The Red Army and its rise from the Ashes

If I may,, I'd like to post something by M.Kenny, one of our members who made a post that may be relevant to this discussion: Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History - View Single Post - Prokhorovka: The Deciding Battle of Kursk

The whole thread is contained here: Prokhorovka: The Deciding Battle of Kursk - Page 10 - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History

DISCLAIMER: The post contains many posts and opinions. I am not endorsing this thread or the opinions contained within but I did think his post was relevant.

Golly! Cross-pollination at it's best

Thank goodness I can only manage one forum at a time, more than that is bad for my blood pressure

 

Eh, talk to some of the German Veterans from Army Group Centre in 1944. Based on their performance your opinion is refuted.

Well, in 1941 the USSR had numerical parity with the Germans (slight numerical inferiority if you count the allies that Germany had). By mid 1944 the Soviet had nearly 3 to 1 numerical superiority. I think that this factor more than any other determined the difference in outcome of 1941 and 1944.

And note that in 1941 the USSR truly lost a great deal of territory, however their army was losing men at expected and planned schedules, the problem was the lost lands, that contained 70 million people and half of the heavy industry of the USSR. But the red army defeats in 1941 weren't completely unexpected and losing millions of men every quarter of an year wasn't anything unexpected to the soviet military planners. Their military doctrined established that.

 

Putting quarterly red army losses together, we get the overall picture:

German/Soviet Combat Losses by quarter

1941 3q: 551,189 / 2,744,765 ratio: 4.979
1941 4q: 279,861 / 1,563,329 ratio: 5.586
1942 1q: 280,238 / 1,791,441 ratio: 6.395
1942 2q: 220,291 / 1,478,441 ratio: 6.711
1942 3q: 383,750 / 2,418,801 ratio: 6.303
1942 4q: 177,050 / 1,391,831 ratio: 7.863
1943 1q: 498,795 / 2,077,543 ratio: 4.165
1943 2q: 110,139 / 596,868 ratio: 5.419
1943 3q: 533,025 / 2,747,957 ratio: 5.155
1943 4q: 381,725 / 2,061,251 ratio: 5.399
1944 1q: 423,715 / 2,035,823 ratio: 4.805
1944 2q: 352,831 / 1,208,573 ratio: 3.425
1944 3q: 879,127 / 1,972,397 ratio: 2.244
1944 4q: 297,782 / 1,286,411 ratio: 4.319

German losses include KIA+MIA+WIA of the Heer, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe ground forces. Soviet losses are Red Army losses.

This shows the decline of the fighting power of the German army from 1942 to 1944. Note too the decline in quality of the red army between 1941 and 1942, as they had to mobilize hundreds of poorly trained divisions to stop the onslaught. Then, the quality of their troops increased, while German quality declined.

Note the turning point at Stalingrad, at 1943 1q. In the last quarter of 1942, the decisive period of WW2, the Red Army was losing men like flies to turn the tide. After encircling the 6th army, they managed to soundly defeat the wehrmacht for the first time.

The best quarter for the Red Army was the 3q of 1944. Sure, with Bagration, they ate the wehrmacht that quarter, capturing hundreds of thousands of German soldiers.

However, note that in the last quarter of 1944, the ratio was 4.32, while in the 3q of 1941 the ratio was 4.98, not much better.

Sources:

German losses - A post by ljdaw on one of the 20 foruns that he is active on, he claims that his source is Qvist, one PHD history student that is/was working on a thesis about the eastern front.

Soviet losses - Krivoshev.

 

Putting quarterly red army losses together, we get the overall picture:

German/Soviet Combat Losses by quarter

1941 3q: 551,189 / 2,744,765 ratio: 4.979
1941 4q: 279,861 / 1,563,329 ratio: 5.586
1942 1q: 280,238 / 1,791,441 ratio: 6.395
1942 2q: 220,291 / 1,478,441 ratio: 6.711
1942 3q: 383,750 / 2,418,801 ratio: 6.303
1942 4q: 177,050 / 1,391,831 ratio: 7.863
1943 1q: 498,795 / 2,077,543 ratio: 4.165
1943 2q: 110,139 / 596,868 ratio: 5.419
1943 3q: 533,025 / 2,747,957 ratio: 5.155
1943 4q: 381,725 / 2,061,251 ratio: 5.399
1944 1q: 423,715 / 2,035,823 ratio: 4.805
1944 2q: 352,831 / 1,208,573 ratio: 3.425
1944 3q: 879,127 / 1,972,397 ratio: 2.244
1944 4q: 297,782 / 1,286,411 ratio: 4.319

German losses include KIA+MIA+WIA of the Heer, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe ground forces. Soviet losses are Red Army losses.

