can any one tell me what the thinking was behind the building of the atlantic wall.. 1. did the germans think that one day the US would enter the war and use the uk as a lauch pad. 2. if the germans were to invade the uk what advantage would the wall have provided. 3. it used alot of german resourses, men guns etc that could have been deployed to africa / russia any thoughts thanks
can any one tell me what the thinking was behind the building of the atlantic wall.. 1. did the germans think that one day the US would enter the war and use the uk as a lauch pad. Contstruction of the Atlantic Wall did not begin until 1942, after the U.S. entered the war, although plans were issued shortly after Germany declared war on the U.S. "On December 14th, 1941, orders were given to construct the Neue Westwall ("New Westwall"). The highest priority was given to the defense of the harbors. They were considered the most important in case of an Allied invasion. This meant that harbor cities, such as Vlissingen, got defended from the sea (Seefront), land (Landfront) and air. Construction at that time was relatively light, an interim solution for things to come. In the summer of 1942 the definitive defense plans for western Europe were released. Propaganda became an important part of the new plans. The name Neue Westwall was changed to Atlantikwall. The minor construction from the previous period was replaced or reinforced by heavy bunkers." JT
but in hitlers own mind...he was thinking that one day he could attack america. why would you build formidable defenses if you thought you werent going to be invaded. isnt the atlantic wall like a stratigic line like kev described in another thread a waist of time. surely the men,guns, etc would have been better fighting or used in industry
but in hitlers own mind...he was thinking that one day he could attack america. Then the man was surely and truly demented. JT
thanks JT he may have been demented but with a few more u-boats. he could have caused even more mayhem in the atlantic. and how about if the managed to put v2 rockets onto the u-boats and launch them from just of the coast. aswell as the flying balloon bombs from japan. the US may have had to call upon an home guard !!!
thanks JT he may have been demented but with a few more u-boats. he could have caused even more mayhem in the atlantic. and how about if the managed to put v2 rockets onto the u-boats and launch them from just of the coast. aswell as the flying balloon bombs from japan. the US may have had to call upon an home guard !!! Ach du Lieber! Submarine rockets! Balloons! I'm sure we all would have been trembling with fear. To tell the truth, Raf, I do not know whether the U.S. had a Home Guard. JT
but in hitlers own mind...he was thinking that one day he could attack america. why would you build formidable defenses if you thought you werent going to be invaded. isnt the atlantic wall like a stratigic line like kev described in another thread a waist of time. surely the men,guns, etc would have been better fighting or used in industry and did it work. No. Cos the Allies bypassed the strongest part of it and the bit they did go for, they well well equiped to deal with. Kev
thanks all jt i think some states did set up a home quard http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/usa/11047-us-%22home-guard%22.html from a previous thread thanks
Thanks. I'd forgotten about that post. According to one book, East Wind Rain, the Hawaii Territorial Guard was called up and activated under fire two hours after the attack of Dec. 7th. JT
The so-called Atlantic Wall....or , to use the correct terminology adopted by the German's themselves..."FESTUNG EUROPA"....was as much an exercise in PROPAGANDA as a fixed series of defensive constructs....only in areas like the PAS-DE-CALAIS were the defences really up to the standards set by the Germans themselves as 'adequate' to fend off a well planned invasion from the sea....... Goebbels was trying to frighten the Allies into not taking this much feared course of action, an operation that all were aware would stretch German resources to the point of making a successful prosecution of the war impossible on ANY FRONT.... So, with as much bluster and humbug as there was actual concrete, the Festung Europa provided as much a psychological shield for the German public as anything..... Comments?.....Adam, Alex, where are you?....Spidge?....4th Wilts?.....come on guys!!!!
Hitler built a fortress around Europe, but he forgot to put a roof on it. — Franklin D. Roosevelt The wall was never going to be enough!
Yes....and the Flak defences reassured the German public that something ws being done to put a stop to it all.....Albert Speer talks of enough resouces in men and material allocated to completely justify the existence of a "second front" in 1943!!
