FM Erwin E. J. Rommel (1891-1944)

Wasn't Rommel the only German general whom the British paid the ultimate compliment of trying to assassinate? Does this say anything about his abilities, or was it more propaganda driven.
Special forces carried out a raid on his house, but he was out! Captain Geoffrey Keyes was, however, awarded a Posthumous Victoria Cross after the operation.

Adrian

 

Originally posted by adrian roberts@Jul 6 2005, 12:01 AM
Wasn't Rommel the only German general whom the British paid the ultimate compliment of trying to assassinate? Does this say anything about his abilities, or was it more propaganda driven.
[post=36154]Quoted post[/post]

The mission was actually to capture Rommel, be it death or alive, one of the main reasons for the brits to get rid move of him was, despite of his capabilities, was his image that haunted brits/allied soldiers that he was such a super human creature that able to make impossible things possible,...

and this Psychological effects on brits/allied moral, that needs to be removed,.. abduction is one of the ways.

Regards

 

On May 10th 1940, Rommel formally entered into fighting of WW2. The 7th PZ, aided by strong close air support and a magnificent ground organization, Soon earned the nickname of "The Ghost Division" for their ability to appear from nowhere! There is one important point about the campaign in France and that was Hitler had not taken complete control of the Army and so, Commanders such as Rommel and Guderian were able to respond to the situation as they developed without "recourse to orders from above" which so often happened later on in the war.

Is someone forgetting that Rommel's division belonged to general Hermann Hoth's Panzerkorps, which generally performed in such way? Maybe the neighbouring 5th Panzer didn't perform as well, but it certainly didn't stay in the rear, only capturing Rommel's defeated enemies.

To : ALL COMMANDERS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM : HEADQUARTERS, B.T.E. AND M.E.F.
There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogey-man to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general. The important thing now is to see to it that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya. We must refer to “the Germans “or” the Axis powers " or " the enemy” and not always keep harping on Rommel. Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all Commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest importance.
(Signed) C. J. AUCHINLECK,
GENERAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, M.E.F.*

You forgot Lord Auchinleck's P. S.: 'I am not jealous of Rommel'.

“Living legends, they project, each in his way, the classic image of the warrior: brave, vigorous, sharp of eye and mind, rapid in decision, alert in danger, faster and bolder in the fight than his enemies. Of this extraordinary brotherhood is Rommel - the brotherhood of Hector, of Rupert of the Rhine, of those who can only be described as heroes; and it is curious that so determinedly practical a modernist as Rommel - the least fanciful of men - should have joined a company so bonded by myth.”

That's a disgusting statement… Rommel a 'hero'?! An admiror of Hitler and some one who was fighting for the victory of the III Reich and all it stood for?! :angry: He was no hero, but, in fact, the archetype of the Nazi arrogant and titannycal general (his subordinates' memoirs and comments, my grandfather's included,leave no doubts).

Mention has been made on another thread mention was made of the argument that Monty won because of his massive supplies. That is true; Monty built up both his men and material before launching his attack. Since Monty had both massive stocks of men and supplies then the fact that Rommel despite his lack of the same, still managed to keep on fighting for longer than was expected.

That is completely false, and also disrepectful of British and Commonwealth troops. Just as Rommel managed to exploit tactical situations (by a skilfull use of intelligence and opportunity), by defeating an exhausted, over-extended and ill-prepared British Army, he ever got lost on the general perspective and strategy (a typical German generalship's flaw).

His aim may have been taking the Suez Canal and establishing in the Middle East, but he never realised that he lacked the means to do it. By advancing into Egypt in 1941 he did it because the battlefields' opportunities were too great, but it was in dettriment of his own forces' integrity and capabilities; it affected the general Axis strategy!

Also, had the British' strategical perspectives been different, Rommel wouldn't have achived 'grandious' victories.

In 1941 the U-Boats were sinking everything, Malta was blockaded and 'neutralised' (thus allowing supplies and reinforcements to go through), the British VIII Army was ill-equipped and had no successfull armoured warfare tactics and doctrines (and things didn't improve when the Germans managed to capture the entire VIII Army's Staff) and Lord Wavell was fighting the Italians in Somalia, Vichy in Sirya and Germany at Greece and Crete.

