Researching the history of my fathers infantry battalion I am struck by the rate of attrition. In the 11 months between D Day and VE day his battalion lost 4 COs Killed or wounded and had a total of over 900 KIA, wounded or MIA in the first 3 months, 500 in the first month alone, well over 100% casualties. Presumably this battalion was not unique. Where did all the replacements come from? I understand it may be possible to train a fit young man to take his place in a rifle company or drive a tank in a few weeks or months; but how long does it take to train a battalion CO, other officers and senior NCOs? Given the relatively small size of the prewar army where did they all come from? Also how did they maintain unit cohesion over time? Battalions would have trained as units for 2 years and would have landed as tight knit efficient units which within days would have changed to a group of virtual strangers. How did this change units fighting effectiveness?
Where did all the replacements come from? Hi Ray, Short answer: wherever they could be found. One of the great organizational mistakes made by the British Army during the latter stages of the Second World War was to underestimate the number of infantrymen it would need once full-scale battle was resumed in Europe. By the autumn of 1944, 21st Army Group was 10-14,000 infantrymen short and it had to resort to the desperate measure of breaking up existing divisions (the 59th, and later the 50th) just to keep the other divisions in the field. Surplus men from the RAF and RN eventually had to be transferred to the Army too (much to their chagrin). The US Army suffered from a similar miscalculation also. Best, Alan
Canada's re-inforcement shortage started in Italy, where many wounded men were rushed back from the hospital to the fighting, before they were properly healed. By the winter of 43/44 the Canadian First Infantry Divison was down to 50 percent of normal strength in all its infantry units, and in some armoured units it was only 30 percent of normal. After D-Day, the Second Divison was starting to also be ground down through the bitter fighting in Normandy. Meanwhile, over 100,000 trained conscripts were based in Canada, as the government had promised that they could "sign up for home service only" and never have to go overseas unless they volunteered to go. Canada's original volunteer army was now fighting in Europe, with fewer and fewer men. The "Home Service Only " men were bitterly nown as ZOMBIES, by the fighting troops. In the end a very small number, 13,000 actually signed to go overseas. Less than 2,000 of the Zombies actually got to a fighting area, before the war ended.
Quite a few Infantry Regiments relied on recruits from the Commonwealth the augment their officer losses, with junior officers from Rhodesia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc serving in the closing stages of the war.
In Italy AA units were often broken down and transferred to line infantry positions. Needless to say that the guards didn't take too kindly to these pseduo-infantry. Oh and the 2nd Battalion CG fought most of the italy campaign with an entire company of scotts guards ('S' coy) because of shortages of reinforcements after the vicious battle of Ornito.
......................... Meanwhile, over 100,000 trained conscripts were based in Canada, as the government had promised that they could "sign up for home service only" and never have to go overseas unless they volunteered to go. .............................. I guess this explains the 'Canloan' scheme I've read about where Canada had a 'surplus' of several hundred junior officers they lent to the British Army. When I visited the Hermanville Cemetery in Normandy I was surprised how many of the officers in my fathers battalion were Canadian. Maybe the officers either weren't limited to home service or were more inclined to 'volunteer'. Either way they made good officers I believe.
I understand it may be possible to train a fit young man to take his place in a rifle company or drive a tank in a few weeks or months; but how long does it take to train a battalion CO, other officers and senior NCOs? Given the relatively small size of the prewar army where did they all come from? The US experience was that, with the rapid expansion of the US Army, many pre-war junior officers (USMA, VMI, The Citadel, OCS or ROTC; hopefully the most promising) were quickly promoted to Captain and Major. The US, like the British, had generous battalion staffs to fill. These then became a pool for Lt. Colonel, which only required some additional schooling in command and staff operations. Because of this relative abundance of battalion grade officers, it limited the number of company commanders with combat experience to rise to battalion command. Although this did occur in long serving units like the US 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions. So I would hazard the guess that, with Britain's long war, they found it possible, and hopefully effective, to get many more battalion CO's with combat experience.
