The effect of the 11th Armoured carrying on 15 more miles to Woensdrecht and "putting the cork in the bottle" very likely would have made the Canadian role much different. With the exit points sealed from South Beveland and a secure footing over the Albert Canal, the tactical situation changes dramatically. With the 15th Army bottled up in Beveland, the remaining German forces are stretched even further and an advance to the Maas becomes more feasible. In fact, Rotterdam becomes a port option in that scenario. At that point, the presence of the additional six divisions of the 15th in Walcheren/Beveland does change the prospect for an immediate clearing of the Scheldt and the opening of Antwerp. How long that might have taken is pure speculation. However, with an unsupplied 15th Army and the ability to advance up the Beveland peninsula vs the flooded polder land of Breskins, the prospects are likely no worse. Simply masking the trapped 15th Army may have been preferred. Ironically, the inability for the German 15th Army to escape north may have been crucial to Market Garden as those troops played no small part in defeating that attack. The point is, be it trapping the 15th army or opening Antwerp, either outcome was an acceptable result.