The Training Section of S.O.E. - Special Training Schools Including Their War Establishments

Following the manual on the British War Establishment System 1931, which was a rather dry and theoretical approach to the system, showing not much of the content of the War Establishments, this new topic combines two more of my interests: the organisation of training or knowledge transfer in general and the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) as part of these typical “special” British units during World War II, which arose from the need to resist and survive the threat posed by the rapid invasive expansion of Germany and its allies.

Additionally, this is a first attempt to distinguish between several groups of war establishments that cannot be easily determined and at times tend to confuse the researcher. Moreover, the names of the units involved were - and are still - sometimes used by people involved in a sloppy if not incorrect way:
- Special Training Schools (S.T.S.)
- Stations
- Military Establishments (M.E.)

And there are two other groups with similar names, which must also be distinguished:
- Military Missions (M.M.)
- Liaison Missions.

Although S.O.E. training in principle took place in Special Training Schools, which are dealt with conclusively here, there were a few exceptions.

What we shall read here:
The S.O.E. had to organise the training of its personnel and established and used so-called “Special Training Schools” (S.T.S.) for this purpose. There were a few dozen of them, and each had to be housed, staffed and organised. So, the locations and the houses will be brought into connection with the war establishments. Due to the organisation of S.O.E., with one exception only European schools were administered directly by the S.O.E. Headquarters in London, leaving the organisation and operation of comparable schools in other theatres to the respective commands. The latter were, at least in part covered by the British War Establishment Series and are only dealt with marginally to show their connection to the main training system. Some of the stations of S.O.E. were, at least at times, also used for training. These are included here, too, to give a better overview.

Moreover, this publication tries to serve as a kind of reference book for research purposes, allowing to approach the schools from different angles (ordinal numbers of schools, houses, locations, staff and syllabuses).

Those Stations not dealt with here, and the Military Establishments, Military Missions and Liaison Missions will be subject to future publications.

Presentation of Text
Sources:
History of the Training Section of S.O.E., 1940 – 1945
Contemporary documents

Dates always appear in dd.mm.yyyy format.


Acknowledgements
My thanks go above all to member Mike “Trux” Simpson, whom I value for his excellent knowledge of details and contexts relating to the British Army during the Second World War and to Paul McCue of The Secret WW2 Learning Network, with whom I began a lively email correspondence about puzzling details, because he had been recommended to me by several people as a proven expert on the Special Operations Executive. He lived up to his reputation and repeatedly pointed me in the right direction.

Both have given me valuable advice on many occasions.


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1. Notes on Sources
1.1 By far, the most sources used here are held in The National Archives, Kew (TNA). When using Discovery, TNA’s search engine on their website, the search string “Records of Special Operations Executive” returns under the entry “Separated material”:
‘Very few records of SOE are known to have survived to this day, following destruction of files in Singapore before the Japanese occupation of Singapore in 1942 and in Egypt before the German advance on Cairo, and subsequent weeding and a fire at SOE headquarters in 1945.’

This discouraging information refers to the HS-Series, used exclusively for S.O.E. It is somewhat alleviated by the fact that the research of the National Archive’s WO 24- series for the wartime-relevant war establishments revealed a significant number of them for S.O.E. As, for reasons of secrecy, none of these documents were labelled as belonging to S.O.E. - at best, the abbreviation I.S.R.B. for Inter-Services Research Bureau, a cover designation for the S.O.E., appears on a few of them - most of them are only indirectly recognisable.


1.2 The National Archives’ WO 24-Series: War Establishments
These volumes contain, among other things, the war establishments of the British Army, which are numerous, although not complete, and contain very detailed information, preserved to an astonishing degree. The war establishments during World War II are held in numbered volumes. A new volume was introduced at about the same time when S.O.E. came to life: Volume VIII, reserved for “special” war establishments. This was a measure to keep the growing number of war establishments of a secret nature out of the usual publication routines, as war establishments held in this volume were never printed. More or less consequently, the TNA WO 24 series holds all the war establishments in a sub-series in chronologically organised volumes. Those for Volume VIII are held in another sub-series. Once found, these documents are not only even more complete than those of the regular volumes, but as an extra, this is the only volume in which most of the amendments to the war establishments have survived, thus giving a better picture of minor corrections to the establishments. However, there are many war establishments, and as they cannot be assigned to S.O.E. and found by their title, the researcher interested in S.O.E. must learn about the S.O.E. structures, the camouflaging names used for their institutions and the system of the war establishments. And the exclusive use of the term “Special Training School” for S.O.E.

Another sub-series of WO 24 holds the minutes of meetings of the War Establishment Committee, the War Establishment Sub-Committee and the War Establishments Investigating Committees which were consulted in certain cases and occasionally yielded surprising findings, which in turn led to the solving of mysteries.

1.3 The National Archives’ HS-Series: Special Operations Executive
This series, in contrary, is reserved for S.O.E. files. While dealing with their matters, sometimes strengths of personnel are listed, in other secondary sources as books sometimes cited as “war establishments”. Unfortunately, these data in most cases do not give the proper war establishments (table number and issue, title, dates of promulgation, beginning of effective period on the formal side, and the complete content), but rather list only details in context to the respective purpose, insufficient for a coherent presentation and further research within the War Establishment System. Only very few proper cites of war establishments could be found here, but fortunately, some of these fill blanks left by the TNA WO 24-series.

1.4 Main Source “History of the Training Section of S.O.E., 1940 – 1945”
The history itself is presented on 82 pages in the original and is very detailed. The reproduction of the latest issue of each war establishment takes up a further 52 pages in the original, while here all the surviving issues are shown instead.

Unfortunately, the sources are contradictory in many regards. The main source used besides the war establishments (TNA HS 8/435 - History of the Training Section of S.O.E., 1940 – 1945, also contained in TNA HS 7/51), was compiled by Major Gerald Marcel Forty by September 1945 as “SOE Headquarter Files 242”. Major Forty had worked as an instructor in at least one of the Special Training Schools in the Beaulieu area. From about May 1943 until the end of the war, he held the appointment “Staff Officer to the Director of Training” in the S.O.E. organisation. For the period when he held this appointment, it might be assumed that this official source should be most accurate. But as he found himself at the end of the war in the situation to reconstruct the history also for the first two and a half years before his appointment, against all restrictions due to secrecy and with most of the personnel employed during that period having left for other appointments in the meantime, inaccuracies and errors sometimes are evident. In his introduction, he admits that the documentation lacks information due to the absence of complete records. Moreover, the numbering of all Special Training Schools had undergone many changes, and he admits that he forwent to reconstruct all the moves. Since other contemporary primary sources might suffer from the same problems, this applies even more to secondary sources that relied on these original documents. So, research on the ordinal numbers of the schools alone will be misleading at times and should be supported by other facts as the point in time, the houses, the commanding officers, the instructors, at times even the purpose of the schools, having changed several times in case of some of them, and not least, the agents. A complete reconstruction of all changes now seems rather impossible.

Besides this, Major Forty’s history does not give a complete picture of the training of agents for the S.O.E., following the fact that his task was confined to the institutions governed by the London Training Section, which was only responsible for training agents deployed from the United Kingdom. Important schools existed under the commands of the respective theatres. As far as possible, reference will be made to these.

Any hints, best provided with appropriate quoting of the source, will be appreciated.

 

2. Introduction
The Special Operations Executive was a short-lived organisation. While the use of agents had a history, it was nowhere near the scale that was now being pursued and achieved. When Hugh Dalton, the Minister for Economic Warfare, was given political responsibility, Prime Minister Churchill specified his mission: 'And now go and set Europe ablaze.' To do justice to these dimensions, it was not enough to simply build a new organization. Since circumstances were constantly changing during the war, adaptation and forward planning would be part of daily business, and it had to operate in absolute secrecy.

And yet it managed to train thousands of agents efficiently to such a degree that they were able to operate successfully under the enemy's watchful eye in occupied countries, some even for very long periods. The degree of perfection required to achieve this, as well as the requirement deemed necessary for reasons of security and secrecy to avoid any mixing of agents from different countries, i.e. to train them strictly according to their national origin, may at first glance seem unachievable. To make things worse, as a new player on the military stage, S.O.E. suffered from animosity on the part of the established powers, who viewed the new institution as a nuisance if not threat to their own work rather than a helpful competitor, and tended to discredit them, if not fight them.

Eventually, S.O.E. overcame these obstacles. Its Training Section played a major role in their success. This is their history.

3. Birth of a New Service
3.1 Changing Strategy: Introduction of Ungentlemanly Warfare
3.1.1 General Situation
Germany attacked Poland on 01.09.1939. The United Kingdom and France had given guarantee to Poland to declare war in that case earlier that year and did so only two days later. This not only started World War II. Germany’s opponents had to learn that the new German Blitzkrieg strategy was very different from what had happened in World War I. When in spring 1940 Germany attacked their neighbours to the North and the West, seizing and occupying Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and finally France in rapid succession, even forcing the British Expeditionary Force out of France, the United Kingdom suddenly stood alone.

3.1.2 Situation in the United Kingdom
Suffering from the loss of practically all modern weapons that the British Expeditionary Force had to leave behind during operation Dynamo, the retreat from the Continent, there was a permanent threat not only by the constant bombing by the Luftwaffe in their attempt to get air superiority over Britain. Moreover, the United Kingdom were well aware that Germany planned an invasion, operation Seelöwe. In these dark days, rapid action was required, on a large scale. An Allied invasion on the Continent seemed impossible for the coming years, and a totally new way of fighting the enemy had to be found. During the time before the outbreak of war voices had already been raised in public that the traditional British habit of gentlemanly warfare might not be a sufficient response to the threats arising. Moreover, once Germany's style of mobile warfare had been established, the traditional habit to fight an enemy along a defined frontline, all too well-known from World War I, suddenly had become obsolete. How could the enemy still be kept busy and on alert from a distance, tying up at least some of their forces?

3.1.3 The New Option: Ungentlemanly Warfare
Slowly, ungentlemanly warfare became an option. There was a need for new ideas, operations in that sense had to be planned, and of course, suitable personnel had to be found and trained. The war diary of M.I.(R.)* has an entry for 03.06.1940, while the evacuation from Dunkirk was in full swing:
‘The Chiefs of Staff, having decided that subversive and irregular activities should be an auxiliary to the winning of the war, the D.M.I. took a paper written by Colonel Holland to the V.C.I.G.S. with strong recommendations for the organisation of a Command for the conduct of such activities.’

Quickly, new kinds of units were integrated into the regular forces, e.g. the Independent Companies, forerunners of the Commandos and already introduced in mid-April 1940 to support Norway, and the Auxiliary Units, stay-behind units for use in the United Kingdom in case of an invasion by German forces. Both were, at least in part, initiated and organised by Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Gubbins, who had been familiar with military training and irregular warfare and guerilla tactics since the end of World War One. He was soon to play an important role for S.O.E., first as head of its Training and Operations Section, later to become its director. Parachuting was introduced into the Regular Forces, what soon became also an integral part of the training for S.O.E. agents.

Many people had fled their home countries to escape the advancing German troops and had found a new home in the United Kingdom. Thousands of them offered their services and skills to fight the common enemy. They were the ideal resource for fighting the enemy in the occupied territories by means of irregular warfare, clandestinely organising circuits of resistance, training and arming suited personnel, and carrying out operations. The newly created service Special Operations Executive was to assess the suitability of every single candidate and then ensure their training. At the end of their training, they were to be kept in suitable facilities according to their respective nations of origin, until they could be deployed.

Within a few months, sometimes weeks or even days, many things happened, often simultaneously. When researching the whole bunch of war establishments, the period between the end of May 1940 and 06.11.1940 is apparently in some disorder, with many documents lost and many errors on the part of the administration which were only occasionally corrected. The two volumes containing the Home War Establishments (i.e. the United Kingdom), are recognisably the most affected. Volume VIII, introduced at the end of that period to contain war establishments classified “secret”, started with the same disorder. This was to become the home of practically all war establishments discussed here. Although all war establishments officially promulgated in A.C.Is. between the introduction of the system in 1932 and the end of the war have been verified by the author, there are indications and there is a certain risk that not all of these have passed the official routines, let alone have been preserved.

3.2 An Ungentlemanly Service: Special Operations Executive
3.2.1 Amalgamation
S.O.E. came to life in July 1940. It absorbed three existing secret organisations and their tasks:
- Section “D” from the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S.) pioneering undercover sabotage, “black” propaganda** and political subversion,
- MI(R) from the War Office for para-military operations and
- Electra House (Department E.H.) from the Foreign Office for propaganda.
The service was placed under Hugh Dalton, the new Minister of Economic Warfare.

An internal letter “Change of Sections Title” of 21.10.1940*** notified the organisation that ‘as from today, the title of Section “D” no longer exists … [and] will in future be known as S.O.2.’

On 22.10.1940, a secret paper by the D.D.M.O. (H) presented ‘Notes on the Linking of Military Operations with the Special Operations Executive’**** that reflects the meaning of training already at this early stage:

‘Present Arrangements
1. The Special Operations Executive is under Mr. Dalton with Mr. Jebb as his second-in-command. It is divided into three sections:
- S.O.E.1. (Subversive Propaganda).
- S.O.E.2. (Subversive Operations). This includes detailed planning, and covers such things as the recruitment and training of agents, as well as questions of transport and communications.
- S.O.E.3. (Intelligence and long-term planning).

2. With S.O.E.1. the War Office has no direct link.
S.O.E.2. is run by a Board of Directors, one of whom is the Brigadier Special Operations, who is the War Office representative but who is regarded as attending in advisory capacity only. The B.S.O. also acts as the War Office Liaison Officer with S.O.E.2. and has a staff officer (G.S.O.2) who works permanently in the S.O.E.2. organization.
In S.O.E.3. there is Brigadier van Cutsem, who provides a link with the D.M.I.

3. The B.S.O. does not consider that his appointment is justified within the narrow limits of ‘adviser’ to S.O.E.2. Two further developments are likely to reduce his responsibilities still more. These are:
(a) The proposal to appoint a full Colonel to assist the head of S.O.E.2. as a ‘Director of Training and Planning’.
(b) The centralization in the War Office of all irregular military operations under the M.O.9. section of the D.M.O.& P.’s Directorate.

[…]

8. […] In view of the immense importance of S.O.E. activities in in relation to military operations, it would not be out of place to give Mr. Dalton a Brigadier as military adviser and perhaps to raise the G.S.O.2. in S.O.E.2. to the status of a G.S.O.1.’

To fulfil this mission, S.O.E. not only had to find suitable agents, but also develop a suitable training apparatus for their training from scratch. To bring this training programme to life, suitable instructors and houses had to be found for the different kinds of schools. All this of course in secrecy, and not only in the tradition of the forerunner organisations, as at this very moment in history, the United Kingdom found itself under an imminent threat of invasion by the rapid successes of the German forces in Western Europe, already suffering from the disaster of Dunkirk. So, it had to be kept in mind that the training should be continued even after an invasion to keep resistance working.

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* TNA HS 8/263: MI(R) Unit War Diary, 1939 - 1940
** Black propaganda is intended to create the impression that it was created by those it is supposed to discredit, typically used to vilify or embarrass through misrepresentation.
*** TNA HS 8/334: Organisation and Administration Staff, August 1940 – December 1941 - S.O.E. H.Q. File 149
**** TNA HS 8/258: MI(R) Functions and Organisation (War Establishment), 1940, March - October - S.O.E. H.Q. File 66

 

3.2.2 The Country Sections
While the training of the agents was the responsibility of the Training Section, this was of course not an end in itself. To maintain maximum secrecy, S.O.E. was organised into so-called Country Sections from the outset. These were the recipients of the successfully trained agents. The Czech and the Polish Country Sections were among the first, the French probably the best known today, and about a dozen more were added according to Germany’s expansion, occupying one country after another.

3.2.2.1 Countries and Groups of Countries
S.O.E. Headquarters File No. 149 - Organisation and administration Staff – August 1940 – December 1941*, provides detailed information on the country section philosophy.

A most secret memorandum “S.O.2.” from ADZ** (ADZ/XX/321a, dated 26.03.1941)* reads:
‘5. […] The fundamental task of S.O.2. is, therefore, to create organisations within all enemy and enemy-occupied territories which are prepared to undertake subversive warfare or at least to hinder and impede Axis plans; as a corollary, similar organisations must be created in countries liable to occupation, and in countries which, by Axis pertinacity or threats, are helping its’ war effort. […] The methods by which S.O.2. works can best be illustrated by the following examples:
(a) Norway, a completely conquered country. […]
(b) Roumania, an “occupied” territory. […]
(c) Yugoslavia, a “threatened” country. […]
(d) Sweden, a neutral country not immediately threatened.
Other projects are in hand. […]’

This list of examples is deliberately open-ended and provides flexibility for future developments.

3.2.2.2 Internal Organisation
The same internal memorandum, dated 26.03.1941, describes under point 7. that the headquarters of S.O.2 is organised on a country basis (French, German, Austrian, … Sections); also included in the headquarters are among others the Training and Operating [sic] Section and the Intelligence and Planning Section. It continues:
‘(a) Country Sections
Country Sections are directed by heads who have been specially selected as having knowledge of the countries they supervise, and also contacts and influence with the Governments concerned, whether emigre or still in power in their own lands. The first task of Country Sections is to establish, or re-establish if necessary, contact with their countries, and introduce therein organisers and agents who are willing to undertake S.O.2. work. A further function is to study targets for attack, and suitable methods, whether these be attacks against material objects or directed towards the subversion of the population, and the neutralization of hostile activities.’

The same file lists in another internal memorandum, dated 30.06.1941, the status quo of S.O.2 after a rapid expansion. Six groups of tasks are identified:
‘Group 1: The direction of agents operating abroad; planning and execution of subversive operations; sabotage and political subversion, including the distribution of propaganda and whispers on behalf of S.O.1, in neutral countries and enemy and enemy-occupied countries.
Group 2: The training of agents and the para-military bodies; the planning, equipping and executing of specific operations based on this country with or without the co-operation of group 1.’
Group 3: [Collection of intelligence]
Group 4: [General Research]
Group 5: [Finance and Establishment]
Group 6: [Security]

‘II. Experience has proved that the units around which everything revolves are the Country Sections, which are grouped in regions and are responsible for the organisation and control of agencies abroad and so perform the functions of Group 1. It is also clear that, to ensure economic and rapid action, every Country Section must be in itself a complete unit, able to tackle any operation within its own area. […]’

‘IV. Personnel
Group 1 – Country Sections
Country Sections should be grouped under Regional Chiefs who should have a sufficient number of Personal Assistants at their disposal: for Planning and operations (except where the other Service Ministries are involved in the operation); for Intelligence; for personnel and general purposes. The staff of a Country Section must depend on the nature of the countries which it covers.’

Appropriate organisational measures were described for operations that exceeded the responsibility of individual Country Sections. Two days later, these proposals were approved with effect from 07.07.1941, with the exception, that planning now became a central task, as the coordination of planning had to be done on many occasions anyway. A Co-ordinating Secretariat was to be set up, which would also take over the planning of the Country Sections.

A “Note on the Organisation of a Country Section”* by M***, dated 05.11.1941, starts:
‘The object of this paper is to urge the formation of an executive Country Section as a basis of the organisation of S.O.E.’

Work that had previously been centralised was delegated to the Country Sections to favour specialisation in the varying conditions in the respective countries. Furthermore, the previous centralisation was recognised as the antithesis of conspiratorial work. The Country Sections were not included in the Army’s War Establishment System. An attached draft organisation to the above note gives the basic establishment for a Country Section as follows:
‘One Major,
Two Captains,
Four Subalterns,
One other rank.
Four secretaries.
Total: 7 officers, 1 O.R., 4 Secretaries.’

The respective qualifications and tasks were assigned to the staff as follows:
- Head of Section
- G.II Operations
- G.III Operations
- G.II Intelligence
- G.III Intelligence
- 2 Conducting Officers
- Driver and packer, general duties
- Secretary to the Head of Section
- Secretary to the Operations Sub-section
- Secretary to the Intelligence Sub-section
- Secretary (registry).

3.2.2.3 Established Country Sections
Country Sections were established according to the political situation in each country; this could lead to establishing more than one section for the same country. As generally usual within the S.O.E., “speaking” names were avoided wherever possible and replaced by codes, internally called symbols. By adding more letters, these codes served to denote members of the sections. So, F denoted not only the French Section, but also its head, Lt.-Col. Buckmaster. FB, FP, FG, in all nearly a dozen, denoted the functions in the section. These symbols, as they were called internally, were used in place of the names of persons involved, as in minutes of meetings, memorandums and letters throughout the administration. This naturally contributed to security and secrecy, but as the symbols changed according to organisational changes over the time, it is difficult today to understand and evaluate sources.

Organisation Code Responsibility
Section S - Scandinavia
Section SD - Denmark
Section SN - Norway
Section SS - Sweden
Section J - Italy, Switzerland
Section F - France
Section DF - Clandestine Communications
Section EU/P - Polish Minorities Section
Section RF - Free French
Section N - Netherlands
Section T - Belgium
Section MP - Poland
Section MY Czechoslovakia
Section MX - Czechia
Section MPH - Hungary
Section X - Germany and Austria
Section H - Iberia and Spanish Morocco
Section D/P - Neutral countries

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* TNA HS 8/334: Organisation and administration Staff, 1940 - 1941 - S.O.E. H.Q. File 149
** AD/Z: Director of Services, later Director of Research, Development and Supply; Col. F.T. Davies
*** M denotes the Director of Operations and Training

 

3.2.3 The S.O.E. Training Organisation
Major Forty’s valuable and very detailed work on the Training Section has gaps. Additions are made wherever they are available and necessary or simply considered useful. His limitations at the time of developing the History, due to secrecy and missing eyewitnesses from the time before he joined the Training Section, are overcome and supplemented by facts from other sources, enabling a broader perspective.

Additional added value:
- The history of each war establishment used during the war: While Major Forty tells the story of the Training Section from the end, using only the last war establishment of each school in a loose-leaf collection, here all the surviving war establishments will be shown, including amendments.
- Major Forty was not able to reconstruct all the changes in the Training Section, particularly during the first two years. As far as changes can be reconstructed, these will be shown here.
- He had to rely on the histories and reports provided from other sections and directorates, which may not have known or wanted to provide the desired scope. As far as these histories are available, they were used to appending details.