In 1942 the U-Boats were against on the run, Malta was again under siege and the VIII Army lost all kind of units to meet the Far East and the Pacific's needs.

That means that, thanks to Admiral Dönitz, marshal Kesselring and the Japanese, Rommel had an open way to victory. But he doesn't have why to be special, since almost any German commander would have done such things in the same circumstances.

just like to add,.. that it is not true that Rommel is logistic ignorant,.. he fully aware that in order to master the dessert, one has to master logistic as well, as no victory can be attain without a proper one,.. and the earlier stage of dessert war,.. and until the later part of his dessert campaign most of his manouvre were has to base on his supply availibility which mostly all about oil.

Yeah… rite…

Rommel failed miserably to keep on with his forces' logistics:

1) He didn't do anything to improve the convoy system along the Via Balbia, which had to carry water, fuel and ammunition from Benghazi, 2.000 km from the front.
2) He didn't take any measures at all to make Tobrouk operational again, which would have shortened his supply lines by half.
3) The most important. He failed to evaluate Malta's utmost relevance. When the island was successfully blockaded and ready to be invaded in Spring 1942, without talking to his superior, marshal Kesselring, he persuaded Hitler to cancell the invasion and give Rommel the air power involved in such operation. The result was catastrophic: Malta's 12 fighters in May became 400 by November, and Axis shipping losses' increased accordingly.

All this meant that 50% of Rommel's supplies ended in the bottom of the Mediterranean and 40% scattered between Tripoli, Banghazi and the Egyptian frontier…

Monty, as the master strategist he was, DID realise this and, along with he deep understanding of his own Army's flaws and weaknesses, decided to play a piece-set-up game. He ignored Churchill's urging for a premature offensive, because he knew time could only affect Rommel and favour him (the former's forces would weaken and their logistics and morale would deteriorate, whilst the latter's would be trained, re-fit, re-equipped and their planning, tactics and capabilities would improve).

The British, in 1942, played all Sun Tzu's main rules for victory: they chose the battle ground for their advantage and then chose the timing, the way, the tactics and everything else for the battle. In other words, Monty played the tune and Rommel danced.

 

He failed to evaluate Malta's utmost relevance

Malta, my friend, is not the only thing that lies between him(Rommel) and his supplies,..

his subordinates' memoirs and comments, my grandfather's included,leave no doubts

In history, so many things came up from so many resources, with all respect to your Grand Father.. there's always rooms for questions in any statement (even Marco Polo as few people still disbelief that he ever reach China after all),...

this.....
by defeating an exhausted, over-extended and ill-prepared British Army
explain this....
the former's forces would weaken and their logistics and morale would deteriorate, whilst the latter's would be trained, re-fit, re-equipped and their planning, tactics and capabilities would improve

Regards

 

Malta, my friend, is not the only thing that lies between him(Rommel) and his supplies…

Indeed, it’s not just Malta. It’s the bloody Royal Navy and RAF stationed there.

Also, there is the Via Balbia thing and the far way ports…

Originally posted by GUMALANGI@Jul 7 2005, 11:47 AM

this.....
(1) by defeating an exhausted, over-extended and ill-prepared British Army

explain this....

(2) the former's forces would weaken and their logistics and morale would deteriorate, whilst the latter's would be trained, re-fit, re-equipped and their planning, tactics and capabilities would improve

Regards
[post=36217]Quoted post[/post]

(1) In Spring 1941 General O’Connor’s victorious but exhausted 30.000 men were at the extreme of a 1.500 km supply line. These forces, once the best units were re-deployed to Sirya, Greece or Somalia, lacked proper equipment, training and were not sufficiently indoctrinated and aware of German mobile tactics. They didn’t have an effective AT system or co-ordination. That way, Rommel was able to kick them quickly and individually, since they were unable to react and act in a co-ordinated way.

