Boy, you set me up perfectly to showcase one of my more involved efforts at map making. While not quite ready for publication, this effort with vector graphics is at least one step forward from my postings with MSPaint. When I read these books together I noticed what appeared to be errors, but more likely just the limits of illustration, between the maps and the text. The book illustrator seemed determined to use the NATO symbols at the expense of clarity. Not only that, they may also be his/her best effort to understand the text (much like my own). According to the Forward in Seven Days in January, the author made his own maps which went beyond what the publisher could print within the budget. I would really like to see those original maps. It's my assumption that military history writers make their own maps and then write their text. It would be like making a blueprint before building hardware. For my effort, I liked what I had seen on the British official histories, showing the limits of advance with U shaped arcs. Note my contour lines are guesses from a 1:100K topo map. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=45997&stc=1&d=1298131084 For comparison, cross-linked from Aberjona Press: Printable Maps
As long as I'm shillin' for Aberjona, I should give a shout-out to my man Robert at: Merriam Press World War II Books If you want a list (three, at least) of recommended infantry memoirs to order from Merriam, I can tweet the deets for you by PM. (how embarrassing am I?)
Before leaving the "Bitche Bulge" (and, technically, NORDWIND, I believe), I was able to browse the regimental histories of the 100th Infantry Division for clues about what happened in detail on the west shoulder. To my favor, the 399th Infantry history is not too bad; I've seen worse. This gives a pretty clear idea of how the battalions and companies were deployed prior to the attack and when their line stabilized. Just remember Red is 1st Bn, White is 2d Bn, and Blue is 3d Bn. And of course Able, Baker, Charlie, ....Mike are the letter companies. Here's a link, click "Seige of Bitche", the German counter-attack starts about page 13 of the PDF. "The Winter Line" starts with a description of the effort to straighten the north-south line and re-take the "Signalberg". The Division I OCR'ed an excerpt for those just curious. And I attached a map that keys all/most of the terrain features cited. I cross-linked this map of the Maginot Line from this site: ALSACE - LA LIGNE MAGINOT - FORT DE SCHOENENBOURG History of the 399th Infantry Regiment (printed in Germany) "Doped-up mobs charged Flanagan’s Fort and the Shoenberg woods behind the College de Bitche. Three waves came up, the Dog heavy machineguns of Sgt. John Mizar and Paul Kovacs barked in the night, three waves broke and went back down again, leaving 100 fallen Germans under the barrels of the smoking guns. Pfc Solter of Baker was hiding in a potato barrel in the cellar of Flanagan’s Fort when the house was overrun by a thousand Germans. An Oberleutnant came down after him just as the 1st Battalion AT gun drilled 15 rounds through the house killing the officer. Solter escaped from the cellar through the AT shell hole in the wall. In the high Maginot Line battlefield on the other side of Bitche Sgt. Frank Sims’ Easy squad in the last pillbox of Schiesseck was surrounded, phone wires cut, Missing in Action. A fierce midnight attack welled up from below the dragon’s teeth and Easy’s 1st and 2nd platoons were waiting. Machinegunner Davis zeroed his chattering 30 on the hillside of Schiesseck and an enemy assault column ran right through his sights, Easy fought back under Sgt. Gerald Lennarton and Lt. James Walsh using several captured German machineguns in front of Fort Freudenberg. The attack broke. At 0400 of New Year’s Day three men from the 117th Recon without helmets or rifles came running into the Blue Battalion lines at Lemberg shouting that most of the 117th had been wiped out at the Hotel de Hasselfurt. The German New Year’s attack against the 7th Army hit first the Maginot powerhouse city of Bitche, and wave after wave of storm troopers smashed at the corps boundary at Flanagan’s Fort. The remnants of the cavalry boys got on their armored horses and could be heard rumbling off through the Bois de Bitche, leaving the 399th with two miles of open flank. “If we had had another Baker and Charlie Company on the other side of the Bitche-Lernberg road there wouldn’t have been any Bitche Bulge.’ For hours the 399th fought off overwhelming 25 -1 odds, and then the enemy began drifting thousands of storm troops into the Bois de Bitche to surround the 399th rather than fight it. At dawn the Germans must have figured Shoenberg was cleared, because they started marching up from the Citadel past the College. “Good soldiers, too,” said Lt. Steinman of Dog who learned his soldiering in the French Foreign Legion. “Perfect columns of two.” Steinman fired a belt of 1500 rounds in one burst and destroyed the column. At 0600 the Screaming Meemis shrieked into the 2nd Battalion lines and the Germans jumped off against George Company in a master attempt to encircle giant Fort Simserhoff. The left pincer of the attack charged up out of a draw and overran the 1st platoon’s exposed outpost commanded by Sgt. Russell Sisco. The attack got as far as the next OP hole. Sgt. John Harlowe skip-bombed the krauts with anti-tank grenades while Robert Tomlinson, Ralph Broitman, and Julian Motley blasted the enemy back into the draw. Machinegunners Klein and Mooney of How Company blasted the woods, and 81 mortars destroyed the attackers. The right pincer worked into a draw defended by the 3rd platoon and Georges 60mm mortars zeroed in. George reigned. The Infantry Journal later heralded Sgt. Harlowe’s skip-bombing as a new weapon of war. The Air Corps swung in to bomb and strafe Shorbach from where all the attacks bubbled, and all activity at the sunken ghost town ceased. How Company’s mortars ruled the 2nd Battalion Maginot front...."
