Channel Islands Occupation/Raid/Dieppe alternative/etc..

I will try to get comparison photographs for 1 & 2 if anyone is interested

of course we are , we like Then & Nows.

 

The Distinguished Service Order
Captain Temporary Major Allan CHAMBERS, Canadian Intelligence Corps
DRAFT
A plan had been prepared on the fall of BREST to take a German General, (Mr. Black), who is a prisoner of war, to negotiate with Lieut.-Gen. von SCHMETTOW, Commander of the German garrison in the Channel Islands, with a view to securing the capitulation of the Islands.

Copies of a letter inviting von SCHMETTOW to attend a parley at sea, under Article 32 of The Hague Convention, were dropped from aircraft at night, with flares, on the enemy H.Q.

In spite of a report from the pilot that the copies of the letter were believed to have fallen into the sea, Major CHAMBERS, accompanied by "Mr Black", set off on the morning of 22nd September, 1944, in an unarmed R.A.F. sea-air rescue craft flying a white flag, and arrived just after mid-day at the appointed rendezvous, some five miles off ST. MARTIN'S HEAD, GUERNSEY.

As there was no sign of any German emissaries, Major CHAMBERS decided to take the craft right into the harbour of ST. PETER PORT and compel the enemy to parley with him. A German motor-boat, with guns manned and without a white flag, then put out and drew alongside, so Major CHAMBERS went aboard and demanded to see von SCHMETTOW.

After messages had been flashed to the shore and back again the request for an interview was refused, so Major CHAMBERS returned to the R.A.F. craft and put to sea again, being fired at by the enemy batteries while passing ALDERNEY en route to CHERBOURG.

Major CHAMBERS showed great courage and coolness throughout this hazardous mission and handled a delicate situation with sound judgment

Recommended for the award of the Distinguished Service Order

Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
Unit: Canadian Infantry Corps
Captain, Temporary Major Alan CHAMBERS, GSO 2. FWD/SHAEF

"FOR BRAVERY AND SKILL IN A SECRET OPERATION IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS 22 SEPTEMBER 1944"

1. Appended hereto is a copy of the report dealing with the operation which was carried out in mine-infested waters.

2. Major CHAMBERS displayed outstanding courage and perseverance in carrying out his mission to contact the enemy commander personally, in that:

a. (see para. 6) He deliberately ran the gauntlet of the enemy batteries although he had every reason to expect a hostile reception;

b. (see para. 12) He deliberately misunderstood the enemy signal to halt and proceeded further in toward the enemy HQ in an endeavour to get ashore before they could put off;

c. (see paras. 15 to 22) He showed great courage and disregard for his personal safety in going aboard the armed enemy craft alone. He handled a very delicate and difficult situation with extreme coolness and very sound judgement.

d. Para. 24 emphasises the risks taken.
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WO 373/97-ir323-p49-62

 

Report by Capt Chambers:
TOP SECRET
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Welfare Division
24 September 1944

SUBJECT: OPERATION "NEST EGG"
TO: Brigadier General R.A. McClure, Chief, PWD/SHAEF.
FROM: Major Alan Chambers

Further to my report on the above dated 15 September 1944.

1. On 18 September 1944 it was decided at SHAEF (FORWARD) to postpone the PWD plan to bring our German General (Mr. Black) into contact with Lt. General von SCHMETTOW Commander of the German garrison in the CHANNEL ISLANDS until after the fall of BREST.

1. On 21 September 1944 BREST having fallen and the meteorological forecast being favourable for the ensuing 24 hours period it was decided to proceed with the attempt.

3. Accordingly I notified the USN Chief of Staff at CHERBOURG (Captain CLARK) to alert the craft and arranged with the Leaflets Section to make a night drop, with flares, of a letter to von SCHMETTOW (in duplicate). (See Appendix "A"). This letter stated that, under article 32 of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 I, as accredited representative of the Supreme Command accompanied by two companies would arrive at a point 4 1/2 miles South of ST. MARTINS HEAD, 142 degrees (True North) at 1100 hours (GMT) on 22 September 1944. It invited von SCHMETTOW to come to the same point at that time. It was further stated that our party would travel in R.A.F. sea air rescue craft No. 2632, flying a white flag and completely unarmed, and that our course would be due west from the mainland at CAP GARTERET to the point specified.