(2) By remaining at its fortiefied position at El Alamein, the British gained shorter and safer supply lines, just a few km from a major port as Alexandria, whilst the Germans remained 2.000 km away from Benghazi (of course, they didn’t do much to use Tobrouk, 1.000 km nearer). By remaining there, Montgomery can man his position with few men, thus allowing the majority to rest and entertain (raising their morale) and go through hard training programmes. Armoured crews then had enough time to develop new tactics, to get their new American tanks and get used to them. By not attacking earlier, Monty had time for his staff to organise everything and take care of every single detail, not leaving anything up to hazzard, to study air photographic reconaissence and gathering ULTRA and field intelligence reports. Also, it gave time for the general buildup. The longer he waited, the more planes and ships Malta got into action (with its obvious consequences upon the Axis’ supply lines).

He decided to fight a set piece battle at the moment of his choosing, at a familiar and pre-chosen battlefield (which was also unfavourable to the inflexible Rommel), and there was NOTHING at all Rommel could do about it. That means that Monty played his cards to gain all the initiative and have the battle fought on his own terms and completely favouring his side. That’s called STRATEGY. A winning one, by the way.

 

That is completely false, and also disrepectful of British and Commonwealth troops. Just as Rommel managed to exploit tactical situations (by a skilfull use of intelligence and opportunity), by defeating an exhausted, over-extended and ill-prepared British Army, he ever got lost on the general perspective and strategy (a typical German generalship's flaw).


Monty, as you have pointed out built up his forces, as well as, his supplies before launching the attack. the odds were something in the region of 5:1 in favour of the british.

As Napoleon said Morale is to material as one is to three

 

Indeed, it’s not just Malta. It’s the bloody Royal Navy and RAF stationed there.

Also, there is the Via Balbia thing and the far way ports…

So they are only Malta, RAF, RN, and distance?,...

How about Halder, Garibldi, OKH, Eastern Front, Italian commitment?

 

Monty, as you have pointed out built up his forces, as well as, his supplies before launching the attack. the odds were something in the region of 5:1 in favour of the british.

As Napoleon said Morale is to material as one is to three

Exploiting your own advantages to the maximum is called intelligence. Monty didn't win at El Alamein by throwing supplies, men and matériel upon Rommel. He simply did things better.

How about Halder, Garibldi, OKH, Eastern Front, Italian commitment?

The Eastern Front is out of the question. For Hitler, Lebensraum and the Final Solution were the top proirity objectives of the war. The Mediterranean Front was, and would have been in any case (since Hitler had no ambitions there or even didn't wish to fight the British there), a secondary theatre. Hitler and Mussolini failed, no doubt, in understanding that it would become Great Britain's main theatre of operations for the next 4 years…

General Halder and the OKH, on the other hand, saw this more accurately. The main strategical goal in the Mediterranean was preventing an Italian defeat. That and just that. Given the circumnstances, with the maximum force Germany could deploy in the Mediterranean theatre, a decisive victory to knock Great Britain out of the war was not possible. Rommel disobbeyed direct orders and went into the offensive taking advantage of tactical situations in detriment of the Axis strategical position. That is why Halder sent a 'spy' to check on Rommel, lieutenant general Friedrich Paulus (as a footnote, I'll add that my grandfather, then a I Lt., acted as aide de camp to Paulus during that trip in 1941), who soon realised that without Tobrouk as a fully operational port, with Malta in the middle and lorry convoys that used 4 gallons of petrol to deliver just 1, a deep thrust into Egypt was not possible.

Italian commitment? What does that mean? Italians were, at all times, more than 60% of Rommel's forces…

Marshal Gariboldi? He was no problem at all… Rommel disobbeyed him all the time and once humilliated him in public. Rommel never went through Gariboldi, the Commando Supremo, Kesselring, Halder or the OKH… he always went directly to Hitler, because he was the shining and loyal favourite.

To all this we must add something: the Axis was doomed from the beginning. There was no common strategy, tactics o aims and minimal co-operation. In other words, Germany and Italy were two nations fighting each on their own, a common enemy. They didn't stand a chance.

