Why Bernard Montgomery?

Discussion in 'North Africa & the Med' started by Slipdigit, Aug 24, 2008.

  1. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    I'm reading a book written to dispel the superiority of "Blitzkreig" as theory of war. I am at the part of the book where the author is discussing the North Africa campaign. He is mostly complimentary of Montgomery but made the comments that before his appointment to command the 8th Army "his only achievements had been as a trainer, if one discounts incurring life-long enmity among his superiors and his peers. Quite possibly Bernard Montgomery was, in August 1942, the most disliked general officer in the British Army."

    Later he comments "By all accounts Montgomery was an exasperating fellow and in many respects a most unpleasant one: a supremely irritating subordinate, a treacherous friend, and ungrateful child, and a pyschologically abusive parent.

    The author then spends the next 10 pages or so complimenting Montgomery in his handling of the North Africa, while excoriating Rommel.

    If the negative comments on his prior experience and personality are accurate, what prompted Churchill to send Montgomery to North Africa after Gott was killed?

    Please, before you respond, this is not a question on his abilities, succeses or over-all "greatness," you can discuss that elsewhere. I simply want to know if anyone has any insight into why the Prime Minister made the choice he made?
     
  2. PsyWar.Org

    PsyWar.Org Archive monkey

    "his only achievements had been as a trainer, if one discounts incurring life-long enmity among his superiors and his peers. Quite possibly Bernard Montgomery was, in August 1942, the most disliked general officer in the British Army."

    That I believe is the error. Montgomery performed exceedingly well in the Battle of France, which IIRC brought him to the attention of his superiors and brought promotion.
     
  3. handtohand22

    handtohand22 Senior Member

    Check out page 93 of the Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Collins, 1958.

    On 5th August 1942 Churchill visited Auchinleck at HQ 8th Army where he had taken over from Ritchie. This left Auchinleck with a dual role, C-in-C Middle East and Command of the 8th Army.

    Auchinleck agreed with Brook's proposal that Montgomery should command 8th Army but Churchill and Smutts elected Gott.

    On 6 August, Churchill decided that Alexander would replace Auchinleck and Gott would command 8th Army.

    After Gott was shot down on 7 August, Montgomery was ordered to take his place and Auchinleck was also relieved of his command.

    On 9th August, Auchinleck and Alexander met in Cairo after General Ramsden (30 Corps) had taken temporary command of 8th Army on Auchinleck's orders. So, Montgomery was Churchill's second choice. This story is reiterated in Richard Doherty's Irish Generals, Appletree Press 1993, page 17.

    Montgomery goes on to say that he thought putting Gott in command of the 8th Army was a mistake because the man was exhausted.

    Marrian in his book, Churchill and the Irish Generals, Pretani Press, 1986, points out on page 290 that the decision to remove Auchinleck was Churchill's alone:and the Reason? Auchinleck refused to allow Churchill to bulldoze him into a premature August offensive against Panzer Armee Afrika. So it appears the subsequent moves Montgomery/Gott were secondary to removing Auchinleck.





    My Service Life

    http://coleraine-battery.tripod.com

    The Last Coleraine Militia
     
  4. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Despite being of consistently 'difficult' personal character, Monty's field achievements in France were solid, based largely on actually absorbing the lessons he'd learnt in WW1. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in his preferment was that Alanbrooke could spot a 'good 'un', and very much saw Monty as one of the best, having worked with him at all levels, even once handing a corps command over to him. Monty's efforts in organising Southern command & Home Defence, essentially rebuilding a large chunk of the Army post BEF were also, rightly, viewed as a great success; he was a significant figure in taking a much weakened resource, and over time helping to shape it into a greatly more viable and motivated fighting force.

    Alanbrooke's influence can't be overstated in the selection of British high rankers, he was such a strong influence over, even a counter to, Churchill's less informed or opinionated interferences in military matters. The PM himself fluctuated on Montgomery (as with any of his commanders), even referring to him in conversation with Alanbrooke as 'Your' Monty, when he was off him, and 'My' Monty when keen, something that irritated Alanbrooke immensely, but does indicate (as do AB's Diaries) that he was consistently pro-Montgomery.

    What's the book Jeff?

    Cheers,
    Adam.
     
  5. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    So essentially it wasn't Churchill who chose him, he only okayed the choice? Montgomery could possibly owe his position to whom he knew, such as Eisenhower could?

    Blitzkrieg Myth, by Mosier.

