Gort knew already on the 26th of May that the Belgian army was unable to " fill the gap in the direction of Ypres " and that the only hope of saving the situation was a counter attack by Gort or by reserves of which he had none ! So we are at odds as to what extent of BEF troops rushed into the area to fill the gap? Besides the British had abandoned the Weygand Plan after the failure at Arras on May 21-22- 23. The Belgians counted on the Weygand Plan for a determined attack south of Arras, the possibility of such an attack being successful had been diminished by the British failure at Arras.Thus Gort diverted troops north to Gravelines Douai- Bethune in the west. The wedge driven by the enemy between the British and Belgian was greatly widened, the Belgians already holding a front of 90 kilometers had no reserves left to throw into the gap.Already deployed toward a different objective, Gort was then in full flight to the coast. The Belgians had suffered so seriously from low flying attack that they were on the verge of cracking, unless strong RAF intervention took place. No such intervention ever took place. On the 25th may, by which time Gort had decided to withdraw, The BEF were holding 97 miles of the 128 mile front of the British / French salient, suggesting that they were doing their share. They were not at that time 'in full flight to the coast.' The 'British failure' at Arras was of course a British / French failure and was substantially contributed to by the failure of the French to deliver forces. This is of course a criticism of those in command and not of the soldiers on the ground, of whichever nationality. Gort certainly knew that an eight mile gap had appeared beyond the Lys towards Ieper as the Belgians were driven northwards. Only units of the British 12th Lancers were present. 143 Brigade were sent immediately and 13th & 17th Brigades of 5 Division were present from 26th May. These three brigades together with 1 Corps Heavy Artillery faced three divisions of the German IV corps. ...That sounds like a pretty determined effort to plug the gap to me. If the Belgians were troubled by aircraft attack then one has to question the extent of their anti-aircraft provision and also the state of 'preparedness' which led to their airforce being almost totally destroyed on the ground on 10th May It ia also a little unfair to criticise the RAF whose suicidal attempts to destroy the bridges that the Belgians had failed to blow on the Albert canal led to such losses of Fairy Battles and their crews. Peter Taghon refers to the decision to locate the Commander of the Grenswielrijders / Cyclistes Frontieres in Lanaken, out of sight of the bridges for which he was responsible as "een fiasco" I have seen it reported that the ultimate decision to demolish the bridges was only taken once a messenger had cycled to HQ to request it. Ultimately, it probably is all the fault of the British. After all, it was they who allowed the odd historical anomally of Belgium to be created when with hindsight, it would probably have been better to give half to France and half to the Netherlands. It would certainly have saved a lot of whinging about always being other people's battleground (conveniently forgetting that the indigenous aristocracy of the region were just as prone to starting wars as anyone else).