A Bridge Too Far.

Discussion in 'Books, Films, TV, Radio' started by Peter Clare, Nov 17, 2006.

  1. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    I found myself wondering (again) how many tit bits within the film were very factual or if there was some poetic licence used. As an example did the Major in the Dorsets actually exist who was sent on sick leave for rocking the boat....I'm assuming he would have been a Brigade Intel Officer at that rank rather than a Battalion Officer.
     
  2. horsapassenger

    horsapassenger Senior Member

    Drew

    The officer sent on sick leave was Brian Urquhart and the story is absolutely true.
    Coincidentally Major Tony Hibbert, who was captured at the Bridge and subsequently escaped on Operation Pegasus 1, met and worked with Brian again on Operation Eclipse. It would have been very interesting to listen to their discussions on the outcome of Market Garden. Tony has said that they were fully aware of Brian's concerns and had seen the photos showing the presence of German armour.
    Tony and Brian remained good friends and I was present at the lunch in Holland in 2009 where the Arnhem Fellowship was launched. Although Sir Brian could not be present he sent a message of encouragement.

    John
     

    Attached Files:

  3. Cee

    Cee Senior Member Patron

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  4. Ron Goldstein

    Ron Goldstein WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Cee

    Many thanks for the Urquhart Youtube link.

    I urge anyone who hasn't seen this to do so.

    The excerpt about entering Belsen is particularly not for the squeamish but deserves another airing.

    Ron
     
  5. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Gerard

    I recall reading somewhere - some time ago - that Cornelius Ryan as the name implies was a Southern Irishman who like many others carried the Battle of the Boyne 300 years ago on his shoulders along with a hatred of all things British which came to the fore in his books of both TBTF and The Longest Day - whilst he was dead for the making of The Longest Day - his wife of equal hatred was chief advisor ......the less said about Attenborough the better - at least he didn't become an American as did the Ryans...

    Cheers
     
  6. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Horsapassanger wrote:

    "The officer sent on sick leave was Brian Urquhart and the story is absolutely true."

    Except that there is no evidence of "low-level" photos taken before the op that showed "tanks on the DZs/LZs" - mainly because there were no "tanks on the DZs/LZs"!! The photos seen in the film were taken especially for the film. See the After the Battle books for the full story.

    It's a bit like the trip by Beddel Smith to Monty on 15 Sep that he told the US official historians about after the war - the same meeting when he says he warned Monty about the presence of panzer divisions at Arnhem but Monty "waved the warning aside" - the only problem is that he did not visit Monty on 15 Sep!

    Regards

    Tom
     
  7. horsapassenger

    horsapassenger Senior Member

    Tom

    I agree that there were no photographs of tanks on the LZ's/DZ's but I am happy to accept Tony Hibbert's word that he saw photographs of German armour refitting in the area. After all he was Brigade Major and had attended all the briefings.

    John
     
  8. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    John,

    I have enormous respect for veterans like Brian Urquhart and Tony Hibbert, however, is it possible that perhaps after all this time their memories might not be absolutely perfect?

    If Tony Hibbert saw photographs of German armour refitting in the area at any of "the briefings" why was Brian Urquhart seemingly alone in his pre-mission concerns? It's one thing suggesting that there was a pre-mission "conspiracy of silence" throughout the division but surely there would have been other voices shouting post-war about this evidence. Indeed, if the Brigade Major of 1 Parachute Brigade saw photographic evidence of German armour refitting in the area why did the Brigade Intelligence Summary issued on 13 Sep say:

    "To sum up : There is no direct, recent evidence on which to base an estimate of the troops in the immediate divisional area."

    This report was issued by the Bde IO (a Captain) who would have been working for Major Hibbert - if subsequent information was received that provided 'direct, recent evidence' then why was it not passed on to the Battalions?

    The After the Battle book on Market Garden debunks the supposed low-level photo mission that Brian Urquhart claimed took place - there was high level photo reconnaissance though. Is it possible that he had picked up the news of panzer divisions withdrawing into Holland to rest and refit at a higher HQ (one with access to Ultra?) but had to "invent" the low-level photos as evidence to cover the true source? If so, he would have had to maintain this deception until the 1970's and perhaps by then he felt he had repeated it too often to change his story (or perhaps he had built a memory that that was what had happened).

    I've watched a little bit of the Brian Urquhart interview when he talks about the build up to Armhem. Much of it is simply not based on historical evidence, or on what he would have known at the Corps HQ - for example, he makes great play of Patton being stopped ("there was nothing in front of him", "this was a great mistake"). Is that based on what he knew at Airborne Corps at Moor Park or on what he subsequently read? The German panzer divisions at Arnhem were equipped with "heavy armour" against which the Airborne troops were "defenceless" - how many Anti-Tank guns did 1 Airborne Division take to Arnhem? How did they manage to hold out until 25 September?

