The Mechelen incident – orchestrated by Anti-Nazi Generals?

Discussion in '1940' started by PsyWar.Org, Nov 2, 2012.

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  1. PsyWar.Org

    PsyWar.Org Archive monkey

    Have been delving into British records starting with confidential minutes to War Cabinet memoranda.

    Here's mention of the intelligence received from the plane crash:

    WESTERN FRONT: Possibility of German Attack on Holland and Belgium.
    W.M.(40) 11th Conclusions, Minute 5
    Confidential Annex


    THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that a telegram had been received from the Military Attaché, Brussels, on the 11th January, stating that he had received information from a most reliable source as to a German plan, with details of a projected attack against Holland and Belgium in which the German Army was to launch an offensive against the British and French Armies from the North Sea to the Moselle, whilst a detachment would occupy Holland. The land offensive was to be combined with an air attack, of which the plan gave circumstantial details.

    The War Office had had no confirmatory information of this German plan. They considered, however, that sufficient German Divisions were present in the Aachen area to carry out an initial attack without further troop movements and with little warning. At the same time certain features of the report raised doubts as to its authenticity.

    The War Office had accordingly asked the Military Attaché, Brussels, whether his informant was in possession of original documentary evidence, and, in particular, what were the grounds for believing that the attack would be put into execution within the next few days.

    The reply from the Military Attaché stated that the information was derived from an aircraft which had crashed at Hasselt in Belgium with two German Staff Officers on board. These officers were believed to have been carrying out a reconnaissance over Belgium. Papers found in the aircraft contained the alleged plan for attack on Belgium – papers which the German Staff Officers had endeavoured, but had failed to destroy, and which were now in the possession of the Belgian Staff. The Belgians asked that the strictest secrecy should be observed. Meanwhile, it was stated that the German Embassy in Brussels was in a state of panic.

    The Secretary of State for War explained that he was conveying this report to the Cabinet because it was of a much more definite character than many of the reports which had lately been received of German intentions against the Low Countries.

    [Source TNA CAB 65/11, annex 11.]
     
  2. PsyWar.Org

    PsyWar.Org Archive monkey

    More on the War Cabinet opinion's about the plane crash:

    W.M.(40) 13TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1
    Confidential Annex
    …Discussion also took place as to the accident to the German aeroplane containing the two Staff Officers, who had had possession of the papers describing the German plan of invasion of Belgium. There was general agreement with the view that there were a number of suspicious circumstances attending the whole affair, for which a variety of explanations could be advanced...


    [Source TNA CAB 65/11, annex 13.]
     
  3. PsyWar.Org

    PsyWar.Org Archive monkey

    There is quite a negotiation ensuing between Britain and France with King Leopold of Belgian to bring Allied troops into Belgian before a German invasion in order to secure a line Namur-Antwerp.

    This quote is incidental regarding the plane crash:

    W.M.(40) 15th CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 7.
    Confidential Annex.
    …King Leopold had expressed his belief in the genuine character of the documents which had been captured. No doubt the documents, if published, would be repudiated, but nevertheless Germany would make tremendous capital of the fact if Belgian neutrality were violated by Great Britain and France. He thought that it was in the paramount interest of the Allies, as well as of Belgium, to leave the onus for breaking Belgian neutrality on Germany, and that the guarantees asked for were no more than those given to Belgium before the last war…


    [Source TNA CAB 65/11, annex 15.]
     
  4. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  5. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Cheers Lee...I've read a few books that pretty much say the same thing as post 23 in the authors words..
     
  6. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    There was a sequel related to Leopold's performance as King of the Belgians when he surrendered to the invading Germans.After the war the Belgians had scant regard for Leopold reflecting his decision not to continue the fight against Hitler as a king in exile as demonstrated by his government.

    Further, there was consternation in the British and French camps when Leopold procrastinated in giving permission for British troops to enter Belgium to counter the German thrust to northern France.

