Were the prefabricated harbors erected by the Allies off Normandy worth the effort and treasure invested in them? I ask the question because I am in the process of finishing a manuscript concerning Mulberry and its place in the history of the war. During the war, many on this side of the Pond seem to have considered it a waste of time and resources. Personally, I don't agree, but as an author, I try to walk the middle ground and keep my own opinions and biases out of the story as much as possible. As we seem to have many UK-based members here, I thought that I might do a little fishing, and maybe come up with a new slant on the story as seen through European eyes. I've still got plenty of time to tweak the project before I send it in. Thanks for your time
Personally I consider Mulberry to be one of the greatest factors contributing to the eventual success of the invasion, but being a Brit perhaps I am a little biassed! I know that several small ports and harbours were captured virtually intact in the early days of the invasion and also that Cherbourg was heavily damaged before capture. Given the relatively low capacity of these facilities (and the loss of the American Mulberry in the 'great storm') the British Mulberry at Arromanche remained the major onloading facility for the Allied operations for many months. It should not be forgotten that many months later (eg September '44) the 'Red Ball Express' was still carrying supplies from Normandy to Allied units in Belgium and Holland. Operations such as 'Infatuate' to make Antwerp accessible and useful did not take place until November. So if the Mulberry had not been available the supply capacity for the Allies in Northern Europe would have been immensely reduced, and it was effectively the Allied supriority in men, materiel and fuel (largely via 'PLUTO') that decided the outcome of the entire campaign. I don't have figures to hand for supplies landed at Mulberry but they are available. Guesses as to what could have been landed without Mulberry are largely speculation. Probably not anything new there for you but hope it helps.
Thanks for your input, Mike. One of the thoughts that I play with in the book is the idea that the creation of Mulberry might have encouraged Churchill to get behind the concept of Overlord. With a ready-made harbor able to supply the invasion force until the services of a real port were available, many of the logistical questions he might have had could be resolved. What do you think? Is that plausible?
Watson, I am not sure I quite follow your line of thinking. My understanding is that Churchill was fully behind the opening of the 'second front' both of his own intent and after his meetings with Roosevelt and Stalin. BUT not until overwhelming forces (largely US) could be transported to the UK and then transported to the invasion front. Logistics were obviously a prime consideration since it would have been well known that the German forces in Europe would deny acces to a major harbour by either demolition (eg Cherbourg) or fortification of access routes (eg Antwerp). Hence the design of the Mulberries and PLUTO to support the campaign after the initial landings and the time necessary to construct the harbours and install PLUTO. I rather think that the supposed invention of the artificial harbours by Churchill in his bath tub was a typically inventive response to the logistical problems facing the Allies rather than a factor deciding on Churchill's intent or backing for the operation. I suppose you could argue that, if it were not for Mulberry and PLUTO, the feasibility of the invasion would have been doubted by many, eg Ike and Monty. There is little doubt that the RN an USN could have supplied the invasion using LSTs and LCTs to carry cargo directly onto the beaches but at a much slower rate than was achieved. The ability to unload deep draught ships incapable of beaching directly onto a harbour is so much quicker and more efficient that it probably made the Allied build up too fast for the Germans to respond to.
I read that the American Engineers "skipped" on stringent reinforcement requirements set out in the plans when locking down their Mulberry "as it was only a short term requirement". The British Mulberry was reinforced at every place whereas the American's only locked down one in three. I think I had a link to that report so will try and look it up and post it here. Cheers Geoff
Geoff, I have also read similar accounts of the US Mulberry being rushed into operation with less regard for the 'assembly instructions' but the American Mulberry was in a location more vulnerable to weather (perhaps an argument for increased care in construction). Both Mulberries were out of operation after the storm but the British one was repaired in a couple of days, albeit with a reduced capacity. Salvaged segments of the American harbour were later re-used to further enhance the British Mulberry. Without the single remaining artificial harbour logistics would have been extremely difficult given the loss of tanks, troops etc in the Normandy breakout.
The ratio was every three whereas the Americans used one in six. As Mike states, conditions may have been different for both Mulberries however they were definitely innovative in application and the end result even though one was short term, moved great quantities onto the beaches in support of the landing. The other link is here: http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/war-sea/38250-ships-deliberately-sunk-normandy-1944-a.html#post425700 Cheers Geoff
Sorry about that Spidge. I was in the process of typing my reply when you sent your's in. Rather than repeat your information I was going to delete my reply, then I figured what the heck, I need the post count. The Americans in their haste to complete "A" on schedule (and beat the British in completing their respective units) did fail to properly anchor their roadways to the seabed. Although, instead of securing every third pontoon, I've read sources that had it at one in six. After the destruction of "A" during the big storm, the British claimed that this failure to follow the plan was to blame. The Americans countered with statements that it was a faulty design that couldn't withstand the rigors of Channel weather and that the British had the benefit of the Calvados reef to protect them.
Watson, Might be worth following the many links Geoff has suggested. It might not add much to your theory but it gives a great insight to the Mulberries. I haven't followed all the threads but there might be some statistics in there somewhere that might help, although personally I hate statistics, they can be manipulated to support or destroy any argument, but what else can we rely on?
Mike, I'll check out those links as you suggested. Couldn't agree more concerning statistics. They can always be twisted, plus they're boring.