It's hard to talk about NORDWIND without moving-on to the battle of Alsace in January 1945. And I have found more links that provide a few more details on the whole German counter-offensive. But my prime motivation is to map the details and deduce what happened from the scattered descriptions. Mostly I was interested in the disposition of the infantry regiments of 79th Infantry Division, Cross of Lorraine. Recall the 79th ID sent four battalions to the 45th ID in the Vosges. That left the 79th ID with 314th and 315th Infantry Regiments, each with two battalions, plus the remaining battalion of the 313th Infantry. When Task Force Herren (70th ID) left their positions along the Rhine, those positions were taken over by TF Linden (42d ID, Rainbow). I don't recall exactly reading that the 79th ID took over the whole sector of the north Alsace plain, with the 42d ID attached, but it surely makes sense. Here I'll mention the book The Final Crisis by Richard Engler, again from Aberjona Press. This provides a good overview plus a whole lot of details about particular battles. And, being written by a veteran of the 42d ID, it provides many personal accounts from other veterans, plus the story of "The Company" (F/222d Infantry) in its first campaign. However as I read this book, it was necessary to use a process of deduction for determining what units had responsibility for which sector. Because the link does not goes into detail, I should mention that the 232d Infantry had just taken over positions on the Rhine on about 5 January, just before the Germans struck. It is my guess that the 242d Infantry, with two battalions, had just taken over the positions of the 314th Infantry, allowing that unit to go into reserve and be available when the Germans attacked across the Rhine. Latter the 222d Infantry would relieve the 315th Infantry, allowing that unit to be rushed to Hatten and Ritterhoffen behind the 242d. The 222d Infantry was covering Strasbourg, just to the south on the Rhine, and was relieved by the 3d Algerian Division. So here's a link to the 12th AD website that provides a battle overview and from where I grabbed the excerpt. 12th Armored Division Here's a link to the 14th AD website. There's not much there but they were the prime player in the battle of Hatten and Ritterhoffen. I noticed there is a "combat study" PDF on the Fort Levenworth library site, but for me the file has some problem (maybe my Reader is too old). Combat History Page On to the map. At first I thought I might be able to do one map for the whole battle but that didn't work out. So this map just covers from January 6 to about January 15. Not shown is the relief of the right flank of the 45th ID by the 103d ID. Ironically, the 103d had left this sector to cover the portion of the Third Army front inherited by the Seventh Army in mid-December. There it sat quite until moved back to Alsace starting around the 10th of January. Also recall that the 36th Engineers and the 79th ID occupied Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, respectively, until about 3 January, when they pulled back to the line of the Maginot forts (marked with the light blue dashes). It's hard to express how thin the line on the Rhine was. IIRC the 232d Infantry had a sector 10 miles long. I counted the number of towns and it was greater than nine, the number of rifle companies in the regiment. Danger on Rhine Flank "On 6 January, the Germans began to probe seriously into Seventh Army's vulnerable, lightly held Rhine River flank which extended for some 26 miles above and below Strasbourg: An estimated battalion of enemy crossed to the general area Gambsheim-Offendorf, and further small elements continued to cross during the day. This was the beginning of a troublesome infiltration which the Germans subsequently exploited to full extent and which, considering the heavy pressure on the Army front, Seventh Army was not in a position to wipe out. Fortunately, the Rhine flank was shortened, so far as VI Corps was concerned, when First French Army's north boundary was shifted north along the river as far as Gambsheim. Elements of the 3d Algerian Infantry Div. had already begun relief of Task Force Linden in the Strasbourg area by 5 January, but due to enemy action, the French were unable to assume control of the sector until 7 January at 1915A. Although pressure was building up in the North, VI Corps 79th Inf. Div. began operations immediately to destroy the Gambsheim bridgehead. Units in the Maginot Line were relieved by Task Force Linden. The 232nd Inf. Regt. (Task Force Linden) cleared Kilsett and reached the woods north of Gambsheim. On 6 January Rohrwiller, Drusenheim, Sessenheim and Statimatten were cleared. Next day operations made little progress against stiffening resistance. Tanks and self-propelled