    Again, I have enourmous respect for these gentlemen as veterans but just as I would be very cautious about using a general's memoirs as evidence, I think we should be allowed to respectfully challenge a veteran's memories when there is simply no supporting evidence for them. I know there are a couple of veterans who use this forum and I would hope that they do not feel that I have offered them any disrespect (for that truly is not my intention) - if I could, I would be more than happy to buy them a pint and say "thanks mate". :salut: :)

    Regards

    Tom
     
  9. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Tom O'Brien

    Being one of the few veterans on this forum - I can assure you that your comments do not displease me in the slightest as my memories of yesterday lunch is a bit suspect but my memory of the days of Ahrnem are etched
    firmly in my mind as I lay on a battlefield from approx 2.pm. until dark in Italy on that Sunday 17th September 1944 - the Ahrnem thing was all over before I knew of it..but like you I have grave reservations about the whole thing - why did Brereton allow Browning to drop his Corps HQ into the battle zone - why was the intel of the panzers not acted upon - why did the 82nd drop short of their bridge - why did the 43 Div have to clear the way instead of supporting the guards - why was Brereton missing thoughout that battle .....etc etc etc

    Cheers
     
  10. horsapassenger

    horsapassenger Senior Member

    Tom O'Brien

    I know that you have expressed some scepticism about there being any knowledge within the First Airborne Division of any German Armour being in the vicinity of Arnhem prior to Market Garden. You might therefore be interested in the attached First Airborne Intelligence Summary for Operation Comet which, as you will be aware, was cancelled on September 10th. From this document it would appear that, even at the planning stages of that operation, they were aware of the presence of one Panzer Division, with about 50 tanks, refitting in the area north of Arnhem. As prior to the 7th September Operation Comet was known as Operation Fifteen I would date it on or about that date - ie at least a full week prior to Arnhem.

    John
     

    Attached Files:

  11. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    John,

    I'm not sure that I actually expressed "scepticism about there being any knowledge within the First Airborne Division of any German Armour being in the vicinity of Arnhem prior to Market Garden", my scepticism is about the account that Brian Urquhart gives of the low-level photo recce producing photographs of armour and of that evidence being dismissed by Browning.

    To say that they were "aware" of the presence of a panzer division, "with about 50 tanks", is also a bit of a stretch from the information quoted in their Intel Sitreps of the time. You are missing out all the uncertainties involved in the summaries; and you also miss out words like "battered", which they use to describe the panzer division. There were certainly not "50 tanks" in any case.

    Julian Thompson asks a pertinent question in his book on the parachute regiment; which was why, in the light of the available intelligence, did the troops appear to be briefed that they would not meet heavy opposition.Something about the intelligence should have set middle ranking officers "nostrils twitching" IIRC.

    BTW thanks for posting the document.

    Regards

    Tom
     
  12. Hesmond

    Hesmond Well-Known Member

    Last night nothing to do so poped on thd dvd ABTF , i am of an age that when the film was in production i can recall a few of the rows this caused and rember seeing it on release feeling that Attenbrough had droped thd ball with this ,but last night the anti British comments just seemed to keep on coming ,is it just me or does any one else feel the same?
     
  13. merdiolu

    merdiolu Junior Member

    It was more an Anti Montgomery theme. "Like American tough boy paratroopers did what they were assigned , it is just Monty's tankers who stopped for tea that let down brave British Red Devils in Arnhem and caused whole mess" The book has same anti Montgomery stance coming from writer Cornelius Ryan also. It is just fashionable to blame unfriendly Field Marshal who had died and can not defend himself anymore for every Allied setback.
     
  14. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I don't think the Ryan book is bad at all. He was a journalist, yes, but a very experienced one who was familiar with military subjects. The film unfortunately, could not go into such great detail as the book did about the complexities of the operation, why it failed, and who was responsible. In the end, you get the impression from the movie that Montgomery and Browning were most at fault. A careful reading of the book (and any book on Arnhem, I think) shows that failures were multiple and many persons bore some responsibility for them. Urquhart is portrayed as a hero in the film (as I think he mostly was), but the film glosses over the fact that he lacked airborne experience and failed to insist on a drop zone closer to Arnhem Bridge. Horrocks is mostly portrayed in a good light in the film, but he bore ultimate responsibilty for XXX Corps slow progress and bad traffic management.

