The Red Army and its rise from the Ashes

Discussion in 'The Eastern Front' started by Gerard, Jan 8, 2008.

  1. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    The Soviets had also learnt to their cost especially after the Kharkov debacle that it might be wiser to make their offensives more limited in depth, reaching a sensible line and stopping there, instead of the headlong rushes prompted by an over-optimistic and anxious Stalin. Once he let his instincts stay under control, starting at Kursk, things went on rather smoothly afterwards.
     
  2. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Having been inspired by the Forum here I am back reading a fair amount of Eastern Front material again and the same thing keeps cropping up as I read it, that the Russians produced 3 versions of an army over the course of the Great Patriotic War. The first version is the pre-war version that was obliterated by the wehrmacht from June - Dec 1941. By the end of the Year the Red Army had undergone a massive transformation. The second version was the one that "bled the Germans White" and was put through the mincer at places like Stalingrad, Leningrad and Kursk. The final version was the Army that threw the Germans out in June 1944 and subesquently overran Eatern Europe and stormed Berlin.

    Well, if you measure operational proficiency in terms of ratio of combat casualties of the opposing forces, them the red army became worse during the first 18 months of the war, as the adequately trained soldiers of 1941 were replaced by less adequately trained conscripts.

    In 1941 Ger lost about 800,000 men and the Red Army, 4.3 million (ratio 5.4 to 1), however many of these 4.3 million soldiers were captured. So the ratio of combat casualties will be lower. Assuming that half of these 4.3 million were captured we get a ratio of less than 3 to 1.

    In 1942, Ger lost 1.2 million men and Red Army, 7.1 million, ratio of about 6 to 1. However, most of the Red Army losses were combat casualties, while in 1941, most were prisoners. So you can notice a significant drop in combat proficiency.

    In 1944 Ger lost 2 million men and the Red Arrmy, 6.5 million. A ratio of 3.25 to one. However, many Ger soldiers were captured, assuming that 500,000 ger's soldiers were captured and none of the 6.5 million soviet soldiers were captured, them we get a ratio of 4.25 to 1, a higher ratio than in 1941.

    So, my argument is that the Red Army was not really better in 1944 than in 1941. The difference in the outcome can be attributed to another factor: Numbers:

    In June 1941 there were about 3.316 million Ger vs 3.310 million Red Army soldiers (source: barbarossa net), numerical equality.

    In June 1942 we had 2.5 million Ger soldiers vs 5.4 million Red Army soldiers. Ger soldiers were outnumbered by more than 2 to 1.

    In June 1944 we had 2.4 million Ger soldiers vs 6.5 million Red Army soldiers. Ger soldiers were outnumbered by nearly 3 to 1.

    Sources for Ger casualties: L J
    Sources for Red Army casualties: Glantz (1995)
     
  3. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Oh, and production of JS-IIs was capped at 250/month, the approx equivalent of 10 new Hy.Tk.Regiments per month, much less if you are producing replacements. In any case in a few months at this rate this would be more than all Tiger Is and Tiger IIs combined.

    Ger could make 600 Panthers per month. And the Panther was better than the IS-2. Tigers were quite useless tanks, since their role could be taken up by the Panther.

    Tanks were never a big problem to Ger, in fact, they allocated a smaller proportion of their resources to make tanks than the USSR. Second to Art of the Axis History forums:
    "However, it appears that for in USSR much bigger part of steel production was used for production of AFVs. the relevant percentage of rolling ditribution in 1943 is 16% in 1943 and 16 % in 1944, while the same percentage for Germany in 1943 was 6.5% - that is more than two times lower. If to remeber that the Soviet tank indusrty used iron cast in significant scale (turrets of T-34, turrets and hulls of IS-2) then the difference must be even greater."

    The advantages of the USSR never lied in their capability of making munitions, since Germany had much greater industrial production in the decisive 1942-1943 period (they produced 4 times more steel and 5 times more coal and consumed a total of 4 times more energy in these years). The great advantage of the USSR lied in their manpower reserves, about 15 million strong at the time of Barbarossa.
     
  4. L J

    L J Senior Member

    Well, if you measure operational proficiency in terms of ratio of combat casualties of the opposing forces, them the red army became worse during the first 18 months of the war, as the adequately trained soldiers of 1941 were replaced by less adequately trained conscripts.

    In 1941 Ger lost about 800,000 men and the Red Army, 4.3 million (ratio 5.4 to 1), however many of these 4.3 million soldiers were captured. So the ratio of combat casualties will be lower. Assuming that half of these 4.3 million were captured we get a ratio of less than 3 to 1.