guns had been ferried across. If the Rhine situation had been the only problem confronting VI Corps, things would have been simple. But enemy armored pressure was developing steadily on the 79th Inf. Div. front from the direction of Wissembourg. The German was intent on keeping the initiative and, when push through the Vosges toward Rothbach did not meet success, he shifted 21st Panzer Div. 20 miles further east to Wissembourg Gap. Any break in this sector would undoubtedly attract the 25th Panzer Grenadier Div. To meet this threat, Combat Command "A" of the 14th Armored Div. was attached to 79th Inf. Div. and on 6 January began moving to an assembly area north of Haguenau. Army Reserves Move East With the Schwerpunkt of the German offensive apparently moving east, Seventh Army on 6 January detached the 12th Armored Div. from XV Corps and attached it to VI Corps. General Brooks, commanding VI Corps, received authority to move one normal combat command plus a tank destroyer battalion east of the Vosges, but the remainder of the division was not to be moved except on Army authority. CC "B" of the 12th Armored Div. began movement through the passes to Hochfelden. Feeling that more armor was needed to deal with his situation, General Brooks at 1130A on 7 January telephoned Seventh Army Headquarters for authority to move the remainder of the 12th Armored Div. to Hochfelden. General Brooks was told to go ahead. Next day CC "B" began a series of operations against the Gambsheim cancer. It was not only from the front and flank that VI Corps was threatened — but also from the rear. The German 19th Army had been building up its forces in the Colmar Pocket for a drive north on Strasbourg. It was reported that Heinrich Himmler had taken personal command of German forces in the Colmar Pocket, and that Strasbourg had been promised to Hitler by 30 January as a sort of gift in commemoration of the 12th Anniversary of his rise to power. On 7 January, First French Army's II Corps received a strong attack in the Neunkirch-Witternheim area, and withdrew to Rossfeld. The attack from the south was obviously being coordinated with that from the Gambsheim Pocket in the north. The enemy appeared to be bringing more armor into play. Hatten-Rittershoffen Action What transpired during the period 8-25 January can best be told chronologically. The bitter fighting which saved Strasbourg does not fit into a neat picture. To emphasize the Gambsheim action at the expense of that at Hatten would be distortion. Nor should it be forgotten that enemy threats from the Bitche salient and on the VI Corps front continued to be very real long after the Rhine flank claimed first priority. As expected, the Germans drove viciously into the VI Corps Maginot position in the vicinity of Aschbach on 8 January. Shortly thereafter, 25th Panzer Grenadier Div. made its appearance in the Hatten area, apparently operating under command of 21st Panzer Div. in an attack called "Operation Feuchtinger" after the Commanding General of the 21st Panzer Div. It was apparent that the enemy was attempting a quick breakthrough to Haguenau, vital communication center, perhaps with the intention of effecting a junction there with enemy troops crossing the Rhine and with forces emerging from the Hardt Mountain salient. Through January 20, when the VI Corps executed a planned withdrawal, the fighting in the Hatten-Rittershoffen area continued to be extremely fierce. Both 21st Panzer and 25th Panzer Grenadier Divs. suffered heavy losses in armor and infantry. The enemy reinforced his troops in the Rittershoffen area on 13 January with elements of the 20th Parachute Regt., a recent arrival from Holland. The 10th SS Panzer Div. "Frundsberg" was reliably reported in the Kaiserlautern area. Meanwhile, considerable reshuffling of enemy units was on in the Hardt Forest area. "
While at the NARA II over the weekend, I found two Signal Corps photos that will be of interest: Caption reads: "Mail call for the 70th Division Infantrymen who fought to retake the French town of Wingen after the Nazi counter attack gained control of the town. 781st Tank Battalion, 274th Infantry." Date: 7 January 1945. Photographer: Newell. III-SC 337278, Credit NARA. The image is resized for this forum. Dave
And the second photo. The caption reads: "M-4 tanks move back into Wingen, France, after figuring in move to retake town from Germans after counter attack during night. "781st TK Bn, 274th INF REGT, 70th DIV, Wingen, France." Date: 7 January 1945. Photographer: T/4 Edward C. Newell, 163rd SPC. III-SC 337378, Credit NARA. The image is resized for this forum. Dave
so they really did wear grenades like that, thought it was a Hollywood thing. Gen Mathew Ridgway was called Old Iron Tits because of his habit of carrying grenades in that fashion.
