Private Diary: Royal Army Service Corps, 51st Highland Division by Major B SHAND

TNA Catalogue Reference: WO 217/10

Context: Private War Diaries of Various Army Personnel, Second World War, British Expeditionary Force
Scope and content: Private Diary of Major B Shand, R.A.S.C.
Covering dates: 1940 Apr.- June

Courtesy of Drew

 

PRIVATE DIARY (UNOFFICIAL) of B.E.F. OPERATIONS 1940 by MAJOR B. SHAND, ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS
51st HIGHLAND DIVISION ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.


INDEX

MOVE to SAAR - ST. VALERY
MOVE AY-SUR-MOSELLE - ETAIN
SOMME
SPARE PARTS


RATIONS
JUNE 9th
JUNE 10th
JUNE 11th


AMMUNITION
AMMUNITION SUPPLY
SOMME
JUNE 8th
JUNE 9th
JUNE 10th
JUNE 11th


PETROL SUPPLY
MOVE to SAAR
MOVE to SOMME
JUNE 9th
JUNE 10th
JUNE 11th


No. 9 AMMUNITION SUB PARK

152 FIELD AMBULANCE

FURTHER TRAINING & ORGANISATION

 

Move to SAAR - ST. VALERY
26th April - 12th June 1940.


The move of the 51st Division from ESTAIRES area to the SAAR presented the first serious problem to the DIVISIONAL R.A.S.C., as a whole - though the Supply Column functioning fully from the first day after landing in FRANCE, had encountered and surmounted quite exceptional difficulties, especially during the period of several weeks when the DIVISION was divided between the BETHUNE and BOLBEC areas.

The absence of Troop Carrying Companies and road restrictions imposed by the French necessitated the move being made by road and rail, the former, with attached troops, being spread over six "flights".

With a normal supply situation existing, and the movement order issued in ample time for the adjustment of demands, and strengths of road and rail parties, it was decided to provide additional Preserved Rations for train parties and a system of supply for road parties, by which, supply lorries, carrying two days fresh rations would accompany each flight, under the supervision of a Supply Officer who organised the issue of rations on arrival at each staging area.

A Composite Company of Supply, Petrol and Ammunition preceded the Divisional move in company with an advance Brigade, and it was upon this Composite Company commanded by Captain W.M.S. WOOD, that the supply of the DIVISION on arrival at the SAAR was based, R.A.S.C. vehicles automatically linking up under this Command on reaching the dispersal point of their "flight", and so ensuring normal supply. The Company was for this purpose based on WOIPPY in the vicinity of the existing D.I.D.

The organisation of the actual move worked smoothly though the staging areas LE FERE and ST. MENEHOULD, the difficulties experienced being the feeding of road and rail parties on arrival, owing to shortage of vehicles and the almost complete absence of indents from units showing strengths.

A further difficulty, resulting in long hours in the dark, over unknown and bad roads for all driving personnel, was the absence of accurate location statements.

With the Divisional strength over 20,000 it was obviously impossible for a Divisional R.A.S.C. to cope with the demands on its recognised establishment. It was therefore decided to concentrate all Supply vehicles of attached units under one command and form a Composite Corps Supply Column, under command of Captain HAINING ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS, of the R.H.A. Supply Section. This Company was located at HAGONDANGE and while administered and operating separately, came under general command of the Divisional Supply Column - to which Captain HAINING reported daily for orders. Prior to the formation of the Composite Supply Column the Divisional Supply Column personnel broke bulk for almost 22,000 men. After formation of the Composite Column the latter drew in detail for the units it served, direct from D.I.D. WOIPPY.

This experiment proved highly successful and simplified the handling of the large SAAR Force from the supply point of view. It should be noted that although the SAAR Force was increased to 21,700, NO additional Supply Personnel were available even for the Composite Corps Supply Section. The Divisional Supply Column in spite of the fact that it was working at full pressure had also to lend 12 men to D.I.D., where they were based for almost the entire period.

Nevertheless, to meet the existing situation - 3rd CORPS having provided the minimum vehicles possible for Supply and Petrol - every vehicle was in constant use. Meantime the demands made upon the Divisional R.A.S.C. for vehicles to equip the permanent base staff was a serious and constant danger to the whole system. Why the permanent base staff should have been without essential transport in vehicles and men was never understood.