 

Exploiting your own advantages to the maximum is called intelligence. Monty didn't win at El Alamein by throwing supplies, men and matériel upon Rommel. He simply did things better.

There still lies the the point that the plan that monty used was based upon one drawn up by Dorrien-Smith, who had been saced for imcompetance and more to the point, the germans still managed despite lack of material to pull back that the campaign continued for some months.

 

The Eastern Front is out of the question. ....

General Halder and the OKH, on the other hand, saw this more accurately. .....


but they did bothers the line of supply and reinforcement to Rommel,.. didnt they?

Regards

 

Today July 17th is the day the British nearly killed Rommel. He was badly wounded when a low level RAF fighter bomber attacked his car on his way back to La Roche - Guyon ..........his HQ.

 

Bearing in mind how he liked to be up near the action, la Roche-Guyon, on the Seine near Mantes, was an awfully long way from the Normandy front and not a journey you would want to make too often considering allied air supremacy.

 

Originally posted by angie999@Jul 18 2005, 01:28 AM
Bearing in mind how he liked to be up near the action, la Roche-Guyon, on the Seine near Mantes, was an awfully long way from the Normandy front and not a journey you would want to make too often considering allied air supremacy.
[post=36544]Quoted post[/post]


With the benefit of hindsight his HQ was probably in the correct position to command his troops considering the allies were stretched so far along the coast from Cherbourg, St Mere Eglise & St Lo in the west and the push in the east.

He would have had to have been somewhere near the top of the arc and still have a retreat available.

 

It is just that I spent a very hot and unpleasant Sunday afternoon driving from Cherbourg to Vernon, which is on the Seine some miles short of la Roche-Guyon. As I remember it, it was a very fine autumn day and half of Paris must have headed out for the day, so the roads were hell. I got to thinking about how far Rommel was from the battle.

Of course, only one of the two armies in Army Group B was committed to the battle, as the bulk of 15th Army was kept back in the Pas de Calais, so there was no need for him to be there for tactical command, but it must have been frustrating for him, because the tactical level of command is the only one he really understood in my opinion.

 

Of course, only one of the two armies in Army Group B was committed to the battle, as the bulk of 15th Army was kept back in the Pas de Calais, so there was no need for him to be there for tactical command, but it must have been frustrating for him, because the tactical level of command is the only one he really understood in my opinion.

Rommel was on his way back from meeting Sepp dietch.

 

Originally posted by morse1001@Jul 18 2005, 03:58 PM
Rommel was on his way back from meeting Sepp dietch.
[post=36592]Quoted post[/post]

In other words meeting a corps commander. I wouldn't have wanted to command 7th Army under him.

 

(morse1001 @ Jul 1 2005, 06:23 PM) [post=36078]I had written this as an introduction to a new thread but it seems to have been created!

......
Rommel was always hampered by the lack of supplies. His supplies had to come either by air or by sea from italy, this meant that British forces based on Malta could launch attacks against the convoys. The Italian navy proved to totally useless since they refused to engage the Royal Navy.

[/b]

The lengthy debate about what the Italian navy did or did not and its performance assessment was suddenly revived in 1994, after years of slumbering stagnation, when James Sadkovich published his by now famous essay on the matter. That book had been preceded in Italy by innovative, and hotly discussed, studies pointing out what seemed to be a sensational Italian success in getting much stuff across the sea - much more stuff than the received wisdom stated. These essays turned so to speak the world upside down - what had been labeled for decades as an abysmal Italian failure, now looked rather like a British inability to do what the world's foremost navy should have done, shutting the sea communication lines between Italy and Libya down.