Gen Mathew Ridgway was called Old Iron Tits because of his habit of carrying grenades in that fashion. Yep. My dad told me that they always wore two grenades on the front of their 'Harness', which is what they called their web gear. Dave
This should be my last planned map of German offensive operations in northern France. The 79th ID, with attachments from the 42d ID, held an extended bulge in the north Alsace plain. They attempted to eliminate the Rhine bridgehead but it was strength against strength. The Germans continued offensive operations that seemed un-coordinated but the pressure finally forced the Americans to withdraw to the line of the Moder and the Rothbach. Perhaps to rest units or perhaps to gather strength to conduct an offense against the Colmar Pocket in southern Alsace. Here's a link to a detailed description of the 12th Armored Division's fight around Herrlisheim. This covers the battles on January 7/8 and January 16/17. I can't recall a more one sided defeat for American armor. 12th Armored Division The excerpt is from the same Seventh Army Report (posted to the 12th AD website) that I excerpted earlier. Difficulty at Gambsheim "Despite all efforts to reduce the troublesome Gambsheim bridgehead, the Germans succeeded not only in maintaining it but in reinforcing it. When it had become apparent that the Hatten-Rittershoffen effort was stalemated, the enemy transferred his attention to the Gambsheim bridgehead. Accordingly, 10th SS Panzer Div. "Frundsberg" was ferried across the Rhine into the bridgehead. On 19 January, elements of 22d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were identified just southeast of Rohrwiller, and the following day elements of the 21st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment appeared at Rohrwiller. Moreover, elements of the 7th Parachute Div., which were originally destined to be committed at Hatten, were re-routed East across the Rhine and then ferried into the bridgehead. The purpose of this drive undoubtedly was to capture Strasbourg. In order to wipe out the Gambsheim pocket, VI Corps directed the 12th Armored Div. to attack on Corps order through elements of the 79th Inf. Div. and destroy enemy forces west of the Rhine River in the Offendorf-Herrlisheim-Drusenheim area. The attack was to be given maximum support by Corps artillery, D-Day was 16 January. On 15 January, while the 103d Inf. Div. was moving into lines on the VI Corps front and bitter fighting continued in the Hatten area, preparations were made for the 12th Armored Div.'s attack. Sixth Army Group had authorized the Seventh Army Commander to use the 36th Inf. Div. and 12th Armored Div. as he saw fit. A plan to use the 12th Armored Div. for two days on an offensive mission was subsequently authorized. Armored Attack Fails Next day 12th Armored Div's drive made good progress initially, but resistance stiffened and all units withdrew west of the Zorn River. The First French Army's 3d Algerian Inf. Div. attacked in the vicinity of Gambsheim. House-to-house fighting continued in the Rittershoffen-Hatten area, where the 79th Inf. Div. and 14th Armored Div. were in contact with elements of three enemy divisions. By 17 January, the Gambsheim pocket had been linked up with German forces to the north. The 12th Armored Div. continued its attack across the Zorn River, but on 18 January was forced to withdraw from Herrlisheim after heavy and bloody fighting. Sessenheim fell. Next day a battalion of the 79th Inf. Div. was surrounded at Drusenheim. Farther west, in the Bitche salient, the 45th Inf. Div. was attacking to regain contact with the isolated 3d Bn. of the 157th Inf. Regt. and other elements cut off by enemy infiltration. Not much progress was made. Withdrawal to Moder River Upon authority from Seventh Army, VI Corps on 20 January disengaged the enemy and commenced withdrawal to the general line Rothbach-Nieder-Modern-Haguenau-Bischwiller-Weyersheim. This shortened the 36-mile Corps front to 26 miles. A road junction one (1) kilometer northeast of Althorn was designated as limiting point between VI and XV Corps. Two battalions, the 3d Bn. of the 157th Inf. Regt. (northeast of Reipertswiller) and the 2d Bn. of the 314th Inf. Regt. (Drusenheim), remained isolated and all efforts to rescue them failed, although some personnel managed to filter back through the lines. On Sunday, 21 January, the withdrawal to the Moder River line was completed as planned except for a few minor elements. The Germans were left in thin air, and troops were disposed more favorably for Strasbourg's defense. The 36th Inf. Div. attached to VI Corps on 17 January, had now been moved into reserve positions east of the Vosges and had completed relief of the 12th Armored Div. on the Rohrwiller-Weyersheim line. Plans For Colmar Offensive While yielding ground temporarily in the Haguenau area, Sixth Army Group was planning to take the offensive elsewhere. On 18 January the Group issued a letter of instructions which provided for continuation of the defensive by Seventh Army while