The Red Army and its rise from the Ashes

They were indeed Lee and yes the battle of Kharkov showed that the Russians were still incapable of holding the strategic initiative against the Germans. However Kursk changed all that forever.

 

it must be remembered even after stslingrad,that the germans were still very capable of kicking the russians in the face,so to speak.the recapture of kharkov springs to mind.lee.

But after that re-capture were re-re-capture by soviet forces and that was real mark of their strong

 

it must be remembered even after stslingrad,that the germans were still very capable of kicking the russians in the face,so to speak.the recapture of kharkov springs to mind.lee.

It springs to mind as an exercise of overconfidence, but please remark that as time wore on such opportunities were getting scarcer and scarcer.

 

funny you should bring up Von Manstein as a source on this.

I have posted a link to an interesting article about Von Manstein. Note that the author does not give a whole lot of credence to Von Manstein's biography

Axis History Factbook: Erich von Manstein: His Life, Character and Operations – A Reappraisal

Yes, the author wrote a nice anti-Manstein propaganda piece, in which nearly every sentence has something negative to say about Mantstein. I'm sure that the author was being completely objective and impartial when he wrote the article; and of course everything he has written should be taken for granted because... well, because he says so.

I can't find a passage in the article where the author accuses Manstein of lying in his autobiography, where the author has anything other than unsubstantiated evidence or hearsay to support his claim. I'm not supporting the idea that Manstein was perfect (which I don't believe he ever claimed to be), but I'm pretty sure he wasn't promoted time and again throughout his military career because he was an incompetent lout.

Manstein was a military genius who had his hands tied by Hitler's bungling interference in strategic matters, and it will take more than a hack writer to convince me otherwise.

 

I'm not so sure that Manstein was a military genius, he was certainly a brilliant general but the word genius is a word bandied about far too much when talking about some Generals. I'm not saying that he was an incompetant lout, he was by far one of the best Germany had. Comparing him to Rommel or even Guderian and he comes out very favourably. But as regards his book "Lost Victories" he certainly paints a very high picture of himself and I'm not sure I would put him on the same pedestal as he would put himself on. Its universally accepted now that the German General's memoirs, whilst fulfilling the task of providing great insight into the minds of the Wehrmacht High Command, can also be seen as self-serving too. "I was shackled by the lunatic in Berlin" was a theme that runs through many of the memoirs and, yes there is absolutely no question that Hitler impeded his generals. But its also easy to place the reasons for defeat on the head of a dead man, for he cannot refute the allegations. You will also notice in many of these works that the Soviet army is referred to as a Horde, they speak of positions being overrun by "waves and waves" of Soviets "who just kept coming". They give very little credit to the strategic operations that the Soviet army was beginning to develop and towards the end the generals always blame the poor state of the Wehrmacht as opposed to their foe being a better enemy who was better equipped, more numerous and better Commanders. The likes of Rokossovski, Malinovsky and Vatutin would give any German General, yet you wont find any of these being mentioned in a German General's memoirs. I'm not saying that these works are wrong, but you must read them in a particular context and read between the lines. The Eastern Front was not Black and White, and taking any memoirs at face value can be dangerous.

 

Manstein was certainly no great shakes as an author... Lost Victories is one of the most turgid books by a WW2 commander I've ever read.

Mellenthin's Panzer Battles is also rather dull but does have it's moments...

Amazon.com: Panzer Battles : A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War: F. W. von Mellenthin: Books


H

 

Mellenthin's Panzer Battles is also rather dull but does have it's moments...

Amazon.com: Panzer Battles : A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War: F. W. von Mellenthin: Books


H
His description of the attack to relieve Stalingrad is very readable but again it sinks into the common themes that I have outlined already. Good mention though Capt!

 

They were indeed Lee and yes the battle of Kharkov showed that the Russians were still incapable of holding the strategic initiative against the Germans. However Kursk changed all that forever.

However if you read Mar. Sokolovsky's "Soviet Military Strategy" you'll find on the chapter on the Great Patriotic War that this Khakov débacle was caused by one single Army (can't rememeber which and I'll only get the book back tomorrow!) that not only was given an excessively optimistic mission without being properly supported by paralell armies. This lesson was learnt wand you don't hear again of any 'Manstein Backhand Slaps" again. What happened to Tank Group Popov was that it was employed as a primitive Operational Manouevre Group with an unrefined technique. Again another instance for Lessons Learned.

 

However if you read Mar. Sokolovsky's "Soviet Military Strategy" you'll find on the chapter on the Great Patriotic War that this Khakov débacle was caused by one single Army (can't rememeber which and I'll only get the book back tomorrow!) that not only was given an excessively optimistic mission without being properly supported by paralell armies. This lesson was learnt wand you don't hear again of any 'Manstein Backhand Slaps" again. What happened to Tank Group Popov was that it was employed as a primitive Operational Manouevre Group with an unrefined technique. Again another instance for Lessons Learned.
I would agree with you Za, it seems that Tukhachevskii's legacy started to bear fruit around this time with the Soviet Armies beginning to apply the theories he espoused about Deep Operations. Two examples of this would be Operation Bagration which destroyed Army Group Centre and the Vistula/Oder Operation.