    In 1942, Ger lost 1.2 million men and Red Army, 7.1 million, ratio of about 6 to 1. However, most of the Red Army losses were combat casualties, while in 1941, most were prisoners. So you can notice a significant drop in combat proficiency.

    In 1944 Ger lost 2 million men and the Red Arrmy, 6.5 million. A ratio of 3.25 to one. However, many Ger soldiers were captured, assuming that 500,000 ger's soldiers were captured and none of the 6.5 million soviet soldiers were captured, them we get a ratio of 4.25 to 1, a higher ratio than in 1941.

    So, my argument is that the Red Army was not really better in 1944 than in 1941. The difference in the outcome can be attributed to another factor: Numbers:

    In June 1941 there were about 3.316 million Ger vs 3.310 million Red Army soldiers (source: barbarossa net), numerical equality.

    In June 1942 we had 2.5 million Ger soldiers vs 5.4 million Red Army soldiers. Ger soldiers were outnumbered by more than 2 to 1.

    In June 1944 we had 2.4 million Ger soldiers vs 6.5 million Red Army soldiers. Ger soldiers were outnumbered by nearly 3 to 1.

    Sources for Ger casualties: L J
    Sources for Red Army casualties: Glantz (1995)
    Some points
    1) For the German-Russian strength in 1941,I have lower figures,2.7 against 2.7 ,but there was a numerical aequality
    2)For the Russian casualties:Krivosheev is giving lower figures:maybe his figures are to low or the figurees of Glantz to high
    3)About the numbers of German POW in 1944 :I should be careful and not assuming 500000,because we don't know
    4)About the numbers of Russian POW in 1944:assuming none of the 5.7(Krivosheev)or 6.5 million were captured is wrong :Dallin:Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland is giving 147000(very few in proportion to te total losses)Source :the Dupuy institute forum :Soviet POW according to German and Soviet sources
    5)You know my opinion about not counting missing and POW as casualties
     
  5. L J

    L J Senior Member

    My PC is becoming independent :Read :Dallinn Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland
     
  6. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    So, my argument is that the Red Army was not really better in 1944 than in 1941. The difference in the outcome can be attributed to another factor: Numbers:

    So you base yourself in simplified number games to reach the conclusion that the 1944 Red Army in 1944 was equal or inferior to the 1941 version? Disregarding the better equipment, better doctrines, acquired experience, better command, etc?

    I'm wasting my time here.
     
  7. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    So you base yourself in simplified number games to reach the conclusion that the 1944 Red Army in 1944 was equal or inferior to the 1941 version? Disregarding the better equipment, better doctrines, acquired experience, better command, etc?

    I'm wasting my time here.

    No, I am basing on data regarding: Casualties of each side and numbers of each side. They do not show a better Red Army in 1944 than in 1941, quite equal really.

    In 1941 the Germans traded their soldiers 6 to 1 to the soviets. However, most Soviet soldiers were captured, so the number of battle casualties (killed and wounded) were about 3 to 1.

    In 1944 the Germans traded their soldiers 3.25 to 1 to the soviets, but many German soldiers were captured (1/5 of German casualties), so they traded killed and wounded about 4 to 1 with the soviets.

    Since German soldiers were worse in 1944 than in 1941, I can say that Soviet soldiers in 1944 were in fact, worse than their equivalents in 1941. You note that before the war the Soviets had more time to train their men. So their tactical proficiency would be better. The soviets learned about the strategic and operational arts during the war. In other words, the soviets learned how to use their divisions better. But when they were pitted against German divisions, their combat performance was as bad as in 1941.
     
  8. guaporense

    guaporense Member

    Some points
    1) For the German-Russian strength in 1941,I have lower figures,2.7 against 2.7 ,but there was a numerical aequality
    2)For the Russian casualties:Krivosheev is giving lower figures:maybe his figures are to low or the figurees of Glantz to high
    3)About the numbers of German POW in 1944 :I should be careful and not assuming 500000,because we don't know
    4)About the numbers of Russian POW in 1944:assuming none of the 5.7(Krivosheev)or 6.5 million were captured is wrong :Dallin:Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland is giving 147000(very few in proportion to te total losses)Source :the Dupuy institute forum :Soviet POW according to German and Soviet sources
    5)You know my opinion about not counting missing and POW as casualties

    Well, I have taken your points in account.B) cheers.
     
  9. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    No, I am basing on data regarding: Casualties of each side and numbers of each side. They do not show a better Red Army in 1944 than in 1941, quite equal really.

    In 1941 the Germans traded their soldiers 6 to 1 to the soviets. However, most Soviet soldiers were captured, so the number of battle casualties (killed and wounded) were about 3 to 1.