First French Army — augmented by American troops — moved to wipe out the troublesome Colmar Pocket south of Strasbourg. It was stipulated that Seventh Army would immediately turn over to the French the 2d French Armored Div. and one additional U.S. Armored Div. VI Corps' 12th Armored Div. was the logical choice. To cover this shift of forces, Seventh Army received within the period 16-23 January three divisions which had been deeply involved in the Ardennes fighting — the 10th Armored Div., the 101st Airborne Div. and the 35th Inf. Div. A fourth division, the 28th Inf. Div., began arriving at St. Die on 18 January and was placed under operational control of First French Army. The 75th Inf. Div. followed. Late in the evening of 24 January, Seventh Army informed General Haislip, commanding XV Corps, that he must be prepared on short notice to take over the XXI Corps' 18-mile frontage in addition to his own. It had been learned from Sixth Army Group that XXI Corps would immediately take over a sector of the. First French Army and would be placed in command of the 28th, 3d and 75th U.S. Inf. Divs. and 12th U.S. Armored Div. Seventh Army was to be responsible, of course, for administration and supply of these troops. At 1100A the following day, control of the XXI Corps sector passed to XV Corps. Troops occupying the sector included the 106th Cavalry Group, Task Force Herren and the 10th Armored Div., less CC "B". Enemy Repulsed on Moder The 35th Inf. Div. began arriving in XV Corps' sector on 23 January and immediately went into the line. It was a quiet day. The three Corps rested and refitted reserve troops and maintained contact by vigorous patrol action. There was evidence of an enemy buildup in the Haguenau sector. An attack against the 79th Inf. Div. outflanked the outpost line of resistance and entered Offwiller. The 14th Armored Div. was directed by VI Corps to relieve without delay elements of the 12th Armored Div. which were maintaining a reconnaissance screen along the Corps' rear boundary from Olwisheim to Marlenheim. In the II French Corps sector, the 3d U.S. Inf. Div. was progressing in its attack south of Guemer and liberated many towns, Next day VI Corps sustained five attacks and destroyed a number of enemy armored vehicles. The enemy had quickly followed up the withdrawal. In the 79th Inf. Div. sector, Task Force Linden's 222d Inf. Regt. was heavily attacked. The enemy crossed the Moder River in the vicinity of Neubourg after an artillery preparation. Regimental reserves had to be committed. The Germans on 25 January continued their efforts to get across the Moder River in strength. The 103d Inf. Div. received a strong attack in the Kinswiller-Schillersdorff area, but was successful in re-establishing its MLR. In the 79th Inf. Div. sector, the enemy succeeded in capturing Schweighausen and in getting troops into Bois de Ohlungen. To take care of this situation, VI Corps released the 232d Inf. Regt. and CC "B" of the 14th Armored Div. which — without further commitment of reserves — restored all positions. The 101st Airborne Div. began movement to VI Corps sector. On the following day, 26 January, the 103d Inf. Div. had annihilated enemy troops which had gotten into Schillersdorff, and a counterattack by the 79th Inf. Div. cleared up all enemy penetrations south of the Moder River. CC "B" of the 14th Armored Div. rejoined its parent unit in the vicinity of Wittenheim at 1545A. The German effort to cross the Moder River in the vicinity of Haguenau had apparently been discouraged. The month of January had seen Seventh Army engaged with more enemy armor than at any other time since D-Day in Southern France. The major effort in the attack which began 1 January had been provided by two Panzer and two Panzer Grenadier Divs., with the total strength of approximately 250 tanks and self-propelled guns, and a minimum strength at any one time of 170-180. The enemy had employed his tanks in comparatively large groups of 15 to 20 in his all-out efforts to break through the Alsace position. It is estimated that his total tank losses on the Seventh Army front were about 171. "
The third Bn of the 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th Infantry Division, was essentially destroyed at Reipertwiller in January 1945. The 157th had not sustained such losses since Anzio. The Battle of Reipertswiller In late January and Feb., the regiment replaced its losses and trained for the upcoming assault on the Siegfried Line. Dave Just wanted to bring this excellent link closer to the map that reflects this battle. And if I find the time, I'll check to see if it is possible to map the identified landmarks. Then, if I find the motivation, I'll try a detail map. **EDIT: The attached map should help the reader identify the hills mentioned. At almost the same time the 45th ID lost this battalion-plus, the 79th ID lost a battalion in Drusenheim. I can only recall the 35th ID losing an almost complete battalion, in September 1944, while attempting a crossing of the Moselle south of Nancy.
