, for which A Tp had removed all their equipment except their waist-belts, A Tp had lost their TSM (TSM plank) and a marine (McGregor) both of whom bad been killed by small arms fire coming from their left front. Y Tp occupied a fire position and A Tp passed through them.

    A Tp continued the advance, until reaching W.11, the final objective, where they were held up by the enemy southeast of the “umbrella” feature. During this advance to W.11 Germans were surrendering the whole time to A Tp who left them to be dealt with by B Tp who were mopping up in rear.

    Then Y Tp came forward and joined A Tp and both troops, or what was left of them, intermingled. From then onwards, there was no separate or proper troop organization within either A or Y Troops. They were as one.

    Y Tp by this time had dwindled to about 18 all ranks (No. 18 Section, under Sgt. Mothersell, had gone down to the left towards the pumping station to deal with some opposition but re-joined later).

    The composite A and Y Tp’s then split into two groups, Captain Dobson with Captain Flower and Lieut. Styles and most of Nos. 1 and 2 Sections of A Tp and some men of Y Tp tried to work their way round to the left and Lieut. Whenham, with Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of A Tp and some men of Y Tp went round to the right flank. There were no orders given for this but it was part of our battle drill.

    Captain Dobson’s party got almost on to the objective when he, together with Captain Flower and Sgt. Ainsworth, were wounded. Lieut. Styles, who rushed the enemy position, was met by a shower of stick grenades and was killed.

    Lieut. Whenham’s party made good progress round to the seaward side of the objective. Some of his men got well behind the first gun casemate and others succeeded in getting about it on the high ground near the “umbrella” feature. An enemy machine gun opened up on the men on the high ground and hand-grenades were thrown at those below. Mne Turner was wounded and later died of wounds. Lieut. Whenham, with his men then tried to work his way round to the left side of the “umbrella” but they were again held up in close hand-to-hand fighting, during which a number of stick grenades were thrown by the enemy.

    Lieut. Winter, who had become detached from the remainder of Y Tp, had now come forward, collecting men who had become scattered, to join in the battle. When trying to get round on the seaward flank he met Lieut. Whenham who said he bad tried to do this but found it impossible. The two then separated, Whenham to try to extricate Captain Dobson’s party and Lieut. Winter to withdraw to a position where he was later joined by Lieut.

    Realizing that A and Y Tps had shot their bolt, Lieut. Whenham’s party covered the withdrawal of the remainder of Captain Dobson’s group and withdrew with the wounded men (including Captain Dobson and Captain Flower) to a position about 50 yards in rear.

    From this position he saw Lieut. Lloyd and Lieut. Winter, with a number of men of B and Y Tps on a ridge to seaward of them.

    Now to trace as best I can the adventures of B Tp.

    Captain Moys, with Nos. 5 and 6 Sections on the left and Lieut. Lloyd, with Nos. 7 and 8 Sections on the right, crossed the start line behind A Tp. The Dutch Section of 10 (IA) Cdo were with Lieut. Lloyd’s party but he saw little of them.

    Captain Moys’ sections came under fire about 400 yards after crossing the start line and Captain Moys was wounded. There was no senior N.C.O. with these sections and they became sticky and made little progress.

    Lieut. Lloyd, on the right, pushed on. With him were TSM England, Sgts. Mansfield and Cumner and about six marines. They came up to where A and Y Tps’ attack had been halted and were joined by a few men from A Tp. Lieut. Lloyd when leading this party round to their left was joined by Lieut. Winter, with a few men from Y Tp, and together they occupied a position on the landward side of the “umbrella” feature. It was here that they were seen by Lieut. Whenham.

    It was then becoming quite dark.

    Lieut. Winter then appears to have taken charge of Lieut. Lloyd’s and Lieut. Whenham’s parties as well as his own, and he gave the order for a withdrawal to a position about 100 yards in rear, It was then completely dark. Lieut. Winter described it as like being in the Sahara Desert at midnight.

    There was some noise to their left flank and thinking they were being out-flanked, they withdrew to the next ridge where they stayed for about one and a half hours.

    Contact was made with the adjutant who was on a position about 400 yards further back and he ordered the remnants of A, B and Y Tps to concentrate with him.

    A defensive position was occupied and was just getting organized when about fifteen of the enemy came up the shoulder of the hill and opened fire. There was a great deal of firing but it was not then certain who was firing. There was also some throwing of hand grenades. It was difficult to tell friend from foe. The Adjutant called out “Cease fire. Is that 47?”. The reply came back in German calling on the Commandos to surrender and the battle went on.