The difficulties of supply to units arose mainly through the failure of units to submit indents in time and regularly; failure to provide guides at Supply Points, particularly when reliefs were in progress, which made location of units at night difficult, it laid down that delivery be carried out during the hours of darkness.

This latter, an instruction from the French, held many disadvantages over delivery by day, when the roads were invariably used freely by much unessential traffic, over which supplies were entitled to priority. The outcome would have been the saving of much valuable time, greater convenience for units and strain on R.A.S.C. personnel.

During the period on the SAAR, the Supply Column was located at AY-SUR-MOSELLE when bulk was broken daily. This entailed the concentration of a large number of vehicles in a small area. Camouflage was, however, to the satisfaction of the Divisional Camouflage Officer, and to provide against air attack a scheme was rehearsed by the Echelon commanders under which the village was actually cleared and the 8 operating sections distributed under natural cover in the surrounding area in 2 1/2 minutes.

 

MOVE AY-SUR-MOSELLE - ETAIN.
When the Division was ordered to move to the ETAIN area, the question of supplies again presented a problem in that no British R.H. or D.I.D. existed. Consequently the Supply Column was to remain at AY-SUR-MOSELLE and work forward from the existing D.I.D. at WOIPPY. Unfortunately the French, taking over the MAGINOT LINE insisted upon occupying AY, and the Supply Column was forced to move to VILLE-SUR-YRON, at very short notice, in fact, while one Echelon was actually delivering, with the result that a small quantity of supplies had to be dumped.

To continue operating the Supply Column from WOIPPY to the Divisional area meant long hours on the road and made preparations for the subsequent move to the SOMME one of extreme difficulty.

The repeated and rapid change in orders made it impossible for the S.S.O. to adjust demands, and in any even the comparatively small D.I.D. at WOIPPY, originally opened and staffed to deal with a Brigade, and never augmented or enlarged to meet the needs of a force of 20,000 was unable to cope with the conditions. All fresh meat had to be drawn by the Supply Column from METZ.

Eventually train parties left at such short notice that only an extremely rapid delivery of preserved meat enabled any rations to be made available and it was utterly impossible, in the time available, for the Column to collect, far less deliver, rations according to Divisional orders, namely, two days fresh rations for road parties, the strengths of which, incidentally were never given to the S.S.O. To meet the emergency the Supply Column decided on its own initiative to load every available lorry with at least two days preserved and if possible in excess of this, for each unit of each flight.

To do this only one Echelon and one section of the second Echelon were available, three sections and the supply personnel of one Echelon, under command of Captain D. CROCKART having been ordered to move to PACY under their own arrangements, in order to feed flights on their arrival there. This meant that an almost intolerable strain was placed on both the operating and the supply personnel of the remaining echelon and section. Almost continually the former were delivering
(a) to units in the wide Divisional area - one section working as far away as VARENNES - with little information regarding unit locations and continual trouble caused by the failure of guides to turn up at S.P.s - making special deliveries to train parties - or loading up to proceed with a road flight.
(b) running back to WOIPPY or METZ to pick up more bulk: while the latter worked in relays almost without a pause - breaking bulk not only for normal delivery, for train parties and for road parties, but also making up special deliveries to brogan up to strength all those units who were short of their full complement of 2 days preserved. The work of this supply section was directed, under particularly difficult circumstances and almost entirely without reliable information as to strengths, by Captain H.L. PUMFRETT and Staff Sergeant J. STUART.

The Composite Corps Supply Column formed to deal with Corps units reverted to the direct control of the Supply Column Commander.

For the purposes of the move to the SOMME area, the arrangement of a Supply section with each flight was not feasible owing to shortage of vehicles, and it was decided to attach vehicles to individual units, although a Supply Officer travelled with each flight to supervise the use of rations and to arrange the feeding of small road parties for which no specific rations had been loaded.

It was fully recognised by the R.A.S.C. that under the chaotic conditions preceding the move to the SOMME, the supplies that could be carried were insufficient to provide any reserve for the Division on arrival and arrangements were accordingly made with WOIPPY D.I.D. to forward by train to MONTMIRAIL additional rations to be collected by Supply lorries of each flight and carried to final destination. This train never turned up.

