The attacks on Cristot (10th to 17th June 1944)

Thanks for posting these Jim. As you say the devastation resulted from the 2nd and this time succssful attack on Crristot (16 June). I think I am right in saying that prior to the attack 49 Div still believed Cristot was strongly held, but in fact the Artillery bombardment of the town was effectively unnecessary as the Germans had largely left the area? Is this so?
Ian

 

Hello Ian, I think this part of the description of the footage is quite telling:

"Full description
III. The camera surveys the desolation in Cristot, its shattered stone cottages and farm buildings, with gutted and smouldering interiors, and dead livestock, of which a chicken and a cow appear to be the only survivors. Also present are the wrecks of a German lorry and an SdKfz 250 halftrack armoured personnel carrier from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. A 1/4th King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry patrol on the lookout for snipers passes a farmhouse set ablaze by German artillery. At the village calvary, a chicken shows little interest in food offered by a KOYLI Sten gunner."

"On the look out for snipers" gives me the impression that there were no readily observed enemy forces present, plus "a farmhouse set ablaze by German artillery" would lead you to believe that the German m.o. of having any of their previously occupied positions already registered for fire was in this case carried out (and they would endeavour not to stonk their own if they could avoid it).

So it seems likely I think that the German forces had indeed withdrawn. The big question mark for me though is when were those "description" words written? If they are cribbed from the daily sheets written at the time (to describe the film footage taken) then that, for me, would seem to be a clincher.

More than happy to be incorrect, especially if war diaries state otherwise.

Kind regards, always,

Jim.

 

There's a brief mention of Cristot in this -

D-Day 80: Doncaster veteran, 104, shares memories on WW2 anniversary (doncasterfreepress.co.uk)

“Our first major operation on 16 June 1944 was to take part in the attack on Cristot.
"During and following the attack, eight of our Battalion were killed, including five from my Company, 'A' Company and 30 or so wounded.

 

Re. Following The Story of Stuart Hills and The Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry. Part 2 - Breakout - YouTube



The account there seems to credit Stuart Hills (SRY) with an attack on Cristot on the 17d6m1944 and the subsequent capture of the village (of Cristot) then.

Everything is rather confused / confusing given there are so many varied accounts and such a lot going on which was - quite often - recalled and recounted subsequently.

Perhaps its an interesting lesson, albeit it's well known how complicated after the battle accounts can subsequently be.

Trying to get much of a handle on anything now, I think, is particularly fraught with difficulty, partly because there are so many short cuts in the way things are understood and because it is difficult for anyone to present all of the "facts" with what happened where and when, when there is much that is - on the face of it - contradictory - or requires caveats such as - source "A" says - whereas "B" and "C" differ in saying something different, or see things differently.

 

Re. "On June 16, 1944, a battalion of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, supported by a depleted squadron of Sherman tanks, attacked Cristot in Normandy. “We lined up on a road near a farm with embankments on either side.” The men's nostrils curled at the stench of rotting cows killed in the shelling. They had to advance through an open cornfield. “Suddenly the preacher appeared out of nowhere and we all knelt and prayed.” As they advanced, the supporting artillery fired overhead, but then the Germans used a stratagem by firing mortar rounds between the forward troops, giving the impression that their own artillery was not firing far enough. Officers passed orders to the rear to stop the barrage and expose the German ruse. By nightfall, Cristot had been captured; it was the KOYLI Battalion's first major victory in the campaign. The cost had been high — 66 dead in five days of fighting. The battalion managed to exploit as far as Le Hamel (south of Cristot). They were relieved the following morning by the 7th Duke of Wellington's."

D-Day - Google Books



--- x ---

 

This is the film that was filmed in Cristot on 17d6m1944 - the relevant bit is in the middle section...

https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/record/931

II. A Sherman tank squadron from the 8th Armoured Brigade rumbles along a dusty road leading to 49th Division's front between Tilly-sur-Seulles and Fontenay-le-Pesnel past a shot-down Royal Canadian Air Force Spitfire IX from No 412 'Falcon' Squadron.
III. The camera surveys the desolation in Cristot, its shattered stone cottages and farm buildings, with gutted and smouldering interiors, and dead livestock, of which a chicken and a cow appear to be the only survivors. Also present are the wrecks of a German lorry and an SdKfz 250 halftrack armoured personnel carrier from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. A 1/4th King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry patrol on the lookout for snipers passes a farmhouse set ablaze by German artillery. At the village calvary, a chicken shows little interest in food offered by a KOYLI Sten gunner.






