CALM Discussion of the Eastern Front.

Discussion in 'The Eastern Front' started by von Poop, Apr 17, 2006.

  1. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    Thanks for the welcome, it certainly is a relief being able to talk without being constantly badgered!

    Now, where were we?

    You lead!
     
  2. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    This thread has Finally achieved it's aim.:Hydrogen:
    CALM discussion is now possible, It's possible the thread itself has largely run it's course unless anyone wants to pick up from about 10 posts ago? but now underlines the fact that the East is no longer a taboo subject on ww2talk, :icon_fork:which was a bloody silly position for a ww2 forum to be forced into.o_O

    Onwards and upwards.
    Adam.
     
  3. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    I've moved the rest of this thread to it's own place on the Forum.
    No reason to carry on here.
    It's achieved it's aim.
     
  4. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    I'll go along with that. Though logic and hindsight dictate that the oil-fields could have been absolutely crucial the concept of an attack on Russia wasn't formed by logical thinking. Ideology was surely at the forefront & there was a genuine belief that Lebensraum was not only a necessity but also a right of one 'superior' race over another 'lesser' one. There were plenty of plans drawn up for establishing settlements and farmsteads for the 'Germanic' peoples from across Europe to live in, I always pictured a kind of Australian situation with huge farms covering thousands of acres providing cattle and grain for the Greater Germany, I suspect Adolf and Heinrich did too.
    Were they really so blinded by ideology as to disregard military possibility though? I suppose a large dose of arrogance came into it, Napoleon may have failed but a fair sized cadre of the OKW must have seen themselves as superior to him in every way after sweeping through the rest of europe but it still seems surprising that they don't even seem to have seen the possibility of losing, or the dangers inherent in attacking such a huge area.
    Just to elaborate on the point about plans for the resettlement of Russia, there is an exhibition in Zhukov's HQ in Karlshorst Berlin which deals with the war and part of it is about the plans for when the war ended. I saw models of huge trains designed to run between Berlin and the far reaches of the Reich and they looked huge. There were provisions to carry thousands of people on each train and the exhibition has a scale model of at least one of these behemoths.

    Hitler was a lunatic but was a consistent one when it came to Russia and its satellites. German Armies were greeted with Flowers and bread when they entered the Ukraine but that soon dissipated once the SD squads and the Gauleiter Erich Koch arrived. Talk about a missed opportunity. we have the benefit of hindsight but I doubt if German Intelligence knew that the Ukranians were so anti soviet.
     
  5. Norman Davies postulates that given the german economy and inadequate build-up of supplies along with over optimistic goals and time frame, Hitler had embarked on a campaign that Germany could not win. Gen. Von Bock is supposed o have made this very point prior to the invasion. Was HItler counting on a 1917 style collapse of the Soviet government? Had all the "easy" victories previously along with Russian performance in Finland and Poland caused him to be over-confident? So long as Hitler refused to negotiate while either winning or losing, did that prdetermine the outcome? Was Hitler the deciding factor in Germany's defeat in Russia? Did Stalin and his General's disregard for casualties have the deciding impact?
     
  6. I have read that there was no opposition amongst the German Generals to operation Barbarossa at the onset and while victories were occurring. Except by Von Bock and this was on logistical grounds not "moral". I wonder, do the Russian's blame their horrendous losses in the conflict on their regime (Stalin himself) or just the German's?
    In "Stalin's Folly" Constantine Pleshakov make a convincing argument that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany, but was pre-empted by Hitler. The German's were obviously aware of the build up and location of troops and airfields close to the border, but this is rarely mentioned in Eastern Front histories until recently. Would Hitler have been better off waiting and repelling a Soviet offensive and then doing what the German army did better than anyone else, counter attacking? It bothers me when Hitler or similar dictators (Stalin) are dismissed as insane or madmen. The human race would like to disown such evil as something apart..."the other" it isn't. The difference between the person today taking advantage of his fellow human's gullibility, ignorance or vulnerability for profit and shoving someone into a gas chamber is only a matter of degree. It's the same odorous characteristic, just recruited and carefully developed.
     
  7. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    The difference between the person today taking advantage of his fellow human's gullibility, ignorance or vulnerability for profit and shoving someone into a gas chamber is only a matter of degree. It's the same odorous characteristic, just recruited and carefully developed.
    I don't guess the presence of men with guns makes any difference between then and now as to whether someone has a choice or were compelled on pain of death?
     
  8. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Ok then, ;)
    Do we reckon there were any circumstances or situations that if played out differently would have allowed the German aims in the East to succeed? I know it's generally held now that the Invasion was a straightforward impossibility but many bright lads on the German staff must have thought otherwise. Where exactly did it all go wrong for 'em?

