The Problems of the encounter battle etc RE Journal and subsequent discussion in Army Quarterly

Agreed. I have indeed dismissed sensible principles as platitudes. I could also add that the eternal principles of war are sod all use practically when you have to write a set of orders.

There is a world of difference between having sound principles and actually making it all happen. The difference is in the application of technology. procedures and training so the idea happens on the ground. Military history is full of examples of bright ideas that fail because of deficiencies in procedures, technology or training.

Montgomery's article illustrates this. He refers to the good words in FSR but then writes a more detailed procedure that an Infantry division could adopt and be trained to implement. Montgomery was a brilliant trainer and knew how much detail needed to be written.

 

David: another well deserved 'thank you' from me, too.

From the RE Journal, Dec 1938:

 

This article was published in the September 1937 edition of the Journal, when it was written is open to speculation.

Montgomery had only just returned from India to command 9th Brigade in 3rd Division. Did he write this article before or after arrival back in England? Did he write this article based upon his observations of actual mechanization and organizational changes in the Field Force (ie, after he got back) or is the article based upon the theory of the changes he has only read about (ie, still in India)?

The Aldershot Command Division Exercise (the big one of 1937) was held at the same time as the article came out. Reading about this exercise suggests much, if not all, of what Montgomery writes had already been thought through as Brigadier Nosworthy set up his 2nd Division forces in a not too dissimilar manner. True, there are differences according to circumstance (the 'higher doctrine' of the divisional commander) and also differences in marching order being experimented with (a brace of MG battalions being used - unsuccessfully - between the leading elements and the main force), and so on.

I'd suggest that the article was far from being a start process in anything: not the understanding of the encounter battle nor how to adapt tactical doctrine in light of new organization and mechanization.

Were Montgomery's proposals as written in this article the ones adopted by the Army as doctrine and to what extent were his proposals original or a tweaking of what others had already come up with?

 

Further to my previous, the exercise that Montgomery had set for his brigade was to practise the breakthrough and pursuit. The end of the exercise being the collision with a unexpected laagered tank brigade.

If plucked from thin air and presented on a stand alone basis, Montgomery's article appears insightful. When put into contemporary context, that insightfulness becomes somewhat dimmed. He wasn't even practising his own proposals!

 

According to Hamilton, The RE Journal article formed the basis of his first policy document on 14th August 1937 - nine days after taking command - so the thinking was done before he had seen what was going on in Britain.

My interest was in the emphasis on forward planning which played such a big part in the controversy about Montgomery's reputation.

 

I haven't done the reading on Montgomery that you have to the point that beyond knowing a controversy exists about his 'true' place in history, I have no knowledge of the specifics of the arguments. Nor do I feel inclined to weigh in on one side or the other. Does our understanding of our history really improve through endless circular arguments defending or questioning one individuals reputation? It seems to be a classic avoidance of the wood whilst fixated on a tree and arguing over how a specific twig is positionned.

And your line of thought seems to suggest you have fallen into that 'trap'.

Your comments about Wavell's words in FSRs were: I have indeed dismissed sensible principles as platitudes.

But when Montgomery writes sensible principles, they are not deemed platitudes and dismissed but become the focus of investigation and potential evidence of something that may sway the reputation argument.

What turns: For this reason alone it is worthy of study, provided the study is kept up to date-ahead of the times and not merely with the times. from a platitude into an insight?

Why is Wavell's: A commander must be quite clear as to the object he seeks to attain, and he must have a plan to attain it. a platitude but Montgomery's Therefore a commander must decide before contact is gained how he will fight the battle-only thus will he force his will on the enemy. something of great import? Is it the insight to emphasize the word before in his writing because he fears his peers may not have the intellect to work that out themselves?

I guess, the point I'm trying to get across is that there is nothing in this article that suggests Montgomery is saying anything that hasn't already been said nor that his thoughts are out of step with those of the collective.

In isolation, this twig may seems to point towards a tactical genius ahead of his time. A twig of evidence placing Montgomery head and shoulders above his peers.

In context, this twig (and article as a whole) serves to highlight Montgomery was thinking the very same things, and making the very same mistakes of assumption, as his peers.

I guess, depending on how one presents the twig, one can argue either side of an argument.

 

Very good points. Especially important perhaps because of the likely very great expansion of the army if major war occurred, Lt Colonels of 1937 commanding divisions, Brigadiers commanding corps within a short space of time.

 

Hi,

I guess the truth is that because Montgomery became a successful commander his biographers have looked in much more detail at his papers (both private and public) and connected some of his early writing with his later success. Regimental journals between the wars may well have been full of worthy articles all containing deeply thought out concepts for future operations but all sadly written by officers who failed to survive participation in the disastrous early British campaigns or who were just unlucky in the random posting of themselves or their formations. The regimental journals have never been very accessible before though so the musings of Lieutenant Smith on platoon attacks, Captain Jones on the co-operation of a squadron of tanks with a section of carriers or Major Catastrophe on the co-operation of a squadron of ground attack aircraft with a tank regiment may all be out there and may just have never been picked up by military historians before.