    In 1944 the Germans traded their soldiers 3.25 to 1 to the soviets, but many German soldiers were captured (1/5 of German casualties), so they traded killed and wounded about 4 to 1 with the soviets.

    Since German soldiers were worse in 1944 than in 1941, I can say that Soviet soldiers in 1944 were in fact, worse than their equivalents in 1941. You note that before the war the Soviets had more time to train their men. So their tactical proficiency would be better. The soviets learned about the strategic and operational arts during the war. In other words, the soviets learned how to use their divisions better. But when they were pitted against German divisions, their combat performance was as bad as in 1941.
    Why is it that we have to compare simply figures to draw conclusions on the Great Patriotic War.? Casualty Rates dont tell the full story. In 1941, by your reckoning, the Red Army performed better, yet it was beaten to within an inch of its life, it overran half of Eastern Europe in 1944, yet it is determined by you to be inferior to its 1941 counterpart? And you produce Casualty Rates as proof of this.

    So therefore we can conclude that you are of the opinion that the only reason the Red Army was successful was due to the Germans being woefully inadequate in 1944 - and I think that is a very unfair statement to make. The Soviet Army got better as the war went on - compare the offensives made by the Soviet armies in 1941 to the offensives in 1944. I think you will find they were better planned and much superior in their execution. The Co-ordination between fronts was much better than in 1941.
     
  10. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    But when they were pitted against German divisions, their combat performance was as bad as in 1941.
    Eh, talk to some of the German Veterans from Army Group Centre in 1944. Based on their performance your opinion is refuted. :)
     
  11. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

  12. L J

    L J Senior Member

    I will risk a compromise position(and off course will be attacked by the two opposing parties :D )
    the red army :I don't think they did so bad in 1941 (btw :I think that it's an exageration to say that they were beaten to an inch of their live );in 1944 they were off course better,having a.o. more fire power
    the germans :I don't think their performance was that good in 1941 nor their weapons;in 1944 :the quality of the ostheer was weakened,but I don't think that the difference was that much .
    generally I don't think that there was such a difference between the two armies during the war :they were mainly non mobile,not motorised armies and that's explaining the big casualties when they were attacking (the Germans in 1941,the Russians in 1944 )
     
  13. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Fair point LJ about my use of saying "to within an inch of their life" but they did take a terrible beating nonetheless. I would also agree that they didnt do so bad in 1941. The Germans were often surprised by the Russian's willingness to fight on even in desperate situations. The fierce fighting around the Kiev Pocket is proof of this.
     
  14. L J

    L J Senior Member

    well,my post was to react on the traditional,simplifying views (not on this forum :) ) of the superior German army walking over a shambless Red army in 1941 and the opposite in 1944:I think it needs to be nuancing(off course,old myths never die :) )
    In fact,qua casualties ,1941 was a bad year for the Germans,relatively,it was worse than 1942 and even than 1943.
    For 1944:the tank(and AG ) status of the Ostheer on 31 may 1944 was 4174 and on 15 september 4154 (operational,in repair and assigned )(Source the Dupuy Institute :German OOB for june 1944 in the East )
    That's maybe an indication that the average situation of the Ostheer in 1944 was not that bad in 1944.Off course,there were other elements (artillery,aircraft,supply...)by which the Germans were weakened (maybe-probably )
    cheers
     
  15. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Well the wehrmacht was not exactly the well oiled machine that the myths would have us believe. It was still a mainly horse-drawn army and one of the problems encountered during Barbarossa was that the Infantry formations couldnt keep up with the armored spearheads. Add into this the vast number of trucks and vehicles purloined from occupied states which created a logistical nightmare in terms of spare parts, a Command Staff far from unified in its strategic goals, differing rail gauges and the associated supply problems and you can begin to see that the German Army was not prepared at all for the situations it would find itself in by invading the Soviet Union.
     
  16. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    ...they were mainly non mobile,not motorised armies...

    Perhaps exaggerating a bit. On the Soviet side in the latter part of the war the breaching work was made by mainly supported infantry (All-Arms), exploitation being reserved to the mechanised and/or tank units. It was not simply a matter of WW1 with some movement.

    ...Add into this the vast number of trucks and vehicles purloined from occupied states which created a logistical nightmare in terms of spare parts...

    To give you an idea of what this means in practice, when I was working in Ireland I had a fleet of about 100 4wd Nissans and Mitsubishis. The vehicles coming from the continent, spare parts inventories of the local service centres did not match my vehicles, so I had to waste days and at times weeks waiting for parts to be shipped from a distribution centre in Holland!