On arrival at the new area it was found that the advance Supply Echelon for PACY had been redirected to ROUEN and was working from Base Camp there, under conditions of extreme difficulty - drawing bulk in the afternoon, breaking at high speed, and delivering at night to train and road parties as they arrived. The situation was extremely unsatisfactory owing both the the tremendous difficulty in location units and to the fact that the distances to be covered were far too long for a single echelon to maintain.

Unit lorries, attached for the move were instructed to report to the Supply Echelon at ROUEN immediately on the arrival of their flights.

Some of these vehicles did, but many were retained by units and used for unit purposes and the Supply Column were forced in one or two instances not to deliver rations to bring home to these units that without vehicle the most efficient R.A.S.C. could not be expected to supply them.

 

SOMME
With the completion of the move the Supply Column concentrated at MAUCOMBLE WOOD - working from R.H. at BOSC-LE-HARD. Greatest difficulty was once again the failure of guides and the alteration of unit locations without notification. Many units throughout the whole period in action never appreciated the fact that certain responsibilities rested upon them in maintaining an adequate supply organisation, and their repeated moves, without notification, which invariably coincided with a stoppage in the submission of indents, did more to upset the whole system of supply than anything else.

On one occasion the Supply Pack for the Division failed to reach R.H.

By 6th June, with reports of German advanced on the Right of the Division the supply organisation for the Division through ROUEN Sub Area completely broke down.

On being informed that BOSC-LE-HARD R.H. was to be closed C.R.A.S.C. visited ROUEN Sub Area and found preparations being made to evacuate ROUEN immediately.

C.R.A.S.C. was informed R.H. would now be MARTINVILLE, ROUEN, but as all Sub Area Staffs were evacuating the Division would require to staff the R.H. themselves. Two trains, it was stated, were to be at this R.H. for the use of the Division.

The approaches to MARTINVILLE R.H. laid down by Sub Area were as unsatisfactory and unsuitable as it was possible to imagine.

Both Supply Captains were immediately dispatched to reconnoitre the R.H.

No Supply trains were there. R.T.O., Movement Control and A.D.S.T. had all left ROUEN.

 

SPARE PARTS
Although hardly a supply question the matter of spare parts and replacement of vehicles for the whole C.R.A.S.C. following losses by shell fire and accident in the SAAR and on the SOMME was one of the extreme urgency, but C.R.A.S.C. on his visit to ROUEN Sub Area on the 8th June was informed M.T.S.D. at ROUEN had been evacuated, all vehicles and spares having been loaded on board ship and therefore none were available for his requirements. Application would require to be made to NANTES.

 

JUNE 9th
With rations definitely running short for the Division owing to the failure of the Packs to turn up at MARTINVILLE, No. 2 Echelon of the Supply Column and one section of the Composite Supply Column was despatched to LE HAVRE to draw two days preserved rations for the Division and attached troops.

Both Supply Captains went with this echelon which travelled independently in sections under section commanders at 1 1/2 hour intervals. On arrival at No. 3 B.S.D. it was discovered that this depot had been evacuated. The Sections as they arrived were therefore redirected to the D.I.D., which was on the point of being blown up. 3 1/2 sections were loaded with 40,000 rations and left D.I.D. to return to LINTOT - preceded by Captain T.S. CAIRD. The remaining lorries of "G" Section and Composite Supply Column were halted on the outskirts of LE HAVRE and instructed immediately to return to LINTOT. Neither Captain CAIRD nor any of these sections returned to LINTOT, nor has anything been heard of them beyond the fact that certain officers and men are known to have got back to the U.K. It is presumed therefore that they were stopped at some point on the return journey and diverted to safety. Meanwhile the second supply captain (Captain H.L. PUMFRETT) having seen the loading operation completed returned independently to LINTOT.

Meantime, fortunately the Supply Column - No. 1 Echelon had accumulated certain surpluses. These were broken and delivered from LINTOT to about 75% of the Division who were in receipt of instructions in time to send guides.