This shows the decline of the fighting power of the German army from 1942 to 1944. Note too the decline in quality of the red army between 1941 and 1942, as they had to mobilize hundreds of poorly trained divisions to stop the onslaught. Then, the quality of their troops increased, while German quality declined.

Note the turning point at Stalingrad, at 1943 1q. In the last quarter of 1942, the decisive period of WW2, the Red Army was losing men like flies to turn the tide. After encircling the 6th army, they managed to soundly defeat the wehrmacht for the first time.

The best quarter for the Red Army was the 3q of 1944. Sure, with Bagration, they ate the wehrmacht that quarter, capturing hundreds of thousands of German soldiers.

However, note that in the last quarter of 1944, the ratio was 4.32, while in the 3q of 1941 the ratio was 4.98, not much better.

Sources:

German losses - A post by ljdaw on one of the 20 foruns that he is active on, he claims that his source is Qvist, one PHD history student that is/was working on a thesis about the eastern front.

Soviet losses - Krivoshev.
I did not know that there were 20 forums for WW II
I think I have given the source on Axis History Forum ,where Qvist is considered as a specialist on the war in the east .
For those who would be interested ,on AHF,Qvist has given on topic:"Operation Barbarossa revisited" an analysis of the German strength reporting procedures
a)Verpflegunsstaerke(ration strength)
b)Gefaechtstarke (combat strength )
c)Iststaerke (personnell strength )

 

This kind of raw figures all mixed up may be very interesting but it doesn't tell me much. Raw figures are just that: raw. Intensity was not homogenous along the entire front, there were quiet sectors here, earth-shaking offensives there, and next month it could be the reverse. The Leningrad siege lasted three years, NAG was mostly a relatively quiet sector until the Soviets decided to break break the siege in 44. Another example: in the same timeframe, 2nd Q '42, Op. Mars was a disaster for the Soviets while Op. Uranus was the major success it was shattering 4 Armies in total or in parts.

This division by quarter is already a step in the right direction, but better yet it should be divided by sector (say Army Group), and excellently by operation.

In other words this is like the recipe of a cake. So many eggs, so much milk, flour, etc. But if I'm not told how to mix and bake it, I still don't have any cake at all to eat.

 

And note that in 1941 the USSR truly lost a great deal of territory, however their army was losing men at expected and planned schedules, the problem was the lost lands, that contained 70 million people and half of the heavy industry of the USSR. But the red army defeats in 1941 weren't completely unexpected and losing millions of men every quarter of an year wasn't anything unexpected to the soviet military planners. Their military doctrined established that.
Guaporense, I dont agree with you. I've been reading "War without Garlands" and "The Road to Stalingrad", both devote numerous pages to Soviet pre-war thinking and at no time is it ever mentioned in either of these volumes that the losses incurred at "expected schedules". To be honest, the Kremlin was not even sure that the Soviet Soldier would fight.

The Soviets were committed to meeting attacking troops at the borders and planned their deployments accordingly. Although they had good information about the Wehrmacht's performance in France and the Low countries, they certainly werent expecting the losses that they encountered in Summer 1941. If they had done then the question of throwing formations piecemeal into the path of the German Advance would never have arisen. The Soviets were surprised by the ferocity and the scale of the attack. They didnt help themselves by refusing to allow aircraft to disperse pre-June 22 in which case the Soviet Air Force might have been more of a factor.

 

This kind of raw figures all mixed up may be very interesting but it doesn't tell me much. Raw figures are just that: raw. Intensity was not homogenous along the entire front, there were quiet sectors here, earth-shaking offensives there, and next month it could be the reverse. The Leningrad siege lasted three years, NAG was mostly a relatively quiet sector until the Soviets decided to break break the siege in 44. Another example: in the same timeframe, 2nd Q '42, Op. Mars was a disaster for the Soviets while Op. Uranus was the major success it was shattering 4 Armies in total or in parts.

This division by quarter is already a step in the right direction, but better yet it should be divided by sector (say Army Group), and excellently by operation.