    Later the enemy withdrew and the re-organization was completed.

    The RSM arrived with his ammunition party and with orders for Y Tp to withdraw to the Searchlight Position. The Counter-attack started again about five minutes later. Tracer ammunition was fired which set something alight under the netting outside the pillbox.

    Y Tp withdrew; to the searchlight position and occupied a defensive position.

    As far as these fighting troops wore concerned, the remainder of the night passed without further incident. It was very cold.

    Now for hat happened to the remainder of the unit.

    First X Tp. About 20-30 minutes after A and Y Tps made their joint attack on the final objective, X Tp was ordered forward by the 2 i/c to reinforce Y Tp. When they reached the searchlight position, they were then ordered by the 2 i/c to mop up on the left flank before it got dark. Here they were joined by the I.0. and, when they were shown up against a patch of light sand, two enemy MGs opened up on them, one from half left and one from extreme left. L/Cpl Buchanan was killed.

    Lieut. Armstrong decided to withdraw and move round to the right of the searchlight position where they came under fire from a mall enemy mortar. X Tp extricated themselves by throwing No. 77 hand-grenades and assembled at the searchlight platform where they were re-formed and were taken forward by the Adjutant and I.0. with the intention of joining Y Tp.

    Later they were disposed to the right and rear of “the Adjutant’s Position”.

    Now Q Troop

    Later, after it had grown dark, Lieut. Adam, who by this time had pulled Q Tp survivors together, was ordered by the 2 i/c to concentrate Q Tp in the area of the R.A .P., in order to carry forward stores, food and blankets to the Searchlight Platform. On arrival there, Q Tp was ordered to provide left flank protection.

    I went forward with Captain O’Connell, the HW Troop commander and established a Command Post near the Searchlight Platform, where I met the 2 i/c.

    When it was getting dark, I realized that the attack had failed and I had no reserve left. My chief concern was to re-gain control of the fighting troops and to get a clearer picture of what shape they were in and to find out as fully as I could where the enemy were, and where they were not.

    With this in view, I sent off the Adjutant and the Intelligence Officer.

    It was some time, getting on for 2100 hrs., before I had a reasonable picture and I formed the opinion that the men were so scattered, even within troops, that it required daylight to re-organize the unit properly.

    I warned Captain O’Connell that the mortars would be required to support the attack on W.11 at daylight. About 2100 hrs. he sent a written message back for the mortars to be brought forward to a position 200 yards south of the anti-tank ditch.

    Cpl Ripiner went on ahead in the dark and the remainder, keeping to the road, picked their way through the anti-tank minefield.

    Then Cpl Ripiner was shot and the mortar detachment withdrew to the north side of the anti-tank ditch.

    The 3” mortar in action on the dunes was carried down to join the other one after the attack in the dark.

    The MMG which had been engaging targets on our left flank was carried forward to position in the vicinity of the Searchlight Platform where it remained for the night.

    The LVT’s, under Major Wiltshire, were slowly making their way forward. Our troop reached Zouteland soon after noon but the going was so bad for them that it was dark before the remainder of the squadron joined them there.

    The anti-tank obstacle further south along the road was examined and mines were found. A party of sappers was put on to clearing a path through them.

    Meantime, a P.W. cage had been established and men from 80 Assault Sqn. R.E. provided some of the guards.

    LVT’s also helped to evacuate wounded to the beach.

    At about 0100 hrs 3rd November Brigadier Leicester and Lt. Colonel Moulton arrived at my Tac. H.Q. I described the situation to him (I still did not know clearly where everyone was) and he pressed me to put in a night attack on W.11, adding “You know the situation better than I do and you also know what 47 Cdo can do but I think that, if you leave it until tomorrow, you may regret it bitterly”.

    I declined to follow the course of action he recommended and, in the event, he was proved to be wrong.

    The Brigadier questioned me about a report he had received that we had had 150 casualties. He also said that the Canadian doctor at Zouteland had reported that a large number of men had gone back with whom nothing was wrong.


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  6. Brigades and Commandos are units of different level/size. Commandos were grouped into Brigades, whose composition changed between D Day and Walcheren.