This is probably worth a book of its own. Even given that some men became casualties several times the losses in the infantry were horrendous. Infantry replacements were found from many sources. However it was not possible to train infantry quickly from scratch so there was a progression. Some surplus units which had training but not as infantry were quickly retrained as Lines of Communication units to replace infantry battalions who were used in that role. Redundant Royal Marine Landing Craft crews and redundant AA regiments provided several battalions. There were a range of Belgian units raised. However this simply increased the load on fully trained infantry who spent even more time in harms way. The RAF regiments rifle units were remustered into the army and used as front line infantry. Usually as replacements but in some cases providing entire companies. Officers were found by similarly retraining those who were already trained for service in other arms. These included artillery, pioneer and RASC officers. Elderly or low category officers were sent to fill administrative roles and release active officers for fighting duties. Many NCOs were also commissioned. Mike
This is probably worth a book of its own. Even given that some men became casualties several times the losses in the infantry were horrendous. ...................... Mike Hi Mike, I'm sure you're right. Quite apart from the human drama/tragedy involved it represents a mammoth management/leadership problem. I recall reading in a couple of places that the casualty rate for British Forces in Normandy was actually higher than on the Somme in WWI. I must admit that I didn't take this too seriously but maybe my cynicism was misplaced for once. Is there an authorative analysis available anywhere on comparative casualty rates for different branches, corps etc.? Ray
Ray - One of the sad facts on the diminishing Infantry force was that they were allegedly the lowest of the low - and no one wanted to be known as "just infantry" - consequently there was a rush to fill other units - paras - commandos- special forces etc - and so towards the end we had an abundance of "specials" who were underemployed and an infantry force full of AA- Navy - RAF base wallahs et al who were retrained in weeks..... Canuck explained where the Canadian Government fell short in maintaining a Volunteer force which affected the 1st Division badly after their losses at Sicily - Ortona and the Liri Valley - without replacement - so in my own last battle with them we had six Tanks supporting what was supposed to be two companies of Seaforths- which was a joke as both were down to around 75 men each from 150 - in the first attack we lost five Tanks and after that day ended the Seaforths had lost a further 90 men - then the panic started in Ottawa- it should have started long before then .. Likewise the British had an abundance of Tanks going into the Liri Valley Battles with a GOC who boasted that he had 2000 Tanks - of which he could lose 50%- and he damn near did with close to 5000 men as casualties -Gerry Chester lost 14 Churchill Tanks in the first day - as did 51st RTR - the G.O.C. was moved out to Burma ! Cheers
Ray - Further to the replacement position - every regiment - and brigade had an LOB -left out of battle - core of men and officers to replace casualties - sometimes this was never enough - as an example we had started one month long battle with nine officers who had survived North African and other battles - at the end of that month we had nine different Officers..... Cheers
Ray What a lot of people fail to recognise is that life in WW2, particularly with the front line services, could be best described as organised chaos. My own unit, the 49th LAA Rgt.RA, whilst at Cassino, found itself used as smoke layers and stretcher bearers to the infantry in addition to it's conventional purpose as anti-aircraft gunners.. It was only because I was permanently involved in manning the lines of communication that I was spared being used in either of those roles. In addition, when my unit was eventually chopped up for spares in December '44, I found myself going back to school in order to learn tank gunnery. The depot was based at Rieti in Central Italy and was full of troops from every unit all wondering where in the hell they were all going to end up ! Organised chaos, indeed ! Ron
