D Day Landing Craft Markings

Discussion in 'The War at Sea' started by Noel Burgess, Sep 19, 2011.

  1. Some more thoughts on Group 11:

    In spite of the various twists and apparent incoherences mentioned in the different posts above, I still believe that Lt Cdr MOW MILLER was on a craft of Group 11, most probably on board Serial 311 which was supposed to be the Group leader, and which was probably, but not certainly, LCI(L) 380.

    This is because the ONEAST Orders dated 21.5.44 state that Sailing Convoy S10 (code name MAGAZINE), which included the 9 LCI(L) of Group 11 (and no other LCI(L)) and the 29 LCT of Groups 12 & 15, was to have as Senior Officer the Squadron Officer of "I" LCT Squadron, i.e. Lt Cdr MILLER.

    Even if Lt Cdr MILLER might have decided not to go in on board LCI(L) 380 as he should have according to another statement in the ONEAST Orders, I can't see how he could have overcome these orders to the extent that he would change for another Sailing Convoy!

    Enough for today...

  2. Bunts

    Bunts WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Hello Michel/Arty

    The comments I make below were written before I saw the posts from the past couple of days so are in response to your posts on the 23rd August and 9th September 2015 for which I thank you for the information....

    I feel that the confusion is all tied-in with the unknown commander being transferred to LCI(L)380, it seems so odd that a commander (I believe senior to Lt Com Miller) was in charge of 380 and other craft (we know he was in charge because he gave orders to another LCI telling them to take all seaworthy craft back to Newhaven and told them that he would follow as soon as possible, I believe that this was mid-morning. He would not have done this if Lt Com Miller had been on the scene).

    I have the impression that a change of plan took place which split the LCI group and LCI(L)380 and others with the new commander were given an earlier landing time of 0725

    Referring back to Sunday 4th June 1944 I wonder if there is any significance in the fact that we put to sea around fifteen hours before the originally planned H-Hour of 0725 Monday 5th June 1944? As it turned out we were sailing up and down the channel until we were given the revised instructions to go, we then had to pass through many slower craft to get to the beach

    Thinking of events which may help to establish the timings I have mentioned we saw a destroyer heading straight for the shore, we were convinced that he was going to run aground but unknown (to me at least) he went straight into the mouth of the River Orme, performed a 180 degree turn and headed back out to sea generating a bank of thick black smoke which hid us from German guns giving us great relief. His actions must have been documented somewhere together with the timing of that action which again would help to identify 380's time on the beach

    Regarding your question about photographs - I have some of foundations which I believe were part of a "blockhouse" or similar structure which was set back into the sand-dunes and was off our port bow as we were running into the beach and I will send these along as soon as I figure out the method!!

    I am amazed at the amount of information supplied in the latest posts which I have not yet had time to fully read


    Bunts (Frank)
  3. Arty

    Arty Member


    Some feedback on some of your many posts ;)

    From post #97...

    Regards the webpage which refers to the DSM citation for A/B Harrold GEE. It states: "In the case of L.C.I. (L.) 111, however, that policy was overidden, for she was ordered to land on “Sword” beach to collect casualties, and was hit by a shell below her waterline as she withdrew." However the webpage also states: “Given their size, Landing Craft Infantry (Large) were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire and, therefore, generally used at a sufficient distance offshore to avoid the dangers of a direct hit - thus smaller craft laden with infantymen [sic] were lowered over their sides.”

    Top put it nicely the webpage is b’llcks! It was clearly written by someone who has little knowledge of the role of the LCI(L) and/or the events of the day. As Bunts is well aware all LCI(L)’s had to run the gauntlet of fire all the way onto the beach.
    Also from post #97...

    Re LCI(L)’s utilised for ferry duties you mentioned: “This might mean that the LCI(L) in Group 11 were meant for the Ferry Service, while those in Group 14 were to return to the UK. However again, the ONEAST orders seem to imply that all LCI(L) (except one from the Reserve Group) were to return to the UK, so the allocation of some (at least LCI(L) 169) to Ferry Service must have been an ad hoc order by DSOAG.”

