Lads, I have been re-reading about the Sittang débacle, and with so much effort (blood and guts would be more precise) by the Gurkha Rifle battalions to reopen the road to the bridgehead, wasted when the bridge went up in smoke, one wonders how many of the sepoys that could not make it across, decided, out of frustration and under constant "psychological aggresion" in the POW camps, to become Jiffs. Is there record of how many Jiffs came out of each of the major defeats the Indian Army suffered during the initial maelstrom in SE Asia and surrounding islands? Because there were defeats and there were DEFEATS: Units went down fighting for King and Country in, say, Hong Kong and Borneo, but others were just deserted by their lack of training or useless brass, in places like Central Malaya, or the Sittang.
Thought the term was better known; sorry, mate However, your link provided interesting information about other sources of Jiffs: They didn't only come from POW camps, but also from the frontline, as deserters. Always thought that most (if not all) Allied deserters went AWOL to go back home or do some pillaging, not to change sides!
I read a very good book on the history and slow build up to the I.N.A.s formation: The War of the Springing Tigers, by Gerard H. Corr.
The INA also recruited from the Indian civilian community in Malaya and elsewhere, e.g the much propagandised women's regiment, so its total strength does not provide an accurate measure of treachery. In Malaya in particular, I believe there were attempts to sow the seeds of politicisation before the balloon went up. There was certainly no shortage of agents amongst the Japanese community there. There was significant correlation between 'class' (in the Indian martial sense) and loyalty. Most muslim troops stayed loyal, most non-muslims didn't - excepting the Gurkhas, but even they weren't 100% loyal. Some of the most loyal were actually Indian State Forces units; it may be that their loyalty to their state/prince gave them something else to cling to. Not seen it backed up by anything academic, but I do feel that the mostly-Sikh First INA was less concerned with Indian independence than the Sikhs repositioning themselves as primus inter pares under the new colonial power.
On me radar for a few months now, mate. Been rather short on quid lately, and importing printed books into Guatemala is a pain in the a**e (specially if you use ordinary mail), so am still waiting for the right moment to attack!
This caste thing is something that also had me wondering, and now you have shed light on the subject; means then that, e.g., the Garhwal regiments were more prone to defection that the Jats, or the Dogras over the Punjabis, etc., etc.?
Nothing's ever that simple but there was a blurry pattern. One of the complications is that regiments, and sometimes different battalions within a regiment, could be mixed-class or single class. Obviously it was as much in the Japanese's interests to 'divide and rule' as it was ours.
I meant statistically, mate, if there are records to find out. I know an army is a human zoo with a lot of specimens represented, but ethnic names like the ones we are dealing with here, should, IMHO, pull weight in terms of overall loyalties or fighting characteristics.
I have got some figures lurking on the PC, but I can't promise to get to them tonight. Another book worth looking for, but a bit scarcer, is Hugh Toye's The Springing Tiger. Toye was involved in counter-intelligence or similar regarding the INA.