The so-called Atlantic Wall....or , to use the correct terminology adopted by the German's themselves..."FESTUNG EUROPA"....was as much an exercise in PROPAGANDA as a fixed series of defensive constructs....only in areas like the PAS-DE-CALAIS were the defences really up to the standards set by the Germans themselves as 'adequate' to fend off a well planned invasion from the sea....... Goebbels was trying to frighten the Allies into not taking this much feared course of action, an operation that all were aware would stretch German resources to the point of making a successful prosecution of the war impossible on ANY FRONT.... So, with as much bluster and humbug as there was actual concrete, the Festung Europa provided as much a psychological shield for the German public as anything..... Comments?.....Adam, Alex, where are you?....Spidge?....4th Wilts?.....come on guys!!!! The propaganda game was carried out by Hitler and projected by Goebbels to the German public to convince the Allies and assure the German heimat that the Atlantic Wall was impregnable and would result in the Aliies being thrown back into the sea. In reality,the defences consisted of guns plundered from the French,Poles, Czechs and Belgians and the manpower had been deliberately reduced, with poor reserves in order to maximise the thrusts in the East."A landing in France would be a catastrophe for Germany" was Hitler's statement in relation to his gamble.Goebbels kept the German public happy and content by showing newsreels of units such as the Leibstandarte marching down the Champs Elysees in full battle drill with the latest tanks. His later newsreels would show German "victories" from orderly retreats on the Eastern Front.In the end, Hitler was relieved that the Allies had not attempted an invasion and with the winter of 1942/1943, the Allies faced traditional bad weather.He was convinced he could relax,the Allies would not be coming.The Leibstandarte did not appear in the propaganda newsreels too long for they were packed off to the Eastern Front with the express Hitler instruction to hold fast against the continual Russian tide. The Atlantic Wall remained on Hitler's mind and the defence policy changed when Hitler decided to deploy Rommel again in the heartland of Europe from his lost cause appointment in North Africa. In February 1943 reality came into play.Hitler appointed Rommel to be responsible for the Atlantic Wall as Commander of Army Group B for the defence of France from the Seine to the Loire.Rommel believed that the Allies could be only be defeated on the beaches and to this end oversaw the construction of 1200 bunkers and the seeding of 6 million mines with an emphasis on beach obstacles below the low tide mark. This was the standard of coastal defences that faced the Allies on 6 June 1944. The Atlantic Wall in June 1944 was not the same Atlantic Wall that Rommel had been given responsibity for in February 1943.It was a formidable coastal defence line which the Allies worked hard to gain knowledge of, through aerial reconnaissance and agents in the field. The Channel Islands were similarly defended and were bypassed by the Allies having no strategic value in the liberation of Europe.Other Festungs, such as Brest,Lorient and Royan were isolated and left to surrender in May 1945 (as was the Channel Islands) being thought that it would have been a waste of casualties to take them when there were other priorities and aims which would directly contribute to the defeat of Germany. Having been in France recently, I can tell you that the defences still evident in Granville,Manche,especially those at the Pointe du Roc overlooking the harbour and beaches still look as formidable as they would have been in June 1944.(One reason why there were no plans by the Allies to take a port direct.) One defence line that was neglected by Hitler and which again received Goebbels propaganda treatment was the Western Wall in the Rhineland, referred to by the British soldier as the Siegfried Line. It was constructed at great expense in 1938/1939 but so confident was Hitler of his military supremacy and other committments, that it never received priority in updating. Still it posed a delay in tank advances by its dragons teeth which had to be dealt with in the course of the Allies advance into Germany in late 1944 and early 1945.
Thanks Harry.....This is an aspect of WWII that is often given short shrift. The fact that these defences were NOT complete in any sence of the word is not really made plain, or if it is, then only Pas-de-Calais is ever given as an example of completed sites....but there were otheres....Bordueax, St.Nazaire...the Dutch Coast.....but it was by no means a complete defence system.....thankx Harry!!
Thanks Harry.....This is an aspect of WWII that is often given short shrift. The fact that these defences were NOT complete in any sence of the word is not really made plain, or if it is, then only Pas-de-Calais is ever given as an example of completed sites....but there were otheres....Bordueax, St.Nazaire...the Dutch Coast.....but it was by no means a complete defence system.....thankx Harry!! Christos, Can I respectfully suggest you do a little research on the build up of the Atlantic Wall and the reason why the Baie of the Seine was chosen as the landing ground.Had Hitler left it to his rational thinkers they would have come up with sound predictions.However there was one unknown dimension that was proved to be beyond the thinking of the German High Command and that was the Allied lateral thinking that resulted in the Allies not having to chose a port for a main assault on Europe, but take their own. The German High Command realised the importance of Cherbourg as an entry point and made adequate provision for its defence and destruction but did not realise fully of the importance of the north end of the Manche.This area being the nearest in the area to the southern ports of Britain was ideal to be the supply pipeline coupling for petrol and oil supplies direct from Southern England.I am not aware of a second option for the entry of Pluto but there must have been a second option with the disadvantage of a greater distance and possibily in a less secure area.That option did not have to be used. Regarding coastal defensive lines, the defence lines south of Brest still look formidable and I would say they are at a specification to those at Granville and sites in the Pas de Calais.Clear military thinkers would have realised that the Allies would never make a main landing in Southern Brittany or indeed Northern Brittany but due to the misinformation spread by the Allies, the German High Command was always left guessing and then with the interference of Hitler and his mistrust of his Generals in the field, this often resulted in poor decision making. One of the fundamental flaws in the organisation and operation of the Atlantic Wall was the control and direction of its heavy batteries.The operational responsibility was split between the Wehrmacht and the Kreigsmarine.When the batteries were directed to off shore targets, the Kreigsmarine directed operations while when beach and beachhead targets were to be targetted, the Wehrmacht were in charge. Whether this had any bearing on battery efficiency,I do not know.