    And as far as it goes, Montgomery did indeed bear ultimate responsibility for MARKET-GARDEN as a whole, so it is entirely right to assign him some of the blame for the failure. That's how it goes if you are in supreme command: if you are big enough to claim credit for victory, then you must also be big enough to accept blame for defeat. MARKET-GARDEN was Montgomery's baby, he pressed hard for the operation and argued with Ike until he got it, but it was not his finest hour. Montgomery was known for careful, thorough planning, attention to detail, and avoidance of undue risk, but MARKET-GARDEN exhibited few of these virtues. Montgomery was trying to press the enemy hard and exploit what appeared to be a moment of weakness, and his praiseworthy eagerness to do so led him into uncharacteristic haste and over-optimism. In some ways, it was his least typical battle. It was certainly his least successful.
     
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  15. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I wouldn't worry much, though. It's not a very good film anyway.
     
  16. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Many conveniently forget that MARKET-GARDEN was on Eisenhower's watch - he'd taken the reins back from Montgomery as land forces commander at the beginning of September.

    As for the film, it's probably not so much anti-British as pro-American, seeing as that was the major market (no pun intended) it was aimed at. The best thing about it is the James Caan segment - it's long enough to make one of those vital cups of tea without missing anything interesting.
     
  17. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Of course, Eisenhower gets some blame for approving the operation in the first place. Montgomery pressed for it, and the execution was his--or rather, Miles Dempsey's. I haven't gotten deep enough into the Arnhem literature to know what role Dempsey played in the failure. He never seems to get the attention he deserves.

    I don't think the film is particularly anti-British. As to the market question, the US is of course the biggest English-speaking film market in the world, but I doubt that Attenborough was hovering over the screenwriters saying, 'let's throw a bone to keep the Yanks happy here.' He's British himself and he remembers the war. I think it was the inevitable over-simplification and smoothing out of rough edges and inconvenient details that happens in so many historical films. I see it done in films about US history too.

    I found some of the American bits in the movie tedious, but the 82nd and 101st did mostly succeed in accomplishing their missions. That's no reflection on the 1st Airborne, though; the British airborne were just as good as the Americans and they did all that guts and skill could do, the bad plan was certainly no fault of theirs. Urquhart and Hackett were very bitter about XXX Corps' slowness, so you have some British officers finding fault with other British officers.

    One point that I think bears remembering: MARKET-GARDEN was a failure in that it did not accomplish the main objective, but it was not a complete failure. Half of Holland was liberated. Even more importantly, the Germans suffered heavier casualties than the Allies, many of them in a persistent and futile counteroffenisve against XXX Corps' bridgehead on The Island between Arnhem and Nijmegen. Almost nobody points that out.
     
  18. ethan

    ethan Member

    I think it's actually a pretty good film (although Max Hastings rightly points out that the 'Bridge too far' comment probably never happened and indeed, without the Arnhem Bridge the other bridges were nowhere near as valuable; a plan to grab the others and not that one would never have been made).

    I think it's a rather anti-military/anti-war film in it's own way too, not that surprising considering when it was made.

    For me the fine points are the good performances almost across the board, the fight scenes at Arnhem and the final scene with Kate Van Der Horst's family leaving their house/improvised hospital.

    Since others have brought the subject of blame up, I can only repeat that again-as often happens- Hastings' judgements sound sane and sensible to me.

    There's also the simple fact that the US troops in this operation achieved their objectives with greater success than the British did, so it's inevitable that something of this comes across in the film.
     
  19. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    No wish to become involved in this saga of who was to blame for what but - both "Bridge too far " and " The longest Day " books were written by a Southern Irishman who like many of his land are STILL

    fighting the Battle of the Boyne of 300 years ago - they just can't let go of that defeat and consequently their hatred of Britain is paramount and keeps on returning - the latest being the IRA troubles which still

    bubble away in the background and no doubt will continue well into the future..I know only too well the many who fought alongside me in WW2 specially in the NIH - but they didn't quite hate Britain...

    Cheers
     
  20. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    But, of course, the US Airborne Divisions did not achieve all their objectives - Son bridge was blown, and the Nijmegen bridges were only captured after Guards Armoured Division arrived and joined in the fighting there. Whether these failures were down to poor initial planning, a failure to prioritise the seizing of bridges over the holding of drop zones or due to underestimation of the likely resistance seems to be the root of the matter.

    As for the Ryan book (and subsequent film), they now remind me a bit of my Ladybird books on history - nice pictures but very superficial.

    Cheers

    Tom
     
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