    For D Day 4th Special Service Brigade incorporated:

    No.10 (Inter Allied) (Army) Commando
    No.48 (Royal Marine) Commando
    No.41 (Royal Marine) Commando
    No.46 (Royal Marine) Commando
    No.47 (Royal Marine) Commando

    In October 1944, No.46 (Royal Marine) Commando and No.4 (Army) Commando, the latter from 1st Special Service Brigade, exchanged places and therefore for Walcheren 4th Special Service Brigade consisted in:

    No.10 (Inter Allied) (Army) Commando
    No.48 (Royal Marine) Commando
    No.41 (Royal Marine) Commando
    No.4 (Army) Commando
    No.47 (Royal Marine) Commando

    Last edited: Jul 10, 2019
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  7. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Hmmm - personally I would have preferred a little more detail next time Michel :whistle:

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  8. My apologies TD, I knew it was a bit short on detail, so here is some more. ;)

    This is the casualty list. Unfortunately the table format is squeezed by the forum software, so it's a bit more difficult to read. The letter or group of attached letters after the last name is the Troop (HQ, A, B, Q, X, Y or HW - for Heavy Weapons) , followed by the nature of the wound or cause of death, when known. "SW" means "Shrapnel Wound". "M" is (I suppose) "Mortar":



    Killed in Action Tp.

    2 Nov. Lt. M.G.H. STYLES A Died of Wounds
    Lt. N.A.W. HAYWARD B SW head (Wounded 1 Nov
    (Died 3 Nov

    2 Nov. Capt. M.G.Y. DOBSON A SW Leg & foot
    Capt. J.D. MOYS B SW left arm
    Maj. J.T.E. VINCENT Q SW head, compound fracture of skull
    Lt. A.J. THOMSON Q Bullet Wound, neck
    Capt. P.C. McCORMICK X SW both arms, both legs
    Capt. R.T. FLOWER Y Bullet wounds, chest, left hand, right leg.


    Killed in action Tp.

    3 Nov. Mne J. MUIR HQ A Tk mine

    2 Nov. TSM H.H. PLANK A Bullet
    “ Mne D.F. McGREGOR A

    3 Nov. Mne K.G. PATEY A Bullet

    2 Nov. TSM W.J.C. SPEAR Q Bullet (or M)
    “ Sgt J.E. PUDDICK Q Bullet
    “ Cpl E.J. EVANS Q
    “ L/Cpl W.R.D. FLETCHER Q M
    “ L/Cpl M.H. GRIMSDELL Q M
    “ Mne A.S. DAVIES Q
    “ Mne M. DERRICK Q M
    “ Mne A. DUKE Q M
    “ Mne D. FEE Q M
    “ Mne A. LONGDEN Q M
    “ Mne F. NICHOLL Q M
    “ Mne H. PAYNE Q M
    “ Mne R.A. PETTIT Q M
    “ Sgt R. WEBB X M killed collecting cas from Q Troop
    “ L/Cpl J. BUCHANAN X Bullet

    3 Nov. Mne J. FLANAGAN X Assault

    2 Nov. Sgt R.H.R. BREHME Y Grenade/Shell
    “ Cpl J. UNSWORTH Y Shell
    “ Mne G.McL. WILSON Y Shell during the attack
    “ Cpl C.S. RIPINER HW+ Bullet

    1 Nov. Mne J.E. DAY HW Air Burst

    Died of Wounds

    Mne A. TURNER A Bullet wound head (Wounded 2 Nov.
    (Died 4 Nov.
    Mne A.G.M. THATCHER B Fractured skull (Wounded 1 Nov.
    (Died 2 Nov.
    Mne J. FAWCETT Q Multiple SW (Wounded 2 Nov.
    (Died 5 Nov.
    Missing believed Killed

    1 Nov. Mne R.L. HUBBARD HQ
    “ Sgt R.F. RACKHAM B


    1 Nov. Cpl K.T. TEED HQ
    “ L/Cpl E.G. LAWTON B


    1 Nov. RSM E.A.B. WOOD HQ SW right leg (NOT evacuated
    “ Sgt A.J. LASHLEY HQ Traumatic knee injury
    “ Mne H.A. CHATTERTON HQ SW left arm, right hand (NOT evacuated
    “ Mne J. MUIR HQ Burns right hand and face (NOT evacuated

    2 Nov. Sgt R.H. AINSWORTH A SW left leg (grenade ?)

    3 Nov. Cpl H. LUCKMAN A SW left upper arm
    “ Mne D.E. HOW A Bullet wound left leg

    1 Nov. Sgt D.H.G GARDNER B Burns face & hands
    “ Sgt H. HORSFIELD B SW face
    “ Cpl F.P. KENT B SW right leg
    “ Cpl D.G. MORGAN B Burns face & hands
    “ Cpl A. RUTHERFORD B Burns hand (NOT evacuated
    “ Mne J.G. ARCHBOLD B Burns face, leg, hand
    “ Mne E.L. BATTLEY B Compound fracture leg
    “ Mne H. LEE B Burns face & hand
    “ Mne B.R. SMITH B Burns leg & face