3.2.3.1 Terms Used for Training Schools
The use of terms like “Special Training School”, “Station” and “Military Establishment” in the primary sources is sometimes subject to inaccuracies. One reason is that some of the institutions were renamed at some time, and some authors cite the original term while others cite the newer or by that time formal term. Even people involved at the time sometimes seem to have shown a certain degree of negligence regarding formalities, perhaps due to “one change too many”. In the case of Station XVII, located at Brickendonbury Manor, there were times when training courses were organised in addition to the main and usual tasks of the Station, leading to call the institution in that respect “Special Training School No. 17”. During 1942, it changed its title officially from Station to Special Training School, by keeping its number. S.T.S. 61 and S.T.S. 62 are other examples, being renamed Stations after some time. In case of S.T.S. 48, the assigning of the newly introduced training syllabus for the JEDBURGH personnel as one of the many preparations for the invasion on the Continent led soon to changing the name completely to Military Establishment No. 65, due to security and for reasons of camouflage. Station XIX went the other way in becoming S.T.S. 19 late in the war.

Schools beyond the auspices of the Training Section (Middle and Far East, Australia, Mediterranean theatres) were integrated in the system under the nomenclature of Military Establishment rather than being called Special Training Schools.

It seems inappropriate to limit this investigation to the group of institutions treated by the main source, for reasons of jurisdiction confined to the Training Section of the S.O.E., as it does not take into account many connections and developments that are necessary to understand the evolution of the training apparatus as a whole, covering schools called ‘Stations’ or ‘Military Establishment’ beyond this restriction, at least as far as the ‘school’ part of their duties is concerned.

3.2.3.2 Many changes in the Training System
Besides the inaccuracy regarding nomenclature, other things hamper the research. In many cases, it is a question of the accurate date, whether a school has this number or another, is located in that house or elsewhere, or which syllabuses are being taught.

3.2.3.3 Changing School Numbers
Although the final numbering of the schools shows a certain recognizable grouping, there is evidence that during 1941 and 1942 students were posted to schools showing obvious differences in number, house or nationality assigned. When researching a certain agent’s career, his personal papers might give a hint on the Special Training Schools that he attended. The number of such a school might be different from the number found in Major Forty’s history, which uses the numbering, which was valid in 1945, particularly in reports from the period 1941 – 1942. The biography of Anders Lassen gives an example.*

3.2.3.4 Changing Locations
Suitable locations were constantly in short supply. Usually, for purposes like training, the army used several locations which were not appropriate for S.O.E., as they had not only to maintain a higher level of secrecy and security, in their own words ‘complete seclusion from the outside world’**, but in addition had to keep the agents coming from the various allied countries strictly apart. To make things worse, S.O.E. were dependent on the Ministry of Works and Planning for the supply of suitable locations. A contemporary letter reads:
‘… although Q.1*** often help in finding suitable premises, they have no need to do so. The matter is complicated by the fact that S.O.E. can never completely put their cards on the table to the Ministry of Works and Planning. Secrecy must be observed and the type of accommodation suitable for the S.O.E. Schools is almost invariably not that, which would suit ordinary units.’

In the same letter, S.O.E. express the urgent needs to move the 12 houses used for the finishing schools in the Beaulieu area, because they were concerned at the large number of invasion barges being packed into the Beaulieu Water during June 1942. They anticipated some form of invasion on the Continent, i.e. operation “ROUND-UP” [early invasion plans], and they were alarmed at (a) the possibility of their own secrecy being jeopardised, and (b) the thought that if any one of their agents happened to be captured and was subjected to fifth degree methods certain preparation for operation ROUND-UP might be revealed to the enemy.

Several reasons led to moving a part of the Special Training Schools to other locations, being more suitable for a specific reason. At times, this also included houses used for the Country Sections.

3.2.3.5 Changing Training Syllabuses and Purpose of Schools
From time to time and for several reasons, training had to be adjusted following lessons learnt or other specific requirements. For example, signals training came only step by step into the hands of Signals personnel, until S.O.E. established a Signals Directorate. This led to moving schools to different houses, as accommodation was needed for a larger number of students. The Beaulieu group of Finishing Schools soon found the space available too limited for its headquarters and the accommodation of the students and found a second house which enabled them to separate the administration from running the school; in this case, both houses were held under the same number (S.T.S. 31), and the students were no more allowed to The Rings, while the training was run from The House in the Wood, a large 30-room house that also served as a base for administrative and teaching staff and an officers’ mess. The Preliminary Schools changed their role in mid-1943, after a Students’ Assessment Board had been introduced, taking over the important task of assessing the candidates by centralising it in the new (renumbered) S.T.S. No. 7. From that time on, the remaining Preliminary Schools operated as Operational Holding Schools and included paramilitary training. S.T.S. No. 22 in Rhubana Lodge was at some time converted from its role as Para-military School to a W/T Preliminary School. There were many more examples.

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* Langley, Mike: Anders Lassen, VC, MC, of the SAS - The Story of Anders Lassen and the Men Who Fought with him, New English Library, Dunton Green, Sevenoaks, Kent, 1988
** TNA HS 8-960; Letter from M.O.1 (c) [an S.O.E. office], 01.10.1942, to D.D.M.O. (H) [Deputy Director of Military Operations (Home)], classified “Most Secret”, about problems with the Finishing Schools in the Beaulieu area
*** most probably an office of the Directorate of Quartering within the War Office’s Department of the Quartermaster-General

 

3.2.4 Early Training – Getting Started
3.2.4.1 The Needs
After the establishing of the S.O.E., its Training Section found itself faced with a few complex tasks:
- Suitable individuals had to be found who possessed all the qualities required to be deployed reliably as agents. To make this already difficult task even more complicated, the candidates came from many countries and were often unable to understand English sufficiently, let alone speak it. A suitable selection method had to be found.
- Suitable instructors had to be found who were not only able to master and teach the syllabuses, but also to overcome language barriers. In many cases, the pool of suitable personnel had to be extended beyond the Army to include the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, and for certain trades, civilians were even considered first and foremost.
- Suitable locations had to be found. The widespread term “Stately ‘Omes of England” for S.O.E., which was actually meant to be humorous (if not disparagingly in relation to the new service, which was unwelcome for many of the traditional institutions), gave away the main source: requisitioned houses that could either be denied to their owners for the duration of the war or, in some cases, were even voluntarily made available by them as a contribution to the war effort. However, many houses were not suitable, not least because the minimum requirements for security and secrecy could not be met.
- Several training syllabuses had to be drawn up, the content of which differed significantly from the usual Army stuff. One of the few typical Army type syllabuses was “parachuting”, which was as new as the S.O.E. itself.
- All the above had to be organised in good time to produce suitable trained agents for planned operations, which were constantly either subject to changes, replaced by other operations or cancelled.
- To ensure the efficiency of the training measures, it was necessary to find an optimal sequence for the required training courses that would strike a balance between the effort involved and the assessment and possibly lead to the “weeding out” of unsuitable candidates. In other words, it should be clear whether candidates were suitable before they were allowed to proceed with the more costly parts of the training. And the more they learned before being deemed unsuitable, the greater the risk that their knowledge could fall into the wrong hands. In these cases, correspondingly more effort had to be expended to isolate these candidates until their knowledge was no longer of any further interest.

All this had to be done simultaneously, in a relatively short period of time and essentially from scratch. The training results had to be almost perfect, as even the smallest mistakes could lead to arrest, torture or death for agents in the field.

Although the results of these efforts were generally considered a success, S.O.E. was frequently criticised for various reasons. It is questionable whether the fulfilment of the aforementioned conditions was adequately considered in this context.

3.2.4.2 Training Measures Prior to the Introduction of the S.O.E.
Essentially starting from scratch meant that, upon examining the efforts already made by the predecessors, useful components could be found.

A: Section D, part of the Secret Intelligence Service; director Lawrence Grand
Section D had its own Training School, having started as a small magazine for the testing and storage of explosives and incendiaries at Bletchley Park before the war, called Station X. Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, head of the Secret Intelligence Service, had secretly purchased Bletchley Park for his organisation in June 1938, primarily to house the Government Code and Cipher School. Since Department D belonged to the S.I.S., it was only natural to make a small part of the then still spacious grounds available to it. After the outbreak of the war, with the rapid expansion of the school, a new base was found for its noisy work at Aston House, Stevenage. In a nearby chalk quarry, called ‘The Dell Hole’, a certain Lieutenant Cecil “Nobby” Clarke, together with Lieutenant Edward Ramsey-Green, organised short and basic training courses for saboteurs, attended by foreign agents, regional officers of the Home Defence Scheme* and Intelligence Officers of the Auxiliary Units**. As this soon proved unsatisfactory in respect of the quite informal syllabus as well as for the location, another location for the new school was found in Brickendonbury Manor, outside Hertford, which had been requisitioned by the War Office in late 1939 like many other houses after the beginning of World War Two, to have locations outside London at hand. Training in Aston House ceased and it became S.O.E.’s Technical Department and primary storage facility under the title Station XII.

The espionage and sabotage school was given the official name Station XVII, in accordance with the numbering conventions of the Special Intelligence Service which was continued by S.O.E. Another name used was “Inter-Service Experimental Department”. The training syllabus for Station XVII was formed at the end of June 1940 by an ad hoc committee under Lawrence Grand, director of Section D, with Guy Burgess as representant for the new school and several representants of Section D for allied countries. The resulting syllabus was used for the first six weeks course and included:
- Training in devices: theory of sabotage, tactical training, practical instruction in the growing range of explosives, fuses and timer devices.
- Special training: camouflage, secrecy and security, communication lines and counter-espionage, and the principal of recruiting and organisation through cut-outs, procurement and dissemination of intelligence.
- Use of small arms and grenades
Training in wireless communications could not be included before the transfer of the establishment of S.O.E. later in 1940.
The school established its staff in July 1940. A first course under the auspices of S.I.S. started already on 29.08.1940 and lasted six weeks. The participants came from various countries: six Belgians, five Norwegians, three French and eleven Spaniards. During this course, Lawrence Grand had fallen in disgrace and was dismissed on 18.09.1940. The future of the school at Brickendonbury Manor became uncertain.

B: M.I.(R.) from the War Office for para-military operations; director Jo Holland
M.I.(R)’s portfolio had been aimed to train agents. A “rough outline of the extent of M.I.R. activities” of 05.04.1940*** lists the following:
‘2. “The Art of Guerilla Warfare”, “Partisan Leader’s Handbook” and “How to Use [High] Explosives” have been printed in their thousands in English and German.’
These pamphlets were the work of Colin Gubbins, produced before the war, based on his experience with irregular warfare gained post-World War I, particularly by fighting the Bolsheviks in Archangel, during his service in Ireland and India.
Copies in many languages should follow, given to S.O.E. agents during their training.
‘Courses and Training of Personnel
4. In Mai and June, 1939, a short course was run at the Caxton Hall, consisting of various lectures on irregular and regular methods in war, including talks on foreign armies etc. About 100 picked O.E.R [Officers’ Emergency Reserve] personnel attended this.
5. In March, a Course was run at Cambridge on a much larger scale, for six weeks, attended by 40 or so picked men from the O.E.R., Regular Army, etc. This proved successful and it has been recommended that a further two Courses should be run this year, the second starting in April. The officers were graded afterwards, and those earmarked by M.I.R., though at present in other jobs, can be taken up by M.I.R at any time and used for special purposes.’

The Politico-Military Course at Cambridge University was regarded as a forerunner to the specialised training at the Special Training Centre (Lochailort); it started in March 1940, in the belief that the war would produce in many areas chaotic conditions for which men, expert in languages and knowledge of countries, would be needed to direct the activity of troops and local organisations in many parts of the world. During 1940, three courses were held, each for 40 officers; there were vacancies for the Navy and Air Force.
The subjects dealt with were:
- System of government (Fascism, Bolshevism, Federation, etc.),
- Mob and mass psychology,
- Political history,
- Historical geography,
- Economic history,
- Ethnological history.

'6. A section of M.I.R. holds records of over 1,000 men with language qualifications. It is now felt that M.I.1.x have sufficient records of British personnel for our requirements, and that, in future, more attention should be paid to the collection of foreigners and “toughs” of all sorts. In this connection, since the war M.I.R have arranged for approx. 200 M.I.R nominees to be trained thru’ O.C.T.Us. “Cover” for representatives proceeding abroad.
[…]
10. An idea has been put forward of using A.T.S. with language and secretarial, and other, qualifications, who could be sent abroad to various places as “propagandists” and general “boosters” of England. About 200 or more names now lie […] waiting […] to go through them.’

M.I.R.(c) was a recently founded department of M.I.(R.) for experimental work, located at “The Firs” in Whitchurch. It should become M.D.1 under the Ministry of Defence in October 1940.
The Special Training Centre Lochailort was approved on 07.05.1940, with the immediate task to train the newly introduced Independent Companies. The M.I.R. war diary*** reads for the 01.06.1940:
‘The KNIFE party****, who had been practising stalking, scouting and sniping in Scotland, became the nucleus of the instructional staff at the Training School of Irregular Warfare which was to open at Inverailort Castle, Loch Ailort, near Fort William.’

And already two days later:
‘The Special Training Centre opened with 400 pupils, including No. 10 Independent Company.’

The Special Training Centre served as another resource for the early training of S.O.E. personnel. When Majors Davies and Wilson toured Scotland to find suitable places for S.O.E. schools, Arisaig House, an off-spin of the school at Lochailort for para-military training, was found suitable. S.O.E. obtained agreement from the War Office that pending the identification, requisition and opening of S.O.E.’s own schools, small parties sent by S.O.E. could receive training at the Special Training Centre Lochailort, an interim solution while Davies and Wilson got on with creating what would become the “Group A” Paramilitary schools in the West Highlands.

---
* Intelligence and sabotage organisation created in 1940 by Section D of S.I.S, also known as the Regional D scheme.
** New stay-behind units organised under the threat of a German invasion.
*** HS 8/263
**** Operation KNIFE was an unsuccessful operation in late April 1940, aborted due to engine problems. Participants in the operation were Major Bryan Mayfield (commander), Major John Gavin, R.E. (demolitions), Captains Bill Stirling (the elder brother of David Stirling, later founder of the Special Air Service, and soon to become a member of the team), Ralf Farrant and Peter Kemp, and Lieutenant David Stacey. They were all veterans of 5th Scots Guards, a short-lived ski unit of volunteers destined to support the Finns in their Winter War against the Soviet Union. It was this group of M.I.R. officers who, in their opinion, had found the ideal premises for training. With the help of the 17th Lord Lovat, Lieutenant Simon Fraser, cousin of the Stirling brothers, the Inverailort estate was chosen for the establishment of the M.I. Wing School.

 

4 History of the Training Section of S.O.E., 1940 – 1945
The “History of the Training Section of S.O.E., 1940 – 1945” was internally registered as “S.O.E. Headquarters Files 242”. It was compiled in September 1945. Its author is Major Gerald Marcel Forty, who had been the Staff Officer to the Director of Training since April 1943. The file is held in The National Archives, Kew, as TNA HS 8/435 and as part of TNA HS 7/51. The wording and structure are given as the original except where apparent mistakes were corrected. The wording and structure of the headlines are also kept as in the original, but the headlines are integrated in the structured numbering of this publication. Several footnotes in the original document refer to sources whose citations no longer appear to be searchable today. For this reason, only footnotes that contain useful information for research purposes, such as at least a date, are cited.

The original document cites many War Establishments in appropriate appendices, but as the War Establishments system was held as a loose-leaf binding, only the latest, current issues were available, providing no history or development. Instead, in this document, the War Establishments will be shown in an own chapter, including all available issues and amendments, giving an impression of the development during their existence. Unfortunately, the entire system of the War Establishments in the period between June 1940 and 06.11.1940 shows numerous shortcomings that reveal the many efforts to hastily reorganise the army and prepare for the defence against an impending invasion. As S.O.E. came into being during this period, most of the early documents have not survived. They will be labelled accordingly in the respective lists.

The original appendices of the S.O.E. history file contain two further groups of documents, “Reports” and “Syllabus”, which are not reproduced here.

As far as more information is available than described in the Official History, appropriate explanations and additions will be added immediately after the respective chapter. To distinguish both parts, the original document is written in Courier New while explanations and additions will be written in the usual style. This applies also to footnotes on the History. Other contemporary documents cited here are also reproduced in Courier New.

Major Forty inserted footnotes that sometimes refer to later chapters.

4.1 Introduction
‘The Training section of S.O.E. consisted of the headquarters section in London, under the control of a Director of Training, and, also under his command, a number of schools in England and Scotland. These schools carried out almost the whole of the training of S.O.E. agents for Europe; the only exceptions being technical training carried out by the headquarters section concerned, and the training carried out by certain of the Country Sections for their own students. The training of S.O.E. agents carried out in the Middle and Far East was under the control of the local S.O.E. Commander, though there was a varying degree of liaison with the Training Section in England.

The documentation of the early parts of the history is not so full as would have been desired, owing to the absence of complete records. The compiler has therefore had to rely to a certain extent on this own memory, but wherever possible undocumented sections have been checked by other officers with special knowledge of the particular subject or period. Acknowledgments are particularly due to Mr. M.P. Murray, to Colonel J.W. Munn and to Major D.P. Hilton for reading the history in draft, and for their many valuable corrections and suggestions, which have now been incorporated.’

 

4.2 Origin and Early History of the Training Section
‘In July 1940, S.O.E., at that time known as S.O.2, was formed from Section D. It was separated from the remainder of S.I.S. and placed under the control of the Minister of Economic Warfare. Section D had its own training school at Station XVII, later known as S.T.S. XVII, and this school was retained by S.O.E., becoming the first Special Training School, which was the name given to S.O.E. Training Establishments. Station XVII was located at Brickendonbury, Hertford and was under the command of Commander Peters, R.N. The instructional staff included Major (later Brigadier) G.A. Hill, Mr. Philby, Mr. Burgess and Professor Patterson with Captain Barcroft as Adjutant. The object of the school was to train men of different nationalities as instructors and recruiters who would be equipped and returned to their own countries in order to raise organisations to counter enemy interests and commit specific acts of sabotage. In addition, the establishment acted as a general purpose school and undertook the special operational training of raiding parties. The syllabus covered a variety of subjects ranging from political theory and propaganda to demolitions and weapon training, including also the technique of secret service work. The early records of Station XVII are scanty and no detailed account is available of the training given there. There is, however, evidence that while the individual abilities of the instructors were considerable, there was lack of co-ordination and discipline.

At the time of the formation of S.O.E., Major (later Colonel) F.T. Davies was transferred from M.I.R. Section of the War Office and became assistant to the then “CD”*. He was particularly charged with the organisation of training and prepared a paper** on the subject, which formed the basis of all subsequent developments. In this paper Major Davies first of all postulated two types of activity for which training would be required, i.e. Long Term and Short Term. The Long Term policy was to entail the formation of “bridgeheads” in the countries in which S.O.E. was interested, staffed by “organisers” (mainly nationals of the country) who could be charged with establishing a network of agents, a system of communication, and depots for equipment. The Short Term policy, which was not held to be strictly within the clandestine province of S.O.E., was to be concerned with the carrying out of raids by “suicide squads”. The first essential was the training of organisers, which must precede any large scale operations, to be followed as soon as possible by the training of a small pool of men for the “suicide squads”. Organisers would be sent first to Preliminary Schools (also known as Depots) where they should receive elementary training while undergoing their probationary period, during which any undesirable or unsuitable elements would be removed. The next stage would be para-military training where they would be instructed in demolitions, weapons, minor tactics, combined operations, as well as the necessary intelligence methods (forward reconnaissance, topography, field security) and communications. It was also envisaged that parachute training should be carried out at this time. After the Paramilitary stage, organisers would move on to Finishing Schools of which there would be one to each Country Section, and where instruction would be given in security, secret service methods, propaganda, the organisation of enemy forces and the local conditions in the occupied country concerned. Students would also be held at Finishing Schools until they were needed for operations. Final instruction (i.e. briefing) would be given at Country Section flats in London. The training of “suicide squads” would be limited to a Paramilitary course after which they would be sent to a special holding camp until required.

As a result of Major Davies recommendations, it was decided to transfer the M.I.R. training school in Scotland to S.O.E., as the facilities available at Station XVII were clearly inadequate to meet the growing commitments. This school was located at Arisaig House, and was commanded at the time by Major (later Colonel) J.W. Munn. Its function was to carry out the training of M.I.R. personnel in demolitions, weapon training, combined operations, forward reconnaissance, and clandestine intelligence work.*** Major Davies, accompanied by Major (later Colonel) J.S. Wilson, who was his training Staff Officer, visited the school at Arisaig and carried out a reconnaissance of the area.**** As a result of this reconnaissance, Inverie House, Rhubana Lodge and Meoble Lodge were requisitioned to serve as wings to Arisaig House which became the headquarters of the Paramilitary group of schools (later known as Group A), with Major Munn as Commandant of the group and Captain Godfrey as Chief Instructor.

While the Arisaig group was being formed Brigadier C. Mc. V. Gubbins joined the Organisation and assumed the responsibility for training and operations with Major Wilson as his staff officer for training. Colonel Buckland also joined the organisation at this time on the training staff of Brigadier Gubbins, with the particular responsibility of acquiring the necessary accommodation and staff to enable the original plan evolved by Major Davies to be brought into being.

Progress in obtaining staff and accommodation had been slow, owing to difficulties with the War Office over requisitioning and war establishments, and as a result the first training carried out in December 1940 was somewhat makeshift. Two parties were involved, sixteen Spaniards known as Sconces and five Italians known as Quins. One party received its preliminary Training at Station XVII, and the other in Scotland, and they then changed places for their paramilitary training.

From the beginning of 1941 progress in the acquisition of additional accommodation for preliminary, finishing and holding schools became more rapid and by May of that year a number of each type of school were in existence. Some slight modifications had been made to the original plan in that it was decided to centralize the finishing schools under Training Section control and to make them separate to the holding schools, which, though allotted to Country Sections, were also to be controlled by the Training Section. It is to be noted in this connection that Brigadier Gubbins held the view that these holding schools should be a Country Section responsibility and only agreed to them being under the control of the Training Section for ease of administration.

In January 1941, five houses were acquired in the Beaulieu area Hampshire to serve as finishing schools. Major Munn who had already been moved from Group A to Station XVII, which was serving at this time as a finishing school, was transferred in March 1941 to this newly formed group (later known as Group B) and appointed Commandant with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. An additional house was also acquired in this area and was used as an elementary W/T training school until July 1941*****, when all S.O.E. signal training was centralized at Grendon Hall. The house in the Beaulieu area then became an additional finishing school.

In addition to the schools already mentioned, reference must be made to “Briggens” and “Audley End”. Both were placed under the control of the Polish Section, the former being used as a Finishing school and the latter as a holding school and despatch station. For further information on these schools, reference should be made to the Polish Section History******.