4. The air drop having been arranged to take place at approximately 2300 hours on 21 September 1944 on the enemy H.Q. at ST. PETER PORT - GUERNSEY I left for France in the afternoon to complete arrangements with Major Lord ABERFELDY and Mr. BLACK arriving at GRANVILLE at 1930 hours.

5. At 0150 hours on 22 September 1944 Captain FOX (Leaflets Section) telephoned from LONDON to advise that our pilots reported the result of the drop to be poor. That it was just possible that the letters had been received but that due to drift they more probably had fallen in the sea off ST. PETER PORT.

6. I advised my companions forthwith and after discussion it was agreed unanimously to take the chance that one of the letters had been received.

7. Accordingly at 0845 hours on 22 September 1944 we drove to CAP CARTERET and from the beach went aboard R.A.F. sea air rescue boat No. 2632 (F/O Robert CHANDLER, R.A.F.) and left for the rendezvous at 1045 hours.

8. From my first report dated 15 September 1944, it will be recollected that our plan was to proceed to the rendezvous and if the enemy did not appear after a reasonable interval I was to go in alone in a dinghy with an outboard motor under a white flag with the object of forcing the enemy to receive me. Our plan then was that I should endeavour to speak to von SCHMETTOW and tell him that a high ranking German Officer (Mr. BLACK) was in our boat and that he wished to confer with him. It was hoped that I might then persuade von SCHMETTOW to come out to our vessel - Mr. BLACK made it plain that he would not personally land but that von
SCHMETTOW must come to him.

9. About 25 minutes after leaving CARTERET we sighted the north east coast of JERSEY and ran due west along it at about 16 knots. Visibility was poor and it is certain that the enemy could not see our white flag and probably not even our craft. The enemy batteries took no action.

10. At 1200 hours on the same course we sighted SARK, visibility was still poor. The enemy took no action.

11. At 1240 on the same course we sighted ST. MARTINS HEAD Island off GUERNSEY and arrived at the rendezvous 4 1/2 mies to the south of the Head at 1246 hours being then 46 minutes late. There was no sign of anyone so we preceded in at about 10 knots and prepared to drop our dingy overboard.

12. We continued to move in at reduced speed and stopped at 1320 hours in the roadstead of ST. PETER PORT (the enemy H.Q.) about 1 1/2 miles off shore at SARDRIER BUOY. At 1325 hours the enemy fired one white very light and we replied with two very lights. We did not know what this signal meant but naturally took it to be an invitation to come in.

13. Accordingly we proceeded further in and then launched the dinghy at 1335 hours. I got in with one seaman and a white flag. Unfortunately in spite of repeated efforts by several of the hands the outboard motor refused to start.

14. At 1350 hours I decided to take our craft in further and row the dinghy to shore - accordingly we started up again and moved in towards ST. PETER PORT inner harbour.

15. At 1355 hours an enemy motor boat fully armed without a white flag put off from the inner harbour and approached at speed with her guns manned. We continued to move in and made contact at 1400 hours by hailing in German over our loudspeaker.

[There is no Point 16]

17. The enemy boat contained a naval full Lieutenant (Oberleutnant See MEYER-LOTTING) an Army 2nd Lieut. - interpreter - and a crew of eight. I told them my orders were to contact von SCHMETTOW personally. They invited me aboard and I went aboard alone.

18. In his cabin MEYER requested my authority and my mission. I produced my written authority (Appendix "B") signed by Lt. General MORGAN on behalf of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and he then communicated the exact German text by light signal to the Admiral on shore about one mile away. I then suggested we should proceed in, in his boat. He said "not until I have permission". Adding, "if you have come about a surrender let me tell you now that is useless". I replied that I had nothing to discuss with him and that my orders were to contact von SCHMETTOW personally. I asked MEYER why no one had been at the rendezvous to meet us. He stated that hey had no knowledge we were coming. I asked if they had seen our drop the night before. He said "Yes, I was on sea patrol last night and saw two parachutes fall in the sea about one mile east of ST. MARTINS HEAD."

19. At about 1425 the reply came out by light signal from the Admiral acknowledging my credentials and asking my business. At my request Lt. MEYER replied by the same means that I wished to speak personally to von SCHMETTOW.