Nigel Hamilton suggested in his biography that articles such as this were comparatively rare in British inter-war journals - that supported his argument that Monty was almost unique in his professional approach to his trade whilst most Army officers were more interested, according to Hamilton, in polo, strong spirits and wild women (Sheldrake will be able to confirm whether that was the case in the BAOR!). Of course, like most biographers, Hamilton likely exaggerates the extent to which Monty's undoubted professionalism made him stand out from his peers.

Having said all that, I still regard Montgomery's take over in the desert in August 1942 as one of the most incredible examples of positive man-management in British history (despite the silly hat!)

Regards

Tom

 

Hello Tom,

I haven't read Hamilton, and can only comment on your words, but that looks like a real whopper of a misrepresentation of reality to push a specific agenda.

I guess it does need a whopping misrepresentation to support that handwave of an argument.

Yes, I'm sure that the number of academically published inter-war Army officers was but a miniscule proportion of the total number of serving Army officers. But to suggest that statistic is evidence of professionalism or almost uniqueness in professional approach is a real stretch of a very imaginative mind.

 

That rather depends on whether such articles were actually rare or not. Maybe Hamilton conducted a straw poll, maybe he made an assumption. It wouldn't be a major surprise to find that the submission of 'professional' articles to the regimental journal was viewed with the same disdain as talking shop in the mess. That's not to say it wasn't done, of course.

As far as I'm aware, there was no professional 'arm' or 'corps' journal for the infantry that might have been more conducive to shop talk like those of the RE and RA (probably). Much as we like to knock them, even the cavalry had its own arm journal. Maybe the only avenue for the infantry was the Army Quarterly, and that may have been considered too upmarket for tactical talk.

On the other hand, I've got a few of the early post-war RAC journals and - bearing in mind the general tankiness of the war they'd just won - there are depressingly few technical or tactical articles. It's almost like they were a bit embarrassed to talk about it. Luckily, Mr Ogorkiewicz was on hand to take up some of the slack. (And I spelled that right first time!)

As well as articles, essay writing seems to have been a moderately common activity. AQ ran an annual essay competition, for example, and if it wasn't part of the promotion process, it was certainly part of the prep. Being unpublished, in the main, these are likely to be harder to find. One written by Looney Hinde before the war resides in the Lincs county archives. It discusses the future mechanisation of the cavalry and is a useful antidote to the image of reactionary donkey-wallopers.

Reading this thread, battle drill keeps coming to mind as an analogous situation. The official manuals weren't 'wrong', but they didn't give the green platoon commander much practical guidance on what to tell or show the three dozen blokes in front of him. It's not lost on me that Montgomery is perhaps guilty of causing a similar problem downwards (as the primary author of Infantry Training) to the one he was trying to solve upwards. Perhaps that's forgivable in a formation commander?

 

Mark Old chap,

As I have already written I started this post because I am interested in the impact of the article on Montgomery own attitudes and actions. His biographer wrote that it was important to him.

FSR and Montgomery's article and for that matter Infantry training Vol 2 - War are at a different level of detail and sit in different spaces in the doctrinal universe.

FSR are the general principles. The modern equivalent is Army Doctrine Publication: operations (updated 31 March 2017). This is described as the "Capstone doctrine" Wavell is probably a better writer than the modern tome which I fear has been infected by Mckinsey or someone similar) But these are the general principles that the Army is supposed to follow. it doesn't help you to deploy a division, brigade, battlegroup, company, platoon or section.

Montgomery - the anonymous author of Infantry Training Vol 2 and his article on the Infantry Division in the encounter battle was writing a level down writing 'how to guides' which complied with the principles laid down in FSR . I am sure that somewhere the British Army is still producing pamphlets on how a division, brigade or company is supposed to operate in different phases of war, referring back to ADP Land Operations with the same reverence Monty gave to his references to FSR. Unless the doctrine at this level ties up then FSR is mere warm words.

Agreed, the sentences in FSR and the Encounter battle look similar. The statement in FSR is an expression of one of the principles of war (reference to yet another MOD Doctrine document ) and the obligation of the commander to have a plan seems part of the job description.

But in the real world it is rarely as simple as that. Look at the situation poor Wavell faced in 1940-41.Soldiers might believe in selection and maintenance of the aim, but politicians like to have their cake and eat it. What was the aim of operations in the Middle East on any given day over that period? Kick the Italians out of Africa? or provide political gesture to support militarily indefensible Greece? What was the plan on any given day? Was Wavell a bad general or are there situations where there is no single constant aim or a plan that can guarantee success? By and large we accept that as the circumstances change the plan needs to change. A large part of staff-work is planning contingency plans that might never happen. We also have the concept of an emergent rather than planned strategy - is success better if foretold or if you stumble on it by trial and error?