While doing a completely unrelated Internet search I came across this book written by a veteran of the 19th AIB, Keith Christensen. Recall the 19th AIB was part of Task Force Hudelson which screened the main Vosges sector. The passage starts on page 95 (page 104 of the PDF). http://www.swsupply.com/downloads/HeroForADay.pdf Print version for purchase here: S & W Supply Co. - Jim 'Whiz' White - Ponsness-Warren, Perazzi Sales & Gunsmithing Services
The 442d Infantry (Nisei) were attached to the 36th 'Texan' Division until the late fall 1944 and fought in the High Vosges. Before winter they were pulled out of France, rested and returned to Italy. In the spring of 1945 they fought along side the 92d Infantry Division (Buffalo Soldiers).
While doing a completely unrelated Internet search I came across this book written by a veteran of the 19th AIB, Keith Christensen. Recall the 19th AIB was part of Task Force Hudelson which screened the main Vosges sector. The passage starts on page 95 (page 104 of the PDF). http://www.swsupply.com/downloads/HeroForADay.pdf Print version for purchase here: S & W Supply Co. - Jim 'Whiz' White - Ponsness-Warren, Perazzi Sales & Gunsmithing Services Earthician, Your copy of Keith's book must be edited/abridged somehow. Page 95 of the copy Keith sent me years ago does not deal with TF Hudelson or Nordwind. On a related note, I cannot help but wonder if Keith's family knows his book is posted as a free download on the internet. The title page clearly states the work is copyright protected and "may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher." Keith was a great guy, and I very much enjoyed our discussions about his time in C Company, 19th AIB.
Nordwind started 1 Jan 1945, the first section below is what the veteran remembers. The second is the history written by Foster (Post #9). Note Sarreinsberg is part of Goetzenbruck Book page 102 (PDF page 111) .... The rest and calm lasted until 30 December. The area was now a fluid mess with many units, both U.S. and German, on the move. It was also cold and with a cover of snow. I doubt if the next few days were any more traumatic than any other in war but I have a complete blank of the activities and movements of the unit until we reached a town named Goetzenbruck. In fact, on examining the battalion history closely, I cannot find any reference to what I remember, a move - with vehicles - down a valley to the hills surrounding a large town named Bitche. ... .... Hudelson called his division for reinforcements, and was told the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion and A Company, 25th Tank Battalion, were on the way, with columns heading for Mouterhouse, Philippsbourg, and Baerenthal. ... The 19th Armored Infantry Battalion set up its command post in Mouterhouse and tried to send its A Company to reinforce Bannstein. However the roads, and Mouterhouse itself, were clogged with wrecked, abandoned and destroyed vehicles and cavalrymen on foot. German artillery fire splattered the town and its approaches. While A Company was trying to pick its way through the clutter and keep most of its vehicles out of the ditches, the Germans attacked from two directions. Chaotic to start with, the situation now turned to absolute pandemonium. Those who could do so got the hell out. The 19th Armored Infantry Battalion withdrew to Sarreinsberg with B and C Companies; A Company was scattered. The 117th Cavalry fled to Wingen sur Moder. ....
Read the book, When The Odds Were Even. It is a good study of the fighting in the Vosges. With that specific title and the reading; Keith Bonn’s fascinating study of this little-known World War II campaign offers a rare opportunity to compare German and American fighting formations in a situation where both sides were fairly evenly matched (really ? airsupport ? artillery ? fuel rations ? morale?) in numbers of troops, weapons, supplies, and support. This gripping battle-by-battle account shatters the myth that German formations were, division for division, superior to their American counterparts. it seems the main topic of this book is to prove americans are better if not equal to german troops in all aspects. This reeks of pinpicking data and leaving out undesirable information. Highly suspicious.