From: The Mulberry Harbour By June 22nd, the harbour serving the Americans at Omaha had been wrecked. Parts of it were salvaged to repair the British harbour at Gold which worked for 10 months. In that time this harbour landed 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles and 4 million tons of goods. For all its apparent success, the idea of Mulberry did not have the support of everyone: “I think it’s the biggest waste of manpower and equipment that I have ever seen. I can unload a thousand LSTs at a time over the open beaches. Why give me something that anybody who’s ever seen the sea act upon 150-ton concrete blocks at Casablanca knows the first storm will destroy? What’s the use of building them just to have them destroyed and litter up the beaches.” (Admiral John Leslie Hall, US Navy) He did not have 1,000 LST's to use however the use of both was successful.
Always felt that Hall was abit miffed that he hadn't been named overall USN commander off Normandy and not just the commander of Force "O". Good call on the LST count. As far as I can tell. there were only 236 LSTs available for the invasion. Things were so tight that when three were damaged or lost during "Operation Tiger", three more units were transfered from the Mediterranean.
In addition to LSTs, LCTs were capable of cross channel operations and beach landings (eg Mk3 carrying approx 350 tons) but in the planning stage for D-Day assault losses were estimated to be somewhat higher than actually occurred. The capability of LCT cargo capacity was therefore probably somewhat underestimated in the planning stage for the best of reasons. The LCTs were somewhat flimsy by comparison to purpose built cargo vessels and suffered frequent engine failures as well as battle damage, and their contribution would have been a welcome addition to the majority of cargo delivered by larger vessels and Mullbery. All the time Mullberry was in operation (as far as I am aware) cargo was also offloaded to DUKW and Rhino transports BUT this would probably not have been possible had it not been for the breakwater created by the sinking of blockships as an essential part of the Mullberry harbour.
D'Este goes into the statistics in his D-Day book. If I remember correctly he seems to say that after the destruction of their mulberry there was a short hiatus which dropped tonnage considerably but that the Americans were eventually landing as much directly onto the beach as they had when using a mulberry. Len
Regarding LSTs. In the early stages of the planning,D Day was put back almost 6 weeks on a critical path of maximising LST availability.But in the end a target date of May 31 was agreed on January 21.Even that then slipped back by another week and was caught by the weather for the final planned date. The upmost planning went into Overload and the Supreme Coimmander rightfully made the correct decision only to go when the prerequisites had been met.The other important aspect was that Admiral Ramsey had misgivings about May 31 on account that the programme might not be compatible with the extensive training for those who would man the LSTs. It is difficult to see if Hall was aware of the deeper situation regarding the availability of LSTs.The Allies were under pressure from Stalin to open the second front from as early as 1942,then in 1943 but the Allied ship building resources were given the priority of keeping the sea lanes open to merchant shipping by covering the merchant losses to the German U Boat arm. ....The Battle of the Atlantic had to be won first before any thought of a successful invasion of Europe. LST construction for any invasion of Europe did not have priority during the critical years of 1942 and 1943 when the Atlantic supply route was in danger of being severely threatened. The other dimension as regards LSTs construction was that the Pacific War had to be kept on the ascendancy resulting in a further demand for LSTs construction resources for US forces to be able to push back the Japanese northwards.
Two thoughts. While the US Navy might have found there was no problem in beaching LSTs for discharging vehicles there was a great difference in the turn round time between using a beach and the purpose built LST pier. By unloading simultaneously from both tank deck and upper deck Mulberry could turn round an LST in two hours. Beaching and waiting for the tide to refloat an LST could take twelve hours. More important though is the handling of cargo. Mulberry offered 'proper' port facilities for unloading. Coasters used the stores pier and discharged straight into lorries. Larger vessels discharged into lighters and transferred to the barge pier and thus into lorries. There were great savings in time and labour when shipping and men were in short supply. DUKWs did excellent work but were soon worn out. Mike
This could be an interesting book that combines good analysis of the logistic methods and calculations plus pictures that illustrate all the techniques used. Having no experience I would think the best technique was cargo lifted out of the ship and dropped into a truck (or lorrie) and driven to the in-shore dump. For that you need a pier (floating or otherwise). As stated DUKW's were fragile. I wonder if they tried putting trucks on small landing craft (LCVP's LCM's) to keep from manhandling cargo. Same with the rhino ferries with multiple trucks (or lorries). It seems LST's and LCT's would be more valued for shipping vehicles, although I heard they ferried cargo loaded on trucks (or lorries) for fast unloading. Of course that wastes capacity. Although I do recall in the Pacific they had the roller system (name escapes me, conveyors?) that they set-up and pushed cargo out of the LST (or LSM?) and on to the beach. You see many panoramic pictures of the beaches/ships in full unloading operation but don't pause long enough to interpret what you are seeing. If you dread proving a point with statistics, then may I suggest you provide the facts about the type of material delivered by various means for each month. Better to be a trusted reference than a questionable polemic. Good Luck!
It was effectively the Allied supriority in men, materiel and fuel (largely via 'PLUTO') that decided the outcome of the entire campaign. PLUTO had no bearing on the outcome of the Normandy campaign at all. It did not begin operating until two months after the D-Day landings and was plagued by persistent failures afterwards. PLUTO did not function properly until 1945, at which point the Allied advance had made the purpose of the whole project somewhat moot. It was an ingenious idea, and much was made of it in postwar propaganda, but it simply didn't work. Best, Alan
Hi Sherlock, did you ever get this work published? Very interested in the original question as I seem to remember a discussion about more supplies being brought in by DUKWs and Rhino's than by Mulberry... or was that only in the US Sector?