    The author's contention is that "Blitzkrieg", large, massed tank formation blowing a hole in the enemy's line and wreaking havoc in the rear, was largely not what happened. He disputes claims made about the May 1940 campaign and is very uncomplimentary of the French and British high commands during this period, but not of the rank and file. His contention is that the 1940 campaign was lost because of Churchill misreading Reynaud when the latter said that France had lost and then ordering the BEF to withdraw, sacrificing the Belgians when the fight was still very much still in the balance around Sedan. That the breakthrough and German run to the coast was much the British Army's making, due to a poor choice of words leading to a high level misunderstanding between national leaders. Please don't assume that this is an indictment of the BEF. The author contends the BEF and the French could have held the Germans had they not followed orders to withdraw.

    As I said above, Mosier was complimentary of Montgomery, saying that in the desert, Monty understood the falacy of blitzkrieg as a theory and that knew the British command doctrine would not have allowed for the flexibility that the British staff would need to make changes on the fly, as is required in mobile warfare. Montgomery, in essence, used his strengths to force Rommel to fight the kind of methodical, plodding if you wish, battle his army could best fight. He stated that while tanks were large in number in North Africa, most were lost to anti-tank guns, not other tanks. Makes me wonder where the US tank theories got their genesis. Now I am getting off subject.
     
  6. sapper

    sapper WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Monty was Divisional commander of the Third British Infantry div in France. Where they engineered the rearguard for Dunkirk, and fought like tigers.

    It was Monty's fame as doughty fighter that made the decision to rearm the Third Div with the arms that were available, It was the only fully equipped div at that time. They were supposed to return to carry on the fight in France but France capitulated

    Monty won fame for his actions in France. He was my former Div commander and thus we saw a lot of him.
    SAPPER
     
  7. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Slipdigit -
    "Montgomery could possibly owe his position to those whom he knew - such as Eisenhower could" -

    well no there are two different states there... Monty was known to Alan Brooke as being a solid trainer of a division and as a fighter who might need some careful handling and would do the job of revitilising 8th army - which he did within weeks of taking over..and never losing a battle.

    Eisenhower was known to Marshal as a planner and who would do as he was told, Marshall was - like FDR a geometric strategist - a short line between two points - Eastern Seaboard - Cherbourg - Berlin - Ike had very little tactical or stategic knowledge - combat all along the line - all the time etc...not how Monty fought his battles which caused the ruptures !
    Cheers
     
  8. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Not arguing you point, Tom, about either's exposure to and experience with combat.

    The question was, though, that since Churchill probably wasn't overly familiar with Montgomery, could it be said that Montgomery partially owed his appointment (including his work on the continent and afterward) to his relationship with Brooke? Otherwise, Churchill might never have familiar enough with him to appoint him. As it was, Gott got the nod first, not Montgomery.
     
  9. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Slipdigit -
    you may have a point as Churchill was running out of top Generals at that time - Wavell - Auchinleck - Cunningham - Ritchie - Godwin Austin - O'Conner - Neame -De Wiart, then Gott was killed - Lumsden was not even considered - all the rest in the U.k. were either past it or just coming - someone said that the Desert was the graveyard of Generals - and he got that right as we had lost nine inside two years - Alan Brooke had to persuade Smuts who in turn oersuaded Churchill to accept Monty as he was appointed to be in charge of the 1st Army landings in North Africa,
    Kenneth Anderson took over from Monty..
    just as well as Monty would have fallen out with Ike much earlier !
    Cheers
     
  10. Herakles

    Herakles Senior Member

    All most interesting.

    I have always felt that Auchinleck was the loser in all this. I regard him as having a great skill as a leader and planner. To have stood up to Churchill appears to have been his crime.
     
  11. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    =Slipdigit;145809]So essentially it wasn't Churchill who chose him, he only okayed the choice? Montgomery could possibly owe his position to whom he knew, such as Eisenhower could?

    Eisenhower was not the first choice either, as he was only picked after General Frank Maxwell Andrews was killed in Iceland in 1943. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Andrews was appointed commander of all United States forces in the European Theater of Operations. Andrews was supported by General Hap Arnold and General George C. Marshall.



    Blitzkrieg Myth, by Mosier.

    As I said above, Mosier was complimentary of Montgomery, saying that in the desert, Monty understood the falacy of blitzkrieg as a theory and that knew the British command doctrine would not have allowed for the flexibility that the British staff would need to make changes on the fly, as is required in mobile warfare.