From this point onwards the History of the Special Training Schools can best be considered under their individual headings, but first of all some consideration must be given to the Headquarters Section which controlled them.’

--- --- ---

The early history is written with Major Forty’s distance at the end of the war, which leaves room for some explanations.

A. The early history of Station or S.T.S. 17
Grand’s dismissal on 18.09.1940 had also jeopardised the future of the school at Brickendonbury Manor. Colin Gubbins was aware of this and visited it soon after his appointment to S.O.E. in November 1940. Gubbins intended to transform this country mansion into his principal training centre for all would-be saboteurs. It should be modelled on the experience made in Coleshill House, only Gubbins wanted it to be far more professional.******* He had requisitioned Coleshill House, a Wiltshire country estate, earlier in the year when he was searching for a school for his Auxiliary Units******** to train them in Guerilla tactics. Brickendonbury Manor should become S.O.E.’s first specialist school. Thanks to Gubbins' swift intervention, the first course under the auspices of S.O.E. was able to start as early as December 1940.

Some of the instructors mentioned deserve an explanation:
- Commander Frederick “Fritz” Peters, the commandant, declined to work with S.O.E. and left instantly. He won the V.C. at Oran but died in a plane crash in Devon on the way home.
- Harold Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby soon went back to S.I.S. and worked with Sefton Delmer, the propagandist for the British government during the war.
- Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess received his dismissal from CD********* shortly after being taken over by S.O.E.
- Only after the war it emerged that Philby and Burgess belonged to the Cambridge Five ring of spies for the Soviet Union.

B. Major Davies’ entry into S.O.E.
The Unit War Diary of M.I.(R) mentions Davies several times:
- 23.08.1940: ‘Major Davies went over to the new Special Operations Executive, Section 2, (late D Section).’**********
- According to another entry of 02.07.1940, Davies had just been promoted to major on the basis of a new war establishment for M.I.(R).
- The entry for 25.08.1939 reveals that Captain Davies had been a member of the Military Mission to Poland, headed by Lt.-Col. Gubbins.

C. Colonel Gubbins entry into S.O.E.
Sources are usually vague about the exact point in time when Gubbins joined the S.O.E. Since his new appointment was remunerated higher than his current one, the proposal to appoint him brigadier might indicate the correct date (18.11.1940).

A letter of 28.11.1940 to “M.S.”***********, signed by a J.N. Kennedy, D.M.O. & P.************, reads:
‘I am anxious to regularise the position of Colonel C. Mc.V. Gubbins, who as you know is being loaned with the consent of C.I.G.S. to Inter-Services Research Bureau which operates under Dr. Dalton. It is agreed that no military establishment can be put up for this officer’s appointment, and whilst employed in this capacity, his pay and allowances will not be a charge on Army Funds. In view of the importance of the post and of Colonel Gubbins’ present position in the Army, he should be loaned the rank of acting Brigadier. I should be glad if the appointment could take effect as from 18.11.1940 and if you would cause it to appear in War Office Orders. I will explain to you personally the function of I.S.R.B. at any time you wish.’

D. Problems in requisitioning houses
As the S.O.E. had been placed under the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the War Office was no longer responsible for the requisitioning of urgently needed accommodation. While the requisitioning of houses in Scotland for paramilitary training in the early days of the S.O.E. had gone smoothly, the situation proved to be much more difficult when it came to setting up the finishing schools later on. As head of the Training Sub-Section, Colonel Buckland had the particular responsibility in S.O.E. of acquiring the necessary accommodation and the staff required for the special training schools. He lived at Curtle Mead in the village of Beaulieu and knew about a number of secluded houses in the village and suggested they might be suitable for training. Colin Gubbins saw the potential and started the process of requisitioning.*************

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* Head of S.O.E., at that time Sir Frank Nelson. It was common in S.O.E. to cite the internal functions instead of the real names.
** “S.O.E.’s Training“, no reference, [dated] 12.10.1940
*** “Syllabus of S.T.C. Loch Ailort”, no reference, [dated] 18.09.1940
**** Report on Reconnaissance of the Arisaig Area. No reference, [dated] 16.11.1940
***** See Chapter “Training Carried out by other Sections”, (Section 1(a). Captain Kaplowich installed the Preliminary Signals Training School in S.T.S. No. 35 The Vineyards in early 1941.
****** See Chapter “Training Carried out by other Sections”, Section 2(a).
******* Milton, Giles: Churchill’s Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare, p. 98
******** Stay behind units designated for a German invasion of the United Kingdom
********* Undated note from CD (the director of S.O.E.) to Gladwyn Jebb, TNA HS 8/334
********** TNA HS 8/263 - MI(R) Unit War Diary, 1939 – 1940, S.O.E. H.Q File 71
*********** TNA HS 8/257 - MI(R) Functions and Organisation (War Establishment) - S.O.E. H.Q. File 65
************ Major-General John Noble Kennedy, Director of Military Operations and Plans at the War Office
************* The Secret Army Exhibition in the National Motor Museum, Beaulieu, New Forest

 

4.3 The Headquarters of the Training Section
4.3.1 General
‘The control of Special Training Schools, placed first in the hands of Major Davies, and at the end of 1940 in those of Brigadier Gubbins, was eventually, with its growing responsibilities, made the concern of a separate Training Section under a Director of Training. This section was known internally as MT Section, and externally as S.T.S. H.Q., with its cover address of Room 98 Horse Guards, though this latter designation and address also served all country establishments, including those which were not under its control. The development which led up to the formation of this section influenced its policy, and organisation and also had some bearing on its particular problems. This early history must therefore be considered in some detail, before the functions of the section are examined.

The recommendation made by Major Davies in his paper on Training was that there should be a Director of Training and Operations, who would be responsible, both for the training of personnel, and for the mounting of operations. He would have under him two staffs to deal with these two sides of his activities. This recommendation was partially implemented by the appointment of Brigadier Gubbins as M* at the end of 1940. His staff for training consisted of Colonel Buckland, who was responsible for the general co-ordination of training matters and in particular for obtaining the necessary accommodation and personnel, and Major Wilson, who was responsible for the actual training. In addition to this Training Subsection (MT), Brigadier Gubbins also had under his control the operations section (MO) and the Polish and Czech Country Sections (MP and MX).

During the early part of 1941 the Training Subsection was gradually increased in size, and in September 1941 when it had become difficult for Brigadier Gubbins to give as much personal attention to training matters as before, it was given a greater degree of autonomy and Lt.-Col. Munn was appointed as Director of Training, replacing Colonel Buckland, (who left in November 1941) as Head of the Section. He was promoted full Colonel in December of that year. Despite this title, Colonel Munn was not, however, in the same position as other directors, in that he had no direct access to CD and no seat on the Council. Training was still under the nominal control of Brigadier Gubbins, who remained its spokesman with CD in the Council. This system had both advantages and disadvantages; it made possible a close co-ordination of Training and Operations (more Country Sections having been grouped under Brigadier Gubbins by the end of 1941) but it meant that the Director of Training had no direct authority with these Country Sections. As long as Brigadier Gubbins remained in charge, this was no disadvantage, but when in September 1943, he was appointed CD, it left the Training Section in a weak position. Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, under whom the Training Section was now placed, was, as Head of the London Group, primarily concerned with Operations and Country Section matters, and inevitably left far more than his predecessor to the Director of Training. He, however, had insufficient standing to lay down training policy to the Country Sections, who were under no obligation to consult him in the planning of their operations, thus making it extremely difficult to look ahead and prepare for future training commitments.’

4.3.2. Functions of the Training Section
‘With certain exceptions, which are dealt with separately** the Training Section was responsible for all training establishments and for the instruction given in them. These responsibilities may be considered separately under the headings of administration, preparation of syllabus and training instructions, and liaison with other sections.
(a) Administration
(i) The recruitment of instructors. This is dealt with separately, together with the question of qualifications.***
(ii) Students Administration. As soon as a recruit had been placed in training, the Training Section assumed complete responsibility for him, except in matters affecting his actual employment (e.g. preparation of cover story, special continental dental treatment), where the Country Section made the necessary arrangements. All movements of students were arranged by the Training Section, as were medical and dental arrangements, and, in the case of students enlisted in the British Army, routine administration and documentation. Students in schools were, in accordance with normal Army practice, under the command of the school commandant for all purposes.
(iii) Properties. The Training Section was responsible to the Properties Section for the maintenance in good condition, of all houses occupied by schools, and for the carrying out of all provisions of agreement with owners.
(iv) Transport. The position was the same as with properties.
(v) Stores. As regards barrack and accommodation stores, the Training Section was merely responsible for checking the requirements of school commandants, who indented directly on Cambarly [sic] Reception Depot****. Where training stores were concerned, the Training Section laid down scales for the various forms of training, and made all necessary arrangements with the Supply Section or other sections concerned, (e.g. Signals for certain W/T equipment) for the availability of the equipment concerned.
(vi) Discipline. Commandants of the Groups had the disciplinary powers of Commanding officers of Units, and Commandants of Schools those of detachment Commanders. Matters outside their jurisdiction were referred to the Director of Training who either dealt with the case himself, referred it to the Country Section in the case of students, or, in the case of Courts Martial and similar matters, referred it to the Legal Section for action as necessary. Courts of Inquiry were convened by the Director of Training.
(vii) Welfare. The Director of Training was responsible for the welfare of all troops under his Command, and dealt personally with all cases referred to him by School Commandants.

(b) Preparation of Syllabus and Training Instructions
All syllabus of training were in the first place prepared by the Training Section, but many of the subsequent developments arose out of suggestions made by the Commandants and instructors of the schools. The Training Section remained however, the central co-ordinator of all instruction, keeping the schools informed of the latest developments in material and technique, and considering any modifications proposed by School Commandants before their inclusion in the syllabus. When a new school was opened, or a new subject was to be included in the curriculum, the Training Section issued a detailed syllabus with precis of the lectures and descriptions of exercises. (The actual programme was the responsibility of the School Commandant.) Schools were kept informed of subsequent developments in circulars or Training Instructions, which were virtually amendments to syllabus. When the body of new information became such that a new syllabus was required, this was prepared by the Training Section, after consultation with the Commandants concerned. The Training Section thus laid down and co-ordinated the policy of training as carried out in all schools, and disseminated the latest information on Training to all interested departments.***** It should however be noted that, in the case of Group B and S.T.S. 17, once the original policy had been laid down the actual syllabus was prepared by the Commandants and instructors of the schools, the function of the Training Section being limited to ensuring that these syllabuses were in accordance with general policy, and co-ordinating them with those of the schools. Syllabus and Training Instructions were issued to all schools for information, irrespectively of whether the instructions were to be carried out in them or not.

(c) Liaison with Other Sections
In order to prepare a curriculum to meet the needs of the Organisation, it was essential for the Training Section to maintain the closest liaison with the technical sections and with the country sections.
(i) Liaison with the technical sections. This covered liaison with the Research and Intelligence Sections. In the case of the Research Section, Training was kept informed of the projected new developments in equipment, and a representative attended all User Trials, not only to obtain information on the performance of new devices, but also to give the Research sections the benefit of practical experience in the schools. It was, for example, frequently found that a device which functioned perfectly when handled by technical officers, was useless in the hands of low grade agents. By the presence of a Training Officer at trials it was for such points to be considered before the device was put into production. As soon as the new equipment was ready for use, instructions were issued to schools by the Training Section, who also prepared the written instructions for the Cell Booklets which were sent to the Field. In addition to assisting at User Trials, the Training Section also carried out special trials of equipment in the schools, when it was necessary to study performance over a period or under conditions approximating to those in the Field. (including handling by men who were actually going to the Field).
Liaison with the Intelligence Sections had the purpose of obtaining general information on conditions in the Field for use in Finishing Training at Group B and in operational training. Information was also obtained on specific targets for the training of operational parties at S.T.S. 17 and in operational schools.
(ii) Liaison with the Country Sections. This had three purposes: to obtain information on the operations and missions for which training was required, to supplement the information received from the Intelligence Sections on local conditions in Occupied Countries, details of enemy methods, etc., and to advise Country Sections on the training necessary for the achievement of their aims. Here, relations were less satisfactory than might have been expected. The Country Sections were disinclined to divulge the details of missions, so necessary to efficient training, and they had a tendency to dictate the types of training they wanted, rather than to leave it to the Training Section to decide on the best method and duration of training for a given mission. This attitude appears to be in part attributable to the somewhat equivocal position of the Director of Training referred to above.
In July 1944, a belated attempt was made to bridge the gap between Training and Country Sections by the institution of a weekly Training Meeting presided over by the Director of Training and attended by representatives of the Country Sections, the Signals Directorate, the Stores Section, and any other section likely to be concerned in the items on the agenda. The idea was sound, but the practical results were small, as the Country Section representatives were in many cases too young to speak authoritatively for their sections, and had only the slightest knowledge of training matters. Had the meetings be instituted in the early and experimental days, and attended by responsible Country Section officers, it is likely that they would have had a considerable effect, not only on the relations between the Training and Country Sections, but on the status of the Director of Training, and on the efficiency of instruction. These meetings were discontinued in September 1944.’

---
* Training. Circulars to schools (1941). M/OR/34, dated 18.12.1940
** See Chapter “Training Carried out by other Sections” and Chapter “Overseas Training Schools”
*** See Chapter “Selection of Officers for S.T.S.”
**** The Stores Depot, I.S.R.B.; its war establishment VIII/211/1 became under this name effective from 26.03.1941. It was superseded by VIII/211/2 under the name Camberley Reception Depot, effective from 02.09.1943, and was cancelled on 15.08.1945.
***** See in this connection Chapter “Overseas Training Schools”.

 

4.3.3 Organisation of the Training Section
‘Until the end of 1940, no Training Section properly speaking existed, the necessary organisation and supervision being carried out by Major Davies and Major Wilson. When, in December 1940, Major Davies left to take charge of the Research and Technical Sections, Brigadier Gubbins who assumed control of training in December 1940, appointed Colonel Buckland to co-ordinate training matters and to concern himself particularly with the acquisition of houses and the selection and recruiting of instructors, leaving Major Wilson to deal with the questions of training proper. By February of 1941, although most of the necessary houses and staff had been acquired, it became necessary to increase the staff to deal with routine administration, and Captain (later Lt.-Col.) A.G. Howe was appointed. This small section consisting of Colonel Buckland (MT), Lt.-Col. Wilson (MZ) and Captain Howe (MZ.1) was really the nucleus from which the Training Section grew, and they carried out, in embryo form, all of the functions which are summarised above.

By October, 1941, the Section had been increased to nine officers, five on the training side and four on the administrative, all under the command of Colonel Munn, as Director. These additional officers had been appointed gradually during the year to meet increasing pressure and consisted of Captain (later Major) D.P. Hilton, who was made responsible for Students administration and movements, a technical training officer to carry out the work on syllabus and the liaison with research sections, a signals officer (who was also commandant of the W/T school) to represent that side of training which had not yet become the responsibility of the Signals Directorate, and three administrative officers to work under Major Howe, who, in addition to the administration of schools under the Training Section, was responsible for the administration of all S.T.S. Later in the year a G.S.O. I was appointed for signals training, but both signals officers were eventually transferred to the new signals section in 1942. Colonel Buckland left the section in November 1941.

Lt.-Col. Wilson left the section in January 1942 to take command of the Norwegian section, and was replaced by a G.S.O. II as Staff Officer to the Director. In spite of considerable increases in staff, the Training Section was now in the form in which it was to remain until its dissolution; that is to say it consisted of the Director and his personal Staff Officer, a subsection concerned with syllabus and technical liaison, a subsection for students’ administration and movements and an administrative subsection. The number of officers involved fluctuated according to the amount of work, but the organisation remained stable, with the exception of the administrative subsection.

As already stated, Major Howe was responsible for the administration of establishments other than S.T.S. under the Training section, and since he was thus concerned with matters outside the jurisdiction of the Director of Training, it was decided in July 1942 to form a separate administrative section (MA) under the direct command of Brigadier Gubbins. The anomaly which was removed by this change was replaced by another, in that administrative instructions were now being issued by the MA section to units under the command of the Director of Training, who for this part, was no longer in a position to give orders to the administrative section controlling stores and personnel for his schools. The situation gave rise to a certain amount of friction but this was avoided as far as possible by the Administrative Section working in consultation with, and through the Director of Training, and vice versa. When, in the Autumn of 1943 an administrative officer was again appointed in the Training Section, relations with the Administrative Section improved. This new subsection, later increased to two officers, dealt primarily with questions of War Establishments and of intake and postings of officers. At the same time it collated demands from the schools and so eased the strain on the main administrative section.

In November 1942, Colonel Munn vacated the appointment of Director of Training, which remained unfilled until January 1943 when Lt.-Col. S.H.C. Woolrych, Commandant Group B, was appointed. During the interim period, the work of the section was carried on by Major D.P. Hilton, working directly under Brigadier Gubbins. Lt.-Col. Woolrych, when he re-assumed command of Group B, in May 1943, was replaced as Director by Lt.-Col. J.T. Young (promoted Colonel in July 1943). In April 1943 Major D.P. Hilton relinquished the appointment of Staff Officer to the Director of Training to take up an appointment on the staff of Brigadier Gubbins, and later to become Commandant of S.T.S. 26. His place was taken in the Training Section by Major G.M. Forty*.


In the Autumn of 1943, the Section reached its maximum expansion, totalling 18 officers. The additional officers to make up this total were an R.A.M.C. psychiatrist to advise on questions of recruitment and disposal, an adviser (Major E.A. Sykes) on unarmed combat and weapon training, and an American officer, attached from O.S.S. at the time of integration of O.S.S. and the London Group. The organisation of the section was as follows:

Director of Training
1 G.S.O.2 - Staff Officer to director
1 G.S.O.2 + 1 G.S.O.3 - Technical subsection – syllabus, technical liaison, etc.
2 G.S.Os.3 - Students Administration and movements
1 Staff Captain + 1 Staff Lieutenant - General Administration
1 Major R.A.M.C. - Psychiatrist
1 Civilian Officer - Records
Attached:
1 Major - Adviser on weapon training and unarmed combat
1 Major - (U.S. Army) Liaison officer

Despite minor changes of personnel, the section remained at the same strength until the Autumn of 1944, when, with the disbandment of Group A, a reduction was made, though the organisation remained the same.

In December 1944 Colonel Young was released from the Army and was replaced as Director of Training, By Colonel F.V. Spooner, who held this appointment until the reconstitution of the section in July 1945. During this time, further reductions had been made in the strength of the section, so that at the end it consisted of only four officers, one of whom had been brought in at the beginning of 1945 to deal with questions of overseas training establishments, which were then assuming a new importance.**

At the end of June 1945 all the training schools had been closed down with the exception of M.E. 65***, which was retained as a general purpose school for any training commitments which might materialise, and as a transit camp. To control this, and a staff of Group B officers****, a small Training Section consisting of three officers was constituted under the Rest of the World Directorate.’

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When comparing the numbers of personnel in the headquarters of the Training Section with the situation shown in the respective war establishments, this will result in some discrepancies; compare the appropriate entry for VIII/313.

War establishments for S.O.E. show some peculiarities. On 26.03.1941, a first batch of war establishments for S.O.E. was promulgated. The very first one, followed by six war establishments for the schools, is VIII/204/1 - H.Q., I.S.R.B. As with the first titles for the schools, the title was provisional; it was later specified to Headquarters, I.S.R.B. (Other Ranks). This is the only war establishment explicitly limited to “other ranks”. Moreover, a corresponding war establishment for the officers of I.S.R.B. does not appear. An appendix to an internal letter (DCD/WEC.7) for the meeting of the S.O.E. War Establishments Committee on 29.03 1944 lists all stations and schools with their strengths (officers and other ranks) and with their corresponding war establishments, with the exception of the entry for “London H.Q. (officers)”: 581 officers are approved with the note “Agreed” instead of a war establishment.***** This suggests alternative possibilities of authorisation. Although war establishments were also the general rule for S.O.E. (as for S.T.S. and Stations), it is supposed that in practice and for short periods, officers in particular may have been temporarily and additionally posted within the service. Major Forty’s occasional choice of words, such as ‘… the number of officers involved fluctuated according to the amount of work …’ supports this assumption.

Unlike other formations, units and headquarters in the Army depending exclusively on the rules of individual war establishments, S.O.E. and other organisations also operated under certain circumstances on a “world-wide manpower allotment” sometimes called “ceiling restriction”. That might have provided additional options. This additional administrative instrument was reported periodically for special and secret establishments as “War Office Organisation Tables FFC****** 37, Part 19”, followed by a letter, denoting the part of the not only military organisation concerned:
A – S.O.E.
B – “Y” Services
C – Ministry of Supply
D – Para-military Establishments
E – Seaborne Establishments
F – Civil Affairs
G – Military Missions, Liaison Staffs and Secret Establishments
H – Combined Operations

FFC 37 Part 19.A (S.O.E.) for 15.03.1944******* reads:
‘These Parts cover organisations which have separate world-wide manpower allocations and which do not count against the allotment of the Command in which they are located. The documents will show details of all units already formed within these allocations, and any balance or reserve which is available for further expansion or alteration to War Establishments.

The world-wide manpower allotment for S.O.E. has been fixed at a total of 12,000 all ranks (soldiers). War Establishments may be promulgated up to this total, but such War Establishments may not be implemented in excess of 10,000 all ranks, soldiers********. This has been sub-allotted between Commands as under:
Home 5,554
N. Africa 878
Middle East 2,961
India 607
Total 10,000’

The exact rules for this system are not known. This might have given these parts of the armed forces working under secrecy a more flexible handling of staff shortages, and surely it was suitable to hide secret circumstances even from authorities like the War Establishment Committee in the War Office. The minutes of meetings contain several comments that show that the Committee was not informed more than necessary; usually, a representative of the S.O.E. attended the meetings to respond to critical questions, often vaguely and with reference to the Official Secrets Act.

Apart from the facts presented, this is an example of the British military administration sparing no effort to deliver the most accurate results possible. It is important to know that the figures listed above were broken down on the following six pages by each affected war establishment, in this case 96, separated by theatres and listed with the corresponding figures in several columns. Apart from the periodical reports, amendments were made quite frequently.

---
* The protagonist
** See Chapter “Overseas Training Schools”
*** See Chapter “Miscellaneous Training”, Section 8
**** See Chapter “Agents Finishing Training (Group B)”
***** TNA HS 8/209 - Committees War Establishment Board, 1944-1945 - S.O.E. H.Q. File 17
****** periodical reports of the Field Force Committee
******* TNA WO 33/2210
******** A note on the following page makes clear that this figure refers to Army personnel, leaving 2,000 for R.A.F, R.N and civilians. Such postings led to the note “Not an Army Establishment” on war establishments.