    Re-reading Force S Orders (pg 1046) LCI(L) 374 from the “Reserve Group” was allocated a specific role in the Ferry Service ie. reporting to the Senior Officer, Ferry Control. Another useful account (from "The D Day Landings" by Philip Warner p87-89) comes from Lt G Pugh who served on LCI(L) 374. Lt Pugh’s recollections confirms that 374 landed troops of the Beach Group at 1900hrs then: “detached ourselves from the flotilla and reported to the SOFC….”

    We also have the information (on pg 1067 of Force S Orders) that the Force S Ferry Unit would be “augmented by… Available LCI(L) and LCI(S)”. The LCI(S) of 200 Flotilla were to head to the area Gold area while those of 201 Flotilla were remain in the Sword area. Given the losses/damage to the LCI(S)’s, in particular, the undamaged LCI(L) 169 would have become a prime candidate for the ferry role. Though I can’t help thinking that the majority of LCI(L)’s did in fact return to the UK - no less than 35 of them were required at Newhaven according to the orders.
    From post # 99

    From Lt Henry on LCI(L) 300...“The Colonel whom I carried wanted his three LCI to land opposite a gap in the sand dunes …We landed at H Hour at precisely the spot he wanted, but unfortunately the gap led to a building which looked as though it had been a hotel but was now full of Germans firing down on us…”

    This is particular interesting, it was planned that the Norfolk’s were to land on Queen Red. Lt Henry’s account suggests that did actually occur. About the only buildings (on, or immediately adjacent Queen Red) that could be described as a “hotel” were indeed Maison de la Mer, and, Manoir de Colleville plage (aka Chateau Leba?). The latter building was (and is) located at the rear of strongpoint SKATE. Despite the fact that SKATE had been assaulted almost two hours before the Norfolks arrived most of the houses in the beach area were not systematically cleared. Major Reg Rutherford (then Lieutenant, OC 10 Pl, B Coy, East Yorks) who landed on the left of Queen Red at 0730hrs mentions in a post war interview: “Immediately I discovered where one of the shots was coming from a large brown house on the left and it’s there today.”

    Attached are then and now photos of Manoir de Colleville plage plus an aerial shot taken on 04June.


    Attached Files:

  4. Arty

    Arty Member

    Hello again Bunts,

    Thanks again for your recollections. The subject of the senior officer onboard LCI(L) 380 is interesting. Despite operational instructions and specific orders it’s not uncommon to see senior officers (Army, Navy & Airforce) taking the initiative and/or using their rank to get more directly involved than perhaps they should. It might just be the case with this unidentified Officer.

    Back to trying to locate 380, indeed the plans for the assault ‘evolved’ over a period of many months. However I don’t believe any LCI(L) landed before 0825hrs on Queen beach - with one possible exception which was a ‘spare’ LCI(L) that was used to ferry ashore 263 Field Company RE from the Troopships Princess Astrid & Maid of Orleans. On the subject of the destroyer laying smoke unfortunately that doesn’t help with the time either. There were thirteen destroyers off the beach in the Sword area that morning - although HNoMS Svenner had been sunk around 0545hrs. Though we do know what task each of the destroyer’s had been assigned it’s difficult to determine their exact position at any given time after the initial bombardment.

    Back to you Bunts. The 263rd LCI(L) Flotilla had twelve LCI(L)’s. However Navy and Army orders, reports and records indicate only nine of them were used to land the Battalions of the 185th Brigade. Can you recall the situation on the morning of the 06June as you began your approach to the coast from the so called “Lowering Position” (roughly 10km out to sea). Was LCI(L) 380 in formation with the other eight craft of the Flotilla?

    On the subject of putting your photographs of the “blockhouse” on your computer, then on the forum, ask a teenager for help! Us older generations are generally less computer savvy!

  5. I think this is the classic case of mixing up LSI with LCI, of the same vein as the even more frequent LST/LCT mixup. The comment visibly refers to LSI, (viz the mention of "smaller craft (...) lowered over their sides"). I entirely agree with your assessment on the webpage :)

    Nice photo of Château Leba postwar! It was indeed marked up as the "Manor at the Western End of Small Wood (096802). Most outstanding land mark to the east of RED Beach. Even at night the wood will be conspicuous." This might be the "large brown house on the left" in Maj Rutherford's account, and perhaps also the hotel-like house from which gunfire was observed by Lt Henry.