    As a result of Leopold's stance in 1940,he did not share the confidence of the Belgians and postwar,he was always under pressure to abdicate which he did for his son and heir,Baudouin to succeed him in 1951.Succession may have come earlier but there was a question of Baudouin being of age.
     
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  7. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Well, Harry, I think you are being a tiny bit unfair on the Belgian reign. The thing is, that one being a King or Queen, doesn't easily please the folk. The Dutch Queen and cabinet evacuated the country, thus preventing a governmental capitulation. The Dutch had vast colonies in those days, so the evac was quite easily explained. Nonetheless, the news of the Queen making legs practically paralyzed certain outfits. Not only was it a sign on the wall that the country's defence was on the verge of collaps, but also the people blamed her for fleeing the country whereas the army was supposed to continue the fight on her behalf. A few months later people started to shift their thoughts on the fact that they had a government in exile. And when the repression on the occupied nation increases, so did the support of the Queen being in London.

    The Danish saw another virtue of a King that had stated. The Danish King shared in most of the burdens of his nation. His yellow star act has become famous for his courage. He stayed and was supported by his folk too.

    Leopold III wasn't popular ever. His uncle and predecessor, Albert I who died in a mounting accident in 1934, had been though. Leopold was considered a stranger and due to his lack of charm towards the people, not popular ever. His clash with the Belgian cabinet in May 1940 and particularly his defeatist attitude during the occupation sealed his fate. But had he been a popular person before the war, he might well have survived the aft-war quarrels on his decision to stay.


    Leopold was heavily involved in the political and state government during the late interbellum. There where other Royals were much into the background or quite ceremonial, Leopold demanded the supreme command of the army. In order to facilitate his lack of general officer skills he was appointed a militairy aid, colonel Raoul van Overstraeten (later Generalmajor). Curiously enough, given the supreme command position of the King, Van Overstraeten being his aid became the shadow CIC. The latter was not free of sympathies for the Germans and moreover very particular in a number of state- and military issues. The tandem Leopold/Overstraeten dominated the major decision making of the Belgian army, hence the French claim that Leopold capitulated prematurely.


    In fact one could advocate that Leopold thought of his people and country and judged the situation such that further resistance would only demand unnecessary sacrifices of his people. The French were quite cheap to call Leopold and his hurds "les sales boches du Nord" (lit.: the bloody krauts from the North), when they had just used the Belgian soil and cities as a nice buffer for the defence of their own country, whereas at no point the Belgian interest were in their focus. Quite similar rage was aimed at the British, when they moved back their BEF. Like it hadn't been the French themselves that had failed with their ginormous army and their conceited self-proclaimed "victor of the Great War" title. Still, Leopold was manoeuvred in a position that he wouldn't really manage to work himself out anymore. He wasn't a Houdini and after the war the Belgians were quick to find a scapegoat.

    (to be continued)
     
  8. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  9. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Back to the Mechelen incident. Leopold was - to my knowledge - the only one who thought the plans were genuine. I know that the French and British had much doubt, and so had the Dutch, who were informed by the Belgians a few days later. In reality Leopold had been right, but as such wrong at the same time. The Germans, knowing that a significant part of their plan had been exposed, redesigned their invasion plan and finally ended up with the sort of opposite plan of the one from which the Mechelen contents gave notice. The notorious Manstein element tilted the whole emphasis.

    What is little known is that the officer caught at Maas-Mechelen was a airborne officer. The officer carried some plans for a German airlanding to the rear of the Belgian main defences. Up until well into November 1939 the so called "Operation G" (for Ghent) had been in development. That was an application of air-landing formations around the fortified Ghent area. These had to be relieved by a major thrust punch from the 6th Army right into the beating heart of the Belgian defences. Come November - when invasion plans were postponed - Hitler and his lot redesigned the thing. Hitler demanded still an airlanding operational in support of 6th Army, but this time more feasible. The only elmt that had remained from the old plan, was the "handstreich" against Eben-Emael, simply because this hinging point was essential in any German plan, in order to quickly create an entrance into the central room of Belgium, which was mandatory to gain the vast 6th Army some space for manoeuvres. New was the "Operation N" (for Namur). It had somewhat similar intentions as Operation G, but this time it was the hinging point of the Dyle-line that was held in focus. It would require a fast German land thrust through the so called "Meuse valley" to relief the contained air-landing forces. The plans G en N were renamed in "Nord" (Ghent) and "Süd" (Namur) and in full development when ... the Maas-Mechelen crash occured.