Figures are perspicuous enough, in themselves. The Italian Navy did a colossal (for its size) job 1940 through 1943, keeping at sea an average 5 convoys at any time any day for over 3 years, for a total of about 1,200 convoys plus 756 Libyan coastal convoys and 9,245,171 tons of merchant shipping (584,257 of which lost). An average whopping 91,6% of shipped supplies got through, and even as late as 1942-43, when Allied sea and air forces definitively took over and ruled the theater, a remarkable 84,8% made it to the destination ports. Some authors conclude that the myth of the British severing Axis LOCs across the Mediterranean is just that, a myth. If Rommel didn't get all he needed to wage his war, it was not the Italian Navy's blame. The problem was that the material the ships were loaded with in Naples and Sicily was insufficient, quantitatively and sometimes qualitatively, too, and the shipping organization was far from being faultless, a responsibility resting also with the Army and the overall Italian wartime organization structure. For example, 1940 to the fall of Tripoli in January 1943, only 599,537 tons of fuel were shipped to Libya, of which 476,703 arrived to destination - an 80% rate of success indicating that the British did concentrate their attacks on vital ships, but without ever being able to even get near to block Axis supply lines.

Critics retort by pointing out that, while the *average* successful convoys rate is undoubtedly high, the British focused their most vicious offensive actions on critical stages of the war (autumn 1941 for instance) and on tracking, attacking and sinking, also owing to ULTRA reports, ships transporting key payloads like fuel, ammunition, tanks etc. If 5 ships loaded with food, correspondence and clothing get easily through while one ship carrying vital POL, ammo, spare parts for aircraft and tanks is sunk, that's hardly a success for the Axis, and definitely a success for the Allies, notwithstanding the "average" rate of successful shipping. These are all reasonable criticisms.

The debate still is open anyway, and not going to come to an end soon.

As for the Italian Navy refusing to engage the RN, the opposite seems also true enough. In the first and only real warships clash and gunfire duel, 9 July 1940, the Italian fleet resolutely attacked an enemy superior in numbers and firepower. Matapan also was an Italian offensive, though eventually turned into a disaster. Conversely, RN actions to seriously engage the bulk of the Italian navy are not recorded AFAIK. Often (too often) the Italian navy played too safe, but Cunningham seems to have preferred a far more conservative approach to sea warfare than the aggressive hero he paints himself like in his book. (The Taranto operation was a 1935-36 idea, just brushed up for the occasion. And the result depended more on Italian unpreparedness and self-deception than anything else).

 

(Kufra @ Dec 11 2005, 03:31 PM) [post=42996]Figures are perspicuous enough, in themselves. The Italian Navy did a colossal (for its size) job 1940 through 1943, keeping at sea an average 5 convoys at any time any day for over 3 years, for a total of about 1,200 convoys plus 756 Libyan coastal convoys and 9,245,171 tons of merchant shipping (584,257 of which lost). An average whopping 91,6% of shipped supplies got through, and even as late as 1942-43, when Allied sea and air forces definitively took over and ruled the theater, a remarkable 84,8% made it to the destination ports. Some authors conclude that the myth of the British severing Axis LOCs across the Mediterranean is just that, a myth. If Rommel didn't get all he needed to wage his war, it was not the Italian Navy's blame. The problem was that the material the ships were loaded with in Naples and Sicily was insufficient, quantitatively and sometimes qualitatively, too, and the shipping organization was far from being faultless, a responsibility resting also with the Army and the overall Italian wartime organization structure. For example, 1940 to the fall of Tripoli in January 1943, only 599,537 tons of fuel were shipped to Libya, of which 476,703 arrived to destination - an 80% rate of success indicating that the British did concentrate their attacks on vital ships, but without ever being able to even get near to block Axis supply lines.

Critics retort by pointing out that, while the *average* successful convoys rate is undoubtedly high, the British focused their most vicious offensive actions on critical stages of the war (autumn 1941 for instance) and on tracking, attacking and sinking, also owing to ULTRA reports, ships transporting key payloads like fuel, ammunition, tanks etc. If 5 ships loaded with food, correspondence and clothing get easily through while one ship carrying vital POL, ammo, spare parts for aircraft and tanks is sunk, that's hardly a success for the Axis, and definitely a success for the Allies, notwithstanding the "average" rate of successful shipping. These are all reasonable criticisms.

The debate still is open anyway, and not going to come to an end soon.