    LCI(L) 169's coxswain Henry Sivelle further recalls, in his IWM interview:
    '(...) on the port ramp that was down, they [the troops] were being held back by machine gun fire which was trained on that ramp. And ahead we could see a machine gun post on the window of this house which was about 200 yards away. We reported to the skipper that this machine gun was holding our troops back and he said, "Can you give them a ten second burst?" I said "Yes". We gave them a ten second burst and brought the house down like that, so then the troops could get off.'
    Since Sivelle also states that LCI(L) couldn't get as far up the beach as they would have wanted, and that the disembarking troops had water up to their shoulders or necks, this would imply that the house firing at them was closer to the beach than either Chateau Leba or Maison de la Mer. Additionally, the stone construction of these two buildings would have made it hard for 20mm gunfire to "bring them down" even in part, so I would think this would be a third house by the beach and of lighter construction.

    A planned landing of the NORFOLK at the Eastern end of RED Beach, more or less opposite Exit 26, would make sense, since by this time the beach defences were supposed to have been overcome and Exit 26 continued as the road to the Colleville-sur-Mer village inland, so this more direct route would enable the NORFOLK to clear the beach faster.

  6. LCI(L) 374 must have been one of the 8 LCI(L) carrying 6 Beach Group.

    ONEAST/S.13 - THE BUILD UP - Appendix IV - Table of Planned Arrivals after the Assault & up to D + 1 Day, dated 21.5.44 (page 1068) says:
    D Day
    Approximate time off the beaches:
    H + 10 hr. 40 min. [1805 hrs]
    Ship or Craft:
    9 LST
    4 Rhino Ferries in tow
    8 LCI(L) [The '8' is a handwritten correction. The original typed number is illegible - probably 6]
    (a) Convoy S.14A and S.14B (see ONEAST/S.7A, App.III.)
    ( B) L.S.T. lift 18 L.C.V.(P) for Ferry Service.
    (c ) 66 DUKWS swim ashore.
    Remaining vehicles discharged by Rhino Ferry.
    (d) L.C.I.(L) lifting beach groups.

    The referred ONEAST/S.7A Appendix III - Passage Timetable (page 982), also dated 21.5.44, confirms that these 8 LCI(L) (this time the number '8' is typed, without correction) are part of Convoy S.14B "EUREKA II", planned to arrive at the Lowering Position at H + 10 h. 40 m (1805 hrs)

    This fits nicely with Trux' post here:
    H+11½ Hours
    A group of six LCI(L) carrying personnel for 6 Beach Group will beach. 6 Beach Group will pass through 5 Beach Group and set up Assembly Areas and a Beach Maintenance Area.
    From 6 Beach Group War Diary.
    - 1640 coast of France sighted.
    - 1900 convoy arrived at disembarkation point and was switched to Queen White.
    - 2030 troops disembarked. One man wounded and almost drowned. The craft were unable to beach in less than five feet of water and many men had to swim the first few yards to shore.

    This group of six LCI(L) planned to land personnel for 6 Beach Group at H + 11½ hrs (1855 hrs) was thus apparently beefed up to eight craft just before 21 May 44, and seems to have been alloted the Serials 600 upwards.

    Captain Knight of 5 AFPU, who was on board LST 361 (381) in the previous Convoy S.13 "DEBONAIR" with the five LST towing Rhino Ferries of Group 17 (381-385), took a series of 11 photos of 6 Beach Group troops doing their rather wet landing from their LCI(L) (IWM B 5001 to B 5011). Only 3 of these photos are online [Edit July 2018: more photos have become available online since I wrote this post. I have added them below]:

    [Edit July 2018:]

    [Edit July 2018:]

    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    [Edit July 2018:]

    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    Plus I found another one (negative number not known) [Edit July 2018] This is IWM B5003:

    Unfortunately the Hull Numbers are illegible on these versions.