    And there comes the part where I have to correct myself (as to wrong info in earlier posters on Reinberger's function). I have recently done some additional research on Reinberger. He was an airborne officer (Major) but ... he was not in a 7.FK function nor a staff/liaison function for Kurt Student. He was attached as a liaison officer to "Fliegerführer 220" (Air-commander 220) in Münster and scheduled to attend a meeting with "I.Fliegerkorps" (1st Air-Corps) near Köln.


    I can also be more specific on what he carried. I work closely with Karl-Heinz Golla - the German airborne specialist - and took from his research on the issue the following. Reinberger carried documents related to Führer Directive no. 5, a set containing the outlines of the planned occupation of the Low Countries, fractions of the headlines of the 6th Army operations and important elements of the "Luftflotte 2" (Air-Fleet 2) directives in relation to the Operation N. Almost complete directives for VIII.Fliegerkorps (8th Air-Corps) - the tactical air-corps containing the bulk of dive-bombers of the Luftwaffe - were in his possession too. Besides the quite complete VIII.FK plans only rough sketches and loose directives had been part of the case that Reinberger carried. The essence of the meeting was the working-out of precise directives and time tables, and as such the plans that were contained by the Allies were basically outlines of plans being constructed rather than being finished.

    (to be continued)
     
  10. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    The Belgian King and staff considered the plans genuine and believed the content that had been retrieved from the plane. They had quickly monitored the events occuring in the German embassy and noticed the abnormal anxiousness. Other signals also seemed to indicate German concern. Gamelin and Lord Gort were briefed on the 11th of January on the event. They were however not provided with full copies of the plans. The Belgians feared for the neutrality being jeopardized when Anglo-Franco communications would proof of them possessing original contents. The next day the Dutch CIC was informed, but had almost immediately dismissed the idea of the plans being genuine.

    It mattered little whether the French and British believed the main score of the plans. The Oster-Sas-Goethals chain of intelligence information warned for an imminent German invasion, which indeed had been set on January 17, 1940. That very warning had the Belgian and French take all sorts of precautions. That was noticed by the Germans, who then believed that the plans had been exposed. It caused Hitler to cancel the invasion and ... drop the Operations G and N entirely. He issued a directive that Eben-Emael had to stay in the plans, but the bulk of 7th Fliegerkorps had to focus on taking the bridges at Moerdijk and Dordrecht in the Netherlands. This was also to prevent Anglo-Franco intentions to march from the south and occupy these bridges themselves. The General Staff war-games - a planning feature that the German General Staff embraced as the ultimate test of their designed strategies - repeatedly proved the likelyness of a strong French or British army corps taking possession of the NE angle of Antwerp, thus cutting of German thrusts towards the Northsea in the North. That was the reason why taking the bridges at Moerdijk (Meuse) and Dordrecht would serve two purposes. 1) outmanoeuvre the Allies, 2) open the gates to Fortress Holland.

    The other change that Hitler made was his rejection of the upcoming Halder strategy. Hitler used or rather abused the 10th January event to send Halder back to the drawing table. That would eventually lead to the invasion plan that would be the basis under the actual operation that we all know ...

    #
     
  11. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

    ...
     
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  12. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Don't know if there exists an English version.



    And there is the problem :lol:

    I have a fantastic French book on St. Venant Massacre in 1940 sent to me by the Author but it's in French :mad: I'm assuming its fantastic by the quality of the maps, diagrams and pictures.:p
     
  13. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  14. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    @Stolpi. I do slightly differ on your advice of Jacobsen ...