    The "falacy" of blitzkrieg was proven first by the Australian General Sir Leslie Morshead at Tobruk in April 1941 when he delivered the Germans their first land defeat of the war. Morshead was a subordinate of the brilliant Australian WW1 General Sir John Monash.

    No doubt Monty would have taken note. He was well aware of Morshead and his achievements.

    Combined Arms Research Library
     
  12. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Herakles
    You may be partly right but Auchinlek didn't do himself any favours either - he was ivolved in the debacle in Norway, was corps commander in the U.K. and fell out with Monty , which was never too difficult , he didn't really know the other Generals in the U.K. and thus made some pretty bad decisions regarding their ability to lead an army, then the Gazala Gallop when he took over the 8th Army from Ritchie

    all this plus the main problem of Churchill having great difficulties in the House and needing a victory, then to have the Auk tell him that it was too early to attack was the final straw , as it was it was September before Monty struck his first blow at Alam Halfa ,and late October before Alamein, but by then the pressure on Churchill had eased with his changes of command
     
  13. Gibbo

    Gibbo Senior Member

    As Tom says, Auchinleck didn't know most of the other British generals well. The reason why was that he was an officer of the Indian rather than the British Army.
     
  14. boykin530

    boykin530 Junior Member

    Quote:
    Blitzkrieg Myth, by Mosier.

    As I said above, Mosier was complimentary of Montgomery, saying that in the desert, Monty understood the falacy of blitzkrieg as a theory and that knew the British command doctrine would not have allowed for the flexibility that the British staff would need to make changes on the fly, as is required in mobile warfare.
    The "falacy" of blitzkrieg was proven first by the Australian General Sir Leslie Morshead at Tobruk in April 1941 when he delivered the Germans their first land defeat of the war. Morshead was a subordinate of the brilliant Australian WW1 General Sir John Monash.
    >>>>>>>>>>>>

    Hi slip. Hey, you write pretty good for a southern boy ! :) I haven't read Mosier's book, but I have read the suggestion that blitzkrieg was a "falacy". The suggestion was that blitzkrieg was much less effective against large forces, such as US and USSR than it was against smaller forces such as Poland. The explanation was since there's more troops, then encirclement and the subsequent destruction would prove much more difficult. But I'm not convinced.
    I don't see it as a "falacy" or non falacy. Seems more like a play in playbook rather then hard fact or fiction. Just as there are times when a long pass is appropriate in football, there's times when fast movement of vehicles and encirclement are appropriate actions for mechanized units. And even though I've read that blitzkrieg was less effective against the Soviets, there's certainly a number of times when the Germans encircled and destroyed Soviet forces in the first weeks of Barbarossa. The number of Soviet prisoners taken as a result of blitzkrieg is huge.
    Also, I can think of at least one time when the speed of blitzkrieg enabled the Germans to capture a Soviet bridge intact. Not an insignificant thing.

    Talk to ya later,
    Tony
     
  15. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    As Tom says, Auchinleck didn't know most of the other British generals well. The reason why was that he was an officer of the Indian rather than the British Army.



    And not just that. Being an Indian Army Officer he would have been looked down on.
     
  16. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Quote:
    Blitzkrieg Myth, by Mosier.

    As I said above, Mosier was complimentary of Montgomery, saying that in the desert, Monty understood the falacy of blitzkrieg as a theory and that knew the British command doctrine would not have allowed for the flexibility that the British staff would need to make changes on the fly, as is required in mobile warfare.
    The "falacy" of blitzkrieg was proven first by the Australian General Sir Leslie Morshead at Tobruk in April 1941 when he delivered the Germans their first land defeat of the war. Morshead was a subordinate of the brilliant Australian WW1 General Sir John Monash.
    >>>>>>>>>>>>

    Hi slip. Hey, you write pretty good for a southern boy ! :) I haven't read Mosier's book, but I have read the suggestion that blitzkrieg was a "falacy". The suggestion was that blitzkrieg was much less effective against large forces, such as US and USSR than it was against smaller forces such as Poland. The explanation was since there's more troops, then encirclement and the subsequent destruction would prove much more difficult. But I'm not convinced.
    I don't see it as a "falacy" or non falacy. Seems more like a play in playbook rather then hard fact or fiction. Just as there are times when a long pass is appropriate in football, there's times when fast movement of vehicles and encirclement are appropriate actions for mechanized units. And even though I've read that blitzkrieg was less effective against the Soviets, there's certainly a number of times when the Germans encircled and destroyed Soviet forces in the first weeks of Barbarossa. The number of Soviet prisoners taken as a result of blitzkrieg is huge.
    Also, I can think of at least one time when the speed of blitzkrieg enabled the Germans to capture a Soviet bridge intact. Not an insignificant thing.