    2 Nov. Sgt R.W.W. ESTHER Q SW right thigh
    “ Sgt J. SHAW Q SW chest
    “ Cpl E. CHARLESWORTH Q SW chest & both legs
    “ Cpl S. GILLETT Q SW right knee
    “ L/Cpl J.H. WOOD Q SW left leg
    “ Mne E.P.N. BROWN Q SW left thigh

    1 Nov. Mne H.A. BENNETT Q SW neck
    “ Mne A. HART Q Multiple SW
    “ Mne J.H. HARVEY Q SW leg
    “ Mne W.B. HILL Q SW left buttock and face

    2 Nov. Mne D. LAMBERT Q SW buttock and thigh
    “ Mne R. LINES Q SW arm and ankle
    “ Mne R.A. SHAKESHEAVE Q Wounded by air-burst (AA shell)
    “ Mne G. THOMAS Q SW legs
    “ Mne J. TRESLOVE Q SW chest
    “ L/Cpl L. BUSHBY RAMC SW left wrist (NOT evacuated
    att. Q
    “ L/Cpl F.A. SILLETT RAMC SW back
    att. X

    1 Nov. TSM F. TYNAN Y SW left shoulder

    2 Nov. Sgt J.C. BARTLETT Y Blast injury, perforated eardrum
    “ Cpl J.H. WAIN Y SW right shoulder
    “ Cpl A.E. POTTERTON Y Blast injury (NOT sent back by RMO although seen by him).
    “ L/Cpl W.R. McMURTRY Y Blast injury – concussion
    “ Mne G. FEATHERSTONE Y do.

    1 Nov. Mne J.E. FOTHERGILL Y SW left upper arm (NOT evacuated

    2 Nov. Mne W.G. GREGORY Y Blast injury – concussion
    “ Mne J.A. GRIFFIN Y SW chest
    “ Mne W.J.H. HOPPER Y Blast injury, perforated eardrum
    “ Mne A. LOWE Y SW right thigh (NOT evacuated

    1 Nov. Mne W.B. LUFFMAN Y SW arm and face

    2 Nov. Mne H. TATTON Y Blast injury, perforated eardrum

    1 Nov. Mne B. WILLIAMS Y SW left leg airburst

    2 Nov. Cpl N.D.K. KIRBY HW SW right leg
    “ Mne K. KITSON HW Blast injury
    “ Mne F.J. WILLIAMS HW Sickness ?

    3 Nov. Sgt G.P. UBELS 10(IA) Cdo SW right arm
    “ Cpl A. BLOEMINK “ SW buttock
    “ Cpl B.S. BOELEMA “ SW chest

    2 Nov. Cpl V.G. KOKHUIS “ SW right thigh

    3 Nov. Cpl H. KRAMER “ SW right leg

    2 Nov. Cpl V.A. VAN DER LINDE “ SW lip (evacuated himself

    3 Nov. Cpl P.A. VISSER “ SW right thigh

    Battle Injuries

    1 Nov. Mne D. NORBURY B Twisted ankle

    2 Nov. Cpl J.A. KLOEZEMANN 10(IA) Cdo Ankle
    “ Cpl W. KMIJFF “ Twisted knee

    Battle Accidents

    8 Nov. Mne H.A. CHATTERTON HQ Bullet wound arm and leg

    6 Nov. Sgt W.G. BUCKINGHAM HW Bullet wound head (NOT evacuated
    “ L/Cpl A.H. CARTER RAMC Bullet wound hand (NOT evacuated
    att. HW

    Last edited: Jul 10, 2019
    dbf, Recce_Mitch, Guy Hudson and 7 others like this.
  9. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    WOW! Thank you MIchel! Apologies for late reply. I am always impressed by this Forum. Kindest regards, Mavis
  10. Buteman

    Buteman 336/102 LAA Regiment (7 Lincolns), RA

    Photos taken in 2010.

    DAVIES, A.S. (Large).JPG

    BOZ - GENERAL VIEW 1 (Large).JPG

    BOZ - PANORAMA (Large).JPG

  11. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Ahhhhh - thats more like it - just missing their shoe sizes now

    Thanks Michel
  12. Not a problem! I think I read somewhere that RM Commandos were grouped by their shoe size (Continental, not British) in order to simplify shoe (and uniform) issue, which became the unit number.
    So 47 RM Commando, i.e. French Size 47, corresponds to UK Size 12 (Commandos were big guys).