 

4.4 Preliminary Training
4.4.1 The Purpose of Preliminary Training
‘The need for preliminary training had been outlined in the original plan, and schools to handle it had been established at the earliest possible date. The purpose of this training was two fold:
(a) To give elementary military training and some sense of discipline to men recruited for work in the Field.
(b) To give Country Sections the opportunity of assessment more fully the suitability of the men they had selected, and at the same time to allow for the elimination of unsuitable or undesirable elements before they had learnt anything of the real work of S.O.E.

Both of these functions were important. Men recruited by the Country Sections were commonly civilians, or conscript soldiers of Allied armies, with very little military background, since the qualities and special knowledge required in an agent were frequently not those of the regular soldier. For such men, training calculated to produce discipline and self-confidence, with the corollary of good morale, was essential from the outset. In addition, whatever their future role, they had to be taught the care and handling of arms and to be toughened physically. It is true that a small number of recruits were trained soldiers and for them these considerations did not apply so much, but even if its educational value was small for such men, preliminary training did supply a corporate S.O.E. existence into which recruits were immediately absorbed. This avoided as far as possible leaving men to their own devices and a feeling of uncertainty after they had made the decision to volunteer.

The importance of the probationary period was equally great. Country sections recruiting officers had in most cases to make their decision as to whether to employ a man after one, or at the best, two or three interviews. Even when interviews were carried out by several officers (as was the practice with some sections), the possibility of a mistaken assessment of personality, motive, or aptitude was by no means removed, while the chances of detecting the enemy infiltrate were very small. During the few weeks spent in in preliminary training, the Country Section recruiting officer had however the opportunity to make further enquiries of the security services, to visit and observe the man himself, as well as to receive reports on him from the School Commandant, the Security N.C.O. accompanying the party and from his own Country Section Conducting officer. By the end of the preliminary period, the Country Section was therefore in a reasonable position to say whether or not a man was to be retained, and if so, for what type of work he was most suited. Those men who were unsuitable could be returned to civilian life or their units, without any danger of the revealing anything of importance about S.O.E.’*

4.4.2 The Schools and Their Organisation
‘The following is a list of the Preliminary Schools (also known as Depot Schools), the dates of acquisition being shown in each case, together with the S.T.S. number. (This numbering is the final one. During 1941 the numbering of all schools underwent many changes which it serves no useful purpose to enumerate here.)

S.T.S. 1 - Brock Hall**, Flore, Northants., 14.12.1940
S.T.S. 2 - Bellasis, Box Hill Rd., Dorking, Surrey, 03.02.1941
S.T.S. 3 - Stodham Park, Liss, Hants., 24.02.1941
S.T.S. 4 - Winterfold, Cranleigh, Surrey, 17.01.1941
S.T.S. 5 - Wanborough Manor, Puttenham, Guildford, Surrey, 25.01.1941
S.T.S. 6 - West Court, Finchampstead, Wokingham, Berks., 08.04.1941

In addition to the foregoing, mention must be made of Inchmery House, Beaulieu, which was taken over on 05.02.1941 as a Preliminary School for the Free French, and was ultimately handed over to them entirely as a depot for the special parachute company.

With the exception of Inchmery, Preliminary Schools were not permanently allocated to specific nationalities, since the fluctuation in numbers frequently made this uneconomical. Members of different nationalities were, however, never allowed to meet and every effort was made to avoid changes unless they were absolutely necessary, as it was clearly beneficial to have a commandant and instructors, who were used to, and perhaps spoke the language of the students they had to handle.***

Each school was formed as an independent command, the C.O. coming under the orders of the Director of Training. The War Establishments of the Preliminary Schools were all alike, allowing for a major in command, assisted by a lieutenant quartermaster, 1 lieutenant instructor, and 4 N.C.O. assistant instructors. The commandants were on the whole elderly officers, chosen more for their mature judgement than for their training ability, and the actual instruction was mainly left to the junior officer and N.C.Os. though supervised by the commandant.

Contact between the commandants of schools and general co-ordination of training methods was assisted by the monthly conference at headquarters which the commandants attended. This was started in 1941 and continued until the end of 1942. It was however felt that even with these meetings, the commandants of Preliminary Schools were somewhat out of touch, and that some more adequate supervision was required than could be given by the Director of Training, or by headquarters staff officers. The post of Inspector of Schools was therefore created in August 1942 and Major F.V. Spooner, the Commandant of S.T.S. 45, was promoted to Lt.-Col. To carry out these duties. While paying occasional visits to other schools, he was primarily concerned with Preliminary and Holding training.****

This arrangement persisted until January of 1943, when it was decided, for ease of administration and greater efficiency of training to form the Preliminary and Holding schools into a Group with its headquarters in London, known as Group C****, of which Lt.-Col. Spooner became the first Commandant.

The Preliminary schools were retained until June 1943, when they were replaced by a Students Assessment Board*****, based on the War Office Selection Boards. The schools themselves were then converted into Holding Schools.’

--- --- ---

A. Inchmery House
Inchmery House joined the Finishing Schools as the second S.T.S. 42, after Thame Park had been assigned to the Signals Section in December 1941. Major Forty tells us, that the house had been used by the Free French as a Preliminary School and as a depot for the special parachute company (1ière Compagnie d'Infanterie de l'Air) from 05.02.1941; other sources mention an earlier requisition. No S.T.S. number could be found for this purpose and period; consequently, no war establishment could be detected in Volume VIII. However, the following scenario is conceivable: With A.C.I. of 06.11.1940, war establishment V/227 C/1 was promulgated under the title “Free French Forces - Recruiting Station and Transit Camp - British Administrative Staff”. Unfortunately, it is not retained. At this date, at the end of the chaotic period of the war establishment administration, Volume VIII had just been opened, but as the creation of a war establishment took several weeks, this one might have been earmarked for Volume V (United Kingdom, non-Field Force). The table number 227 in Volume V contains a batch of five different units, sorted as V/227 and V/227A to V/227 D. The whole batch stands for the term “special”, which would have led to the tables being sorted into Volume VIII, if it had already existed at that time:
- V/227/1 and 2 – Special Training Centre (i.e. Inverailort); the first two issues, effective 04.06.1940 and 05.07.1940, were not promulgated in A.C.Is. Volume VIII for the secret war establishments was not yet opened.
- V/227 A/2 – A Special School, containing the Army staff of Ringway, changing its name for the establishment several times during the war. Issue No. 2 promulgated by A.C.I. on 02.10.1940, no issue No. 1 promulgated.
- V/227 B/1 – A Special Stores Depot, promulgated by A.C.I. on 18.09.1940, superseded by VIII/32/1 on 06.11.1940, not retained, to become at the latest “Headquarters, Commando (Home)” with VIII/32/2, A.C.I. 05.03.1941.
- V/227 D/ - An Air Troop, Royal Engineers, effective 30.06.1941 (all air-landing and parachute units were considered “special” at that time).

B. An Early Attempt to Improve Assessment Methods
The path taken by S.O.E. from the Preliminary Schools to the Students Assessment Board in order to arrive at a better assessment of the students was by no means a straight one. As early as November 1941, another method was tried. Already early in 1941, three Field Security Sections were obtained from the Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I.). They were attached to ensure the security of out stations, training schools and trainees. Located at Brickendonbury (Station XVII), Guildford and Kingston, they were unable to perform their duties for schools in Scotland satisfactorily. In September 1941, a fourth Field Security Section was attached for that purpose. There were now four Field Security Officers paid from Army funds and employed by the Security Directorate of S.O.E.

Their responsibilities were determined as follows:
- One was employed at Headquarters on the administration of the four Field Security Sections, which were centrally controlled from London from 1941 onwards.
- Another was made responsible for the external security of the Preliminary Training Schools.
- A third, Aonghais Adamson Fyffe, about whom we shall learn more later, had recently been appointed Commandant of the “Cooler” at Inverlair, Tulloch, to better cover Scotland.
- A fourth formed in November 1941, with the assistance of two Field Security Police units (F.S.P.)******, an interrogation Sub-Section which, by agreement with M.I.5. and M.I.6., examined newly arrived aliens in the Royal Patriotic School on the basis of the questionnaire prepared by the Security Directorate and sought to extract and collate intelligence of special S.O.E. interest. Interrogations were carried out in French, German, Spanish and Flemish/Dutch, and persons thought likely to respond to S.O.E. training were drawn to the notice of Country Sections. The Sub-Section operated for a few months only and was not a success. In July 1942, it was disbanded******* and a staff officer with the symbol D/CE.7 was detailed to act as a liaison officer with the authorities at the Royal Patriotic School******** to obtain copies of the M.I.5. examiners’ reports for circulation to Country Sections.********* At the same time, a new war establishment (VIII/342, two issues, effective 25.06.1942 – 01.06.1946) was promulgated for the organisation of the Interrogation Section at the Royal Patriotic School, which apparently followed this fruitless attempt, now for purposes of the Royal Patriotic School. It provided 19 officers, extended to 26 with the second issue in February 1943. The benefits for S.O.E. could thus be achieved much more easily through the deployment of a single liaison officer.

--- --- ---

4.3.3 Training and Syllabus
‘The training carried out at Preliminary schools followed the lines envisaged in the original plan and underwent little modification. The syllabus covered weapon training, physical training and unarmed combat, simple demolitions (with no reference to specifically S.O.E. stores), map reading, field craft and elementary signalling. The intention was to give a sound grounding on which more advanced training could be based, and to prepare the student both physically and mentally for his further education and work in the Field. At the same time, this simple military training, not unlike a recruits course in the Army, enabled an opinion to be formed of the students capabilities, and his behaviour in a group. Reports were submitted by the commandant, both during and at the end of training, which covered ability, aptitude and character as well as progress in the subject taught.

The syllabus had originally been based on a two week course, but this was found too short for much benefit to be derived from instruction or for the character of the student to be properly studied, and the course was increased in April 1941 to three weeks and in March 1942 to four weeks.

During their preliminary training students were prevented from meeting other nationalities, but they were allowed a certain amount of freedom, in the form of visits to local towns for recreation. This was not only desirable from the point of view of morale, but it also gave an opportunity, since they were accompanied by a Field Security N.C.O. or by the Country Section Conducting Officer, or judging their behaviour when confronted with the normal temptations of every-day life. This would not have been possible had they lived an entirely cloistered existence.

No mention was made to the students during preliminary training of the clandestine nature of the organisation.********** When they were recruited they were led to believe that they were joining a form of Commando unit, for raids on occupied territory, and this illusion was fostered at the Preliminary Schools, though it is not certain that the effort was always successful, either because Country Section Recruiting Officers found it expedient to go further in their initial contacts than had been originally considered necessary, or through contact between students in different stages of training while on leave. A falling off in this respect had certainly taken place, as a reminder had to be issued in January 1943. If the system of the probationary period of preliminary training was to work, it was however, clear that the maintenance of this illusion was important.

The system of Preliminary Schools was ultimately abandoned for a variety of reasons, but there is no doubt that, given a proper co-ordination between Country and Training sections, and suitable staff in the Preliminary Schools, it was a fundamentally sound system.’

---
* ‘The importance of removing any undesirables at this stage, and not later in training was constantly stressed by the Security Section. Men removed from training when they already had information on S.O.E. operations usually had to be sent to the “Cooler” (officially I.S.R.B. Workshops, Inverlair), an establishment maintained by the Security Section for the safe custody of men likely to be dangerous to the organisation. The period of retention in the “Cooler” was usually only so long as the special knowledge of the detainees could jeopardise future operations. For further information on the “Cooler”, reference should be made to the history of the Security Section.’
** Both spellings - “Brock Hall” and “Brockhall” – appear in documents. According to local historians, the latter seems to be the correct one.
*** Training-Circulars M/OR/188, dated 31.01.1941. Allocation of Schools to Nationalities.
**** See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”
***** See Chapter “The Students Assessment Board”
****** V/198 – Field Security Police, two issues, effective 14.12.1938 – 17.12.1941, superseded by V/558/1 - Field Security Section (Intelligence Corps), Command, District or Area, two amendments, effective 17.12.1941 – 30.05.1947.
******* No war establishment could be identified for this Sub-Section.
******** V/391 - Reception Centre (Royal Patriots School), two issues, effective 02.07.1941 – 01.01.1950.
********* TNA HS 7/31 - History of Security Section
********** Training-Circulars M/OR/428, dated 15.05.1941

 

4.5 The Students Assessment Board (S.T.S. No. 7)
4.5.1 Reasons for its Introduction
‘The system of preliminary training, constituting a probationary period for the student, dealt with in the previous chapter, had many very real advantages to which reference has already been made. By its very nature it was, however, a leisurely method, and as the war progressed and the tempo increased it became necessary to find some more rapid system for the selection of agents, but one which would not entail any greater risk of introducing undesirable elements into training. At the same time, it had been noticed that an increasing number of students were being rejected at late stages in training, entailing an added strain on the security section and the “Cooler”, together with the contingent problems of final disposal with the Home Office and M.I. 5. These facts, taken in conjunction with the need of Country Sections for increased numbers in the Field at a time when the supply of good material was rapidly diminishing, made a reconsideration of the problem imperative.
At the beginning of 1943 this question was fully examined by the newly appointed Director of Training, Lt.-Col. Woolrych, in conjunction with the security and country sections, and it was decided that the solution probably lay in the introduction of machinery of selection on the lines of the War Office Selection Boards for officers. In this way it would be possible, in a few days, by means of an exhaustive series of tests and interviews, to assess the general suitability of recruits, as well as their aptitude for particular types of work. This system would supplement without replacing, the work of the Country Section recruiting Officers, who would continue to make initial selections. It was realized that such a method, while fulfilling the selective functions of the preliminary schools, would not replace the training carried out there, but the time saved would allow of an increase being made being made in the length of the paramilitary course,* while still achieving a saving on the total time required for training.
These proposals were finalised and put forward by the Director of Training to Brigadier Gubbins in March 1943, the additional argument being adduced that by the introduction of such a system, the preliminary schools would be made available for other training, which, with the increasing numbers of students, was a consideration of some importance. In April 1943 agreement was obtained to the plan, and arrangements were made for the establishment of the necessary Board, to be known as the “Students Assessment Board”. Lt.-Col. Charley, of the Security Section was appointed as the first President, and S.T.S. 4 (Winterfold) was selected to house it, with the new number of S.T.S. 7. The next two months were occupied in consultation with the Directorate for the Selection of Personnel in the War Office, with visits to War Office, R.A.F. and Naval Boards, with the assembly of the necessary staff, and with installation of equipment at S.T.S. 7. The first party was handled there in June 1943.’

4.5.2 Organisation
‘The S.A.B. was placed under the immediate control of the Director of Training, and for the administrative purposes was treated as a normal S.T.S. with the President as C.O. A special War Establishment was drawn up for it, which, in addition to the necessary administrative and maintenance staff, allowed for a Lt.-Col. (commandant and president), a major (2nd in command and deputy president), two majors R.A.M.C. (psychiatrists), three captains (military testing officers, and three serjeants (testers). Lt.-Col. Charley was replaced as commandant on 20.01.1944 by Lt.-Col. G.A. Brown, the deputy president. Lt.-Col. Brown was in turn replaced by his deputy Major Sinclair, who was promoted Lt.-Col. and appointed commandant on 01.11.1944.
The total student accommodation of S.T.S 7 was 18, this number being divided into three parties of six for purposes of testing. Different nationalities were handled simultaneously, but each group was formed of members of one nationality, or at least with a common language. (When women were being tested, they also were formed into a group, as the tests varied slightly for them.) Smaller numbers would be handled, but effective testing became impossible with groups of less than three, as it was then only possible to assess individual characteristics. Testing occupied four days, and three parties of eighteen could be handled every fourteen days, allowing a fortnightly break of 48 hours for the staff. Potential recruits were collected by the Country Sections into batches of a suitable size before sending them to the S.A.B.
When the recruits had undergone the full range of tests and interviews, a final Borad was held, at which representatives of each side of the testing staff were present to put forward their opinion. A representative of the Country Section, usually the Section Head or the recruiting officer, was also present. A full discussion to place on each recruit, the country section representative stating the particular type of work, or alternative types, for which he was required, and stating the Country Section view of the recruit in question. When all opinions had been heard, the President gave his ruling as to the suitability of the candidate, together with his recommendation as to the particular work for which he was best suited. This ruling was shown in the official report. The finding of the President was final, and Country Sections who wished to employ a recruit who had been pronounced unsuitable, had to obtain the sanction of Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman.
As a result of the introduction of the S.A.B. there was a marked decrease in the numbers of men rejected from training, and most Country Sections expressed themselves well satisfied with the system. This satisfaction was not, however, unanimous, and it was held by some that the S.A.B. constituted a bottleneck, which was holding up operations, and a number of applications were made for candidates to be excused passing through the S.A.B.**
It is important to note that, at the S.A.B. far more reference was allowed to the clandestine nature of S.O.E. than had been the case at Preliminary Schools. This was due first of all to the impossibility of making a true assessment of motivation and character if the candidate did not know what he was volunteering for, and secondly to the changed security conditions brought about by the widespread knowledge of the existence of clandestine organisations.’

4.5.3 Method of Testing
‘The methods of the S.A.B. were based on those of the W.O.S.B., with the necessary modifications necessitated by the difference in the qualifications needed in an officer and agent. The details of these methods are given separately, but are summarised briefly here. They may be grouped under five headings:
(a) Lay Interviews – Each candidate was interviewed by the President or Deputy-President, to obtain as much general information on him as possible, and to enable the interviewing officer to form a general opinion.
(b) Psychiatric Interviews – Each candidate was interviewed by a psychiatrist, to discover whether he was of a stable and otherwise suitable personality, and to obtain some light on those aspects of his character which had not been brought out in the lay interviews.
(c) Psychological Tests of Intelligence, posers of assimilation, memory, and of mechanical, morse and instructional aptitudes. These were administered by the psychologists and serjeant testers.
(d) Practical Tests of initiative, courage, stamina, corporate spirit, self reliance etc., carried out by the Military Testing Officers, who all had experience as instructors in S.T.S. These tests were both indoor and outdoor.
(e) Completion of pro-formas, giving all possible details of the candidates background. These were studied in relation to the results of the tests and interviews.

In some cases, such as when single students had to be tested urgently, a modification of this technique was made, the testing being limited to interviews and psychological tests. Though quite satisfactory results were obtained in this way, there was a greater element of doubt as to the validity of the final decision.’

4.5.4 Extensions of the S.A.B.
‘The technique of the S.A.B. was extended in a variety of ways.
(a) Pre-selection – When large numbers of candidates were involved, a technique of pre-selection, carried out by members of the staff of the S.A.B. were introduced. This pre-selection might be described as a progress of “Topping and Tailing”, since, by the application of a limited number of tests, it was possible in a very short time to sort out those candidates who were clearly suitable and these who were clearly unsuitable, leaving only the “doubtfuls” to be put through the full S.A.B. course. This method was used with success with both the Polish and Free French sections.
(b) JEDBURGH Selection*** – The different type, as well as the large numbers of officers and N.C.Os. involved in the JEDBURGH scheme, made it impossible to handle them at S.T.S 7, and an additional and somewhat modified board, known as No. 205 Selection Board**** was established temporarily***** at S.T.S 3 (Stodham Park) in November 1943, under the command of Major Sinclair, Deputy President of the S.A.B.
(c) Psychiatric Follow-up – Records were kept at S.T.S 7 of the subsequent career of each successful candidate both in training and in the Field, which made it possible to modify the tests where necessary. It was also of value when an agent, as a result of his experience was in need of psychiatric treatment, which was carried out as far as possible by the psychiatrists of the S.A.B.

4.5.5 Disbandment of the Students Assessment Board
‘The whole new scope of training was drastically reduced in the Autumn of 1944, and the S.A.B. was closed down on 16.11.1944. one psychiatrist was retained, together with a serjeant tester, and attached to the Medical Section, to deal with any problems of selection or remedial treatment that might be required. Normally, the selection of agents after the disbandment of the Board was once more carried out entirely by Country Sections Officers, though without the assistance of the probationary period which they had had with the Preliminary Schools.’


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The Students Assessment Board welcomed its first party of prospective students in June 1943. As Major Forty used only the last issues of each war establishment, he was not aware, at least in detail, what had happened before the last issue became effective. In the case of the Students Assessment Board, the three issues of this war establishment tell a story of their own.

As one of the Preliminary Schools, S.T.S. No. 4 at Winterfold got its authorisation by a war establishment of the sample type (VIII/208, with two issues and three amendments). These governed the period from the opening of the schools until 29.02.1944. The schools “Nos. 1 to 6” were included without any exception. At the same time, the titles of the sample war establishments for the Group B schools at Beaulieu had been adjusted several times, including and excluding schools according to the changes.

From 23.07.1942, a new war establishment (VIII/355/1) authorised S.T.S. No. 7, which was located at Winterfold, thus leaving no more room for S.T.S. No. 4. At that time, S.T.S. No. 4 had had a strength of 38 all ranks, with a commandant and chief instructor, an adjutant and quartermaster, one instructor and four assistant instructors. The new war establishment had a considerably lower strength of only 16 all ranks, with two instructors and one assistant instructor.

It remains uncertain for which purpose S.T.S. 7 at Winterfold was used in the time between 23.07.1942 and 05.05.1943.

With effect from 06.05.1943, VIII/355/2 showed much more of an assessment role. With 29 all ranks, particularly two testing officers, one specialist psychiatrist, R.A.M.C. and one serjeant tester from the Personnel Selection Staff, size and purpose clearly changed. As Major Forty stated that the first party was already handled in June 1943, this issue was only in parts and along basic ideas adjusted for its new role. This appears quite consequential, as the consultation with the Directorate for the Selection of Personnel in the War Office, R.A.F. and Naval Boards took place during the period between April and June, and to obtain a new issue of a war establishment from the respective committees surely took more time than a month.

On 05.10.1943, the final issue became effective (VIII/355/3). It clearly showed the influence of the consulted boards and was largely coordinated with the organisation of the selection process of the War Office. A comparison is presented together with this war establishment.

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* See Chapter “Paramilitary Training”, Section 2
** For a further discussion of this matter, see Chapter “Conclusions”
*** For an explanation of the JEDBURGH scheme, see Chapter “JEDBURGH Training”
**** There is no specific war establishment.
***** Training M/TR/1 MT/2579, dated 30.10.1943

 

4.6 Paramilitary Training
4.6.1 Organisation
‘Para-military Training, except for certain exceptions dealt with elsewhere* was evolved and carried out in the Arisaig area, later known as Group A. As already stated Group A was founded on and expanded from the M.I. Wing of the of the M.I.R. training schools at Lochailort. The M.I. Wing was housed at Arisaig House and had a very small establishment, consisting of Major Munn, (Commandant), Captain Godfrey, (Chief Instructor), and about ten other ranks. Captain J. Bush joined the Staff as demolition instructor shortly after the school was transferred to S.O.E. in November 1940. From the small nucleus the whole of Group A was rapidly established. The Group as it was finally constituted consisted of the following schools, of which the dates of opening are given in each case.