I think the choice of invasion site was based more on aircover ranges....if you land at Bordeaux or St. Nazaire, you cancel out much of the aircover that was placed for the protection of the landing phase......It could really have only been somewhere along the Channel Coast, and furthermore, somewhere with wide flat beachs.......Is it not funny that on the other side of the Earth, that Japanese commanders like Kuzumi, and Kuribayashi were coming to the exact opposite conclusion conserning the idea of defeating a seaborne landing "at the waterline".......The fact that these islands offered no retreat for the garrison only made it more plain, I think, the "military correctness" of this dtrategem, to let the landing come ashore, then use your assets to defeat the salient and push it back into the sea......Rommel quarreled with von Runestedt and von Schweppenburg over this issue, and this has become part of the myth of Normandy, that had Rommel been allowed his way, the situation might have been turned....I say BUNK to this thesis, and suggest exactly the opposite, as the other army generals did.....that a concentrated stroke to push either the British side (Gold Juno Sword Omaha), or the American angle of things at UTAH , back into the sea in isolation, before the linkup of the two beach-heads became fact....after it did, Cherbourg was finished, but Cherbourg could have been a much larger thorn than it already was......I STILL say Erwin has more to answer for over Normandy...... And good Christ, if I could find a book that describes the build up of the wall by orgamisation TODT and then Speers efforts then Rommel, i would bloody well read it.... Can I respectfully sugest a lack of available literature on this aspect of the campaign in the West?.....most of the history I've read makes little mention of this really
Oh, before the picky ones fly in from on high....I counted Omaha on the British SIDE of the landing, due to the chaos at Omaha basically rendering it untenable as a position of exploitation, something I am told was due to the Allies lack of knowledge of the positioning of the German 352nd Infantry division, a unit that was not known to exist in the theater until encountered on the morning of June 6th.....Properly supported, this central position was dangerous, and threatened to split the beachhead before the invasion buildup could commence in earnest....Mullberry needed a few days before it became operational, and the American Mulberry A was wrecked by a storm on the 4th day of the operation....
I have in my possession a copy of an American produced design called FORTRESS EUROPA, a corps level simulation designed by Aussie John Edwards......featues a hidden setup for German units of a certain type (mainly panzer reserve)...fixed defences that either stay fixed or become weak divisions when abandoning their positions....and aircover for the allies that really does not extend East of StMalo or South for very much either....this is TACTICAL airpower, and the limitation on it's operational range dictated the choice of the Cannel Coast......it had to be in the center of the coast, because this was a central collection point for the many ships that gathered to comprise the actual support fleet.....a fleet that would have to operate for many days under an umbrella of aircover....THESE are the reasons for Normandy....nothing else.....Books sometimes are NOT ENOUGH to give you an accurate picture......I've played that design many times, and only once ever won as the Allies with a Biscay invasion, it was a tough fight, but I made it to bust through the West Wall before the siren blew.......and it was not possible to achieve in later games, because we found that a simple preallocation in certain key areas made it prohibitavely expensive proposition , so we stayed under the aircover......as the Allies actually sdid..... A well designed game can often lead into into patterns of play that are very historically revealing....
True, for the landings in Europe, there were many criteria for the selection but the the greatest priority as stated was to select an invasion area that was within range of fighter cover with the plan to include contruction plans for strips from D Day +2 or as early as possible following the taking of territory within the bridgehead. The capability of fighter cover which had to be within 120 miles of English bases in order to get to the bridgehead area,attack targets and successfully return to English bases within the south east of England was contained in a radius from Flushing in the North to the west side of the Cotentin Peninsular in the south. Calais was ignored, it was to be part of Operation Fortitute. The Flushing- Belgium coast was ruled out as the area behind the invasion beaches would have presented and advantage to the defenders with its canals and waterways. The Somme area was ruled out as the Somme presented a problem to the invader in pushing inland astride a the Somme estuary with the task of seizing or creating crossings. The Seine estuary option was not taken as it was well known that Le Havre was heavy fortified by coastal artillery.Cherbourg was also discounted for the same reasons.The experience at Dieppe had resulted in not including a port for the initial assault. The west coast of the Cotentin was out of the question as it came under the influence of the Atlantic and would be difficult to cover.It was thought that the sheltered waters of the Baie of the Seine between the east of the Cotentin and the River Orne afforded the best invasion beaches. Further the Seine and the Loire acted as defensive barriers for the Germans and they would be attracted to these postions which suited the Allies.German forces in Brittany would be cut off after a planned breakout from the Cotentin.As it was, German forces south of the Loire posed no problem to the Allies and it did not require regular Allied forces to reoccupy south western France and eliminate the German forces there.
we must think of the raid on dieppe as well.although it was a disaster,some points were learned,by the alllies and jerry.the commando landings were in part a sucess.do you think jerry reinforced the ports more,because of this,and if so waste resources building extra fortifications at ports.yours,lee