In other words this is like the recipe of a cake. So many eggs, so much milk, flour, etc. But if I'm not told how to mix and bake it, I still don't have any cake at all to eat.
from the same Qvist on AHF (Hitler's Decisions ) :some excerpts from a post of yesterday (Iam mentally and phisically to tired to tupe the whole post ):
AGC had suffered 150000 cl till end august,most of them in the infantry,who numbered less than 6000 men per division .The ncl more than offset the limited replacements .
The october losses for AGC were some 70000.
The losses for an offensive in september would be ceertainly higher .
AGC recieved some 100000 replacements in september,but that would be impossible with Tuphoon in september.
With Typhoon in september,you would have AGC with 55 -60 divisions and more than 200000 unreplaced losses and with only 50% combat power (60 divisions with 6000 man infantry minus 200000 )
The cl for november of AGC were 45000,that means a manpower deficit of 250000,=more than 4000 per division ,that is the equivalent of 3/4 of the infantry strength per division .

Combat losses per operation are available (only for the Red Army ):see Krivosheev

 

from the same Qvist on AHF (Hitler's Decisions ) :some excerpts from a post of yesterday (Iam mentally and phisically to tired to tupe the whole post ):
AGC had suffered 150000 cl till end august,most of them in the infantry,who numbered less than 6000 men per division .The ncl more than offset the limited replacements .
The october losses for AGC were some 70000.
The losses for an offensive in september would be ceertainly higher .
AGC recieved some 100000 replacements in september,but that would be impossible with Tuphoon in september.
With Typhoon in september,you would have AGC with 55 -60 divisions and more than 200000 unreplaced losses and with only 50% combat power (60 divisions with 6000 man infantry minus 200000 )
The cl for november of AGC were 45000,that means a manpower deficit of 250000,=more than 4000 per division ,that is the equivalent of 3/4 of the infantry strength per division .

Combat losses per operation are available (only for the Red Army ):see Krivosheev
LJ, the raw data is fine but what conclusions are you drawing from this? What are the figures meant to tell us?

 

Well,the post of Qvist was a reply to Westerhagen's claim that Typhoon was possible in september but that it was delayed by the fault of Hitler .
To quote Qvist:A succesful operation against Moscow would involve several stages:
1)A succesful annihilation battle against the Soviet forces facing AGC at the bginning of September
2)An advance to Moscow
3)A successful envelopment of the city by PG 3 and 2 from the North and South respectively(an approach on which Hitler was absolutely insistent )
4)The reduction of the Moscow pocket and succesful defense against Soviet countermeasures .
The figures I have quoted,are prooving that none of these stages would be possible,because AGC was to weak in september :the manpower losses were not yet replaced ,idem for the material situation
What about the Red Army(mostly forgotten):it was stronger in september than in october.
My personal point of view :I am convinced that it was already to late in september . The whole point of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army in the west and before september,than it would be possibly for the Germans to advance to the A-A line,without bitter fighting .But in september,the Red Army was there again,unbroken and the Germans were weakened and with long supply lines;they had to do it over again (on a lesser scale) in ...october(september beying impossible) and they did it over again and ...failed again ,before the winter and before the Russian counteroffensive ,their offensive power was exhausted,but...not their defensive power:they held out against the Russians in the winter,the Russian counteroffensive was a failure (some heresy from me ) because the Russian offensive power was to weak .
In a nutshell,these are my conclusions .

 

...the Russian counteroffensive was a failure (some heresy from me )

Partially it was, but dont quote me on this!

 

Why the losses in 1941 were normal? Well:

Red Army losses in 1941 (6 months and 10 days):

personnel losses: 4,308,094 (monthly: about 700,000)
equipment:
tanks and SP guns: 20,500 (monthly: about 3,300)
combat aircraft: 17,900 (monthly: about 2,900)

Red Army losses in 1945 (4 months):

personnel losses: 2,823,381 (monthly: about 705,000)
equipment:
tanks and SP guns: 13,700 (monthly: about 3,400)
combat aircraft: 11,000 (monthly: about 2,750)

Sources: Krivosheev

The truth is that the losses that a country suffers in the king of war that WW2 was are determined by the country's capacity to accept and replace these losses. Germany had the capacity to replace about 150,000 men lost per month, the USSR could replace 700,000.

The difference between 1941 and 1945 are not in the losses suffered by the Red Army. The difference is that in 1941 they didn't have the strategic initiative even sacrificing these numbers to the war effort while in 1945 they had the complete initiative.

 

This kind of raw figures all mixed up may be very interesting but it doesn't tell me much. Raw figures are just that: raw.

Well, these figures tell us various things:

1- Men per men, the Germans had always significantly more fighting power than the Red Army.