    Last edited: Jul 10, 2019
  13. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    The icing on the cake , thank you Michel, very much appreciated. Your very kind. Mavis
  14. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    What follows is quoted from the 47 RM Cdo history, written by its Medical Officer. It covers Q troop action(s) on 2 November 1944, in which Marine A Davies was killed. The MO’s descriptions of events and sights are extremely vivid.

    I have included words in square brackets to aid understanding and also numbers in square brackets (with words underlined) which relate to a further e-mail to be posted about Q troop’s casualties on 2 November 1944.

    Source: From Omaha To The Scheldt - The Story of 47 Royal Marine Commando (Forfar).

    Last edited: Jul 16, 2019
    Recce_Mitch likes this.
  15. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Using the information provided by Michel at post No. 8 and enhancing it with information contained in my post No. 14, I have been able to reconcile all of the wounded, died of wounds and killed, except for one wounded and one killed. However, the former was wounded by an AA air burst and did not feature in the book.

    In the round there is only one of the 12 men killed [numbered 3 and 4] for which I have no explanation. He was either killed in the Carmen mortar incident and so there were 12 killed (not the 11 mentioned in the history), or was killed in a separate and unreported incident. I cannot identify which of the 11 men at [3] this man is.

    On the balance of probability Mne A Davies was killed in the Carmen mortar incident, but it is not certain.

    Wounded - 2 Nov 1944

    [9] Maj. J.T.E. VINCENT Q - Bullet, head + compound fracture of skull
    [2] Lt. A.J. THOMSON Q - Bullet, neck
    [11] Sgt R.W.W. ESTHER Q - Shrapnel wounds, right thigh and back
    [5] Sgt J. SHAW Q - SW chest
    [5] Cpl E. CHARLESWORTH Q - SW chest & both legs
    [5] Cpl S. GILLETT Q - SW right knee
    [5] L/Cpl J.H. WOOD Q - SW left leg
    [5] Mne E.P.N. BROWN Q - SW left thigh
    [5] Mne D. LAMBERT Q - SW buttock and thigh
    [5] Mne R. LINES Q - SW arm and ankle
    [?] Mne R.A. SHAKESHEAVE Q - Wounded by air-burst (AA shell)
    [5] Mne G. THOMAS Q - SW legs
    [5] Mne J. TRESLOVE Q - SW chest

    [6] L/Cpl L. BUSHBY RAMC att. Q troop - Mortar, left wrist (Not evacuated)
    [8] Capt. P.C. McCORMICK X troop - Mortar both arms, both legs
    [7] L/Cpl F.A. SILLETT RAMC SW att. X troop - Mortar, back

    Killed - 2 Nov 1944

    [4] TSM W.J.C. SPEAR Q - Mortar
    [1] Sgt J.E. PUDDICK Q - Bullet
    [3] Cpl E.J. EVANS Q
    [3] L/Cpl W.R.D. FLETCHER Q - M
    [3] L/Cpl M.H. GRIMSDELL Q - M
    [3] Mne A.S. DAVIES Q
    [3] Mne M. DERRICK Q - M
    [3] Mne A. DUKE Q - M
    [3] Mne D. FEE Q - M
    [3] Mne A. LONGDEN Q - M
    [3] Mne F. NICHOLL Q - M
    [3] Mne H. PAYNE Q - M
    [3] Mne R.A. PETTIT Q - M

    [10] Sgt R. WEBB X troop - Bullet, killed collecting casualties from Q troop

    Died of Wounds
    [5] Mne J. FAWCETT Q - Multiple SW (Wounded 2 Nov. Died 5 Nov.)


    Last edited: Jul 16, 2019
  16. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    Again this Forum is wonderful, I cannot express my admiration for the dedication that all the Forum members have in getting to the truth of the question, no matter what is asked. Thank you so much Steve. I really do appreciate all that you have given me on this posting. So much to add to his story. Kindest regards, Mavis
  17. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Can I thank Michel for his input into thread as well as Steve - well done both

  18. Mavis Williams

    Mavis Williams Well-Known Member

    Ditto TD's thanks - Kindest regards, Mavis
  19. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Three copy photographs: From Omaha To The Scheldt - The Story of 47 Royal Marine Commando (Forfar) covering the action described at message No. 14 and the Roll of Honour


    Last edited: Jul 21, 2019
    Tricky Dicky likes this.
  20. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    2nd of 3. This is the worst quality image of this picture I have, but it is the only one that will upload; apologies. It does, however, support Captain John Forfar’s description of the dunes and the issues the troops had carrying mortars and MG’s up and down these soft sand dunes.

    Last edited: Jul 21, 2019
    Tricky Dicky likes this.

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