The implications of Montgomery's article - and something he carried forward as a commander was his claim that in advance of the battle, and with imperfect information, the commander needed to decide how to to fight and win the battle. This is something at the heart of the debate about Montgomery's reputation. Monty claimed that all his battles went to plan. Carlo D'Este picked apart allied decision making in Normandy and decided that lots of Montgomery's plans failed, but he had a real talent for coming up with new plans. To me this is the significant bit of the encounter battle article. This was the point where Montgomery had to claim himself to be infallible.

 

Hello idler,

Adding to what you posted, not disputing.

Montgomery's career is a matter of historical record. And in the category which counts the most, command success on the battlefield, his record is second to none. Let that sink in for a moment.

So why does Hamilton feel the need to somehow inflate the significance, and relevance, of other aspects of his career?

I wrote earlier my belief that recognition or respect or gratitude or what ever noun you wish to use for when considering our war commanders is a finite commodity and thus it is a zero sum calculation to decide who gets what share of the whole. To increase one individuals credit rating, you have decrease another or other by an equal amount.

Look what Hamilton does (as per Tom's words):
Nigel Hamilton suggested in his biography that articles such as this were comparatively rare in British inter-war journals - that supported his argument that Monty was almost unique in his professional approach to his trade whilst most Army officers were more interested, according to Hamilton, in polo, strong spirits and wild women
Not only does he create/infer the idea that having an article published is a/the defining mark of a professional soldier, but he also decides to double down by suggesting that the majority where not just less professional but decidely unprofessional sporting, debauching louts! To ramp up Montgomery's stock he has to demean the rest.

Perhaps the reason Montgomery had some articles published was because he was a complete Bernie-no-Mates and rather than drink himself into a stupor he chose to sit in his room alone and rehash other people's essays, polish them a little and twist somebody's arm to publish them.

Seriously, being published is NOT an indication that one soldier is more professional than another. That is the first misdirect/falsehood by Hamilton. The second is to suggest the rest were "more interested" in sport, having fun and women than being professional. The third was to then over-egg these two misdirections/falsehoods by misrepresenting Montgomery's 'true' effort in the (publishing) whole.

 

Sheldrake Dear chap,

Your attempt to de-equivilize the same statement to try and up Montomery's cred by stripping some from Wavell's supposed platitudes is not doing your cred any favours.

If Wavell's ...
A commander must be quite clear as to the object he seeks to attain, and he must have a plan to attain it.
... is rarely as simple as that, then Montgomery's ...
Therefore a commander must decide before contact is gained how he will fight the battle-only thus will he force his will on the enemy.
... is just as rarely simple.

The same advice doesn't suddenly become easier because one is written as advice in principle and another advice in potential scenario. Montgomery has taken Wavell's so called platitude and reworded it. Then, it seems, tried to take sole ownership of it as words of prophesy.

Both are just the very same plain, common sense.

Now this is something that is really worthy of serious discussion - as opposed to this defence/question of reputational level nonsense.

From my reading there appears to me to be a serious failure in British commanders to have thought through a Plan B when Plan A does not succeed as wished for. Plan B seems to have been defaulted to withdraw as quickly as possible to avoid complete humiliation. The mindset of better to avoid losing the battle completely than trying to win it. So ingrained was that mindset that you can see traces of it in written orders!

Now, Montgomery does indeed stand out as being someone who did think through a Plan B and had the courage to go through with it rather than just whistle everyone back to the start line.

For me, the difference between Montgomery and some of the earlier failings was not the basic thinking in advance, but the thinking of various alternatives as well.

Neame knew what he wanted to do and had a plan to achieve it. When the wheels fell off his trolly, he had no alternative and was left floundering whilst effecting a withdrawal.

Beresford-Peirce knew what he wanted to do and had a plan to achieve it. When the wheels fell off his trolly, he encouraged more effort in his original plan (no indication an alternative existed), and then had his control taken away by a subordinate effecting a withdrawal.

There, I would suggest, is a far more interesting and helpful line of study than trying to argue whether Montgomery was right to call himself a prophet based upon words he regurgitated from FSR II.

 

So, the controversy you're trying to get to the bottom of is whether Montgomery himself was telling fibs or not about something after the event.

If his claim was soley "that in advance of the battle, and with imperfect information, the commander needed to decide how to to fight and win the battle" and that he had held this view pre-war and not just made it up on the hoof, then the article we've been discussing seems to offer up some good evidence. But that evidence is double-edged.