    LCI(L) 374 was part of 265 LCI(L) Flotilla, "T" Squadron, Assault Group "S" 1, whose eight LCI(L) seem to have been distributed over various Groups, e.g. LCI(L) 385 which was Serial 395 carrying 2 LINCOLNS in Group 16, and LCI(L) 390 & 389, also part of Group 16, and probably also carrying the LINCOLNS (Serials 394 & 396). See British Pathé clip 2115.10 frames 63-109:
    Ships At Sea

    Last edited: Jul 4, 2018
  7. Back to Group 11, looking more closely at some stills from the excellent D-Day 7 show one year ago on Channel 4, it appears that LCI(L) 126 was Serial 318:

    In the vicinity we can see LCI(L) 164 also disembarking troops. Alas the Serial is not visible this time:

    A caption on the D-Day 7 website says "LCI(L) 313 of 251 LCI(L) Flotilla is on the left.", presumably meaning the craft whose stern is just visible on the left. If correct this would mean that some craft of 251 Flotilla were allocated to Group 11. I don't think it means the Serial, which can't be visible unless the original film goes on to show the side of the craft. More muddling of the waters...

    Anyway, we now have a firm ID for the three craft of Group 11 carrying 1 NORFOLK:

    LCI(L) 300 (317)
    LCI(L) 126 (318)
    LCI(L) 169 (319)

  8. Arty

    Arty Member


    Damn nice work (yet again) matching the Pennant No.s /LTIN's for the LCI(L)'s carrying the Norfolks. Of note the stills show that the skipper of 126 gave his Troops an almost 'pleasant' dry landing. However if LCI(L) 313 has been identified with Group 11 this means there's now four LCI(L)'s of 263 Flotilla 'unaccounted' for! I ponder whether the makers of the documentary have made an error and are mistakenly referring to the vessel's LTIN.

    Back further to post #105 and... "We gave them a ten second burst and brought the house down like that, so then the troops could get off." I'm absolutely sure a 60 round drum of 20mm from an Oerlikon at 200 yards (or thereabouts) would considerably damage an average house. However I doubt it would literally knock it down. We need to start a thread called WW2Jargon. WW2Talk has already been used...

    Back to post #106 and our favourite rhetorical question....Why wont the IWM put more photos online???

    Meanwhile another photo of IWM origin, credited to Captain Knight, appears in a number of publications - including "D-Day Then & Now - After the battle" (pg 528). The photo is invariably captioned as having been taken on Queen Red. It was taken during the evening - the tide is out and the shadows are starting to lengthen. In the pic there are no less than 8 LCI(L)'s. The photo probably depicts the arrival of the 8 LCI(L)'s carrying the troops of 6 Beach Group. Captain Knight may have then walked down the beach and snapped B5004, B 5008 etc. There's a problem however. At 1630hrs there was a considerable number of stranded LCI(L)'s and LCT's on Queen White & the western end of Queen Red - clearly they couldn't have departed until the tide returned, yet none can be seen in the photo. If indeed this photo was taken on 06June then it seems more likely it was taken from Queen Red - which is at odds with the entry in the 6 Beach Group War Diary! If you can make out any of the Pennant No.s and/or LTIN's in this photo you deserve a medal. ;)


    Attached Files:

  9. Nice photo! I had forgotten about it, good thing you posted it. I also think the LCI(L) in this photo are on QUEEN RED, because there are anti-craft obstacles remaining on the right, whereas the rest of the beach is clear. There is no contradiction with the War Diary, which says:

    "1900 convoy arrived at disembarkation point and was switched to Queen White."

    implying its planned disembarkation point was not QUEEN WHITE but QUEEN RED or even further East. I therefore believe this photo was shot not long after 1900hrs when the flight of LCI(L) had arrived at its planned touchdown spot, before it retracted and moved to QUEEN WHITE. The ramps are still up and no disembarked troops are in sight. The tide on this photo also looks much lower than on B5011, therefore it must have been shot more than a few minutes earlier.

  10. Arty

    Arty Member


    Some more parts of the vast jigsaw puzzle have been put together...