S.T.S. 21 - Arisaig House, Arisaig, Inverness-shire (Headquarters of the Group). Taken over by S.O.E. from M.I.R. November 1940
S.T.S. 22 - Rhubana Lodge, Morar, Inverness-shire, 09.01.1941
S.T.S. 22a - Glasnacardoch Lodge, Mallaig, Inverness-shire, 01.09.1942
S.T.S. 23 - Meoble Lodge, Morar, Inverness-shire, 08.01.1941
S.T.S. 23b - Swordland, Tarbet Bay, Morar, Inverness-shire, 05.03.1941
S.T.S. 24a - Inverie House, Knoydart, Mallaig, Inverness-shire, 25.11.1940
S.T.S. 24b - Glaschoille, Knoydart, Mallaig, Inverness-shire, 08.11.1941
S.T.S. 25a - Garramor House, Morar, Inverness-shire, 25.02.1941
S.T.S. 25b - Cammusdarach, Morar, Inverness-shire, 29.01.1941
S.T.S. 25c - Traigh House, Morar, Inverness-shire, 22.06.1941

The Group was an independent unit, under command of a lieutenant colonel. Its War Establishment underwent several modifications, but at its full development allowed, in addition to the Commandant of the Area, a major commandant and a lieutenant quartermaster for each S.T.S. (as will be seen several houses could be combined to form one S.T.S.) a major, chief instructor, a captain administrative officer, and a captain R.A.M.C. medical officer for the Area together with 16 officer instructors (captains or subalterns), 26 N.C.O. assistant instructors, and the necessary administrative staff. Making a maximum use of all houses it was possible to accommodate some 75 students, though this number was only rarely in residence.

Parties of different nationalities were segregated but no hard and fast allocation of houses to nationalities was made, although, as in the case of the preliminary schools, continuity was always attempted. Students went to Group A direct from the Preliminary Schools, and there began their specifically S.O.E. training. For security reasons the comparative freedom they had enjoyed in the Preliminary Schools was now curtailed, and they were allowed no leave, local or otherwise during their course.

All the schools were used for general para-military training with the exception of Swordlands [sic]** and Glasnacardoch. Swordlands was used for Naval Training*** in connection with the Tarbet Base (and continued to be so used by the Norwegians even after Naval Training had nominally ceased at Group A). Glasnacardoch was equipped and staffed as a Foreign Weapons School**** and continued as such until its functions were taken over by S.T.S. 3 and later S.T.S. 47. Rhubana for a time was diverted from its normal uses and used as a W/T Preliminary School*****, partly to ease the strain on accommodation at S.T.S. 52 and partly to reduce the length of training required for W/T Operators by substituting for the full five week para-military course a combined training covering elementary W/T with weapon training and physical toughening training.******

In the Autumn of 1944, the success of the invasion of Europe made it appear that further training would be much reduced in scope, and as a result it was decided to close down Group A. This was completed on 01.12.1944. The subsequent course of the war was such that a demand still did exist for paramilitary training but such as was needed was thenceforth carried out in the Operational Holding Schools.*******

The Commandants of Group A are given below:
Major J.W. Munn: November 1940 - January 1941
Lt.-Col. I. Evans: February 1941 - October 1941
Lt.-Col. P.C. Anderson: October 1941 - May 1942
Lt.-Col. J.T. Young: May 1942 - January 1943
Lt.-Col. A. D. Balden: January 1943 - April 1944
Lt.-Col. T.H.H. Grayson: April 1944 - August 1944
Lt.-Col. F. Ingham Clarke: August 1944 - December 1944’

4.6.2 Syllabus and Training
‘Paramilitary training at Group A evolved directly from the syllabus of the M.I.R. Special Training Centre at Loch Ailort and of the M.I. Wing at Arisaig, and was in consequence originally based on the idea of military or semi-military bands operating in enemy occupied territory. From this there was a gradual evolution towards the training of agents, saboteurs, and organisers in the practical aspects of the work they would have to carry out or direct while living a clandestine life. There was, however, never an open admission to the student while undergoing paramilitary training that he was in any sense an agent, and the original intention of revealing this to him only at the finishing stage was adhered to in theory right up to the disbandment of Group A. In practice it was found that the students, either by intelligent deduction or by direct information from recruiting officers, usually had some idea of the work they were going to do.

As originally conceived, the Para-military course was intended to last for three weeks, but this was found inadequate, and it was increased in 1942 to four weeks,******** and in 1943 after the closing of Preliminary Schools, and the introduction of the S.A.B., to five weeks. The course had three main objects: to teach the use of offensive weapons and special stores, physical toughening, and training in raid tactics, both as individuals and in small groups, this later including those subjects which enable an approach to be made to the target by land or water.


The syllabus underwent many modifications before reaching its final form, but the following list of main headings remained constant:
(a) Physical training (including preparatory exercises for parachuting)*********
(b) Silent killing
(c) Weapon training (including, from 1942 onwards, training in Foreign Weapons)
(d) Demolition training
(e) Map reading and compass work
(f) Fieldcraft
(g) Appreciations, planning and reports and orders
(h) Raid tactics
(i) Elementary morse
(j) Schemes and exercises designed to bring out the lessons taught in the foreign subjects
(k) Para-naval training and boatwork.

Physical Training, which was done out of doors in all weathers, was designed to “toughen” a student and bring him to a high standard of physical fitness by the end of the course. Instructors were N.C.Os. of the Army Physical Training Corps. Emphasis was also placed on exercises to prepare students for the parachute course. The physical training culminated in an assault course run on a competitive basis involving the use of most of the methods of climbing, ropework, etc. which had been taught.

Silent killing, which was a more aggressive form of unarmed combat included the methods of defence against knife and other attacks as well as the latest methods of attacking and killing sentries and other enemy troops silently. The main difficulty was always the inability to practise and see the results on a live person, although holds, blows and knife thrusts were practised with full fury on special dummies.

Weapon Training, concentrated primarily on making a student a good shot with an automatic pistol (.32 or .45 calibre) and a Sten Carbine. A feature of this training was the method taught of instinctive shooting (i.e. without using the sights) introduced by the late Major Sykes and which was later adopted in part by the Army. Stalk courses were set up to practise students in fast and instinctive shooting and wooden houses to teach close quarter firing. As more and more weapons were sent to the Field (such as silent weapons, P.I.A.T. and Bren L.M.Gs.) the syllabus was expanded to include simple instruction in these also, and also in the particular type of foreign weapons which might be met with on operations. Although initial training was done on an indoor range, the bulk of the subsequent practices were outside on the stalk courses. Latterly, each student was supplied with his own personal pistol which he kept throughout his training and so became thoroughly used to it.

Demolition Training, covered the use and application of explosives, incendiaries and devices. Training was essentially practical and students were able to see for themselves the damages which could be done, whilst the erection of “mock-up” targets which were destroyed on the exercises added a necessary touch of realism. The making up of all types of charges was originally taught at Group A, to give students sufficient general knowledge to solve any problem likely to be encountered in the Field. In 1943, however, this side general training was simplified by the introduction of the Standard 1½ lb. and 3 lb. charges********** by which it was hoped to reduce the risk of failure through wrongly made up charges (always present with unskilled men, particularly those who had only had the training in the Field at second hand). This was regarded by some as a retrograde step, but insufficient evidence is as yet available on which to make a final decision.#*

Map Reading and Compass Work, was taught, for, although students might not have to make great use of it, there was always the possibility of operating in strange country. In addition, students were taught to memorise routes so as to be able to find their way by day or night without map or compass, also to draw a route with suitable remarks so that another person could follow it accurately. Instruction was also given in the use and reading of foreign maps, covering most European countries.

Fieldcraft was the basis of the exercises held throughout the course and was designed primarily to train students to approach targets unnoticed for the purpose of reconnaissance and attack and generally to form a basis for guerilla tactics. All aspects of the subject were covered including use of cover and camouflage, crawling, stalking etc. To a certain degree Army methods were taught with some alterations but where these did not apply, entirely new formations and techniques were evolved. The rugged nature of the country which included areas of marshland, together with the generally inclement weather, made the practising of fieldcraft a physical as well as a mental test, and lessons were driven home very vividly in actual practice.

Appreciations, Planning, Reports and Orders are the basis of all successful operations, and all students were trained in them. To simplify the appreciation, a pro-forma was drawn up which originally followed approximately the same lines as that used by the Army. Later it was found necessary further to enlarge the pro-forma to cover additional factors which assisted the student and those which were habitually forgotten (i.e. meteorological data) and to emphasise the possible deductions which were used as a guide when arriving at the final conclusions. Whilst it was never anticipated students could remember every detail of the pro-forma, it certainly assisted in showing him how to arrive at a definite plan of operation and the points which should be considered. From this appreciation the student was taught to give operational orders and again a pro-forma was evolved as a guide. Students were also taught how to make out reports so as to give the maximum information with the minimum of redundant matter.

Raid Tactics included minor tactics based on subversive and guerilla warfare, in which students were trained to act as raiding parties (including formations and movement across country) followed by more detailed methods for ambushes, attacks on individual houses and street fighting. Specific drills were devised for the various operations based generally on the Battle School technique with amendments and the student was expected to memorise these drills. Lectures were always followed by practical application so that students were able to see for themselves and check in practice the points stressed in the lectures.

Elementary Morse was included in the original para-military course both to assess which students would make W/T operators and to give every student a working knowledge. A minimum of one period per day was devoted to this subject and an average speed of 8 – 10 w.p.m. (sending and receiving) was attained.

Schemes and Exercises were designed to illustrate all the lessons taught as well as to practice attacks on possible targets as on operations. Apart from those involving attacks on “mock-up” targets, schemes were evolved for an attack on an actual railway yard (by night), the derailment of a train (using dummy charges but placing on the railway line and awaiting an actual train) and the setting of an ambush using transport. The number of schemes varied, but usually between 8 and 10 were carried out, half of them by night. Realism was the key note of all exercises and schemes so far as practicable; targets were erected to conform as near as possible to the actual thing, live explosives and incendiaries were used when feasible, and students were made to carry such stores and weapons as they would need in actual fact on operations. This realism was found essential to drive home points and, on occasions, to stimulate that interest and attention to detail which would be so necessary on operations. Instructors always participated in every exercise and at least one accompanied the party as observer.

Finally, some special mention must be made of Para-Naval training. The importance of training men in the use of small boats for landing operations, as well as in attacks on shipping was greatly stressed in the early stages, #** and it was largely to handle this type of work that S.T.S. 23b (Swordlands) was acquired, together with a base at Tarbet Bay. In addition two auxiliary yachts “Orca” and “Risor” together with numerous launches and dinghies and naval crews to man them, were acquired early in 1941. The stress laid on this type of training appears however to have been unduly great, and except in the case of Norwegian students, whose method of entry to their country was commonly by sea, no great demand was received from Country Sections. This is easily explained by the development of parachuting, which became the normal method of transport for agents. Furthermore these who were still infiltrated or who were to organise reception of other men by sea, required far more technical training than could be given at Group A, and the task was undertaken by the Naval Section of the Helford Base. #***


Those who were to be concerned with the sabotage of shipping still received training at Group A from the Tarbet Base as regards approach and the placing of charges, but the more technical aspects of ship sabotage were ultimately dealt with at S.T.S. 17. As the consequence of these developments, the auxiliary yachts Orca and Risor were paid off in 1943, but a small naval party was retained to service the craft required for inter-communication with the Group, and to carry out the limited training still required at Tarbet, mainly be Norwegians, #**** who were sent over for the purpose from S.T.S. 26.’

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* See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”, Section 2
** Other sources use “Swordland”.
*** See below Chapter “Schemes and Exercises” and Chapter “Naval Training”
**** See Chapter “Mines and Foreign Weapons”
***** See Chapter “Signals Training”
****** Training TR/A/1 “Minutes of Meeting to discuss the shortening of Training”; also ADR/1055/378, dated 25.11.1943.
******* See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”
******** Training M/TR/2 JTY/662, dated 09.03.1942
********* See Chapter “Parachute Training”
********** Training TR/A/1 JTY/721, dated 23.09.1943
#* See also Chapter “Conclusion”
#** Training M/TR/3 – Unreferenced paper to MZ and M dated 23.02.1941, entitled “Proposals for development of Paramilitary Training”
#*** See Chapter “Naval Training”
#**** See Chapter “Norwegian Training”

 

4.7 Parachute Training
‘Parachute training for S.O.E. personnel was originally carried out by the R.A.F. at the Central Landing Establishment, Ringway, later known as No. 1 Parachute Training School. The number of students to be handled soon made it necessary, however, that there should be a special S.O.E. establishment at least for their accommodation and ground training.* Furthermore, the problems of parachute training for S.O.E. differed materially from those of Airborne Forces. In the first place, the numbers were smaller and each individual became in consequence of greater importance. Secondly the work with S.O.E. students were destined to carry out in the Field had a natural tendency to induce a high state of nervous tension. The last consideration, and in some ways the most important, was that S.O.E. students were of many nationalities. The only solution to these problems was to have a ground training establishment where special care could be given to the preparatory training of men who in many cases had come straight from a sedentary life before joining the Organisation, and where individual attention could be given in order to deal with the differing temperaments and languages of the students. It appeared that only in this way could the necessary high confidence and morale be obtained. Subsequent events appear to have justified this opinion.

The first step towards the establishment of the S.O.E. Ground Training School was taken in February 1941 by the acquisition of Dunham House which was numbered S.T.S. 51. Major C.J. Edwards was appointed Commandant on 11.03.1941 and continued in that appointment until the final disbandment of the school in August 1945. In March 1941, Fulshaw Hall (S.T.S. 51b) was acquired in order to increase accommodation and to allow for a certain degree of segregation if required. It should be noted in this connection that the rigid principles of segregation by nationalities in force at the Preliminary and Para-Military Schools were at S.T.S. 51 almost entirely abandoned, only being applied where Country Sections specially requested it and in order to avoid meetings between students of the S.O.E. and S.I.S., for whom S.O.E. carried out parachute training,** when they were of the same nationality.

Training at S.T.S. 51 scarcely deviated from the original scheme evolved during the whole of its duration. Each course lasted from five to seven days according to weather. After receiving this ground training students carried out five descents (later reduced to four in conformity with the practice of Airborne Forces). Facilities also existed for students requiring additional refresher training to return to the school before departure to the Field.

In October 1942 training was introduced in the method of making parachute descents into water, by means of a special water jumping suit. Such descents were recommended for students who were not considered sufficiently fit to make a normal landing, and where a suitable stretch of water existed in the Field.

In 1943 the leg bag was introduced and training in its use was given to all students except Norwegians and Danes, at the special request of the Regional Head who considered that the risk of injury was too great. This was not, however, borne out by the experience of Airborne Forces or at S.T.S. 51.

Reception Committee training was carried out at S.T.S. 51 until the summer of 1944 when all such training was centralised at the Reception Committee School, established at Howbury Hall*** in June 1943.

The total accommodation of S.T.S. 51 was nominally 50 students, i.e. 25 in each house, but this was increased to a maximum of 70 by accommodating permanent staff outside. This was, however, exceptional and could not be continued for long periods.

For the training of JEDBURGHS**** where very large numbers were involved, the qualifying number of descents was reduced to three and two parties were handled per week. This system was also used for certain other heavy commitments, dealt with in detail under the Heading of Special Training.

The training of German prisoners for work in Germany which was started in July 1944 under the Bonzo-scheme***** necessitated their complete segregation at S.T.S. 51 and the general reduction in the number of normal students at this time made it possible to allocate one or other of the houses at S.T.S. 51 entirely to Bonzo students. The subsequent increase in normal commitments and the very small number of Bonzo students made this, however, an uneconomical system. When the further complication of Periwig Bonzos*****, who required segregation from normal Bonzos, occurred in the spring of 1945, an additional small house was acquired in March and numbered S.T.S. 51c (York House). This house, which accommodated 10 students, was used purely for Bonzos or Periwig Bonzos and was closed in June 1945.

All training ceased at S.T.S. 51 on 01.07.1945, Fulshaw Hall being closed on 06.06.1945 and Dunham House on 25.07.1945.

During 1941 there was some discussion as to the extent and type of preliminary training which should be done at schools before the parachute training at S.T.S. 51. It was clear that the more early training that the students could receive the less the chance of accidents during actual parachute training. On the other hand too much early training might reduce the students interest during the course at S.T.S. 51 (where the equipment was at that time somewhat primitive) when delays due to weather might then have a bad effect on morale. It was finally agreed that pre-51 training at Preliminary and Paramilitary schools should be limited to specially suitable P.T. exercises such as those to familiarise the student with the movements required for an actual parachute descent. No special apparatus would be used for this training.’

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Major Forty states in this chapter that Howbury Hall was established as Reception Committee School in June 1943. In the chapter “Reception Committee Training”, he suggests rather September 1943. The relevant war establishment VIII/532/1 - Special Training School, No. 40 - became effective on 09.09.1943.

Already in 1941, a week-long “Pick-up Operation Organiser’s Course” dealing with the tasks of reception committees had been organised on Tempsford airfield. For that course, R.A.F. Tempsford was renamed Special Training School No. 61,****** which officially existed under this name as an establishment of S.O.E. from October 1941.

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* Training - S.T.S. 51 Unreferenced Minute from M to CD, dated 30.11.1940
** See Chapter “Assistance given to other Organisations and Services”
*** See Chapter “Reception Training”
**** See Chapter “Jedburgh Training”
***** See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”
****** Perquin, Jean Louis: Clandestine Parachute and Pick-up Operations, Volume 1, p. 52.

 

4.8 Agents Finishing Training
4.8.1 Organisation
‘In accordance with the original project, steps were taken at the end of 1940 to find a suitable location for Finishing Schools. The plan* was to have a number of small houses grouped within convenient distance of a main headquarters, so that small parties of students could be segregated by nationalities and at the same time receive instruction from specialist officers, who at their central headquarters would have the facilities to make a thorough study of the problems of the agent technique. The first house to be acquired was The Rings, Beaulieu, Hants. (S.T.S. 31) in January 1941, and in the same month Harford House (S.T.S. 32), The House on the Shore (S.T.S. 33), Drokes (S.T.S. 34), Vineyards (S.T.S. 35) and Boarmans (S.T.S. 36) were also acquired. The Rings was at first used both as the headquarters and to accommodate students, but this was only a temporary measure, and by March 1941, it had become the office block, and students were no longer allowed access to it. About this time The House in the Wood was acquired for officer accommodation. Subsequently, four additional houses were acquired: Saltmarsh (S.T.S. 32b) in January 1942, Warren House (S.T.S. 37a) in March 1942, Blackbridge (S.T.S. 32c) in June 1942, and Clobb Gorse (S.T.S. 37b) in October 1942. Accommodation was thereby made available for some 80 students, but this number was never reached as parties remained for the most part small, usually from six to ten students. The large number of houses was, however, required for purposes of segregation.

In March 1941, the staff of the Finishing Schools was composed of Lt.-Col. Munn as Commandant, Major Woolrych as Chief Instructor, Major Hill, Mr. Philby and Professor Patterson from Station XVII and several younger officers from the Intelligence Corps. The constitution was under constant review as the work of S.O.E. operators became clarified. During the summer of 1941 the work of the Group expanded rapidly, as did the staff, which by August numbered approximately fourteen officers.

By this time, a proper War Establishment had been drawn up for the Group (at that time known as the Beaulieu Area, but later as Group B) which allowed, in addition to the necessary permanent staff, a Lieutenant-Colonel in command, a major administrative officer and 2nd-in-command, a major chief instructor, a major assistant chief instructor, 8 captain instructors and six subaltern instructors. No N.C.Os. were allowed for on the instructional staff, with the exception of a P.T. instructor, who also dealt with weapon training. Each student house was in charge of a lieutenant (subsequently captain) administrative officer with its own permanent staff. The War Establishment of other ranks remained almost constant, but that of officer instructors was increased until it reached 19 captains in 1944. At the same time as the numbers were raised, subalterns were entirely eliminated since, as the war progressed, it was found impossible to obtain officers with the necessary qualifications in this low rank. Even so at no time did Group B have its full complement of instructor owing to the difficulty of finding officers with intelligence training and with the necessary language qualifications.** Here it should be noted that language qualifications played a much larger part at Group B since the instruction was mainly concerned with the inculcation in the mind of the students of certain fundamental ideas and with facts of organisation. In Para-military and in other more practical forms of training a great deal could be done with an interpreter and by demonstration.

No other changes of any importance were made in the administrative organisation of Group B before its final disbandment in June 1945. Some of the houses were, it is true, closed down in the Autumn of 1944, when it appeared that training was coming to an end, but they were subsequently reopened with the exception of S.T.S. 33 and 37a.

In December 1944, Group B was divorced from the Training Section, and placed under the direct control of Brigadier Mockler Ferryman and subsequently of CD. Its history from then until July 1945 is not therefore included, but it may be stated that its work continued on the lines established. The Group was disbanded in June 1945, but a small establishment of two majors and five captains was retained in London to prepare a handbook of agent technique, and to deal with any training commitments which might arise. This modified Group B was brought back under the control of the reduced Training Section on 08.07.1945.

The following is a list of Commandants & Chief Instructors with the dates of their appointment:

(a) Commandants:
Lt.-Col. J.W. Munn: March – September 1941
Lt.-Col. S.H.C Woolrych: September 1941 – June 1945
(For the period during which he was Director of Training, i.e. January to May 1943, the vacancy remained unfilled.)