On the one hand, there it is in black & white. He did opine that very thing pre-war. If the controversy is simply a did he say/believe it or not, job done.

On the other hand, if the controversy is about whether this was his original thinking (guru-like prophesy) then we also have an answer in black & white: no, it most certainly was not. He refers the idea himself back to FSR II (1935).

Is this the end of controversy? I doubt it.

Is the controversy more about what he was inferring by his claim rather than the veracity of the claim? I mean, was he trying to say that while he always had an objective and a plan in advance, others (his peers) did not?

As I pointed out in my last, in respect of his British peers, that is a claim on very uncertain ground. Was it a dig at the Americans?

Moreover, there is a whiff of disingenuity in his claim. I mean, if in advance ... a commander needed to decide how to to fight and win the battle, then it would make sense if he had that as his Plan A and not have to resort to a Plan B.

For me, it would have made more sense for him to emphasize the sense in having alternatives available and the courage to admit something is not working and moving on.

It is difficult to see this ability in many of his British peers. Perhaps that is something that FSRs were weak to impress. It's ok encouraging confidence of success in your plan but there are limits to its usefulness. If Wavell and the 'brains trust' were remiss in that respect, then the article shows Montgomery was no less remiss himself in 1937.

Beyond Auchinleck I'm struggling to think of a British commander who chose to implement a Plan B and presson with the attack (or defence) rather than default to a headlong withdrawal when Plan A went wrong. Perhaps, with a bit of a leap you could argue Wavell's decision to hold Tobruk in 1941 falls into that category - but it was executed by Australians.

 

Every detail of a battle may not go as well as hoped for the overall plan to be fulfilled as intended.
Reading through Montys 'LIGHTFOOT: Memorandum No 2 by Army Commander', 6 October 1942, it strikes me how very much the battle did go to 'plan'.

"13. To sum up:
(a) During the night D/D plus 1 day we will break into the enemy positions at the selected places.
(b) At dawn on D plus 1 day we will begin the 'crumbling' operations; it is essential to my plans to begin these operations at dawn.
(c) Thereafter we will be ready to take instant advantage of any weakening or 'letting-up' on the part of the enemy; the moment we see signs of this we will leap on him.
(d) Throughout it is vital that we should retain the initiative, and keep up sustained pressure on the enemy. We must not have long pauses during which he can recover his balance.
The R.A.F. will help us in this respect.
And we ourselves must shoot the enemy up with artillery from all sides at all times."

I am not sure Monty ever claimed himself to be infallible? Not that I am sure he ever claimed himself the opposite either!

 

Hello idler,

I thought I would circle back to this.

The answer to that teaser depends very much on how narrow the "such articles" is defined. Which, of course, would be Hamiliton's get out clause in any academic attack upon his writing. If "such articles" means articles written to propose new tactical methods for the infantry division encounter battle taking new organization and mechanical equipment into consideration, then Montgomery's article was probably truely unique in its rarity. If "such articles" is a wider catch. the uniqueness and rarity reduces.

Yes, there were indeed sufficient outlets that a determined soldier-writer who had the ability to write and had an interesting subject could get published.

On the subject you mention, as you would expect, the (British) Cavalry Journal had a good few articles on and around the subject of cavalry mechanization. But aspiring cavalry-writers could look elsewhere too.

How about Major Hume's (18th King Edward's Own Cavalry) article published in 1927 "Mechanization from a Cavalry Point of View" in the RUSI Journal. I can send it to you if you are interested.


Moving on, I thought the following may provide an interesting comparison to Montgomery's article.

 

(All IIRC - ) That's fair insofar at a high level, but was there not a hope that the armour would be able to create a breakout,, which was not possible because of the depth of the German anti-tank defences? Though I think it is true that the army kept up sustained pressure, which in the north eventually put Rommel in the situation where he had to counter-attack which was repulsed.

 

From the same memorandum:

"The main task of 10 Corps will be to destroy the enemy's armour.
If this should not be possible initially, the Corps will be manoeuvred so as to keep the enemy armour from interfering with the 'crumbling' operations being carried out by 30 Corps.
Opportunity may occur for 10 Corps to assist in these 'crumbling' operations, both in the Northern sector in front of 9 Aust Div, and to the South of the MITEIRIYA ridge on the West flank of N.Z. Div."

 

This made my day.

All the best

Andreas

 

Now that the article has been produced, read and digested, how does it impact your original thinking?

Regarding the first point, in the article Montgomery himself references the idea of knowing how to win a battle before it begins back to written doctrine already extant. So less of a great Monty-ism and more of a doctrinal principle (and platitude?)

On the second, Montgomery writes in the article that the study of, training for and practice of the encounter battle was commonplace at the time. Your own experiences post-war suggest that changed. Any thoughts on why that could be?