In evening C.R.A.S.C. was ordered to produce every possible vehicle for Troop Carrying and from necessity, plus the fact that NO further rations were apparently to be supplied to the Division, 30 lorries from what remained of the Supply Column were cleared of stores and with others from the Ammunition Company. Petrol Company and No. 9 Ammunition Sub Park proceeded to FECAMP with 154 Brigade. These lorries were under the command of Captain CROCKART. Captain HAINING was despatched independently to FECAMP for purpose of reorganising the ration dumps under the defence scheme.

The remaining Supply vehicles were ordered to jettison all stores and move to CRUCHET.

 

JUNE 1Oth

At CRUCHET a Supply Point was opened and the remainder of the rations in hand were issued to units who sent lorries during the forenoon. At midday the Column moved to MANNEHEIM where it remained until 2000 hours, when a further 20 vehicles were taken from Troop Carrying. The remainder of the vehicles hung on at MANNEHEIM awaiting orders until 0130 hours next day.

 

JUNE 11th
When instructions were issued to move to a point between ST. SYLVAN and ST. VALERY, the main road being reported full of Divisional transport, the Column was held until first light at 0230 hours, when it moved by side roads into the area. Approaching ST. SYLVAN by road to the East, the Column was caught by enemy machine gun and mortar fire from a South West direction - several men, lorries and cars being lost.

The remainder got away into ST. VALERY and parked in the vicinity of the beach where they were later joined by several of the vehicles that had been despatched on Troop Carrying. The total vehicles left out of the Column numbered 20 with about 100 Officers and men. This remnant remained in ST. VALERY all forenoon and part of the afternoon while ST. VALERY was being intermittently shelled and attacked from the air. Some of the wounded received attention in the adjoining French hospital and nearly all were evacuated about midday in one of the Column's own lorries to the nearest Field Ambulance.

At about 1400 hours when the shelling was closing in from the East side of the river to the West and growing more continuous, the remnant of the Column was led down to the beach by the O.C. Column. Having no information about which beach was to be used for evacuation or when evacuation might be expected, he chose the West beach - after having it reconnoitred as being likely to afford greater safety from shelling. A message to the effect that this move was being made was sent to C.R.A.S.C. by the M.O., who was endeavouring to return to H.Q. No direct communication with C.R.A.S.C. had been had since the O.C. Columns visit to him at approximately 0900 hours.

On the beach were discovered between 1,000 and 2,000 Frenchmen in a complete state of disorganisation. All was quiet except for German reconnaissance aircraft, till after 1500 hours when German tanks (number unknown, but judging from later events, very few) appeared on top of the cliff overhanging the beach and commenced to machine gun it. The Frenchmen at once surrendered and the small remnant of the Supply Column had no option but to follow suit.

The enemy, however, had not secured ST. VALERY itself and before they could get their Prisoners off the beach a British detachment appeared at the jetty end of the beach. The surviving Officers and a small number of men succeeded in getting at the need of the beach and joining this detachment. The greater number, however did not follow and remained on the West beach throughout the night. From information gleaned from R.S.M. TUCKER after capture it appears that they were made Prisoner the next day in this area. The party who entered ST. VALERY remained there throughout the shelling of the evening and night and the survivors were made Prisoner there next day - except for Captain WOOD and 2/Lieutenant PAULI who were not seen by the O.C. Column after 2130 hours. Captain (now Major) WOOD is definitely known to have got back to the U.K. and 2/Lieutenant PAULI is believed also to have escaped. Captain A.F. McINTOSH (H.Q. Captain) who had remained with C.R.A.S.C. all day did not rejoin O.C. Column till late in the evening, when he made his way into ST. VALERY with the first detachment of the Divisional Ammunition Company.

The S.S.O., accompanied by the remaining Supply Captain were captured en route to LE HAVRE to investigate the Supply situation there and to look for the missing Echelon.

From clearance of last pack at BOSC-LE-HARD supply position from the drawing end became hopeless. Full rations were delivered for two further days (9th and 10th) from the last pack plus odd surpluses accumulated, but ROUEN Sub Area apparently found it quite impracticable to supply the Division at all after 8th June and none of the promised reserves of rations ever materialised.

After 9th June Column could not make delivery to units owing to absence of guides, while the loss of one Echelon plus Troop Carrying detachments made it impossible for the Column to continue to perform its proper function.