As for the Italian Navy refusing to engage the RN, the opposite seems also true enough. In the first and only real warships clash and gunfire duel, 9 July 1940, the Italian fleet resolutely attacked an enemy superior in numbers and firepower. Matapan also was an Italian offensive, though eventually turned into a disaster. Conversely, RN actions to seriously engage the bulk of the Italian navy are not recorded AFAIK. Often (too often) the Italian navy played too safe, but Cunningham seems to have preferred a far more conservative approach to sea warfare than the aggressive hero he paints himself like in his book. (The Taranto operation was a 1935-36 idea, just brushed up for the occasion. And the result depended more on Italian unpreparedness and self-deception than anything else).
[/b]
Having never studied the subject of the Italian supply responsibility, I certainly can't debate numbers, but having read the Rommel Papers recently, he made it clear that the major reason for the turn around in Egypt was the loss of his supplies. He stated that the combination of the British Navy sinking so many cargo ships and the dominance of air destroying his supply once it had escaped the RN screens. When the ships were in the harbor, they were subject to bombing and he said they stayed there too long (I don't know if that means they were slow in unloading supplies). But the thing that "frosted his pumpkin" was that not only would Cavallero visit the front and give empty promises to do something about the supply shortages but when the supply did reach land it went to the Italians who were not very aggressive in the war and draining critical points like Egypt. For instance in August he said that the German element of the Panzer groups got only 8200 tons of supplies (32% of what they needed), the Luftwaffe got 8400 tons, while the Italian group of the Panzer group and the Italians in Libya got over 25,000. Not only that but they constantly protested the fact that the Italians refused to upgrade the ports or open new ones and they could never get more than 600 tons unloaded a day. Imagine the RAF pilots licking their chops finding harbors with loaded supply ships in it. These supply problems both those caused by the RN and RAF (and evenutally the USAAF), not to mention the lack of Italian cooperation lead to the downfall of Rommels forces.

 

With regard to the Italian Navy and the supply there is one more important thing to remember. Yes they transported lots of supply to North Africa compared to their size. However, they refused to send it to any other port than (If I don´t recall wrong) Tripoli due to risks of sending it elsewhere. That meant that every little bit of supply had to be transported over land. How much supply does that consume? In November 1942 at the time for El Alamein it consumed a majority of the available supply.

Concering Rommels abilities on higher levels. Start by asking yourself what was his goal with the forces in North Africa? What was OKW/OKHs goal with Africa? Did these match? No OKW/OKH only wanted to tie up british resources and not consume supply/tanks/manpower etc. In fact Rommel made the German more active than planned for the African campaign, thereby he drew resources from other fronts.

In Omaha, if Rommel would have gotten his will through. The OKW/OKH would have sent all the tanks to the beaches, but not to Normandy since the attacks where expected much further north. That would have meant that there where no reserves for the "real" invasion in Normandy.

On a tactical level and maybe on higher tactical level Rommel was outstanding. However, his understanding of the operational level is very low. He did however understand the strategic level to some extent. In the book "The Rommel Papers" this can be seen. He clearly concludes that the allied (US) resources and most importantly the allied airforce would win the war for the allied side. As later happened. The Germans in general (not only Rommel) usually won on the tactical level, very rarely did the US/UK/Russia win in a tactical situation. However, on the operational level Russia defeated Germany over and over again. US and UK didn´t even know about a operational level, they discovered it during the early 1970´s. However on the strategic level US/UK had a much greater understanding than Germany. This can clearly be seen in military theory. Germany describes three levels of warfare - Tactical, higher tactical and strategical. US and UK describes the tactcial and the strategic level and uses operational for certain large campaigns on a strategic level. Russia has five concepts describing warfare above the tactical level - srabenie, operatsiia, kampaniia, destviia and bitva all clearly different from the strategic level.


best regards
Redcoat64RgtFoot

 

With the information that I have seen, Italy lost 2513 merchant ships or just under 600,000 tons.

If we look at three years 1940 to 1943 that is nearly 17 ships per week.

In warships, their losses were 270,000 tons.

In seamen their losses were 33,000.