2- The difference in per capita fighting power decreased during the conflict. However, the superiority of the wehrmacht continued to the end.

3- There were about 3 Red armies: The first, destroyed by Barbarossa. The second, made of hundreds of divisions quickly mobilized, they were the worst in terms of fighting power. But kept the Germans at bay during the crucial moments of 1942. The third, made in 1943-1944 represented the reborn Soviet army that crushed the wehrmacht.

 

Why the losses in 1941 were normal? Well:

Red Army losses in 1941 (6 months and 10 days):

personnel losses: 4,308,094 (monthly: about 700,000)
equipment:
tanks and SP guns: 20,500 (monthly: about 3,300)
combat aircraft: 17,900 (monthly: about 2,900)

Red Army losses in 1945 (4 months):

personnel losses: 2,823,381 (monthly: about 705,000)
equipment:
tanks and SP guns: 13,700 (monthly: about 3,400)
combat aircraft: 11,000 (monthly: about 2,750)

Sources: Krivosheev

The truth is that the losses that a country suffers in the king of war that WW2 was are determined by the country's capacity to accept and replace these losses. Germany had the capacity to replace about 150,000 men lost per month, the USSR could replace 700,000.

The difference between 1941 and 1945 are not in the losses suffered by the Red Army. The difference is that in 1941 they didn't have the strategic initiative even sacrificing these numbers to the war effort while in 1945 they had the complete initiative.
You've stated that this was part of Soviet Military Doctrine and I'm asking you to show me were in Soviet Military Doctrine it stated that the 1941 casualties were deemed "acceptable" and I'm not asking for a comparison with 1945 figures or is this something you are concluding based on these figures? I cannot find any reference with Soviet plans pre-war that these figures were acceptable, indeed I cant find any Soviet doctrines that state that ANY kind of casualties were acceptable so perhaps you might enlighten me on this??

 

I am far from an expert in the Eastern front matters, but from what I have read over the years it is apparent that the Russians were prepared to sacrifice large parts of their land and to an extent their soldiers etc when reorganising their defence in depth.

Ie relocating their munitions and Tank factories etc far to the East over the Urals to prevent disruption in production and supply.

The father of a friend of mine was a Major in the 14th Panzer Div, that attempted to relieve the siege of Stalingrad from the Northwest.

The Division was decimated by the numbers of T34's that were encountered.

He was the sole survivor of the tank that had exhausted all ammunition and was taken prisoner.

On his way East by train, he saw train load after train load of T34's going west and he said then that the war was lost for Germany.
This could not have been easy to say from a Ritter Kreuz holder.

The longer German supply lines extended the harder t became to defend them, which cannot have been a surprise for the planners unless they were totally incompetent, and I do not think this is the case.

The Soviets were too strong in depth and eventually they were going to stop giving ground and attack.

This was the beginning of the end of the German forces.

OK this is simplistic but it serves the point instead of just number crunching.

Regards
Tom

 

I am far from an expert in the Eastern front matters, but from what I have read over the years it is apparent that the Russians were prepared to sacrifice large parts of their land and to an extent their soldiers etc when reorganising their defence in depth.

Ie relocating their munitions and Tank factories etc far to the East over the Urals to prevent disruption in production and supply.


The English language has this strange expression "were prepared to" as meaning "were expected to". Not the case.

Evacuations "were prepared" entirely as a precautionary measure, whereas the Red Army definitley "was not prepared" to yeld an inch of ground. Quite the opposite. The theory, plans and orders issued were to stop the invaders dead cold in their tracks through very aggressive action, and throw them back to their start lines and continue the war in the invaders territiry.

This was the leadership intention, certainly not to draw back the Germans into Soviet territory. This is what happened because the counter-attacks as mentioned above failed, but it certainly was not for lack of trying, and most certainly was not what was intended.

 

These counter-attacks were one of the reasons for the big losses in 1941.
The counter-attacks were a political decision,and,one could say,reasonable :when France was invaded in 1914,the French counterattacked to liberate their country,and this caused big losses .

 

Guaporense:you are sure about the Soviet aircraft losses in 1945? 11000 is a very high figure .

 

These counter-attacks were one of the reasons for the big losses in 1941.
The counter-attacks were a political decision,and,one could say,reasonable :when France was invaded in 1914,the French counterattacked to liberate their country,and this caused big losses .

I didn't say they were going to work

Having good ideas is one thing, having them work and proving them 'good' is another thing entirely!