(b) Chief Instructors:
Major S.H.C Woolrych: March – September 1941
Major R.M Brooker: September – November 1941
Major C. Skilbeck: November 1941 – July 1942
Major J. Wedgwood: July 1942 – June 1944
Major P. Follies: June 1944 – ’

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Major Forty states that some of the houses were temporarily closed in the autumn of 1944, and that they were subsequently reopened with the exception of S.T.S. 33 and 37a.
The official views by war establishments and the dates of closure reported by D/Fin.2 Section are different:

School - House - Closed by WE - Reopened by WE - Closure Date by D/Fin.2 Section
S.T.S. 33 - House on the Shore - 14.11.1944 (VIII/545/1) - 01.02.1945 (VIII/994/1) - 15.11.1944
S.T.S. 34 - The Drokes - 14.11.1944 (VIII/546/1) - 01.02.1945 (VIII/994/1) - 15.06.1945
S.T.S. 36 – Boarmans - 06.12.1944 (VIII/548/1) – no - 06.12.1944
S.T.S. 37a - Warren House - 25.10.1944 (VIII/549/1) – no - 18.09.1944
S.T.S. 37b - Clobb Gorse - 25.10.1944 (VIII/549/1) - no - 18.09.1944

It appears that the official administration had the task of reopening two schools, and the former ordinal numbers of the schools played a secondary role in this. The schools in the Beaulieu region were organised in such a way that the instructors were housed and fed at the headquarters (S.T.S. 31). From there, they travelled to the individual schools to train the students. It is conceivable that two schools were reopened under two numbers (33 and 34), but that other buildings were used than before, as it may have been possible to select buildings based on their suitability due to declining demand. It may therefore be the case that the numbers and the names of the buildings were quoted, which were no longer congruent.

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4.8.2 The Syllabus and Training
‘The curriculum of training at Group B was based on that of the M.I. Wing at Loch Ailort, the Clandestine training of S.T.S. 17, and the security training of the Intelligence Corps. By the early Summer of 1941 the syllabus had become stabilised, and was divided into five sections each with its corresponding departments and officers. The “A” Department dealt with questions of agent technique, clandestine life, personal security, clandestine organisation and methods of communication, and the recruitment and handling of agents. This was the fundamental section of training, the other sections being complementary to it. The “B” Department was concerned entirely with the exercises necessary to bring home the lessons of the theoretical training. The “C” Department dealt with the organisation of enemy forces, both overt (Wehrmacht and Police) and clandestine (i.e. Abwehr, S.D. and Gestapo). Attention was in the main concentrated on German organisations but a fair body of information was also built up on Italian and later Japanese methods. The “D” Department dealt with propaganda. To begin with, this department, under Mr. Philby, handled the training of all propaganda agents whom we sent to the Field in collaboration with S.O.1 (later P.W.E.), but a separate establishment was later set up to deal with advanced propaganda training.*** In spite of this, the propaganda department at Beaulieu continued to function even when the advanced training had been removed from it, as it was considered that an elementary grounding in propaganda was of value to any agent as it enabled him to counteract the effects of German propaganda and also to understand the general scheme of Allied propaganda directed towards his country, and thereby to assist in maintaining the morale of his fellow countrymen. The “E” Department dealt with codes and secret inks, giving, to begin with, only general instruction, but later establishing code conventions for all students.

This organisation continued with only minor modifications during the whole existence of Group B. However, while few superficial changes were made in the framework, the subject matter of the lectures given was constantly undergoing review in the light of reports from the Field, reports from other intelligence sources, information obtained from enemy press and radio and from the comments and criticisms of Country Section Officers. As soon as agents began to be exfiltrated the practice was established of such returned agents visiting Group B and giving an account of their experiences and undergoing detailed interrogation by representatives of the various departments. In this way, it was possible to check and correct the original teaching, based as it was, largely on the practice of the first world war and of theoretical reasoning.

The definitive edition of the syllabus was prepared in 1944, incorporating all the lessons learned since the creation of the Group. The material in it is presented in its basic form, from which it is possible, with an adequate supply of intelligence to make the necessary adaption for any given country. This system was found the most practical at Group B, where instructors specialised in a country or countries, maintaining detailed files on local conditions, etc., and compiled their own modified lectures from the basic syllabus to meet the needs of individual parties.

The duration of the course was three weeks, except in the case of British headquarters officers and other non-operational personnel, when it was reduced to 10 – 14 days. As will be seen by reference to the syllabus, a great proportion of the time was given over to exercises, both indoor and outdoor. It was found that theoretical instruction was of little value unless it could be applied in practice by the student, and that, furthermore, it was unsatisfactory to impose an entirely sedentary life on students who had for the past two months been living an active physical existence.’

4.8.3 Security Training of Wireless Operators
‘It was the original practice for only the comparatively high grade organiser agents to be sent to Group B, but it was found as early as the Autumn of 1941 that a considerable danger existed to the Organisation in the Field by the ignorance on security matters of other types of personnel sent from this country, in particular W/T Operators, who were frequently young and irresponsible. To remedy this defect an instructor from Group B was attached to the W/T Training School, S.T.S. 52, then situated at Grendon, where an abbreviated Group B course was given to the W/T Operators. This lasted fourteen days, but the time was not exclusively devoted to Group B subjects, wireless training continuing in order that there should be no loss of sending speed. This system continued until the spring of 1942 when it was decided that the mixture of W/T training and Group B subjects tended to confuse the students and arrangements were made for all W/T students to attend a shortened course at Group B after the eighth week of their wireless training. The duration of this course was ten days (later extended to 14 days). They continued, however, to receive their code training at S.T.S. 52.’

4.8.4 The 96-Hour Scheme
‘The main development in the early part of 1942 was the introduction of the 96 hour scheme. This evolved from a reconnaissance exercise which had been carried out from the M.I. Wing at Loch Ailort, which was designed to test the student in the subjects in which he had been instructed, and to make it possible to assess his behaviour when faced with problems comparable to those he would meet in the Field. In the early form of the 96 hour scheme, a group of students was sent to an area remote from the school, where they were required to carry out the reconnaissance of a target (usually fairly extensive, such as a railway network, a port, etc.) in order to decide on the most vulnerable point and the best method of attack. At the same time, they were required to organise themselves by clandestine methods and carry out the orders of the student appointed as leader, who prepared the plan of attack. Different individuals were usually located in widely spaced parts of the same town or in different towns in order to make it necessary for the method of clandestine communication to be practiced.

Many of these schemes provided excellent results but in general it was found that too much time was spent in travelling and in maintaining contact and that too much responsibility was placed on the leader, so that insufficient practice was obtained by the remainder of the party. A new and standardised scheme was therefore evolved in which students were sent out as individuals und were given a limited reconnaissance task. The student was now required, however, to face a number of hazards, in his reaction to which it would be possible to judge his ability. These hazards consisted of police intervention, including trailing, arrest and interrogation, and the contacting and recruiting of a previously unknown individual. Hazards similar to these had been introduced in the long range schemes run for W/T Operators from S.T.S. 52 in conjunction with their security course, but the personnel required were in that case supplied by the Organisation in the form of F.S.P. Now the Civil Police and civilian residents in towns were incorporated, and this necessitated a very close liaison with M.I. 5.

Even in the case of the earlier schemes it had always been the practice to notify the R.S.L.Os. through the S.O.E. Security Section, of what was taking place in their area, but now that active co-operation was introduced a more intimate contact was required. This was obtained by two methods. First by the representation of the Commandant of Group B on the M.I. 5 Panel which met at frequent intervals to discuss questions concerning liaison between secret organisations and the security service. The second method was by personal contact between the Commandant of Group B and the R.S.L.Os. whom he visited and to whom he explained in detail his requirements. This personal contact was further strengthened by parties of R.S.L.Os. attending courses at Group B.

The success and value of the 96 hour scheme were borne out by results.

It is, however, to be recorded that considerable opposition to the scheme was encountered from certain Country Sections on the grounds that exposure to the hazards of arrest and interrogation was liable to lower the confidence of students at a time when they were in a highly strung condition. The opinion of the Training Section had, however, always been that it was better for any weaknesses in a potential agent to be shown up in this country rather than in the Field where his failure would probably jeopardise the safety of the organisation as well as the lives of fellow agents. With few exceptions, it was found that the better types of student reacted favourably to the scheme and on their return from their missions stated that the practice they had received had been of value in giving them confidence in the Field.’

4.8.5 Post-Graduate Training
‘It was realised early in the existence of Group B that training a man or woman to lead a clandestine life was more a question of inculcating a habit of mind, than one of teaching facts. To do this in a three weeks course, except in the case of students of great aptitude and intelligence was virtually impossible, and various attempts were made to find a solution to the problem.

The first proposal was to introduce a postgraduate course at Group B which the student would attend after his 96-hour scheme. Such a course would normally be of 14 days duration, and would be concerned with the general application of the principles of the basic course to the particular mission of the student, and with revision of the subjects in which he appeared weakest.

Approval was obtained in 1943 for the institution of these courses****, but only two were held. The reasons for this are obscure, but it would seem that country sections were unwilling to allow the necessary time.

Ultimately the Post-Graduate courses were dropped, and the continuation training was carried out in the Operational Holding Schools.***** This proved a more practical solution, since students normally went to these schools while waiting to go to the Field, and their constitution was such that it was possible not only to revise the Group B training in the light of specific missions, but also in conjunction with what the student had learned at other schools.’

4.8.6 Miscellaneous Subjects
‘Incorporated in the syllabus of Group B were certain subjects which had no direct bearing on the particular form of training given there, in particular training in railway sabotage and reception committee work. Railway sabotage was introduced at Group B at its inception, i.e. before it had been decided to make S.T.S. 17 an advanced sabotage school.****** The syllabus covered all forms of attack on track and rolling stock, both with and without the use of explosives. Railway training continued at Group B long after this form of training had been much more fully developed at S.T.S. 17 and owing to the lack of close liaison between the two schools discrepancies of teaching arose. Railway sabotage was accordingly deleted from the syllabus at the end of 1942, and was henceforth dealt with only at para-military schools and S.T.S. 17, with, of course, revision at Operational Holding Schools.

The position with regard to Reception Committee Training was similar. To start with the practical aspects of the reception of stores by air was handled at S.T.S. 51, while the question of the selection of dropping grounds and the clandestine organisation of Reception Committees was dealt with at Group B. Unfortunately, the instructors at Group B had little, if any, practical experience of dropping operations and serious discrepancies arose. It was on account of this that the Reception Committee School******* was established in 1943 and instruction in this type of work eliminated from the syllabus of Group B, except for general discussion of the security aspect of the organisation of bodies of men for this purpose.

Another subject which came to be included in the syllabus with more justice was that of the organisation of foreign workers. Early in 1942 the large number of workers being deported or induced to leave occupied territories for Germany made it clear that a considerable potential resistance force was being built up in that country. In order to avail ourselves of this opportunity, it was necessary to train special agents to who could either enter Germany as foreign workers and there organise their compatriots, or who could give instruction to workers who were known to be leaving. Group B was accordingly called upon to prepare a suitable syllabus of training, and since the type of work was largely concerned with indoctrination and instruction in passive methods, the lectures in question were made part of the propaganda course. Although this course was in being from 1942, until the defeat of Germany, it is to be noted that little use was made of it by Country Sections.

Other miscellaneous subjects taught at Group B were Photography, the handling of Carrier Pigeons, and Lock Picking, but since these were not exclusively dealt with at Group B, they are dealt with separately.’

---
* Training M/TR/4. Paper entitled “Finishing Schools”, dated 18.02.1941
** See Chapter “The Selection and Training of Officers for S.T.S.”
*** See Chapter “Propaganda Training”
**** Training TR/B/1 (1944) Minutes of CD’s weekly meeting, dated 14.07.1943
***** See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”
****** Training – Railway Training DL/OR/53, dated 13.12.1940
******* See Chapter “Reception Training”
******** See Chapter “Miscellaneous Training”

 

4.9 Training at S.T.S. 17 (Industrial Sabotage, Counter Scorching)
4.9.1 Organisation
‘The early history of S.T.S. 17 (originally known as Station XVII) has already been covered* and there is no need to retrace it here. The school continued to work as a General Purpose School until Group B was established in 1941, when the clandestine agents’ training was transferred to Group B, the elementary training to the Preliminary schools and Group A, and S.T.S. 17, while still available for the specialised training of coup-de-main parties became the industrial sabotage school. This title does not, however, give a full idea of the scope of its activities which covered, in addition to the technique of attacking common machinery, that of putting out of action railways, dock installations, shipping, telecommunications, and also more specifically military targets such as aircraft, submarines, radiolocation installations, and in general of anything which could be described as a mechanical target.

The first commandant of S.T.S. 17 in its new role was Major Clarke, but he was replaced in October 1941 by Major G.T. Rheam who remained commandant of the school until its final disbandment in June 1945, being promoted Lt.-Col. in February 1943.

The War Establishment of the school allowed in addition to the Commandant, for one major (chief instructor), five captain instructors and two lieutenant instructors, (subsequently upgraded to captains vacancies). In addition, there was a captain administrative officer, and four N.C.O. instructors, together with the necessary permanent staff. This establishment, by no means excessive for the work to be done, was unfortunately never filled, owing to the difficulty of finding officers with the necessary engineering qualifications**, particularly later in the war. During 1943 and 1944 when the school was working to capacity the instructor strength dropped as low as three officers, entailing very considerable strain, and making impossible the carrying out of much of the necessary research work, or the preparation of handbooks. Despite these difficulties, it can with confidence be said that never was there any falling off in the quality of instruction.

The school could accommodate some thirty five students in all, and this number was reached regularly during 1943 and 1944 when, in addition to Basic Courses***, the Home-Made Explosives Course**** was also accommodated at S.T.S. 17. (The average number of students on the Basic Course rose from 10 in 1942, to 18 in 1943 and reached its maximum of 28 in 1944.) Conditions with such large numbers in residence, were however extremely cramped.

The programme was so arranged that one Basic Course of three weeks duration took place every four weeks. This allowed for operational and specialist***** courses to be handled in the free week, since, with the shortage of instructors it proved almost impossible to run Basic and Specialist Courses simultaneously.

No segregation of students was made at S.T.S. 17, and courses were normally of mixed nationalities. This had certain practical disadvantages, such as necessitating the use of several interpreters simultaneously, but on balance it would seem that these were counteracted by the advantage derived from the free interplay of ideas between men of different temperaments, training for different, but closely related work, and united by a common aim. No particular difficulties arose at the school from this practice and the commandant expressed himself strongly in favour of it.

S.T.S. 17 was closed in July 1945, but on the instructions of CD****** most of the equipment was transferred to M.E. 65******* under the charge of Major Blackden, the Chief Instructor. This was an interim measure to avoid dispensing the specialist personnel and the equipment until such time as a permanent Industrial Sabotage School should be established.’********

4.9.2 The Basic Course
‘When S.T.S. 17 ceased to be a general purpose school and became the Industrial Sabotage school In the Spring of 1941, comparatively little was known of the potentialities of co-ordinated and scientifically planned attacks on industry. Industrial Sabotage was regarded as one of the many types of activity to be indulged in by clandestine agents, and it was only later, largely due to the work carried out at S.T.S. 17, that the potentially decisive character of industrial sabotage was generally realised.

In these circumstances, it is natural that the early courses where oft an ad hoc nature.********* However by October 1941, the principles had been established that there was to be a standard course, and its duration was fixed at 12 days.********** This basic course was again lengthened in September 1942,#* this time to three weeks, at which it remained until the dissolution of the school.

For sabotage of industry to be effective, that is, to stop production, it was clear that the agents concerned, in addition to their ability to make up and place charges, required a knowledge of the complex organisation of modern industry.#** At the same time it was equally clear that the average agent sent to S.T.S. 17 was in no way an industrial expert, and the problem was therefore: how to give a layman, in three weeks the necessary engineering outlook to enable him to apply his demolition knowledge intelligently and effectively. It was recognised that, for non-technical personnel, the ability to locate the vital parts of the major industries, and to identify the vital machinery, was more difficult to acquire than a knowledge of the enemy’s industrial economy.

When the syllabus of the Basic Course was drawn up the main emphasis was placed on these points. In addition it covered the organisation of industry, the sabotage (both with and without explosives) of common machinery, electric power, transport, telecommunications, shipping, canals and special types of works, such as oil refineries and tanneries. In order to familiarise the students with the type of target they would encounter, a number of visits to factories were made during the course, and in addition to the theoretical training, practical exercises were carried out by day and by night. As the war progressed and the emphasis changed, instruction was also included in the Basic Course on attacks on military targets (grounded aircraft, ammunition dumps, artillery, A.F.Vs., Radar installations etc.), and a period was introduced dealing with the prevention of enemy demolitions and the safeguarding of vital equipment for the Allies.

To cover such a wide range of Technical subjects as this in the basic course of three weeks presented a problem of peculiar difficulty. Satisfactory results were however obtained by reducing the instruction to fundamental principles, which were largely based on the time it would take the enemy to repair or replace a particular piece of equipment. The instruction itself was concentrated rather on recognition features than on how and why a particular plant or machinery works, and in the methods of attack, training was as far as possible standardised, and alternative methods eliminated. (In this connection it should be noted that the O.C. S.T.S. 17 was instrumental in bringing about the introduction of the standard charge, which was adopted in all trainings schools. #***)

The material on which the syllabus of the basic course is founded is set out in extenso in the “Industrial Demolitions Handbook”, prepared at S.T.S. 17. This handbook, of which a volume is devoted to each type of target, constitutes the standard work on the subject.’

4.9.3 Operational Courses
‘In addition to the Basic Course, Special short operational courses were run at S.T.S. 17 for “coup de main” #**** parties, who were going to carry out one specific operation, and for men who were going to specialise in one type of target. Ideally, the men attending such courses should previously have attended the Basic Course, but this was not always possible. Since these special courses lasted only two to seven days, an even more rigorous application of the principle of the Basic Course was necessary; cutting out all reference to details other than those which had direct reference to the task, and practising the men thoroughly on targets similar to the ones they were to attack in the Field, using models of the actual made-up charges with which they were to be supplied.’

4.9.4 Other Training
‘In addition to Industrial Sabotage training, instruction was also carried out at S.T.S. 17 in Counter Scorching (i.e. the prevention of demolitions by a retreating enemy), Counter Sabotage (i.e. the prevention of enemy sabotage behind our own lines) and also in safe breaking. The first of these types of training was given to normal S.O.E. agents who were to be concerned with harassing tactics in the Field, and was largely based on the methods taught in the Basic Course. For this purpose it was necessary to give instruction in enemy demolition methods and for a long time great difficulty was encountered in obtaining the necessary information and specimens. (The training in enemy demolitions given at S.T.S. 17 was more concerned with the methods of application than with the actual devices used, which were primarily dealt with at the school of enemy weapons and demolition equipment.)#*****

Counter Sabotage Training was carried out for personnel of the army counter sabotage organisations at the request of Lt.-Col. Rothschild of M.I. 5 after the invasion of France when enemy sabotage attempts were causing some anxiety. #****** These courses were quite separate from the normal S.O.E. courses and lasted 12 days.#******* In them a general picture was given of sabotage methods and a detailed study was made not only of the methods of neutralising the devices used by the enemy but also of the general measures to be taken for the safeguarding of large installations und factories. A number of visits were made during this course to the type of installation of particular interest to the students attending it (i.e. docks, power stations, etc.).

Training in safe breaking and lock picking was carried out for officers of “T” Force#******** whose role was to seize documents of value left behind by the enemy.

This training only began after D-Day. Courses were of 12 days duration and students were taught various methods of opening safes with explosives and by the use of oxy-acetylene cutters, as well as the principles of lock picking. A detailed report#********* on the methods of safe-breaking was make by the officer responsible for organising and running this course, Major D.E.F. Green.’

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Like every element of S.O.E., S.T.S. 17 was ordered to produce an official report or history, either after they had finished their work or at the end of the war. The “Report on the Development of Industrial Sabotage Training at S.T.S. 17, August 1941 – August 1944” was written by its commandant Lt.-Col. George Turner Tatham Rheam, R.E.M.E.#********** He came from the Central Electricity Board, held a Bachelor of Science and was a renowned expert in modern industrial sabotage. His predecessor as commandant Major Cecil "Nobby" Clarke had vacated his post only in April 1942 to assist Stuart Macrae in his "Winston Churchill's Toyshop", run by M.D.1 at The Firs, Whitchurch (VIII/239, effective 07.07.1941 – 01.02.1946). Rheam had joined S.T.S. 17 as an instructor for industrial sabotage already on 24.08.1941. In his report, he made several key statements:
- Organised industrial sabotage was a new means of warfare. No previous experience was available on which instruction could be based.
- In World War Two, resistance came in two forms: Secret Armies for guerilla warfare and sabotage groups specialising in attacks on industry. In industrialised Europe, the Secret Armies could only play their most important part in the closing stages of the war with the enemy in retreat; it was in the earlier stages that sabotage had its greatest value.
- The initial view was that industrial sabotage was simply a profitable sideline to the activities of secret army personnel, however, it soon became apparent that properly planned and carried out sabotage might well be decisive.
- He emphasised the importance of focusing on practical industrial sabotage by visiting basic industries and large docks, and he considered the location of S.T.S. 17 in Hertford to be a stroke of luck, as these conditions were remarkably well met, with most of these targets located within a 30-mile radius.
- Standardised industrial sabotage training started only in the summer of 1943. (This was after he had been appointed commandant.)
- S.T.S. 17 was one of the few schools where students of different nationalities were instructed together. He considered this an unqualified success.

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* See Chapter “Origin and early history of the Training Section”
** See Chapter “Selection of Officers”
*** See Chapter “The Basic Course”
**** See Chapter “Home-made Explosives Course”
***** See Chapter “Other Training”
****** Training TR/J/1 GMF/7078.J.1, dated 11.05.1945
******* See Chapter “M.E. 65”
******** Training TR/J/1 Recommendations by the O.C. S.T.S. 17, dated 05.06.1945, for the establishment of a Permanent Industrial Sabotage School
********* Training - Industrial Sabotage Syllabus MZ/80, dated 31.07.1941
********** Ibid. JWI/112, dated 29.10.1941
#* Ibid. MT/1429, dated 14.09.1942
#** Handbook “Report on the development of industrial Sabotage Training at S.T.S. 17, dated August 1944
#*** See Chapter “Para-military Training”
#**** See Chapter “Holding and Operational Training”
#***** See Chapter “Foreign Weapons”
#****** Training TR/J/1 GR/2105, dated 27.11.1944, Report to CD by O.C. STS 17 on discussions with Lt.-Col. Rothschild
#******* Training TR/J/8 MT/5655, dated 15.12.1944, Programme of Counter-Sabotage Course
#******** “T“ Force was the operational arm of a joint U.S. Army and British Army mission to secure German scientific and industrial technology and to seize corresponding key personnel. Known war establishments for the British contingent of “T“ Force:
- VIII/867/1 - "T" (Target) Force Intelligence Unit (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)
- XIV/646/1 – "T" Force Investigators Camp, 21 Army Group
#********* Handbook
#********** TNA HS 7/51

 

4.10 Propaganda Training
4.10.1 Organisation
‘The operation of propaganda agents was not strictly within the charter of S.O.E. As early as 1940 when S.O.E. and P.W.E. (originally S.O.2[sic]*) were formed, it was, however, agreed that S.O.E., which had the facilities for training and despatch, would undertake these functions for agents recruited and briefed by P.W.E. The assistance of S.O.E. was to cease once the agent was in the Field apart from maintaining for him a W/T link.