    (Glad to see the General Ostfront thread return, been bugging me that this one remained closed long after the shouting had ended :))
    Cheers,
    Adam

    Absolutely

    VP, I think that if the original German plan had been followed, attack USSR at the beginning of May instead of the end of June it would make a huge difference. But the Eastern front can only be taken in context with the total war, a combined effort by Germany & Japan to strangle the Commonwealth shipping to the Middle East & Asia could have knocked the British out of Africa & Arabia, with corresponding shifts in the power equasion in Russia.
     
  9. Eastern Front fast and easy.
    Hitler and Stalin sign a non-agression pact in 1939 that neither intends to keep, but both derive benefits from. They divide Poland. Stalin begins building up supplies and troops along the front and airfields. Warned of th exact date of Hitler's attack, operation Barbarossa, Stalin ignores the evidence. Hitler attacks and Stalin is displeased. The world's two worst dictators and mass murderers engage in the mother of all battles for the next 4 yrs. Millions of civilans and soldiers die because of their nations respective evil regimes. Countless millions of forgotten innocents die in the Ukraine, Poland and Byelorussa alone. Hitler's arme acheive incredile initial success. His three pronged assault stalls in the north at Leningrad (est. 1 million deaths) before Moscow and finally in the south at Stalingrad. Historians argue forh next 60 years about why the German's failed. Stalin finally musters the Soviet Union's forces for massive counter attacks that eventually succeed in grinding down
    Hitler's armies. Stalin retakes all the lost territories and then some. War ends in 1945 and Uncle Joe Stalin comes out the big winner, absorbing all of eastern europe.
    Britain and USA paint smily faces on the outcome for decades afterward until the fall of the Soviet Union allows today's historians to really debunk the myths. Reccomend you start with "Stalin's Folly" by Constantine Pleshakov a Russian historian who' book is eminently readable. Regards Gen. Mayhem
     
  10. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    In "Stalin's Folly" Constantine Pleshakov make a convincing argument that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany, but was pre-empted by Hitler. The German's were obviously aware of the build up and location of troops and airfields close to the border, but this is rarely mentioned in Eastern Front histories until recently. Would Hitler have been better off waiting and repelling a Soviet offensive and then doing what the German army did better than anyone else, counter attacking?
    This is part of a post I made in another thread but its relevant here I feel although it is more of a counter to Suvorov's arguments:

    The Soviet Dispositions at the border in 1941 were set up with a view towards forward defense, rather like the NATO strategy for the defense of western Europe. Stalin hoped to counter any possible attack as close to the Russian Border as possible in order to minimise the effects of a war on Russian Soil. The idea of defense in Depth was not high on Stalins Agenda. Suvorov states that Stalin was about to Attack Germany and yet his biggest force, the Southwestern Front, which was stationed in Ukraine was deployed moreso with a view to attacking Rumania rather than an attack into Germany. Why concentrate your biggest forces away from your only direct point of attack against your enemy??? Suvorov indeed concedes that an operation against Rumania was on the cards but to be honest it seems unlikely that if the Red Army was about to take on the best army in Europe, it would concentrate its biggest formation against the lowly Rumanians, even if the objective was the Ploesti oilfields.
     
  11. I had read recently that Hitler's "pretext" for attacking Soviet Union was to "knock out" CHurchill's main hope for continued resistance. I think this was somewhat disingenuous (sic). I think it was a sales pitch to his Generals, though from what I've read they didn't need much selling. Wasn't it afterall always a part of his "grand plan" as outlined in "Mein Kamph"? The one British Biographer makes a pretty convincing argument that Hitler was a gambler by nature (apart from being a gangster) and that his character and the dynamics of the Nazi ideology demanded a constant military and political agressiveness. It seemed to me to be pretty good arguments. But then I don't subscribe to the Tolstoyan (sic) view of historical forces.
     
  12. Not going to even attempt to argue with such a well reasoned argument. Worth reading a few times. Especially like the metaphor about the coyote in the cornfield.
    Never been in combat so I can't address the issue of motivation from personal experience. Only quote those who have been through the fire. I imagine there are as many motivations for actions in combat as their are combatants, but I think some of Jimbotosome's points are good. I can't support the idea that Soviet soldiers weren't courageous bcause their government was terrible as that rule would have to apply to Germany as well, since the boche often fought heroically for a horrible regime.
    The thing that never fails to awe me when I read accounts is of men who knowingly sacrifice there lives in a "suicide mission." Different war but I think of the Union soldier's diary found on his body at Cold Harbor.
    "August 6th, Cold Harbor. I am Killed." That's a tough one. Or the soldier who throws himself on a grenade to save his comrades. Jimbotosome is correct, that is a whole different motivation and state of conciousness than going forward because you have a gun to your head from behind. However, that doesn't mean I depreate the courage of Soviet troops either. Not that I think Jimbosome is either. Going into battle with an enemy waiting to kill you in front and a comrade behind waiting to do the same thing also requires a "sang froid" I'm in no position to judge.
     