    Accepting your premise that all the eight LCI(L)'s retracted after arriving off Queen Red we can put a fairly accurate time on Captain Knight's photos. The photo I posted was apparently taken soon after 1900hrs, whilst B5004, B5008 were taken around 2030hrs (according to the 6 Beach Group's War Diary). B5011 was taken around 2100hrs ie. the time the Airlanding Brigade & Divisional troops of 6th Airborne flew over (the first glider reportedly landed on LZ 'N' at 2051hrs).

  11. One more photo of an unidentified LCI(L) presumably of Group 11, from another sequence in the Channel 4 DDay7 website. No Hull Number nor Serial is visible:

    Unidentified? Not quite so, because a comparison with 378 on H38213 shot during Ex FABIUS reveals shocking similarities in the "bumps" on the bow of the two craft:

    Although some "bumps" or scratches were similar on most LCI(L), because of the design of the craft, others were unique to each craft, and when there are many identical, non-standard "bumps", then the ID is all but certain. The one major difference between the two photos, i.e. the presence of an additional water height marker on top of the others on the starboard part of the bow, may be explained away as having been painted anew between FABIUS and D Day, during which period she also got a few more bumps. The position of those markers with respect to the darker sub-waterline paint is also typical of 378.

    I therefore think that the presence of LCI(L) 378 as part of Group 11 on D Day is confirmed, although her Serial might not be 312 as during FABIUS.

    This also means that seven out of the nine craft in Group 11 are now known with reasonable certainty:
    LCI(L) 126 (318)
    LCI(L) 164 (313 FABIUS)
    LCI(L) 165 (311, 312 or 313)
    LCI(L) 169 (319)
    LCI(L) 300 (317)
    LCI(L) 378 (312 FABIUS)
    LCI(L) 380 (311 FABIUS - 311, 312 or 313)

    The remaining two craft presumably come from the rest of 263 Flotilla, i.e. LCI(L) 171, 179, 181, 377 and 379, about which very little is known...

  12. borjeno

    borjeno LCI 241 (L)


    I have looked at my Fathers letter sent on the 7/6/44 to his parents but it says due to the censor he can only say he was in the invasion of France. My Father did say there were troops on his ship but never went into any detail.
  13. Many thanks a lot for posting these photos. It's a pity that we can't find the exact role of LCI(L) 241 on D Day, but no information is better than wrong information :)

    I believe LCI(L) 241 was part of Group 16, and that it was one of the three craft which carried 1 KOSB, but I have found little evidence for that so far.

    Hopefully some new facts will emerge some day...

  14. borjeno,

    After close examination, I'm afraid that the cameracraft of the first, magnificent photo you posted, showing an LCI(L) opposite Exit 11, with Villa Le Brèche blazing fiercely on the right, cannot be LCI(L) 241. This photo was definitely shot on board an LCI(L) of the second series, i.e. with Hull Number 351 onwards. It however probably shows another craft of your father's Group, and was apparently given to several crewmen in this Group, who usually thought it showed their own craft. See two other examples of this same photo here:



    The telltale signs that it cannot be a first series LCI(L) include:
    A second Oerilkon can be seen ahead of the first one on the right. The photo cannot have been shot from behind the central Oerlikon gun of a first series LCI(L) because the conning tower would block the view. The following photo shows a US LCI(L), whose conning tower was substantially higher than on British craft. However, the British version was still higher than the armour around the central Oerlikon and was the same width as the US version:

    It also cannot be shot from the aft port Oerlikon, because we would see the port life raft supports which were present on most if not all first series British craft, and which are visible on your (beautiful) side shot of LCI(L) 241. The fore Oerlikon would also probably have been screened by the superstructure in-between, although I have no photo to prove it.

    Additionally, all photos of first series craft I've seen show that the guardrail behind the aft Oerlikons, if any, is a life line on stanchions and never a solid guardrail, which is present on all second series LCI(L) between the two Oerlikons each side of the bridge. An example of this guardrail on first series craft:
    Example of the solid guardrail on second series craft:

    Finally, the second Oerlikon on the photo is more or less at the same level as the first one, when it should have been visibly higher if on a first series craft.

    The photo was therefore shot from behind the first Oerlikon on the port side of the bridge of a second series LCI(L).