20. At about 1455 hours the reply came back "specifically what matter does Major CHAMBERS want to discuss". At this point I had to make the decision whether to answer that I had a high ranking German on my boat and disclose my full purpose to the occupants of their boat and the Admiral, and his staff, as well as to von SCHMETTOW. This I was prepared to do if it seemed at all possible that von SCHMETTOW would come out to talk to him. (BLACK, as described above, would not go in) I saw no purpose in disclosing my hand unless there was a reasonable chance of attaining my objective. There was also the possibility that they might have ordered BLACK brought in by force. As they were fully armed and we had no arms such an order could have been carried out. BLACK would have been no great loss but it would he made a good story for GOEBBELS. I conferred over the ships rail with Major Lord ABERFELDY and we agreed that my answer should be that I wished to discuss the "general military situation" with von SCHMETTOW, hoping that they would let me in when I would be able to persuade von SCHMETTOW to talk to BLACK.

21. At 1520 hours the reply came back "Lt. General von SCHMETTOW is fully informed as to the military situation and therefore declines any discussion" and ordered MEYER to break off and return to ST. PETER PORT, forthwith, I requested a written copy of this last communication and append it hereto (appendix "C"). I then asked MEYER if he as well as von SCHMETTOW understood the full import of this refusal. He said he was sure they all did. I repeated my question slowly and solemly in English to the Army 2nd Lieutenant and again in German so that all might hear. He also agreed, but was quite visibly shaken. I then left and went aboard our craft.

22. The events described above took place in full view of a number of interested civilians in and about ST. PETER PORT approximately 1 mile off shore - and would also of course have been clearly visible to our people on SARK.

23. At 1530 hours we got underway and set a course for CHERBOURG (as the breeze was increasing) by way of LITTLE SARK, BLANCHARD BUOY and FORAINE TOW without interference from the enemy.

24. At 1700 hours in the RACE of ALDERNEY when abeam of ALDERNEY distance 6 miles approximately the enemy batteries fired a salvo at us, scoring a near miss, the burst falling to port and starboard simultaneously, distance from 10 to 50 yards. Only prompt evasive action by our skipper F/O Robert CHANDLER, R.A.F. saved the craft and occupants. Some damage to hull on both sides and one slight casualty. Ammunition was identified from fragments as 88 mm. We arrived at CHERBOURG at 1840 hours. (At appendix "D" is a sketch of our course).

25. REMARKS
The following notes are the result of joint observations and from my conversation on board the enemy craft held during the intervals between the despatch and receipt of messages to shore:

(a) It was clear that we were not expected and from remarks on the boat that we had probably not been seen at all until close to ST. MARTINS HEAD. Their watch was apparently poor.

(b) From the behaviour of the crew, the conduct of the two German officers and their remarks it would appear that the enemy will to resist is no unanimous.

(c) The Army Officer indicated by his conversation that as the Division had been on the islands so long their relations with the civilians were very friendly. The troops regarded themselves as prisoner of war in effect already and saw no reason why we should not leave them that way.

(d) It was noticeable that their craft was poorly found - except for their weapons. Their uniforms were threadbare and ordinary supplies like cigarettes and sugar etc. were lacking.

(e) We saw no sign of mines or underwater obstacles anywhere.

(f) Major Lord ABERFELDY, Mr. BLACK and I agreed that it seemed probable that von SCHMETTOW (like the other remaining German commanders still holding out in the West) had received a definite order not to treat with the Allies and to refuse all demands for surrender. Compliance with this order being assured by control in Germany of the families of the officers.

(g) We agreed however that it was quite possible that MEYER's communication to shore had been dealt with by the SS and that von SCHMETTOW had not been entirely in the picture.

(h) We agreed that force would be necessary to get a surrender but that not much force would be required.

26. CONCLUSION

(a) In view of the above I believe that no further specifically Psychological Warfare attempt should be made except in conjunction with a show of force.

(b) May I be instructed please to discontinue nightly air dropping of information leaflets (NACHRICHTEN) on the Islands.

Signed Alan Chambers
Major, G.S.

See attached file for original documents including Appendices mentioned here and in previous post

 

G F
What a super account, and I don't doubt that everything was indeed planned for maximum effect on the Germans. I'm glad though that the Islanders didn't witness it.

The report was attached to the recommendation and the file can be downloaded free of charge here - file 323
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If you have the time I'd recommend that you have a browse through it - just in case I missed out any snippet.

Are you connected to this site by any chance?
http://www.festungguernsey.supanet.com/

Regards
Diane