It is noteworthy that the Division Supply Column had been operating over long periods during moves night and day, continuously from the arrival of the Division in FRANCE until the ST. VALERY episode, and on NO occasion, despite lack of vehicles, personnel and data, failed to effete delivery to units, and the fact that vehicles stood up to gruelling tasks speaks highly of the efficiency of the Column mechanical staffs.

Major K. STEWART was a most successful Supply Column Commander.

 

AMMUNITION SUPPLY
Immediately the Division reached the SAAR the Ammunition Company, of the R.A.S.C. were given a heavy task to perform, and the situation of A.R.H., previously selected, and the restricted nature of billeting accommodation made it at once obvious that proper use could not be made of the Ammunition Sub Park, or 3rd line, attached to the Division from 3rd CORPS. Accordingly it was an unusual organisation that was evolved to carry out the C.R.H.'s dumping programme of

500 rounds per 25-pounder gun
(except for the Troops in the Ligne de Contact where only 200 rounds per gun was to be maintained).

400 rounds per 4.5 Howitzer
300 rounds per 6-inch Howitzer

TOTAL = 32,400 rounds.

Owing to enemy observation restricted movement - one vehicle per hour on each road - was laid down during the hours of daylight forward of the MONNERN Ridge.

Another unusual demand made upon the Divisional R.A.S.C. was that it must provided transport and loaders to unload Ammunition Trains arriving at A.R.H. and form an area dump at a previously laid-down site, one that provided no cover of any description and was an obvious target to any enemy aeroplane.

The drain on vehicles and personnel in meeting the requirements of A.R.H. and the base staff at WOIPPY D.I.D., including permanent guards, reduced the carrying capacity of both the Divisional Ammunition Company, and the Ammunition Sub Park, which was aggravated by the necessity of setting aside a number of vehicles for ROYAL ENGINEERS work daily. In order not to immobilise any Company, and it being essential not to interfere with the operation of the Supply Column, the duties were divided as equally as possible between the Ammunition Company, Ammunition Sub Park and the Petrol Company.

The ammunition, taken from the second line loads was sufficient to meet the needs of the forward troops, and to begin the batteries on the main line of defence. This work, despite taking the lorries up to within 800 yards of the German outposts, was carried out without incident.

There was a few days delay until the arrival of the first of the ammunition trains. To deal with the latter all S.A.A. and explosive loads were dumped in RURANGE WOOD and work of unloading was kept up all day and delivering to guns at night.

Daily throughout this programme every vehicle, apart from those in workshops, was fully employed. The presence of an R.A.S.C. Company organised for ROYAL ENGINEERS work would have greatly facilitated all services. Despite all demands of an outside nature, it was gratifying to all ranks to know the dumping programme was completed on time and to the satisfaction of the C.R.A.

A.P.'s met the normal daily expenditure demands of Batteries and Brigades, communications being maintained by D.R., but there was always an alarming shortage of Rifle Grenades and Tommy Gun ammunition, wires for replacement of which were ignored.

Following the outbreak of hostilities in the North, when the Division was ordered away from the SAAR to the ETAIN area, the Division Ammunition Company was ordered to pick up all ammunition remaining at gun positions and a new dump to be formed at ST. BENOIT Wood. This work was immediately begun, the same restrictions as to movement forward, as existed during the original occupation of the MAGINOT LINE, being maintained. Much of the ammunition picked up had to be man-handled to the lorries over a considerable distance of rough ground before being loaded and the route to ST. BENOIT and return was approximately 60 miles.

Fully 1200 tons of ammunition was moved in this afternoon without incident.

Twenty vehicles of the Corps Ammunition Sub Park were detached and left behind under the Officer in charge A.R.H., RURANGE to load ammunition remaining on area dump back into trains, which it was intended, at that time, should be sent to the new area occupied by the Division. This never materialised and neither the officer in charge, the trains, nor the lorries were ever contacted again.

 

SOMME
On receiving the warning order for the move to the SOMME area, the Ammunition Company, and the Ammunition Sub Park completed their normal second line loads as accurately as possible from the ST. BENOIT dump, the remainder of the ammunition being left to be dealt with by the A.R.H. officer at RURANGE on completion of his work at the latter place.