    It might be LCI(L) 375 as claimed by one of the other sources, or any other LCI(L) in Group 16, but unfortunately not LCI(L) 241.

    However, 241 probably landed in the vicinity of this spot, although the exact location is yet unknown.

  15. Bunts

    Bunts WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Michel/Arty. Re last para #106 I do`nt know if this is helpful in your search for L.C.I`s but I have a friend who was a crew member onboard L.C.I.[L]390 and I know that he landed Canadian Troops on Juno on D + 1. I asked him if he remembered any details such as other LCI Numbers or Regiment carried but he was unable to help. Kindest Regards, Bunts
  16. borjeno

    borjeno LCI 241 (L)

    Thanks for the explanation. Funnily enough when I posted the photo I noticed for the first time the second gun barrel but didn't consider the significance at the time. Do you think 241 landed on sword or is the evidence a bit weak for that.
  17. Yes, LCI(L) 241 was definitely part of Force S. The evidence is weak only for the unit she carried.
    She is listed as part of 266 LCI(L) Flotilla, "T" Squadron, Assault Group "S" 1 in the Green List dated 5 Jun 44, and, together with her CO Tempy Lt William Laurence TOYE, RNVR (seniority 29.1.43, although the Report says 11.1.43) as part of 265 LCI(L) Flotilla in the D Day Admiralty Report on Force S, so I believe she was attached, together with all the other craft of 266 Flotilla except 391, to 265 Flotilla for the initial landing.

    I believe she was part of Group 16 (Serials 388-396), carrying troops of the Reserve Brigade (9 Br Inf Bde) and planned to beach at H+270. As the only LCI(L) of the initial type in both 265 and 266 Flotillas, she must be what appears to be a such a craft seen sailing away (or back?) in British Pathé clip 2115.10 on frames 102-109:
    Ships At Sea


    Group 16 was to sail from the Lowering Position as follows (numbers shown are Serials):

    Port Column_______________Starboard Column
    QUEEN RED______________QUEEN WHITE

    394 )_____________________388 )
    395 ) 2 LINCOLNS__________389 ) 1 KOSB
    396 )_____________________390 )

    _________________________391 )
    _________________________392 ) 2 RUR
    _________________________393 )

    Serial 395 was LCI(L) 385 (see frames 71-85), and the other two craft seen in the Port column are LCI(L) 390 (frames 63-70) and 389 (frames 97-109, third in the Port column and therefore probably Serial 396).

    The First Series LCI(L) is filmed at the head of the column, so she might be one of the three craft which carried 1 KOSB (Serials 388-390). However, she seems to be sailing back, perhaps to signal to the other craft in the column, or to regain her assigned sailing position, which could be anywhere in the column, more likely towards the back because she is not seen abreast of either of the LCI(L) in the Port column. In any case, because the three craft of the Port column are identified, she has to be in the Starboard column heading for QUEEN WHITE.

    The craft of Group 16 must therefore be as follows:

    Port Column________________Starboard column
    265 Flotilla_________________attached from 266 Flotilla
    Seen on the clip, in order of appearance, not necessarily the same as the Sailing disposition:
    LCI(L) 390 (probably Serial 394)
    __________________________LCI(L) 376
    LCI(L) 385 (Serial 395)
    __________________________LCI(L) 384
    __________________________LCI(L) 375
    LCI(L) 389 (probably Serial 396)
    __________________________LCI(L) First Series? If so, most probably LCI(L) 241
    Remaining two craft, part of 266 Flotilla, not identified on the clip, but listed in the Report as part of 265 Flotilla:
    __________________________LCI(L) 387
    __________________________LCI(L) 388

    Note that the Port column had only craft from the "original" 265 Flotilla, whereas the Starboard column probably had craft from 266 Flotilla only.
    LCI(L) 376 was planned to carry 266 Flotilla Officer Tempy Acting Lt Cdr James Herbert HARBOTTELL, RNVR (seniority 27.3.41 as Lt), so was possibly the Group Leader (thus normally Serial 388), which would be logical since the craft of 266 Flotilla were the more numerous (six out of nine) in Group 16, although in the British Pathé clip it is unclear whether LCI(L) 376 is sailing at the head of the Column or not.
    The Report is however not fully exact, because it lists LCI(L) 374 as part of 265 Flotilla, but does not mention LCI(L) 376, whereas the clip proves that 376 was in Group 16, and we know that 374 was allocated to a later wave carrying Beach Group troops (see Arty's post #103 above).