    And there was nobody shooting at me, even if at times it people wanted to :)

    Simple Hell! I remember reading a story of vehicles captured from the BEF and sent to AG North, and they all became immobile because with the cold some glass components inside the carburettor simply shattered. Spares? Go conquer Birmingham first!
     
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  17. L J

    L J Senior Member

    well,I said mainly,and I meaned numerically ;in june 1944 the strength of the Russian operationally forces(stavka reserve included) was :7.38 million;tank strength was 6496;AG :2569
    There were 13 mechanised corps (translation:motorised divisions)and 24 tank corps (translation:tank divisions)(source The Dupuy Institute Forum)
    Strength of a MC :16438
    Strength of a TC :12000
    both had some 240 AFV (not only tanks !)
    total strength of the motorised and tank divisions:some 500000
    Those divisions were comparable in manpower and tank strength with the allied divisions in the west .But,there were not enough of them,because it was impossible for the Soviet Union to have a motorised army of more than 7 million men.
    Even if there were 5O or 100 of these divisions,the nature of the terrain would it have made impossible for such army to operate succesfully and there is also the point that the more your army is motorised,the more you need motorised supply forces who also will need more motorised transport,fuel... That's why the Red army relied totally on the railways for their supply.
    In september 1944 the motorised allied armies had to stop because their (motorised !) supply forces couldn't supply them .
    On balance,the red army did not bad :during Bagration they succeeded in advancing some 600 km (Smolensk -Varsow) in 50 days,maybe a proof that a mainly (!) non motorised army could also perform efficiently.
    one point about the Germans:they had some 4000 tanks and AG but their degree of motorisation was lesser than the Red army
    Cheers
     
  18. L J

    L J Senior Member

    If I may,, I'd like to post something by M.Kenny, one of our members who made a post that may be relevant to this discussion: Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History - View Single Post - Prokhorovka: The Deciding Battle of Kursk

    The whole thread is contained here: Prokhorovka: The Deciding Battle of Kursk - Page 10 - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History

    DISCLAIMER: The post contains many posts and opinions. I am not endorsing this thread or the opinions contained within but I did think his post was relevant.
    To summarize my position :it was only the shortage of mobile forces that prevented the Red Army to destroy the German positions,already in 1943
    Sorry,but for the reasons you will understand if you are looking on the thread on Armchair General,I am NOT willing to reply on these posts .
    I am sorry,but I will not change my position .
     
  19. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    In september 1944 the motorised allied armies had to stop because their (motorised !) supply forces couldn't supply them .

    Wait, wait, wait...

    On balance,the red army did not bad :during Bagration they succeeded in advancing some 600 km (Smolensk -Varsow) in 50 days,maybe a proof that a mainly (!) non motorised army could also perform efficiently.

    See? You've replied to yourself. Being dependent on railway for logistics is not an evil in itself when you accept the fact and manage to convince your Vozhd. Which is what Zhukov, Antonov, Vasilevsky et al managed to do once they managed to instil some sense in the man, till he actually became rather good at it. Stalin certainly could learn lessons, not all dictators can brag of the same.

    The trick to be learned was to plan (yes, plan) your offensives and draw on the map lines where your logistics, command and control could realistically reach for this bound, no further. That was the big victory: convince Stalin to withold his natural recklessness and try to go no further - there was a Manstein Back Hand in wait, but even that ceased to work once Stalin's instincts were curbed.

    Besides, in the SU you simply had to depend on railways because there wasn't anything else, as the Germans had found right in the first year when it started to rain. First there were no roads, and the roads that were, were quagmires. Which is rather strange, as there had always been Germans in Russia and they had fought a war there 20 years before.

    And in any case, where there were no railways, the Sovs built them. A lot, thanks also to the prodigious quantities in construction materials and rolling stock provided by the Allied Cornucopia.
     
  20. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    To summarize my position :it was only the shortage of mobile forces that prevented the Red Army to destroy the German positions,already in 1943
    Sorry,but for the reasons you will understand if you are looking on the thread on Armchair General,I am NOT willing to reply on these posts .
    I am sorry,but I will not change my position .
    LJ, where did I ever state that this post is a refutation of your viewpoint? I'm merely throwing out an opinion expressed on the subject of Soviet and German Losses. This has nothing to do with your own opinions LJ, and I'm not asking you to respond to Armchair General. By the way, I would definitely vouch that M.Kenny is a reliable source. If you see his posts here you will know that he knows his stuff. Again, this isnt aimed at anyone LJ, I dont understand why you think I'm taking a contrary viewpoint to yourself.
     

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