    Talk to ya later,
    Tony
    Well to continue the Football analogy, blitzkrieg is the playbook as opposed to a play. You need an army designed to use the doctrine. If you have a ground based game you dont just suddenly "go to the air" or if you dont use a "west Coast Offense" if you're running back cant receive. Blitzkrieg needs a strong Tactical Air Force and mobile elements who can co-operate fully. the use of a Strategic Air Arm would not be ideal for example.
     
  17. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    All very well to say that the "Blitzkrieg" was a fallacy against larger formations and that Monty had noted Morshead;s tactics at Tobruk - but Monty couln't wait to apply it with 8th army in the desert as his first order was to have Harding construct a "Corps de chasse" a three Armoured Division - 1st - 7th and 10th unit for Blitzing - but was hamstrung by both the Armoured leaders - Lumsden et al plus the Air Force's Tedder and Conninghm and it was not until he had gotten rid of those that we had the first British Blitzkreig at El Hamma followed by another at Medjez - Tunis - Cap Bon.

    Monty then still applied his three armoured Divs - 7th - 11th and Guards in the breakout from Caen and also the "swan" to Brussels - so it was used to good measure - not only by the Germans - whose Blitzkreig was invariably supported by horse transport !
    Cheers
     
  18. boykin530

    boykin530 Junior Member

    Slip, on another site, I just read someone else's post on the fallacy of blitzkrieg. I'm ordering Mosier's book, but I'm already biased against. But I'll keep at least a small bit of open mind when I read it.
    Also, the Luftwaffe was a major part of "blitzkrieg". All too often, people will focus only on the movement of Guderian's and Rommel's tanks across northern France. Those moves were bold and courageous, but Luftwaffe is a major part of blitzkrieg and shouldn't be overlooked. The Germans had around twice the numbers in air power as the French.
    And just as important, the French chose to spread out their air groups across the entire border. It's pretty easy to conceive, perhaps now in hindsight, but a responsive air defense against an enemy thrust HAS to have the numbers to achieve the mission.

    By spreading out their available air force, none of the French air attacks really amounted to much.
     
  19. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Slip, on another site, I just read someone else's post on the fallacy of blitzkrieg. I'm ordering Mosier's book, but I'm already biased against. But I'll keep at least a small bit of open mind when I read it.
    Also, the Luftwaffe was a major part of "blitzkrieg". All too often, people will focus only on the movement of Guderian's and Rommel's tanks across northern France. Those moves were bold and courageous, but Luftwaffe is a major part of blitzkrieg and shouldn't be overlooked. The Germans had around twice the numbers in air power as the French.
    And just as important, the French chose to spread out their air groups across the entire border. It's pretty easy to conceive, perhaps now in hindsight, but a responsive air defense against an enemy thrust HAS to have the numbers to achieve the mission.

    By spreading out their available air force, none of the French air attacks really amounted to much.

    Bear in mind, I'm not a kool-aid drinker to this author's suppositions, but he does do a good job of backing his argument with supporing data. He argues just the opposite concerning the French Air Force of what you presented. When you read the book, pay attention to the numbers he offers when he discusses the 1940 air war. It is chapter 6, starting around page 136 in my hardback Harper Collins version. He gives data showing the French air force out numbering the Germans and dealing the Luftwaffe serious losses with supposedly infrerior aircraft. He claims the air disparity was caused by the lack of capable AAA units in the BEF and French Army compared to the lavish numbers provided the Germans and relative proximity of German airfields to fighting. It is because the German aircraft were closer to the front, that they were able to fly more sorties per day than could their counterparts to the west. If you have 200 aircraft flying one sortie a day and your enemy has 100, flying 4 a day, then when it gets down to brass tacks, his air force is twice a large where it counts, over the battlefield.

    I had a very closed mind against it when I bought it around 2003. Some parts of it I still don't necessarily agree with, but a good bit I do. I hope that you enjoy reading it.
     
  20. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Slipdigit & Boyken
    If you "google " for the Battle of El Hamma you will note the predominence of the Desert Air Force in supporting the Tanks - Infantry - Artillery et al with the new "Cab Rank" of fighters and Tank busters in supportof the Blitzkrieg attack and repeated at Medjez el bab -Tunis and Cap Bon - you might also note a similarity to Stormin Norman's attack at Gulf One !
    Cheers
     

Share This Page