I recall reading in a couple of places that the casualty rate for British Forces in Normandy was actually higher than on the Somme in WWI. I must admit that I didn't take this too seriously but maybe my cynicism was misplaced for once. Is there an authorative analysis available anywhere on comparative casualty rates for different branches, corps etc.? Hi Ray, John Ellis' classic The Sharp End (republished in 2009) is anecdotal rather than comprehensive, but it discusses the relative casualty rates in 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. Stephen Hart's Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (2007) is good at putting Montgomery's performance as 21AG commander in the context of British manpower shortages. Best, Alan
Ray, I am afraid that my information comes from the Administrative History of 21 Army Group. This is available on line but I cannot remember where. I have a paper copy from MLRS but it is not with me at the moment. The situation was worse in Italy and Ron is correct in saying that it was common for all manner of unit to be sent to sit in the front line foxholes and save the front line infantry for the assault work. This of course made their losses even greater. Mike
Some of the reenforcements came from breaking up existng formations. As well as 50th & 59th already mentioned some Home forces such as 45th Wessex Div was disbanded & it's personnel posted elsewhere. 45th Div On 1 December 1941 it was placed on a lower establishment and finally disbanded on 30 August 1944. This division did not see active service during the war. Good memoir of a 7th Wilts chap who was later posted to 5th Wilts. Conscript at War - The Wardrobe
As this is 'General' I thought I'd mention how it was planned and carried out in GW1 as I saw it. Because the British Army was not at 'war' all Bns were at peacetime establishment (a half to a comany's worth less than what they should have had), this is accounted for by under-recruitment, soldiers on leave, courses, sick, lame and lazy etc. Therefore: 1. Bns reallocated all their soldiers into as many of their own Coys as possible, leaving an empty Coy space. 2. These Coy spaces would be filled by other Bns i.e. the Staffords got a Plt of Gren. Gds and a Plt of RGJ. The Scots DG got a troop of 17/21 Lancers and so on, but all combat arms did the same. 3. Other units were filled up with drafts from units that, as yet, were not earmarked to go. (my Armoured unit was in Cyprus, so I was sent to an Artillery Regt) This came about because initially the Americans wanted the UK to send a Division, of 3 Bdes, each of 2 x Tank Regts and 2 x Armd Inf Bns. However, we couldn't supply that, (I'll not go into the reasons right now), but all we could send was a Bde of 2 x Tank Regts and 1 x Armd Inf Bn (even these had to be topped up!). 4. When the force had to be Bumped up to a Division, it increased by 1 x Tank Regt, 2 x Armd Inf Bns and an Artillery Bde (me!) of 1 x MLRS, 1 x M 110 and 1 x Air Def Regt. Not quite the Division we'd hoped for. Now we come to the BCRs, or Battle Casualty Replacements. Some of my colleagues went to the ADR, or Armd Delivery Regt/Sqn and others went to the IDR, Infantry Delivery Regt/Coy. Consisting of a hotch potch of crews, sect & Plts made up from every Tank Regt and Infantry Bn in the Army. So much for family Regts and the strength of local recruiting. However, it is my belief that it is good standardised training, proven drills, strong discipline and a belief in your cause which makes the army work effectively, not the age or name of your Regt, although I do have a soft spot for county Regts, and hate, yes hate, what the govenment has, in the past, and is going to do in the future, i.e. ammalgamate Bns into Large Regts an then disband the junior ones e.g. 3rd, 4th, 5th Bns (Look out the Rifles & The Royal Regt of Scotland!), remember the Fusiliers, Queen's and LI. I can understand why the units from 50 and 51 Divs mutinied at Anzio but 'needs must when the devil drives' as anyone will be put anywhere to fill the gaps. Regtl names/Bns were re-distributed around the country in WW1 because the local recuiting system meant that hundreds, if not thousands, of men were lost from the same area of Britain in one battle. I believe a Bn of the Black Watch was raised, probably just re-named, on the Isle of Wight! Finally, (thank God for that!) Conclusion: "Where did they all come from?" - Anywhere and Everywhere. Luckily at that time we had a very helpful Empire then. The Commonwealth now supplies a considerable amount of our troops, strangely enough, quite a few South Africans and Rhod....... Zimbabwians.