    Although, as stated above, the order of appearance in the clip of the craft in the Starboard column does not necessarily reflect their order within the Column, I believe it nearly does, partly because this would fit LCI(L) 376 being the Group Leader. One exception would be LCI(L) 375 which was Serial 389 during Exercise FABIUS, and probably retained this Serial for D Day:
    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    This would mean that she was to sail ahead of LCI(L) 384, which is possible if we interpret frames 71-85 as showing LCI(L) 385 sailing faster than the craft in the Starboard Column, thus "overtaking" 384 in order to reach her nominal position abreast of 375.
    My assessment of the actual Hull number/LTIN match is thus the following (underlined numbers are confirmed by photos, those in italics are those I consider probable, and those with a question mark are just possible):

    LCI(L) 390 (394)_____________LCI(L) 376 (388) Flotilla Leader
    LCI(L) 385 (395)_____________LCI(L) 375 (389) (389 during FABIUS)
    LCI(L) 389 (396)_____________LCI(L) 384 (390?)
    __________________________LCI(L) 241 )
    __________________________LCI(L) 387 ) (391-392) (individual allocation not known)
    __________________________LCI(L) 388 )

    (This job is not helped by the Hull numbers and Serials being largely similar!)

    LCI(L) 241 thus certainly was to land on QUEEN WHITE at H+270 (1055 [Edit: (thanks Arty!] 1155 hrs), and possibly carried troops of 2 RUR.

    Last edited: Mar 11, 2018
  18. Bunts,

    Thanks for the information. This means that LCI(L) 390 was either used in the Ferry Service off JUNO or that she came back to the UK to load more troops.

    With my above post in mind I think you can tell your friend (and give him our thanks) that on D Day his craft most probably carried troops of 2 LINCOLNS to SWORD Area (planned to beach on QUEEN RED at 1055 [Edit:] 1155 hrs), and give him the link to the British Pathé clip where his craft is nicely visible.

    LCI(L) 390's CO on D Day is listed in the Report as Tempy Lt VH KIRKLAND, RNVR (seniority 2.2.41), actually Tempy Lt Vesey Herbert KIRKLAND, RNR (seniority 3.2.41) in the Navy List.

  19. prairie4me

    prairie4me Junior Member

    I'm not sure if information is helpful or not, but on my last visit to Library & Archives Canada I found a file that listed all of the Serial numbers of all Formation & Units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. Further to that, there are documents for each Unit detailing the ship / craft number and corresponding serial number. Bunts mentions LCI-L390 carried Canadian troops so perhaps if the the unit name of those troops could be identified, maybe that information is contained in the documents. It would take another trip to the Archives for me to check as I did not photograph the entire file. I shall include an example of what I found for the Stormont Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders so you can see for yourselves.
    (I will attempt to post the photo with this reply; failing that, I will post it separately. My humble apologies).

    Attached Files:

    Aixman likes this.
  20. Cathy, you're definitely the one!

    These might be the Landing Tables, or the Unit Staff Tables, or the Unit Sheets? Do you know the date for these documents?

    This is something like the Holy Grail for some of us! Although a number of planned Hull number-Serial number matches for Juno do appear in other documents, yours looks like it was prepared at a later date and is therefore more accurate. For example, I had Serial 1743 as LST 401 and LST 368 as spare (thus not given a Serial), whereas Serial 1743 is LST 368 in your sample, which means that 401 was somehow replaced by the spare ship after the first table was written. I think your doc is the closest to what actually took place that has been found so far.

    By the look of it you may very well have dug out the latest version of the landing tables AND craft allocation for JUNO, i.e. an incredible gem!

    This is no mean feat, and you deserve the highest praise for that!

    This would certainly justify another trip to the LAC and a few hours (days?) of photographing these unique documents in their entirety ;)

    Many thanks for sharing your findings with us, and congratulations again!


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