    The Golla book is brilliant as it comes to the historical content, but the publisher should be laid off. What a piece of work that publisher is. Footnotes that go all the way, poor translations and more editorial flaws. Terrible. I know that Karl-Heinz Golla is furious about it. The contents though, are of excellent quality.

    I am not a fan of Jacobsen. Too much prejudice. Karl-Heinz Frieser produced his "Blitzkrieg Legende" and that also appeared in English. Excellent piece of work and plenty of elaboration on the four main invasion plans. As it comes to the Westfeldzug - I would only recommend Frieser's work, to be honest.
     
  15. Rich Payne

    Rich Payne Rivet Counter Patron 1940 Obsessive

    I'm struggling with the American translation of Frieser at the moment. I assume, Gooseman, that you were able to read it in the original German ? My knowledge sadly isn't sufficient although I could probably pick up the gist of it.

    I find it to be a clumsy amateur translation not really suited to a serious reference. I can just about cope with references to British armoured divisions being spelled 'armor' although I don't think that it should happen with proper nouns but if I come across one more sentence with the word 'gotten' in then I think that I'll getten angry and throw it in the waste paper.:mad:
     
  16. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    I'm struggling with the American translation of Frieser at the moment. I assume, Gooseman, that you were able to read it in the original German ? My knowledge sadly isn't sufficient although I could probably pick up the gist of it.

    I find it to be a clumsy amateur translation not really suited to a serious reference. I can just about cope with references to British armoured divisions being spelled 'armor' although I don't think that it should happen with proper nouns but if I come across one more sentence with the word 'gotten' in then I think that I'll getten angry and throw it in the waste paper.:mad:

    On the continent most countries are used to speaking more languages than their own. We usually don't have the luxury of translations in our own language. And when people try to speak our language or English for that matter, we usually appreciate their efforts. Frieser wrote an excellent book on the Westfeldzug. I wouldn't get bothered over some language flaws or American-style. I would simply read it because it makes one wiser. :p
     
  17. PsyWar.Org

    PsyWar.Org Archive monkey

    Some great contributions to the thread. Thanks to all for adding the additional background.

    The War Cabinet Confidential Minutes I've quoted in part above do go into more detail about the negotiations with King Leopold.

    Leopold was asking for guarantees regarding the invitation to French and British entering Belgian. He wanted an agreement that troops will leave at the end of hostilities.

    Chamberlain wasn't impressed with the request but a basic guarantee was given. However this didn't satisfy Leopold resulting in French troops stuck for hours on the Belgian border. The War Cabinet did acknowledge that Leopold was in a difficult position.

    A tricky dilemma for all.
     
  18. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  19. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    Well, Harry, I think you are being a tiny bit unfair on the Belgian reign. The thing is, that one being a King or Queen, doesn't easily please the folk. The Dutch Queen and cabinet evacuated the country, thus preventing a governmental capitulation. The Dutch had vast colonies in those days, so the evac was quite easily explained. Nonetheless, the news of the Queen making legs practically paralyzed certain outfits. Not only was it a sign on the wall that the country's defence was on the verge of collaps, but also the people blamed her for fleeing the country whereas the army was supposed to continue the fight on her behalf. A few months later people started to shift their thoughts on the fact that they had a government in exile. And when the repression on the occupied nation increases, so did the support of the Queen being in London.

    The Danish saw another virtue of a King that had stated. The Danish King shared in most of the burdens of his nation. His yellow star act has become famous for his courage. He stayed and was supported by his folk too.

    Leopold III wasn't popular ever. His uncle and predecessor, Albert I who died in a mounting accident in 1934, had been though. Leopold was considered a stranger and due to his lack of charm towards the people, not popular ever. His clash with the Belgian cabinet in May 1940 and particularly his defeatist attitude during the occupation sealed his fate. But had he been a popular person before the war, he might well have survived the aft-war quarrels on his decision to stay.