The first training of propaganda agents was carried out at S.T.S. 17 by Mr. Philby and Professor Patterson, who were subsequently transferred to Beaulieu with the opening of Group B in April 1941. The number of students to be handled as well as the liaison with P.W.E. grew rapidly and Mr. Hackett, who had previously been employed by Section D, was taken on as an additional instructor.

By September 1941 it became apparent that propaganda training was falling into two distinct categories; the training of propaganda specialists for P.W.E. and the elementary education of S.O.E. agents in propaganda methods. The latter was clearly best carried out at Group B as it was closely allied to the general instruction in clandestine activities. The training of the specialist on the other hand, demanded the close co-operation of the P.W.E. Country Sections, and also facilities for those giving the instruction to keep in touch with the day to day policy being evolved by P.W.E. It was therefore decided that a house should be obtained near to the P.W.E. country headquarters at Woburn where this training could be carried out.

In October of 1941, a suitable house was found and Captain Hackett was transferred to it from Group B, becoming its first commandant. The house was run as a civilian establishment with no military personnel and the numbers handled were always small; the ideal being to treat students as individuals, since the instruction was largely concerned with broadening and developing their own ideas on political and social matters as well as in teaching them the technique of presenting those ideas in the most telling form, and of assessing public opinion, under clandestine conditions.

The staff of this school (known as S.T.P.) was increased during 1942 by two officers, Mr. (later Major) Waddicor and Captain (later Major) Gallie, and the scope of training was enlarged to cover all the processes of reproduction required in the dissemination of propaganda, including printing, block making, photography and radio. Schemes were run in conjunction with the Ministry of Home Security and M.I. 5 involving the assessment of public opinion in this country and visits were arranged to the B.B.C. transmitting stations and studios.

In July 1943 the Propaganda School was brought into line with other training establishments by placing it on a military basis, with a War Establishment that allowed a major (commandant, and chief instructor), three captain instructors and one subaltern as administrative officer, together with one serjeant assistant instructor. The school was at the same time transferred to Wall Hall, Aldenham, Herts., and was given the number S.T.S. 39. Shortly after the transfer, Major Hackett was moved to London to act as a liaison officer between S.O.E. and P.W.E. on policy questions affecting the two organisations, and was replaced as commandant by Major Gallie. After the move the staff was brought up to established strength by the engagement of three additional instructors and by the commissioning into the F.A.N.Ys. of a civilian secretary.

Mister Waddicor was commissioned at this time and in the Autumn of 1943 left S.T.S. 39 to take command, with the rank of captain, of a school of micro-photography established at Beaulieu.**

There was no possibility of segregating nationalities at S.T.S. 39, and here particularly, the interchange of ideas between men of different intellectual, cultural and political backgrounds was found beneficial. The length of training varied between ten days and four weeks, depending on the missions and capabilities of the men concerned, and some ten students could be accommodated in all. Since instruction was on an individual basis, the fact that this number was rarely in residence was an advantage. As it was, the numbers to be trained dropped consistently up to the early part of 1944, when a certain number of men were trained for the P.W.D. of S.H.A.E.F.*** This commitment really lay outside the scope of S.T.S. 39, which was however able to make a valuable contribution to their training, before P.W.D. ultimately set up its own training establishment. By July 1944 there was no further justification for retaining S.T.S. 39, and it was closed in July 1944****, the specialist personnel being dispersed to P.W.E. and P.W.D.***** Arrangements were made for P.W.E. to undertake any clandestine propaganda training commitments which might arise.’******

4.10.2 The Syllabus and Methods of Instruction
‘Owing to the need for flexibility and the individual nature of the instruction, a fixed syllabus of lectures was never formulated. The course did however, divide itself broadly into four main sections:
(a) Printing, duplicating and other means of mechanical reproduction.
(b) The principles and practice of propaganda writing.
(c) Political information and propaganda directives.
(d) Propaganda reconnaissance, or opinion research.

For the purpose of giving Country Sections a clearer idea of the potentialities and limitations of Propaganda Training, a General Syllabus for a Basic Three-Weeks Course was drawn up, but this was never applied rigidly.

The fundamental principle of Propaganda Training was “learning by doing”, and right from the beginning the student was encouraged to express his own ideas and developed them himself, with only the minimum necessary assistance from instructors, either to stimulate ideas, to supply background knowledge for their full expression, or the technical equipment to express them in the most telling form.

In addition to this theoretical work, a large number of practical exercises were introduced with the cooperation of M.I.5., the Home Office, and the B.B.C. Some of these were similar to the Group B 96-hour schemes in that students had to live a clandestine existence, but their task was that of opinion research on some predetermined question among a given section of the population. Other exercises were concerned with the use to be made of local printers, radio stations, and other means of disseminating propaganda.’

--
* P.W.E. was S.O.1; handwritten correction in the original
** See Chapter “Photography and Micro-Photography”
*** Training TR/M/1 MT/1 4176/M.1, dated 04.05.1944
**** Training TR/M/1 ADE/289, dated 06.05.1944
***** Training TR/M/1 ADE/390, dated 12.05.1944
****** For a more detailed account on the setting up of Propaganda Training see Training TR/M/1 “STP-STS 39 – A Summary of S.O.E.’s activities in Propaganda Training” by Major J.W. Hackett, dated 28.12.1944.

 

4.11 Holding and Operational Training
4.11.1 Organisation
‘The Original scheme drawn up in 1940 provided for eight Holding Schools to supply accommodation for trained students awaiting operations, segregated by nationalities. Two of these were diverted to other uses and by June of 1941 six Holding Schools had been established; S.T.S. 41 Fawley Court, S.T.S. 42 Thame Park, S.T.S. 43 Audley End, S.T.S. 44 Gumley Hall, S.T.S. 45 Hatherop Castle, S.T.S. 46 Chichley [sic]*. Permanent allocations of these to nationalities were not made as fluctuating numbers made it necessary to allocate accommodation in the most economical manner. Audley End was the only exception to this rule and was taken over by the Polish Section for final training and despatch, though it continued to be administered by the Training Section, until the middle of 1943.** In October 1941 an additional small house, Forthampton, was acquired and numbered S.T.S. 45a. In December 1941 Thame Park was transferred to the Signal Directorate as a W/T School and renumbered S.T.S. 52, and on 09.07.1942 Fawley Court was also handled over to the Signals Directorate and renumbered S.T.S. 54a. Three Additional Holding Schools were acquired during 1942; Water Eaton Manor in April, Gorse Hill in May and Roughwood Park in August. The Holding Schools were now renumbered in part and the list was as set out below until their final closing:

S.T.S. 41: Gumley Hall, Market Harborough, Leics.
S.T.S. 42: Roughwood Park, Chalfont St. Giles, Bucks.
S.T.S. 43: Audley End House, Audley End, Saffron Walden, Essex
S.T.S. 44: Gorse Hill, Whitley, Godalming, Surrey
S.T.S. 45: Hatherop Castle, Fairford, Glos.
S.T.S. 49: Forthampton House, Forthampton, near Tewkesbury, Glos.
S.T.S. 50: Water Eaton Manor, Oxford

The War Establishment for Holding Schools allowed for a major commandant and chief instructor, 2 officer instructors (originally captains or subalterns, but subsequently all were made captains***), 4 N.C.O. assistant instructors, and a lieutenant adjutant and quartermaster, together with the necessary permanent staff. The original commandants had been for the most part elderly officers of the same type as the Preliminary School commandants, but when these were replaced by younger officers, it became the normal practice to fill the administrative vacancy with an additional instructor.

In the beginning Holding Schools came under the direct control of the Training Section at Headquarters, as did Preliminary Schools, but in August 1942, it was felt that some closer supervision of their functions was required, than could be given by the Director of Training in person, and Major F.V. Spooner, the Commandant of S.T.S. 45, was promoted lieutenant colonel and appointed Inspector of Schools. Though particularly concerned with Preliminary and Holding Schools, he also kept in touch with the other schools to maintain a proper co-ordination. In January of 1943 the Preliminary and Holding Schools were formed into the group (known as Group C) for ease of administration, and were placed under the Command of Lt.-Col. Spooner who became the first Commandant of Group C with this Headquarters in London but distinct from the Training Section proper.**** To begin with his staff consisted of one staff captain and one civilian secretary, but this was inadequate, and the staff of Group C was eventually increased to 1 GSO 2, 1 GSO 3, one staff serjeant and one corporal clerk, in addition to 2 civilian secretaries. No separate War Establishment was drawn up, the necessary vacancies being created on the war establishments of S.T.S. H.Q.

Lt.-Col. Spooner was temporarily replaced as O.C. Group C by Lt.-Col. T.H. Grayson during his period of command at M.E. 65***** from January to April 1944. On the appointment of Lt.-Col. Spooner as Director of Training in December 1944, Lt.-Col. Grayson resumed command of Group C until July 1945, when it was disbanded.

Holding Schools were for a long time regarded purely as pools in which trained agents could be held in conditions of comparative security and which undue deterioration of their physical condition could be avoided. This attitude towards the Holding School, adopted as it was by many Country Sections, discouraged commandants from the display of initiative in evolving training programmes and as a result, while simple revisionary work was carried out, the students tended for the most part to stagnate. The Country Sections, apparently, not appreciating that this state of affairs was due to their own indifference, generally underestimated the potential value of Holding Schools and kept their students in London where they were easily available, rather than send them to the country where they appeared to do nothing useful and were difficult of access. The only exception was S.T.S. 45, where a comprehensive and graduated programme of training was put into practice, due mainly to the energy and foresight of Major Spooner and to the co-operative attitude of the Danish Country Section. The principle adopted in the case of Danish students was that the whole of their training was based on S.T.S. 45. From there they went to the specialised courses in other schools, but returned each time to consolidate the knowledge they gained and to integrate it into their general plan of training which was based on their probable mission. For this system to work a close liaison was needed between the commandant of the training school and the country section and in addition both the commandant and instructors of the Holding School needed a sound knowledge of the subjects taught in other establishments. These conditions were fortunately fulfilled at S.T.S. 45.

Constant efforts were made by the Training Section to improve the training at the Holding Schools in co-operation with Country Sections, but the extreme pressure under which both the Training Section and the Country Sections were operating made these efforts less successful than could have been wished. However, during 1942 and 1943 most of the rather elderly commandants who had originally been recruited were replaced by younger officers with training experience.

Finally, when the S.A.B. replaced the Preliminary Schools in June 1943 the opportunity was taken to re-organise the Holding Schools, which were re-named Operational Holdings Schools, in order to emphasise their true role of co-ordinating students’ training in relation to their projected operations. The houses made vacant by the closing of Preliminary Schools were added to the numbers of Operational Holding Schools, with the exception of Winterfold which was renumbered S.T.S. 7 and became the home of the S.A.B.

While a certain measure of success was achieved, little real co-operation was reached with the Country Sections who persisted in withdrawing their students at the shortest notice, making the preparation of a training programme extremely difficult, or even in keeping them entirely in London. The high degree of success achieved in Danish training was never equalled, but considerable improvement did nevertheless come from the reorganisation, and valuable training was done at the Operational Holding Schools, though it never proved possible to emulate the example of the S.T.S. 45 and use them as the permanent base for the whole training of parties of students.

Anderson Manor, which had previously been the base for the small scale raiding force, was also acquired in June 1943, and became S.T.S. 47.

After the closing of Group A in the autumn of 1943, the Operational Holding Schools became virtually general purpose training establishments, handling both para-military and operational holding commitments, until they were finally closed in the summer of 1945 (May – July).’

--- --- ---

Water Eaton Manor was acquired in April 1942 and Gorse Hill in May 1942. In an undated “Location List of Special Training Schools, etc.”******, which can be determined to be August 1942 based on the numerous entries, Water Eaton Manor is assigned S.T.S. 44 and Gorse Hill S.T.S. 50. Major Forty formulates the renaming somewhat imprecisely (“the Holding Schools were now renumbered in part”) and describes the situation that then applied until the end. Here, the two schools are shown in reverse order. He does not specify a date for the change. By comparing four different location lists from TNA HS 8/969 and Dr. Derwin Gregory’s thesis “Built to Resist”, the exchange of the numbers happened sometime between 16.01.1944 and 03.03.1944.

--- --- ---

4.11.2 Syllabus and Training
‘No standard syllabus could be laid down for operational holding schools, as the training had, by definition, to derive from the operational role of the student, and the previous instruction he had received. It may therefore be said that the syllabus of Operational Holding Schools was the sum of the syllabus of all other schools, but instruction was not necessarily given to all students in all subjects. The system generally adopted in compiling a syllabus was for the O.C. Group C to study the students’ previous reports in conjunction with the application for training by the Country Section, which stated the nature of the proposed mission and the estimated time for which the student would be available. A syllabus would then be drawn up, paying particular attention to those subjects in which the student had shown himself to be weak, and in those of particular relevance to the operation. On the basis of this directive, the school commandant would compile is programme.

An important development in Operational Holding Training was the introduction of “Group C Continuation Schemes”.******* These were based on the Group B 96-hour scheme, but were designed to carry the student a stage further in his development. In the Group B scheme the student was and individual with certain individual tasks to carry out and purely personal hazards to meet. In the Group C Continuation Schemes, students were now called upon to bring all their knowledge into play and to act as a group in the Field, being charged with the carrying out of a complete mission, such as an attack on a vulnerable point of a dock-yard. At the same time the co-operation of the Police and dealings with civilian contacts were included, and where the operational plan of the students involved W/T contact, their W/T operator, or operators, accompanied them on the exercise. As a compliment to these schemes, exercises in the various aspects of clandestine life were continuously carried out in the Operational Holding Schools.

Where a sufficient number of students was available the usual plan was to make one section of the students act as a counter-espionage service, while the remainder formed a clandestine organisation and were required to carry out some subversive act, without being detected and while carrying on their normal daily routine.

After the disbandment of Group A in the autumn of 1944, the Operational Holding Schools undertook all paramilitary training in addition to their normal work. To start with training was carried out on the original para-military syllabus, but it was soon apparent that the type of activity for which students were now being trained demanded a new approach and greater flexibility. Where, hitherto, it had been a matter of the training of either organisers, agents, or coup de main parties, it was now a question of training men to lead and organise guerilla activities in the occupied territories at the time of, or shortly before, invasion. This in particular applied to the French maquis. The men undertaking these missions were for the most part Allied officers who already had a fair military back background, and were, in some cases, regular soldiers. The problem therefore was to train these men in the forms of warfare und the types of equipment peculiar to irregular forces and to fit them to instruct their compatriots in the special devices and demolition equipment being supplied by S.O.E. Owing to the rapidity of the development of the military situation, and also in part to the lack of planning, this training had to be carried out in the minimum of time, in some cases, in as little as seven days and more usually in two or three weeks.

The syllabus of training therefore depended on what the particular party of students already knew and concentrated on those elements which were strange to them. This usually meant that the main emphasis was placed on demolitions, special weapons such as the Bazooka and PIAT, enemy equipment, and the tactics of guerilla warfare. Much of this would normally have been dealt with in Operational Holding School training and would not have been considered part of a Para-military course, but was included at this stage in order to save time. The Training of British personnel to act as liaison officers with Allied guerilla forces was a separate commitment and was handled at M.E. 65 Milton Hall.********

After the summer of the 1944, and the virtual clearance of France and Belgium of the enemy, the need for Para-military training again decreased and only ad hoc courses were carried out for small parties or individuals being sent on special missions. Training for such special students was generally limited to demolition and weapon training.

The need for study of guerilla warfare as opposed to the activities of agents was however stressed by CD********* and some work was done on the basis of the experience of S.O.E. officers In France, Greece, Yugoslavia and other countries. Little was, however, achieved in the way of final conclusions, and the question is still under discussion at the time of writing.’

---
* Chicheley Hall
** See Chapter “Training Carried out by other Sections”
*** Training – TR/B/1 (1944) GFM/8197/B.1, dated 17.02.1945
**** Training – Circulars DCDO/360, dated 15.01.1943
***** See Chapter “JEDBURGH Training”
****** TNA HS 8/960
******* Training – TR/H/6. MT/4428/H.4, dated 02.06.1944
******** See Chapter “Miscellaneous Training”
********* CD/7585, dated 12.01.1945

 

4.11.3 Training of Coup-de-Main Parties
‘In addition to the training normally carried out in Operational Holding Schools, there was also the operational training of Coup-de-Main parties and in this lay perhaps one of the outstanding successes of Group C. The earliest operations of the Coup-de-Main type such as JOSEPHINE A and B*, had been mounted at a time when the distinction between training and operations had not been strongly marked. The training of personnel had taken place at S.T.S. 17 and had been supervised directly from London. This procedure was quite adequate at the time, particularly as there were not large numbers of these special operations to be dealt with. In 1942, however, the French Section instituted a policy of widespread coup-de-main activities and a procedure for the mounting of operations and the training of operatives was laid down by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman.** This in brief states that when a coop-de-main operation was projected a meeting would be called of representatives of the Country Section, the London Group and of the Technical, Intelligence, and Training Sections. At this meeting the general plan would be evolved and the type of equipment required decided. A representative of Air Liaison section was also present to advise on the feasibility of air despatch to the particular area. The preparation of the operation order and the training of the selected personnel of made the responsibility of the O.C. Group C who also advised the Country Section of the usability of personnel for the operation. A school in Group C was made available to hold a pool of coup-de-main type students and to give them general training. Once briefed for their operation, they were trained in its particular requirements and carried out exercises based on the actual operation, using “mock ups” of the actual charges and devices. These exercises were carried out on the targets approximating as closely as possible to those in the Field, and in many cases included the dropping of the teams from aircraft.

This method of preparing coup-de-main operations was justified by its results and in particular SCULLION Operation*** may be cited as an example of operations prepared in this way.

One of the main reasons for the success of the plan lay in the close unity between training and operations; the students feeling themselves to be personally involved in the preparation of the operation orders, and in a position to offer criticism and suggestions, both before and after exercises based on it.’

4.11.4 Training of Enemy Prisoners under the BONZO Scheme
‘In June 1944 the German Directorate made the decision to employ a number of German Prisoners with anti-Nazi sympathies for work in Germany. To handle this special commitment, S.T.S. 2 was converted into a Prisoner of War Camp with the approval of D.P.W. War Office, and was used as an interrogation and selection centre for prisoners who had been diverted from the main prisoner of war stream by a preliminary sifting at Kempton Park. Those prisoners who were found suitable (known as BONZOS) were transferred from S.T.S. 2 to other schools in Group C, specially allocated to them, for preliminary and final training. The syllabus was essentially the same as that given to normal agents, with the exception that, since they were not, for security reasons, allowed to attend other schools, those parts of the Group B and S.T.S. 17 syllabus which were applicable to their missions were given in Group C. For parachute training, they were, however, sent to S.T.S. 51 under special arrangements.****

A further school in Group C (S.T.S. 5) was subsequently made available to the German Directorate as a Holding School for returned BONZO Agents pending a decision as to their re-employment.

Early in 1945 a deception plan was evolved by the German Directorate in connection with the main BONZO scheme under the code name of PERIWIG. For the training of the special students for this scheme, who had to be completely segregated from all other BONZOS as well as from other students. Station XIX, (Gardener’s End, Ardeley, Stevenage, Herts.) was taken over from the Polish Section and incorporated in Group C as S.T.S. 19. Only a very small number of PERIWIG students were handled and the school was closed in May 1945.

In all, 51 BONZO students and 7 PERIWIG BONZOS were trained.’

4.11.5 Other Training
‘In addition to the normal subjects of the syllabus, certain other training was carried out in, or organised by, Operational Holdings Schools.

(a) Street Fighting - Students who required training specifically in the methods of street fighting were normally sent to the London District School at Battersea. In addition, at the end of 1944, facilities were obtained for the use of a street fighting area in Southampton, to be used by S.T.S. for that purpose, but it was ultimately only used for sniping instruction, owing to the difficulties in obtaining demonstration squads.

(b) Driving of Motor Vehicles - There was a sporadic demand for this training, particularly from the Belgian Section, but considerable difficulties were encountered in obtaining suitable training vehicles. It was ruled by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman that any training needed would be carried out by arrangement with local civilian driving schools*****, but this was found to present difficulties as regards security. The case was therefore resubmitted for an allocation of training vehicles, but this was refused.****** It was not until JEDBURGH training had come to an end in the latter part of 1944 that it was possible to take over training cars and motor cycles which had been included on the vehicle establishment of M.E. 65, and make use of them for training in Operational Holding Schools.

(c) Training in the handling of carrier pigeons, in the manufacture of home-made explosives, in foreign weapons and in lock-picking, while all carried out in Operational Holding Schools, also took place elsewhere, and are therefore dealt with separately.’

4.12 Reception Committee Training
‘As already recorded, the need was felt for a central school to teach Reception Committee methods, and this need became particularly acute with the widespread introduction of the S‑Phone and Eureka.******* Numerous instances of failure of this equipment had been reported from the Field, and an examination of these reputed failures showed that the cause lay rather in the incompetence of ground operators, than in any fault of the equipment.

In September 1943, Howbury Hall, Nr. Waterend, Beds., was taken over and became the Reception Committee school******** with the number of S.T.S. 40. It formed part of Group C. The War Establishment allowed a staff consisting of a major commandant, two officer instructors dealing with the organisation of reception committees and the use of the S‑Phone, one R.A.F. Officer to instruct in the Eureka (since the R.A.F. insisted on a RADAR trained instructor for this equipment), an R.A.F. sergeant to assist him, and an R.A.F. officer to carry out liaison between the school and the operational squadron at Tempsford. The technical staff also included Royal Signals N.C.Os., who maintained the equipment and acted as assistant instructors.

The normal course at S.T.S. 40 was of ten days duration, the first three days being devoted to the general theory and maintenance of ultra-short wave wireless equipment and instruction in the S‑Phone; the next three days were devoted to Eureka equipment and the remaining time was devoted to the practical use of this equipment with aircraft and instruction in the organisation of reception committees culminating in the full scale night exercise with the dropping of stores to a reception committee composed of the students. To meet the needs of Country Sections for a more rapid training, the syllabus was modified and a short three day course********* was introduced dealing purely with the organisation of reception committees and omitting the handling of S‑Phone and Eureka. Subsequently, the increasing number of special demands made it necessary to take individuals or small groups for special courses in one or other branches of the syllabus. At all times, however, the principle was adhered to that students who would be called upon to handle the special equipment must receive a certificate of competency from S.T.S. 40.