 

The Soviets had the manpower. They defeated a superior military by wearing it down month after month. The key to the Eastern Front was Moscow and Stalingrad. Hitler made a huge mistake at Stalingrad. Germany should have seized the oilfields first and never got involved in the fighting in the city where their better trained panzer regiments and Luftwaffe had the disadvantage.
Even though the Sixth Army was lost I believe Germany showed how motivated the werhmacht was even under the most dire of circumstances.

 

You do like to make these big sweeping statements... do mean turning point of the war on the Eastern Front, or the war as a whole? If the latter, then there are many who would disagree with you.

Oh Paul, if I may...

This isn't a pissing contest, as the Colonials say*, "My turning point is bigger than yours!"



* (why do I feel I sound like "Goodness Gracious Me" at times?)

 

To be honest there were two turning points of the war itself one of which didnt involve a shot being fired. The first was Barbarossa, the opening of the Pandora's box. The second was the unprovoked declaration of war by the Third Reich against the USA. If any turning points could be said to be truly decisive these two would be.

Now back to the Red Army and its rise from the ashes. One thing the Germans found hard to come to terms with was the ferocity with which the Soviets fought on even when encircled. Unlike the armies of the western democracies the Russians did not surrender when surrounded and retreat impossible. There is also the school of thought that Blitzkrieg could not be successful against the Soviet Union because of the vastness of size of the country. The gap between the Panzer Forces and the following infantry became much more pronounced in the Soviet Union and encirclements became much more difficult to achieve and hold.

 

Russian operational forces :december 1941:4018068 ;serviceable combat aircraft:2517 ;tanks:1958 ;may 1942:5677915 ;serviceable combat aircraft:3143 ;tanks:4022 ;november 1942:68O5498 ;7322 ;tanks:7567 ;july 1943:6626735 ;10676 ;tanks :9957 ;january 1944:639O046 ;9284 ;tanks 4482 ;june ³1944 :6750240 ;13428 ;tanks:5414 ;january 1945:6750149;16952 ;7672 Operational forces are without the Stavka Reserves ;the aircraft and tanks are those assigned to the operational forces only .Tanks are assault guns not included . Source:Axis History Forum:The Soviet Union at War :Soviet Front Strengths .

 

Those for 22 -06-1941 (printer rebelled )perational forces:2432641 ;training call up:310240 ;serviceable aircraft :8696 ;tanks:12188

 

Tomake the lecture not to difficult:numers of heavy tanks (from the same source ):june 1941 :508 ;december 1941 :212 ;may 1942 :660 ;november 1942:922 ;july 1943 :893 ;january 1944:349 ;june 1944 :467 ;january 1945 :976 . These figures deny the popular image of the enormous numbers of Stalin Tanks . I am curious about the % of heavy tanks of the Western allies . Has anyone some information ?

 

LJ, if you think I'm going to straighten up your figures again, then I suggest you find a comfortable chair

Heck, man, that's totally unreadable!

Oh, and production of JS-IIs was capped at 250/month, the approx equivalent of 10 new Hy.Tk.Regiments per month, much less if you are producing replacements. In any case in a few months at this rate this would be more than all Tiger Is and Tiger IIs combined.

I still am of the opinion that Adolf had the bright idea of bringing a knife to a gunfight.

 

Na. He brought a gun. Only the russians had the bright idea of bringing more heavier ones ^^



Cheers

 

Von Manstein attempted to replicate his success against Group Popov during Orel-Belgorod offensives by unleashing his armor on the stern guard of exploiting Soviet armor. Glantz wrote brusquely: "the magic was gone". Were the Soviets more aware of the constraints logistical recquirements imposed on a mobile group's striking distance and thus kept their attacking tanks in fighting shape longer and further away from their logistical base? Or Soviet tactics had changed to adapt to German offensives?

It would appear to me that it was a combination of both. During the Orel-Belgorod offensive, not only von Manstein suffered heavy losses in each of his counterattacks against exploiting Russian armor presumably to improved Russian tank-infantry tactics, but his forces were also exhausted by having to travel from one threat to another because the Russians were now attacking with multiple tank and combined-arms armies in offensives and succeeded to conceal the true center of gravity from the Germans.

 

LJ, if you think I'm going to straighten up your figures again, then I suggest you find a comfortable chair

Heck, man, that's totally unreadable!

Oh, and production of JS-IIs was capped at 250/month, the approx equivalent of 10 new Hy.Tk.Regiments per month, much less if you are producing replacements. In any case in a few months at this rate this would be more than all Tiger Is and Tiger IIs combined.

I still am of the opinion that Adolf had the bright idea of bringing a knife to a gunfight.
Maybe a Chippendale ,or a Kennedy chair ?
The number of heavy tanks :in june 1941 :4 % in january 1945 13 %