Immediately on the arrival of the Ammunition Company at ST. SAENS Wood, the site of a large dump of all types of ammunition, orders were issued to set up A.P.s at WATTLEBLERY, MONCY and VISMES. Owing to the extensive expenditure of ammunition by the gunners it was necessary to dump at those A.P.s and up until 6th June an almost 24 hours ferry service was maintained by the Ammunition Company, to keep pace with the demands made upon them, the ammunition, as before, being delivered by the vehicles direct to the gun positions.

During this period of strain it was decided the Company location was too far back and with a view to bringing the Ammunition Sub Park into line with their normal role, the Division Ammunition Company was moved forward to the FORET de HELLET.

The German Air Force about this time was showing considerable interest in woods and the ammunition dump at ST. SAENS and the vicinity of the Ammunition Sub Park and Ammunition Company and the A.P.s were all bombed, but no damage was done beyond scattering one or two dumps of S.A.A. and Tracer ammunition, much of which was exploded.

In the early stages of the big expenditure of ammunition by the Division of inexplicable policy of ROUEN Sub Area again came to light.

When the anticipated demands of the Division for ammunition were known, C.R.A.S.C. visited ROUEN to investigate the position of ammunition supply from the base. ST. SAENS dump he was informed contained abundance of ammunition and would be in a position to meet all the requirements of the Division.

On visiting the O.O. in charge ST. SAENS C.R.A.S.C. unearthed a totally different story, which showed a woeful lack of co-operation between the Sub Area and the Dump.

This O.O. offered, from the outset totally indifferent to the needs of the Division. It was agreed there was an abundance of 25-pounder H.E. and S.A.A. but many particular types required were very short or entirely non-existent and to the astonishment of C.R.A.S.C. the officer in charge informed him he was making no further returns with a view to having deficiencies made up and on the contrary was evacuating the dump at the rate of TWO TRAINS PER DAY.

In answer to a query as to the 6" H.E. and smoke available, the officer said that any requirements would require to be notified early as all 6" ammunition was high in the priority list of evacuation. Naturally as it was impossible to foretell how much ammunition the Divisional artillery would require in the near future the position was most unsatisfactory and far from reassuring.

In the interval a Subaltern of the Ammunition Company discovered an Ammunition train lying in a siding at CRITOT with an Officer and a few Other Ranks of Ordnance in charge with no definite orders and who was only too willing to supply an ammunition he had in order to get his train empty.

So here we had the extraordinary position of the main ammunition dump of the area being rapidly evacuated while another train of ammunition had been brought up to a nearby station and left under no definite control or policy.

On 6th June orders were issued to move A.P.'s back South of the River BRESLE on the next day a narrowing of the Divisional front enabled the A.P. on the Right flank to be moved nearer the coast.

 

JUNE 8th
All A.P.s were recalled and instructions issued to units to intimate Ammunition Company of ammunition requirements. No demands were received during the day and in the evening the Company, moved back to MANNAHOEULIN where again no demands were made.

 

JUNE 9th
Orders were issued by C.R.A.S.C. to destroy all 6" ammunition and one section of the Company was ordered to proceed empty to FECAMP where they would load with ammunition to feed the 17th and 75th FIELD REGIMENTS. The 6" Section of the Corps Ammunition Company which had been incorporated within the Division Ammunition Company since the SAAR proceeded to FECAMP.

C.R.E. was instructed to prepare a line of demolitions on the route to LE HAVRE and all explosive lorries of the Ammunition Company and Ammunition Sub Park proceeded to TOTES, BOLBECK, GODERVILLE and other places on the line. None of these vehicles returned.

 

JUNE 10th
The ammunition Company was again on the move on the 10th and in the evening were ordered to find a location at NEVILLE. While at the latter point information was received that an effort would be made to evacuate the Division the following evening and that all available ammunition was to be kept on wheels up to the last moment, in case of urgent demands. Certain demands for 25-pounder H.E. were received and delivered during the day.

 

JUNE 11th
No demands for ammunition were received and at 1400 hours Division H.Q. moved to ST. VALERY. About the same time the enemy began shelling NEVILLE and bombing roads in the vicinity. Later in the afternoon orders were issued for the destruction of all empty vehicles and that the Company should move into ST. VALERY. The move was made by sections.