    Leopold was heavily involved in the political and state government during the late interbellum. There where other Royals were much into the background or quite ceremonial, Leopold demanded the supreme command of the army. In order to facilitate his lack of general officer skills he was appointed a militairy aid, colonel Raoul van Overstraeten (later Generalmajor). Curiously enough, given the supreme command position of the King, Van Overstraeten being his aid became the shadow CIC. The latter was not free of sympathies for the Germans and moreover very particular in a number of state- and military issues. The tandem Leopold/Overstraeten dominated the major decision making of the Belgian army, hence the French claim that Leopold capitulated prematurely.


    In fact one could advocate that Leopold thought of his people and country and judged the situation such that further resistance would only demand unnecessary sacrifices of his people. The French were quite cheap to call Leopold and his hurds "les sales boches du Nord" (lit.: the bloody krauts from the North), when they had just used the Belgian soil and cities as a nice buffer for the defence of their own country, whereas at no point the Belgian interest were in their focus. Quite similar rage was aimed at the British, when they moved back their BEF. Like it hadn't been the French themselves that had failed with their ginormous army and their conceited self-proclaimed "victor of the Great War" title. Still, Leopold was manoeuvred in a position that he wouldn't really manage to work himself out anymore. He wasn't a Houdini and after the war the Belgians were quick to find a scapegoat.

    (to be continued)

    Gooseman,

    Overall,I think you have endorsed what have posted. Leopold 111 was forced off the throne by the reaction of the Belgian people to his stance in 1940.As I have said,he would have abdicated earlier had his son not been of age.As it was he was virtually in exile, being in Austria.

    The problem with the French was that post Great War they had made serious mistake in not protecting their Belgian border against the potential threat to their security of Germany, on the premise that they had friendly neighbours. This border having no defences erected attracted the strategy of the Hitler as a somewhat easy route into the French hinterland.(No collective security recognised by Leopold on the onset of dynamic upheavals taking place at this occasion but Belgium's attitude changed by 1948 and they became one of the original members of NATO when it was formed in 1948)

    The other observation was by the British who always regarded relations with the Belgians as being more than cordial.Historically,they had guaranteed the independence, status and neutrality of the new kingdom of Belgium from 1839.

    Then 25 years before,the 1940 crisis, the BEF had gone to war against Imperial Germany in defence of Belgium and then in 1940 were faced with a monarch who thought that after all the past events and Hitler's record of foreign policy,that Germany would recognise Belgium's neutrality...Belgium was no Switzerland.
     
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  20. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    It is a long time since I red Jacobsen's book, in what respect is it prejudiced?

    Jacobsen wrote from a prejudiced standpoint. Some parts seem to be quite precise, others are politically charged. First of all he had some defeatist thing about him. Like many Germans in that period. They also like to blame the mistakes or blunders on scapegoats, rather than objectively browsing the archives for the true recollection of events.

    His account on the Rotterdam raid (May 1940) is quite stunning for its falsification of the facts and the justifications that he manages to produce. Let there be no mistake, I am not a Dutchman haunting Germans for terror or war-crime acts, and I accept that in an all out war situation a massive air-raid could do the trick, but don't try to convince me that it was a measure or tactic that was covered by the "Lex Belli" (international law on war: Hague and Geneva conventions) in 1940. It was not. That the practise of surface bomding raids during the war shifted the odds, must be said. But be honest, and don't try to correct what was wrong.

    I must admit that his Rotterdam account messed up his rep with me. When a sensible issue like that raid (in the same league as the Warsaw and Coventry raids) is justified by a historian on the basis of deliberate (chauvinistic) false interpretation, I lose faith in such a historian. In other words, he made me grow a strong prejudice against him.

    When I need contemporary intel on the Luftwaffe I tend to read the Speidel study for NARA. I have quite a number of other sources of the Luftwaffe, but Speidel produced a more than interesting inside. Also that is not particularly free of flaws, but understandably, shortly after the war.
     
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