There is no doubt of the importance of this course, and its usefulness was generally conceded by the Country Sections and all those who attended it.

The only criticism commonly brought against the course was on account of its length, which could probably have been reduced had more aircraft been available for exercises.

The school was closed down on 28.05.1945.’

---
* Two operations on a transformer station in Pessac, near Bordeaux. The first was abandoned due to a technical fault, and the aircraft crashed on landing. The latter was executed by members of the S.O.E.‘s Free French (RF) Section during May and June 1941; it was successful in destroying six of eight transformers, the repairs not being completed before a whole year.
** Training TR/A/1 ADE/368, dated 04.08.1943
*** Operation SCULLION II (SCULLION I had been aborted) was a combined operation of S.O.E. and O.S.S. in August 1943. Target was a synthetic oil facility in the German occupied part of France, at Les Télots in the Autun area.
**** See Chapter “Parachute Training”
***** Training TR/A/1 JTY/2346, dated 14.10.1943
****** Ibid. ADE/10158/209, dated 12.11.1943
******* Training – Reception Committee – MT/903, dated 21.08.1942
********* Training – TR/Q/1 ADE/650, dated 15.09.1943
********** TR/Q/1 FVS/7237, dated 29.04.1944

 

4.13 Miscellaneous Training
4.13.1 JEDBURGH Training
‘“JEDBURGH” was the code name allotted to one branch of the S.O.E. participation in “OVERLORD”, namely the despatch of allied teams to carry out liaison with the resistance forces in France and the Low Countries. The association of the Training Section with the JEDBURGH Scheme dates from the beginning of 1943, when the potential usefulness of S.O.E. to the Army in invasion was being investigated. The first active participation was in Exercise “SPARTAN” which was run by the Army in March 1943 as a full-scale rehearsal for “OVERLORD”, and in which S.O.E. supplied both agents to work behind the enemy lines and British Staffs, working with formations, to maintain liaison between the armies and the agents, and to collect and interrogate the agents when they were over-run. The Training Section worked out the plan for the agents (known as “BOYKINS”) on the basis of the Group B 96 hours scheme (i.e. with the co-operation of M.I. 5 and the Police) and also briefed the agents. A number of Training Section officers were also employed on the liaison staffs.

Little further was done until the summer of 1943 when plans were drawn up for the establishment of a special training school to handle some 300 students, 200 of them liaison officers and 100 wireless operators, constituting 100 complete teams. The students were to be mainly British, American and French, with a small number of Belgian and Dutch officers. Some difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable site for the training, but eventually, in December 1943, Milton Hall, Peterborough, Northants., was requisitioned, and given the number of M.E. 65 – (The S.T.S. nomenclature was avoided for security reasons, as also to avoid difficulties for JEDBURGHS who might fall into enemy hands). A War Establishment for M.E. 65 was drawn up, which allowed for a total staff of 236 under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, who had an instructional staff of 6 majors, 22 captains or subalterns and 27 N.C.Os.

Owing to the delays in requisitioning and in the necessary constructional work, M.E. 65 was not ready for occupation until the end of January 1944, but the urgency was such that the men were divided into companies and training was started in Group C schools (one company in each of S.T.S. 6, 41, 44 and 45) at the beginning of January. Previous to this the selection of JEDBURGHS had been carried out by the Training Section at a specially constituted selection board*, based on the S.A.B. which was commanded by the Deputy President of the S.A.B. (Major Sinclair) and partially staffed by S.A.B. officers. This board was known as 205 Selection Board and was located at S.T.S. 3.

The training of JEDBURGHS was under the control of Lt.-Col. F.V. Spooner, first in his capacity of O.C. Group C, and subsequently as O.C. M.E. 65 which appointment he held from January to April 1944, when all JEDBURGH training was brought under the control of the newly formed JEDBURGH Section, and the command of M.E. 65 was taken over by Lt.-Col. Musgrave. The school remained under the control of the JEDBURGH Section until all their European commitments had been liquidated, when it reverted to the Training Section as a General Purpose School.**

The syllabus of JEDBURGH training, while the school was under the control of the Training Section, was based on the Para-military course modified by the peculiarities of guerilla warfare. Included in it were instruction in Reception Committee work and handling of foreign weapons, both of which were carried out at M.E. 65 instead of at the Specialist Schools concerned, owing to the numbers involved.

The development in syllabus and organisation after April 1943 are dealt with in the history of the JEDBURGH Section and no reference is therefore called for here.’

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The “History of Jedburghs in Europe”*** describes Military Establishment No. 65 in some detail.

A. The staff
‘This was a unique and experimental establishment. It was both a Training and Holding School for Jedburghs, and was run by a combined British/American Command and Staff. The Officer Commanding was British (Lieutenant Colonel Spooner, and later, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave). The Second-in-Command was American (Major Fuller - succeeded by Major McLallen). The administration was in the hands of a British Adjutant, assisted by an American administrative officer and a British Quartermaster. The Instructional Staff was both British and American. In addition, B.R.A.L.**** provided four French Officers as Interpreters.’

We can only expect to find British figures in British war establishments, which unusually do not include entries such as "British element" or "British increment." The figures cited by Major Forty simply represent those given in VIII/570/1; the American figures were authorised by the United States and are not available.

B. Delayed Opening of M.E. 65
M.E. 65 was not ready when the training was due to start. The obviously tight schedule forced various alternative measures to be taken.
‘[The training] […] was laid down on the lines indicated in ADE/603 Paras. 15 and 16 of 20.12.1944 [sic], and based on the normal Para-military programme that had been taught to students passing through S.T.S. […] It commenced in January 1944 at three schools, each of which represented the nucleus of one Company. (These Companies were purely for training and administrative purposes, and consisted of approximately sixty officers in each.) At this stage the W/T operators were receiving their training at the Signals Schools. This stage of the training lasted between six and eight weeks, and during it a move was made to M.E. 65, where all Companies were finally assembled by the second week of February. (The fact that M.E. 65 was not ready for students at the commencement of their training was regrettable, and made the co-ordination of the training programme and the administration a more difficult task.)

Major Forty mentions four schools by their numbers (6, 41, 44 and 45) at that time accommodated in West Court, Gumley Hall, Water Eaton Manor or Gorse Hill and Hatherop Castle respectively. The History of Jedburghs in Europe mentions only a total of three schools without specifying them, each taking one of the three companies that had been formed for training and administrative purposes.

Two American authors provide more information about the training for the American Jedburgh personnel but seem to have had problems in deciphering handwritten documents or letters, using wrong names for the locations and counties; and the second one seems to have inherited mistakes from the first.

Irwin***** cites Garramoor [i.e. S.T.S. 25a Garramor], Inverie [i.e. S.T.S. 24a], and Traigh House [i.e. S.T.S. 25c] for commando training in the Arisaig area in Scotland, starting one or two days before Christmas 1943 and lasting for about two weeks. Regarding W/T training, he writes: ‘On the last day of 1943, the 62 American Jedburgh radio operator recruits arrived in Scotland. They were immediately sent to S.T.S. 54, the S.O.E. Communications School.’ This is of course S.T.S. 54b at Belhaven School. Unlike Forty and according to the History of Jedburghs in Europe, he only mentions three schools for the early training, which had originally been intended for M.E. No. 65 but had to be distributed among other schools due to the lack of completion of Milton Hall, corresponding to the three companies that had been formed:

S.T.S. 45 at Fairford, Gloucester, S.T.S. 40 at Gumley Hall [the school was No. 41 at that time, and was never No. 40] in Lancashire [there was no school at all – but rather “Leicestershire”] and S.T.S. 6 at Walsingham [sic] [more likely “Wokingham“], Surrey [more likely “Berkshire” for Wokingham, but Surrey suggests Forty’s Gorse Hill (No. 50 or 44)].

Another American source****** specifies also three schools: S.T.S. 6 at Walsingham [sic] [more likely “Wokingham“, see above], which denotes West Court, S.T.S. 45 at Fairford, which denotes Hatherop Castle, and Gumley Hall at S.T.S. 40 [which was S.T.S. 41 at that time, see above].

C. Exchange of Commandant and 2nd-in Command
Lt.-Col. Spooner handed over to Lt.-Col. Musgrave on 08.04.1944 to return to his former task as Commandant of Group C, Preliminary and Holding Schools.

When Major Fuller had taken 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa on 02.05.1944, Major McLallen took up the position of the 2nd-in-Command on 03.05.1944.

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4.13.2 S.O.E. Staff Courses
‘It had been the original intention that all officers taking up appointments within S.O.E. or S.T.S. should go through the training courses at least in a shortened form. The urgency of filling appointments was, however, such that this sound plan was not put into effect, and even in the case of S.T.S. Instructors, they were for a long time only trained in the work of the particular school to which they were posted. In the case of officers of S.O.E. Country Sections and other departments they were mainly forced to acquire their knowledge in the exercise of their duties.

Some attempt was made to remedy this state of affairs by week-end conferences which were held at Group B during the summer of 1941. At these conferences, lectures were given by the instructors of Group B on the technique of organisation and the handling of agents, and general discussions were held on the common problems of training and country sections. The results of these discussions were subsequently published******* and showed that the exchange of ideas was most valuable. Only two such conferences were, however, held, and apart from individual officers voluntarily attending courses at the training schools, no further organised training of S.O.E. officers took place until 1943. This was in spite of a circular urging the necessity for training Country Section officers.********

In April of that year CD directed********* that an S.O.E. Staff Course should be established, partly for the general education of S.O.E. officers and to facilitate personal contact between members of different sections, but primarily to educate those officers who would be called upon to work with army formations as S.O.E. liaison officers at the time of invasion. A general syllabus was drawn up covering training in weapons, demolitions, unarmed combat, map reading, security, reception committee work and other subjects of the normal S.T.S. syllabus. At the same time, lectures when given by S.O.E. Headquarters officers on the work of their own particular sections, and special instructions and exercises were given in the staff duties of S.O.E. liaison officers. The course was established at S.T.S. 3 under the control of Colonel Munn, the school being under the command of Major Godfrey. The duration of the course was three weeks to which was added one week of parachute training. Six courses in all were held, finishing in November 1943. To start with the course had been the responsibility of the MG Section, but in August 1943, it was taken over entirely by the Training Section and Major T.H. Grayson assumed command of the school. 125 officers were trained in these courses.

No further staff courses for S.O.E. officers were held until March 1945, when, on the orders of CD, courses were resumed, this time at S.T.S. 41. The intention now was to provide refresher courses for officers who had seen service with S.O.E. in the Middle East and elsewhere and who were returning home to take up appointments in Headquarters, or on their way to the Far East. The syllabus of the course remained much the same as it had been in 1943, except that the sections dealing with staff duties in connection with the army formations were eliminated and lectures were given on matters specifically affecting S.O.E. work in the Far East. Three such courses were run, and 34 officers trained. No further courses were held, since the number of officers available did not justify it and the Far Eastern Section preferred to get officers out of the Far East as soon as possible to be trained on the spot. Provision was, however, made for further courses to be run at M.E. 65, if necessary, after the closing of Group C. The training of S.T.S. officers is dealt with separately.’**********

4.13.3 Training in Mines and Foreign Weapons
‘The first training in enemy weapons was carried out as part of the normal syllabus of Group A. With the increased appreciation of the importance of this subject, and the slightly better supply of specimens, more time was made available, and in 1943 a collection was established at S.T.S. 22b (Glasnacardoch) where special two-day courses were run in conjunction with the Paramilitary course. This training continued until Group A was closed in the Autumn of 1944.

While the training at Group A constituted an excellent introduction to the subject, it was felt that something more was needed, particularly for men who were going to work in conjunction with guerilla forces which made extensive use of captured equipment. Furthermore, instruction was called for not only in enemy weapons, but also in enemy mines, demolition equipment and booby-traps, as well as in the laying and neutralizing of Allied mines. To meet these needs, one of the schools of Group C (S.T.S. 3 Stodham Park) was diverted from its normal function of an Operational Holding School, and a specialist course in Mines, Foreign Weapons and demolition equipment was instituted there in May 1944.#* In July 1944 the course was transferred to S.T.S. 47, where it remained until its disbandment in June 1945.

The War Establishment of the school (which remained unchanged with the move) allowed for an instructional staff of a major (commandant and chief instructor), 2 captain instructors, and four N.C.O. instructors (2 Staff-serjeants and 2 Serjeants).

The course was organised in two sections, foreign weapons in one and mines, demolition equipment and booby traps in the other. A comprehensive museum was established (to which the specimens from Group A were added on its disbandment) and a cottage was rigged with every known type of booby trap (connected to bells) in which students could test out their knowledge. The syllabus covered, in the case of weapons, identification (including identification of ammunition), stripping, stoppages and handling, and in the case of mines, demolition equipment and booby traps, identification, neutralisation and methods of use. As regards weapons, the emphasis was placed on the common platoon weapons likely to be encountered.

In addition to the work of the specialist school, specimens were available for revisionary work in the Operational Holding Schools of Group C.’

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* Training TR/I/1 MT2579, dated 30.10.1943
** See Chapter “Training at M.E. 65”
*** TNA HS 7/17 to HS 7/19
**** Bureau de Renseignements et d’Action Londres
***** Irwin, Major Wyman W.: A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991, p. 118 and 123
****** Lewis, S.J.: Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992, p. 11 [apparently, Lewis copied Irwin's mistakes]
******* Archives 2/160/28. MZ/1108, dated 25.06.1941
******** Archives 2/160/28. CD/TS/941, dated 10.02.1942
********* Training – TR/C/5 DCDO/620, dated 20.02.1943
********** See Chapter “Selection and Training of Officers for S.T.S.”
#* Training - TR/A/4. Minutes of AD/Es Meetings, dated 18.05.1944

 

4.13.4 Photography and Micro-Photography
‘The first training in micro-photography under the auspices of the Training Section was carried out at S.T.P. in 1943. The purpose of this training was to enable agents in the Field to reduce documents to a size at which they could be conveniently concealed and carried. Strictly speaking two types of work were involved,
(a) direct reproduction by the use of a camera, which might more correctly be called miniature photography and
(b) micro-photography proper i.e. the reduction of a negative, such as the one obtained by method (a) to microscopic dimensions, whether by the use of an actual microscope or by other devices such as were developed later.

The number of students requiring training in this subject at S.T.P. and later S.T.S. 39 was very small and it was not necessary to work to any stereotyped syllabus, each student being instructed separately. In July 1943 the demand for this type of training showed, however, a considerable increase, largely, it is believed, in connection with courier work. Steps were therefore taken to set up a special photographic school* and S.T.S. 37a (Warren House) was made available for this purpose. Captain Waddicor who had carried out most of the pioneer work in this subject was transferred from S.T.S. 39 to take command of it and 2 R.E. serjeants were recruited from the army to assist him.

Instruction was given at S.T.S. 37a in normal outdoor and indoor photography for reconnaissance purposes in addition to training in miniature and micro reproduction photography.** The length of the course depended upon
(a) whether the student was concerned with one or more types of work,
(b) whether the student had any previous knowledge of photography and
(c) the urgency which the student required.
(Any time watch could be given to practice over and above the basic period was of great value.) Subject to these variable factors, it can be reckoned that the course in miniature photography lasted from three to four days, while the combined course lasted from seven to ten days.

The number of genuine students who were put through this form of training (excluding those for whom it was merely a way of filling time) was very small (i.e. 15 up to January 1944) and did not justify the permanent retention of even so small an establishment as S.T.S. 37a, which could at its maximum only handle some three or four students at a time.*** S.T.S. 37a was therefore closed as a photographic school and reverted to Group B. The equipment was transferred in February 1944 to S.T.S. 39****, and one of the serjeant instructors was sent there to continue any training that might be required, and to assist in the photographic training in connection with propaganda work. The other serjeant instructor was transferred to the Far Eastern Section to carry out photographic training in India. Captain Waddicor was transferred to AD/M Section for liaison work in connection with propaganda matters. It was at this time that a Kodak “35” was adopted as the standard camera for S.O.E. work, and all training was based on it.*****

Photographic training continued at S.T.S. 39 until the closing of that establishment in July 1944, when the serjeant instructor and his equipment were transferred to the Photographic Section at Headquarters under CP, who thereafter became responsible for any photographic training that was required, which was carried out in Country Section flats.******

Although the amount of training carried out was disproportionately small in relation to the expenditure involved, considerable advances were made in the technique of micro-photography and these remain of permanent value. The technical processes involved are set out in detail in the syllabus of training.’

4.13.5 Carrier Pigeons
‘Carrier pigeons had been used sporadically by the Organisation ever since its inception, but it was not until the spring of 1944 that the question of developing this form of communication was more thoroughly examined. A paper had been submitted by the Commandant Group B on the possibilities of pigeons, particularly when used in conjunction with miniature or even micro-photography, to supplement the normal W/T service, and on 24.04.1944 this question was this discussed at a meeting******* at which members of the Country Sections, the Training Section and the Signals Directorate were present. Probably very largely as a result of the statement by the Signals Representative that cuts were to be expected in the W/T Service at the time of invasion, a decision was reached that an increased use would be made of carrier pigeons, and that training would be carried out by S.O.E., and not as hitherto by the Special Signals Section at Wing House. In addition the Research Section was instructed to go into the question of avoiding casualties to pigeons dropped by parachute.

Lofts were established at Group B and at a number of schools in Group C, and instructors from those schools were trained at Wing House. Training in the handling of pigeons was not made a special course, but was introduced into the normal curriculum of those agents for whom the Country Sections requested it.********

Less use than had been anticipated of carrier pigeons was made by Country Sections but where they were used, quite reasonable results here obtained; the main trouble still being casualties to the birds during despatch by parachute.

Facilities for training remained until the disbandment of the schools, but not training was carried out after the end of 1944.’

4.13.6 Lock Picking
‘Training in lock picking and methods of burglary was introduced into the normal syllabus of Group B in 1942 in order to enable agents in the Field to carry out this type of work and also to have a general knowledge which would be useful to them in directing local “professionals” whom they might recruit. A great deal of useful assistance was obtained in the study of burglars’ methods from M.I. 5 and from Scotland Yard. Facilities were also granted by the police for an interview with a man who in his time had bee10 a successful burglar. As a result of this assistance and of experiments carried out in the schools, a high standard of success was reached.

Instruction covered the making of keys, the picking of locks and the best methods of illegal entry into premises, cupboards etc. The opening of safes by other methods than that of key copying was not attempted as this was considered outside the scope of the average agent in the Field who would in any case be unlikely to have access to the necessary equipment which can hardly be improvised. In all this training, emphasis was placed on the necessity for the agent to make his own equipment, and to avoid as far as possible being in possession of compromising material.

To begin with all instruction in lock picking was given at Group B, but in the spring of 1943, instructors of Group C were trained in the subject, which became a normal part of Operational Holding School training.

The syllabus was continually undergoing revision and many new methods were evolved including methods, hitherto unknown by Scotland Yard, of unlocking handcuffs.

The culmination of lock picking training was in the “T” Force Course which took place at S.T.S. 17 and which combined previous training with methods of safe-breaking.’*********

4.13.7 Home-Made Explosives
‘In May 1943, training was introduced at Station XVIII********** (loaned for this purpose by the Polish Section) in the methods of preparing explosives from chemicals which were normally obtainable in Occupied Countries.#* In this way it was hoped to make organisations in the Field to some extent independent of parachuted supplies, or at least to put them in a position to improvise should supplies be temporarily cut off. The course at Station XVIII lasted seven days and was designed to instruct students without any previous knowledge of chemistry in safe and simple methods which could be carried out without any specialised equipment.#** This course was transferred to S.T.S. 17#*** on 15.08.1943 and in October 1943 was finally transferred from S.T.S. 17 to Group C#****, and instruction was given in whichever of the Operational Holding Schools it was required.

In addition to this elementary training, courses were also run at the laboratories at South Kensington in conjunction with D.S.R. for the training of instructors in the manufacture of explosives. These courses lasted for three weeks, and pre-supposed some technical knowledge on the part of the students.’

4.13.8 Training at M.E. 65
‘When all European JEDBURGH training and holding commitments were ultimately liquidated in March 1945, M.E. 65 was taken over again by the Training Section. The War Establishment was reduced, giving a total staff of 59 and the rank of the commandant’s vacancy was reduced to major. An instructional staff of 4 captains and 6 N.C.Os. was allowed. The school was placed under command of Major B.W. Gilmour who still holds the appointment.

The school was organised, both to undertake large training commitments of a general para-military or operational nature, and also to act as a transit camp for S.O.E. personnel moving to and from overseas theatres. For this latter purpose a close liaison was maintained with the Administrative Section of Headquarters, but the work was under the control of the Director of Training, as were all the other activities of the school. In June 1945, with the closing down of the Signals Schools, a Signals Wing was established at M.E. 65 to deal with the training and selection of S.O.E. signals personnel being sent overseas. This wing came under the direct command of O.C. M.E. 65, though technical matters were referred to the Director of Signals.

With the closing down in June 1945 of the remaining training schools, the War Establishment of M.E. 65 was again modified, this time to give the additional instructors necessary to enable it to handle all basic forms of S.O.E. Training, i.e. para-military and operational training, industrial sabotage, foreign weapons and the equipment, and reception work. It was also specified that it should be capable of carrying out any further S.O.E. Staff courses which might we required. At the same time it continued its functions as a transit camp.

The main training commitments undertaken by M.E. 65 since its return to the Training Section was that of 120 French Airborne Commando troops for the Far East.’

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* Training TR/O/10c MT1/685, dated 07.07.1943
** Training TR/O/10c MT/688, dated 21.08.1943
*** Training TR/O/10c MT/3409, dated 18.01.1944
**** Training TR/O/10c JTY/3536, dated 01.02.1944
***** Training TR/A/4 Minutes of AD/E’s Meeting, dated 16.03.1944
****** Training TR/A/4 Minutes of AD/E’s Meeting, dated 28.06.1944
******* Training TR/N/10 ADE/210 Meeting, dated 01.05.1944. Minutes of Meeting on the increased use of Carrier Pigeons.
******** Training TR/N/10 GMF/4171/N.10, dated 04.05.1944
********* “See Chapter Training at S.T.S. 17”
********** Located at Frogmore Farm, Stevenage, Hertfordshire; WE VIII/353, four issues, one amendment, effective 23.07.1942 - 30.06.1945
#* Training – Home Made Devices MT/419, dated 20.04.1943
#** Training – Home Made Devices DSR/4762, dated 13.05.1943
#*** Training – TR/J/2 MT/872, dated 29.07.1943
#**** Training – TR/J/2 FVS/4224, dated 02.11.1943