On arrival at ST. VALERY it was crowded with troops with no definite instructions. Orders from C.R.A.S.C. were to get under cover on the edge of the town and await instructions. This was done but an attempt by small detachments of the enemy to establish themselves on the high ground East of the town and overlooking ST. VALERY demanded some action and "A" Section under Captain J. GEORG moved up in an endeavour to dislodge the Germans. The section did good work and succeeded in at least hindering the enemy although losing a number of men killed and wounded.

Another section of the Company under Captain STEWART and 2/Lieutenant D. BEST proceeded to the beach at ST. VALERY about 1900 hours and again suffered casualties through shelling.

The remainder of the Company under the Company Commander remainder in ST. VALERY and at 2200 hours were instructed by C.R.A.S.C. following a conference with the G.O.C. at Division H.Q. that the Company together with all other R.A.S.C. units would proceed at once to the beach East of the jetty, where it was hoped boats would be available to evacuate the men.

Accompanied by Captain T. SHANKS to show the way C.R.A.S.C. led the Ammunition Company and guides from the other Companies to the beach. On approaching the main square it was seen that the houses were burning fiercely and street barricades in flames from end to end, with a great deal of ammunition exploding. Fire from the cliffs on the South side was also being maintained by the Germans. C.R.A.S.C. and Captain SHANKS proceeded ahead and succeeded in reaching the jetty but there were no boats or naval representatives to be seen. Captain SHANKS then returned to Division H.Q. and C.R.A.S.C. encountering A & Q looking for the naval representatives again returned to the beach with Colonel RONEY-DOUGAL. On this occasion a route through the burning buildings was found and when A & Q returned to Division to report no sign of boats C.R.A.S.C. conducted the Ammunition Company and guides through the barricades and houses to the beach, where the men were distributed along the promenade wall to wait.

Later the enemy searched the beach with 6" mortars, inflicting a number of casualty which was dealt with by 152 Field Ambulance who had three dressing stations in houses on the front.

With the first streaks of dawn a large number of ships, naval and transport were seen approaching from the North and Captain SHACKLETON of the ROYAL SIGNALS succeeded in getting in touch with them by means of a hand torch. As the mortar fired from the South cliff and Machine Gun and 2-pounder fire from the East and West cliffs had intensified, the naval units were asked to shell the cliffs. This message was picked up and for a considerable time the West cliff was shelled so successfully that the German guns were silenced.

At the same time an aeroplane flew low over ST. VALERY and dropped Verey Lights which raised the hopes of all that an effort would be made to bring in boats.

Unfortunately this did not materialise but it was noticed that some ships appeared to be very close to land at a point about 5 miles along the coast.

A number of men proceeded in this direction and later Colonel BUCHANAN of 152nd Field Ambulance sent a number of wounded on the strength of a report that men were being taken off. About 0400 hours Major D.K. THOMSON moved this Ammunition Company towards the boats, but found himself under fire and was forced to give up the attempt. A number of men of the Ammunition Company and the Petrol Company, however, succeeded in getting on to a ship which grounded on the ebb tide. The enemy engaged this ship with a 5.9 Battery from the cliffs and completely wrecked it. Many casualties were inflicted and at least ten bodies of R.A.S.C. men were washed up on the beach.

About 0600 hours a French Brigadier reported to C.R.A.S.C. asking to be taken off but was informed there were no boats for this purpose. He informed C.R.A.S.C. that the French Corps Commander had capitulated and that white flags had been put out in ST. VALERY. C.R.A.S.C. ordered the removal of these flags and sent a message by Signal Officer to Division relating the position on the beach.

At 1000 hours this Officer returned reporting that the G.O.C. had agreed following the capitulation of the French Corps Commander, to surrender and with the order that C.R.A.S.C. should fall in the men on the beach and march them back. This was done.

 

PETROL SUPPLY

MOVE to SAAR
One of the biggest problems of moving the Division from ESTAIRES to the SAAR was the supply of petrol for approximately 2200 vehicles over a distance of approximately 250 miles. The wide variation in the consumption of petrol made estimating requirements extremely difficult, but it was decided that no bigger average than 5 M.P.G. would be safe accordingly the move was based on 112,500 gallons of petrol.