  13. You may know something about this that I don't. I wasn't aware that the S.S. recruited there concentration camp guard at a point of a gun. At least I've never read that this was the case. I'm speaking here of course about the S.S not inmates who were forced into this position. Phillip K. Dick made this point about his inspiration for the novel "Do androids dream of electronic sheep." He read a quote by an S.S officer stationed in the Warsaw ghetto. "This in't a bad duty at all. But I must rmark that the cries and screams of the dying jews sometimes disrupts my sleep." If I'm looking to fill heaven I'll look amongst the people who dedicate there lives at ground level to alleviating human misery, if i want to run a concentration camp then I'll look for those people who readily take advantage of their fellows in small ways, because that lack of empathy I can subvert into taking advantage of their fellows in big ways.
     
  14. 4th wilts

    4th wilts Discharged

    i reckon the germans could have if not won,but given themselves perhaps time to consolidate ground gained by bouncing the volga at stalingrad,when i believe they could have.they would then be in control of all the resources of the southern ussr,oil and all.yours,4th wilts.
     
  15. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Suvorov states that Stalin was about to Attack Germany and yet his biggest force, the Southwestern Front, which was stationed in Ukraine was deployed moreso with a view to attacking Rumania rather than an attack into Germany. Why concentrate your biggest forces away from your only direct point of attack against your enemy??? Suvorov indeed concedes that an operation against Rumania was on the cards but to be honest it seems unlikely that if the Red Army was about to take on the best army in Europe, it would concentrate its biggest formation against the lowly Rumanians, even if the objective was the Ploesti oilfields.

    GH, I believe the Soviet attack was planned for late '41 or spring of '42, the forces massed SW of Kiev were still not ready to attack in June '41. It would also make sense to organize your forces away from the frontier so the enemy does not suspect an attack
     
  16. GH, I believe the Soviet attack was planned for late '41 or spring of '42, the forces massed SW of Kiev were still not ready to attack in June '41. It would also make sense to organize your forces away from the frontier so the enemy does not suspect an attack
    FB, what you write makes sense, and it tallys with stated documents from USSR, but then why was Stalin building advanced airfields in 40 when the Germans could and did see them on overflights? Stalin expected to go to war with Hitler in 42, but Pleshakov is saying that Stalin was preparing to attack much earlier. Do you think that this was just a case of not being prepared for all contigencies or that it was taking longer than expected to develop the front. There were Soviet Generals who later wrote about this, making your point that regardless of an offensive or defensive posture building up forces on the frontier was a mistake. Not just from the point of secrecy, but allowing your forces a buffer zone in case of invasion to allow for maneuver and assessing the major points of attack.
     
  17. I don't guess the presence of men with guns makes any difference between then and now as to whether someone has a choice or were compelled on pain of death?
    Please see reply above as I agree men with guns do make a difference, but I wasn't speaking of the unwilling participants.
     
  18. Hey,
    No one has brought up "Citadel" , although "kursk" was brought up. I know that Kursk was the objective but wasn't there more to Citadel then kursk? Sorry about spelling
     
  19. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    FB, what you write makes sense, and it tallys with stated documents from USSR, but then why was Stalin building advanced airfields in 40 when the Germans could and did see them on overflights? Stalin expected to go to war with Hitler in 42, but Pleshakov is saying that Stalin was preparing to attack much earlier. Do you think that this was just a case of not being prepared for all contigencies or that it was taking longer than expected to develop the front. There were Soviet Generals who later wrote about this, making your point that regardless of an offensive or defensive posture building up forces on the frontier was a mistake. Not just from the point of secrecy, but allowing your forces a buffer zone in case of invasion to allow for maneuver and assessing the major points of attack.

    Also remember that AT THE TIME, it seemed like a huge powerful force {to Stalin} it was only later that everyone realized that these huge Russian armies with 1,000's of tanks were not that powerful after all, and the Germans cut them to bits
     
  20. 4th wilts

    4th wilts Discharged

    yes,gm,i believe citadel was an op which would destroy the soviets in the kursk salient,and then continue north to take moscow from behind.yours,lee.
     

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