ANOTHER VILLAGE CAPTURED

 

Ehup Sheldrake - good points, well made. The link has gone wonky in the last 10yrs [or my thumbs are too thick] any ideas where/how I can find it? Cheers!

 

PS Burden of Command is due out this year (ish) and has a good dose of leadership psychology in it.

 

And here's a transcript of the famous letter I just scraped off another forum.
Having fought a traumatic battle at Le Parc de Boislande they remained to plug a gap outside Fontenay-le-Pesnel, which the SS Div "Hitler Jugend" was attempting to force. After 14 days of continuous fighting, their replacement CO (his predecessor having been killed), submitted the following report:

Report on the State of the 6th Bn DWR (49 Div) as on 30 Jun 44

1. I arrived at 6 DWR on the evening of 26 June. From AM on 27 June until 30 June we have been in contact with the enemy and under moderate heavy mortar and shell fire.

2. The following facts make it clear that this report makes no reflection on the state of 6 DWR when they left UK:
a) In 14 days there have been some 23 officers & 350 OR casualties.
b) Only 12 of the original officers remain & they are all junior. The CO & every rank above Cpl (except 2 Lts) in battalion HQ have gone, all company commanders have gone. One company has lost every officer, another has only one [officer] left.
c) Since I took over I have lost two second-in-commands in successive days and a company commander on the third day.
d) Majority of transport, all documents, records and a large amount of equipment were lost.

3. State of Men
a) 75% of men react adversely to enemy shelling & are 'jumpy'.
b) 5 cases in 3 days of self-inflicted wounds - more possible cases.
c) Each time men are killed or wounded a number of men become casualties through shell shock or hysteria.
d) In addition to genuine hysteria a large number of men have left their positions after shelling on one pretext or another & gone to the rear until sent back by the MO or myself.
e) The new drafts have been affected, & 3 young soldiers became casualties with hysteria after hearing our own guns.
f) The situation has got worse each day as more key personnel have become casualties.

4. Discipline & Leadership
a) State of discipline is bad, although the men are a cheerful pleasant type normally.
b) NCOs do not wear stripes & some officers have no badges of rank. This makes the situation impossible when 50% of the battalion do not know each other.
c) NCO leadership is weak in most cases & newly drafted officers are in consequence havimg to expose themselves unduly to try & get anything done. It is difficult for the new officers (60%) to lead the men under fire as they do not know them.

5. Conclusion
a) 6 DWR is not to fit to take its place in the line.
b) Even excluding the question of nerves and morale, 6 DWR will not be fit to go back into the line until it is remobilised, reorganised, and to an extent retrained. It is no longer a battalion but a collection of individuals. There is naturally no 'esprit de corps' for those who are frightened (as we all are to one degree or another) to fall back on. I have twice had to stand at the end of a track and draw my revolver on retreating men.

6. Recommendation
If it is not possible to withdraw the battalion to the base or UK to re-equip, reorganise & train, then it should be disbanded & split among other units.

If essential that the battalion should return to the line, I request that I may be relieved of my command & I suggest that a CO with 2 to 3 years experience should relieve me & that he should bring his adjutant and a signals officer with him.

Being a regular officer I realise the seriousness of this request & its effect on my career. On the other hand I have the lives of the new personnel (which is excellent) to consider. Three days running a major has been killed or seriously wounded because I have ordered them to in effect stop the men running during mortar concentrations. Unless withdrawn from the division I do not think I can get the battalion fit to fight normally & this waste of life would continue. My honest opinion is that if you continue to throw new officer & other rank replacements into 6 DWR as casualties occur, you are throwing good money after bad.

I know my opinion is shared by two other commanding officers who know the full circumstances.


A.J.D. Turner
Lt.-Col. Commanding 6 DWR
In the field, 30 June 1944

 

The "it should be disbanded & split among other units." has an ominous ring to it.

It was the way that the 24L was disbanded etc.

 

Hello Ian, would it be possible to share the details for your contact at York museum at all please? I’d like find out if they have any group photos of 11th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment if they have them.