C.R.A.S.C. visited G.H.Q. with a view to arranging dumps of petrol of staging areas, but this was considered impossible at least so far as first stage at LA FERE was concerned.

To meet this situation a section of the Petrol Company proceeded ahead of the Division to each staging area - LA FERE and ST. MENEHOULD. At the former stage this petrol detachment had to run a ferry service from the G.H.Q. dump at RHEIMS to LA FERE where, as at ST. MENEHOULD each flight was refuelled as it passed through. This system worked smoothly throughout. A workshop section at each stage dealt with vehicle casualties.

S.S.O. and Petrol Officer with the Composite Company that accompanied the advance Brigade meantime contact SAAR Area Commandant regarding Petrol supply. British petrol was promised but until its arrival French petrol was drawn. This was found to be of very poor quality and most inconvenient to handle, the minimum container being of 10 gallon capacity.

The policy laid down by G.H.Q. was that a dump of 100,000 gallons, plus lubricants be maintained for the SAAR Force.

The site of this dump was fixed by the Area Commandant despite the disapproval of the S.S.O. and Petrol Supply Officer. The following disadvantages were pointed out, but ignored.

1) Did not permit of a circuit for vehicles.
2) Was in front instead of in rear of Petrol Company locations.
3) A ditch bordered the entire length of the dump.
4) Location was on edge of village
5) Site was too small and did not permit of adequate spacing of dumps.
6) Cover was totally inadequate.

Repeated objections were made to the continued use of this dump, but the answer always given was that it was an area responsibility.

The responsibility of the Area was not very apparent beyond the appointment of a Petrol Officer and a small staff. All work on the dump and all Petrol Trains arriving in the area being cleared by the Petrol Park Section with the assistance of the Petrol Company.

With increasing area activity Petrol Company eventually, with Divisional authority formed a secondary dump in a much more suitable place and which was entirely under cover and approached by an existing track.

 

MOVE TO SOMME
For this move Petrol detachments at each staging area was again adopted, but the distance being greater and being dependent entirely on the up to time arrival of Petrol trains at each stop, it was decided to unload the blanket and spare clotting section of the Company, bring on these stores by train and utilise the extra vehicles then released for petrol carrying.

As matters, turned out, although petrol trains did arrive, but for this reserve it is doubtful if the whole Divison would have been able to complete the journey. During the move the Petrol Company was distributed over an area of about 300 miles and control was very difficult and much depended on the initiative of Section Officers.

On concentration of the Division - Petrol supply became normal, Petrol Park running between ROUEN and later BOSC-LE-HARD and MONCY, the R.H.'s fixed from time to time and POMMEREUAL, the Petrol Company location. Petrol Company running between POMMEREVAL and Petrol Points. The Petrol Points were established 24 hours a day, the consumption of petrol being in excess of all estimates for the running that appeared essential.

Frequent demands were made upon the Petrol Company for Troop Carrying Vehicles which involved a great deal of extra loading and unloading of petrol which placed a heavy strain on an establishment already considerably under strength.

 

JUNE 9th
The Petrol R.H. at MONCY being closed on the order of ROUEN Sub Area. Patrol Park was dispatched to the BOLBEC area to refill with 25,000 gallons. After loading this Section was ordered by some person unknown to move South of the SEINE and consequently the much needed petrol for the Division was never delivered.

 

JUNE 10th
All lines of communication having been cut another effort was made to reach BOLBEC but without success.

 

JUNE 11th
With the Division moved to the ST. VALERY area Petrol Company were located at NEVILLE where they were caught by heavy enemy shelling and a number of vehicles were destroyed together with a quantity of stores. There were barely 500 gallons left when the Company moved into the triangle around ST. VALERY and in the evening after destroying what vehicles and stores remained the Company moved into the woods North of the village where they again were heavily shelled.

Eventually the remnants of the Company reached the beach via the cliffs under the command of Captain H. McCAFFERTY. Major P.S. NORWELL reported to C.R.A.S.C. at ST. VALERY, but thereafter all trace of him was lost. Many of the Petrol Company were lost on the beach, although a number of men may have succeeded in reaching a boat. It was later confirmed that Major HOWELL had escaped.