Mike, I think that the answer is that there were strict weight limits which units were supposed to observe. But who is going to check. Units will always load a vehicle until there is no more room rather than up to a weight limit. The same happened with loading craft, and DUKWs. DUKW drivers complained that stevedores wanted to fill the space available rather than observe the weight limit. Similarly units saw a space and wanted to put a jeep in it. Movement Control officers were supposed to stop this sort of thing but if a Colonel wants to load an extra jeep a junior staff officer would have difficulty stopping him. Anyway it was reported that Movement Control officers were also offenders. They were issued jeeps, amphibious jeeps and weasels for use in the embarkation ports and were then reluctant to leave them behind. Same problem happened with bridges later in the campaign. Despite all instructions units tried to cross bridges with vehicles which were overweight. Mike
Force ‘S’ Crossing. Minesweepers. It was essential that a wide lane across the Channel be swept clear of mines, and then kept clear. Ten channels, two per beach or one per brigade, were swept to within ten miles of the Normandy coast. This would allow Landing Ships and Craft to reach the Lowering Position some six miles from shore. The area off the beaches was particularly heavily mined. Minesweepers then swept areas for the landing ships and craft to assemble, fire support ships to position themselves and routes for craft to move to and from the beach and along to other beaches. Minesweepers needed to keep a good formation and also employ precise navigation. A flotilla of sweepers would advance in echelon with paravanes trailing astern. The paravanes were attached to long steel cables which should catch mines and lead them to the cutting blades on the paravane. Mines would then float to the surface and be exploded by gunfire. The swept channel should then be marked with dan buoys which had lights for use at night. These buoys were laid one per mile by specially equipped trawlers. Apart from difficult weather conditions the change of tide also affected the minesweepers. The paravanes although towed astern were also off to one side. They needed to be on the opposite side to that from which the tide was flowing otherwise they would be carried across the stern by the tide with the risk of fouling propellers and tangling cables. Although tides appear to go in and out more or less at right angles to beaches, in mid Channel the tides are flowing east to west or vice versa. The tides turned while the minesweepers were halfway across so that they had to recover the paravanes and stream them from the other side, and then change formation. A large area south of the Isle of Wight had already been cleared of mines. This was Area Z through which the various convoys passed to reach their assigned channels. Force ‘S’ had a larger number of minesweepers than other forces as it had to provide for the bombardment ships to neutralise heavy batteries on the eastern flank and round Le Havre. These consisted of: 1 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (Fleet Mine Sweepers). To clear and mark Channel 9 and then mark the Lowering Position. 15 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (Fleet Mine Sweepers). To clear and mark Channel 10 and then clear a channel for Bombarding Squadron ‘D’ from the Lowering Position to the end of Channel 10 Extension. Note: 1 and 15 Mine Sweeping Flotillas were each preceded by a Motor Launch fitted for mine sweeping and accompanied by four trawlers for laying Dan Buoys. 40 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (Fleet Mine Sweepers). To proceed ahead of Bombarding Squadron ‘D’ and then clear a channel from the ‘Knuckle’ to meet the channel cleared by 15 Flotilla. 115 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (Motor Mine Sweepers). Escort to HMS Roberts through Channel 10. 165 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (BYMS. US built wooden motor mine sweepers). To sweep in the bombarding destroyers from the Lowering Position to their firing positions. 143 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (Motor Mine Sweepers) These contained 24 Fleet Minesweepers 10 BYMS 10 MMS 10 Danlayers Coastal craft and rescue craft (if not already painted yellow) had a large five pointed star painted on the largest upper surface. Channels. Force S was assigned two swept channels for the crossing. Since Force ‘S’ was to land troops on a single brigade front it was decided to use one of the channels for slow convoys and one for fast convoys. This avoided the complications and hazards of having convoys of different speeds in the same channel and having to overtake. Channel 9 was to be the slow channel to be used by craft with a speed of 6 knots or less. Although most craft were in fact capable of greater speeds there was a variety of factors which made it wise to impose limits. Most of the LCT and LST in early groups were towing small craft or Rhino ferries which not only reduced speed but caused handling difficulties. The LCT(A) with their additional armour were limited to 5 knots while the LCT3 carrying DD tanks were limited to a rather precise 5¾ knots. Slow channel convoys were given a close escort of armed trawlers plus an escort of destroyers and corvettes which covered the channel from two miles to westward. Channel 10 was to be the fast channel to be used by groups of LSIs, some LCI(L) and LCI(S), plus the vessels of Bombardment Group D. Convoys were to sail in a standard formation. Normally this had the ships or craft sailing in two columns, in order of their serial numbers and with the Senior Officer leading the right hand column and his deputy leading the left hand column. Where LCIs accompanied a convoy they formed separate columns on either flank. On reaching the line of 50 degrees north, the point at which the channels reached the enemy mine belt, convoys formed single line ahead. On leaving the mine belt they could resume the previous formation. The northern entrance to each channel was marked by an FH830 sonic buoy. Developed for anti submarine warfare they were further developed as wreck markers and, as in this case, navigation buoys. They gave an underwater signal which could be detected by a ships sonar set. The entrances were further marked by HDMLs. Channel 9 had HDML 1415 flashing number ‘9’ in the direction of oncoming convoys. Channel 10 had HDML 1416 flashing ‘0’. Both also had type 78T homing beacons to assist navigation. This transmitted a signal which could be picked up by naval radar Type 286 and 291. For some reason, probably connected with the weather conditions, the minesweepers did not start sweeping at the positions marked by FH830 buoys but about a mile to the east. The HDMLs then marked the entrance to the actual swept channels. These channels actually converged on the true channel until they arrived at the correct Lowering Point. This apparently confused Convoy S10 and led to it entering Channel 8, belonging to Force J. This Convoy remained in Channel 8 until clear of the enemy minefield and then joined the correct channel. The weather caused considerable problems during the crossing. The LCTs in particular had difficulties with station keeping. LCTs were not the easiest craft to handle and some of their loads made for greater difficulty still. Add to this the fact that LCT skippers were not professional seamen. Most were RNVR with very limited experience of boats, navigation and seamanship in general. Their qualifications allowed them to skipper landing craft but not other craft. Wind, waves and cross tide meant that they could not steer a compass bearing but had to steer anything up to 40 degrees to one side of the desired bearing in order to remain on course and on station. Any errors tended to be cumulative so that while the leading craft may have been slightly out of station the rearmost drifted a considerable distance to one side. Fortunately none seem to have drifted out of the swept channel and the LCI(S) which were timetabled to overtake slower convoys managed without mishap. The fact that many LCTs were towing smaller craft was an additional complication. Towing in the prevailing conditions proved difficult. The following were towed across: - LCP(L). Twelve LCP(L) were to be towed by LCTs, including two LCP(L) Navigation. In fact an extra LCP(L) was added. Only one failed to arrive but all were eventually forced to complete the crossing under their own power. Fortunately these were very good sea boats but it had been planned that the crews would arrive fresh for their many duties on D Day. Instead they spent a large part of the night fighting the elements. - LCA(HR). These craft suffered the worst. They were not really suited to such a crossing, and although they had been modified by decking over the forward part of the well they were heavily loaded, unstable and only one survived the crossing. Five sank, two were missing and one was towed back to the UK. - Rhino Ferries. Nine Rhinos were towed by LSTs. Only one was lost. - Rhino Tugs. Eight of these were towed by escort trawlers, four trawlers towing two each. One was towed by an LST. Only two arrived. Navigation. Navigation information and warnings were available through several channels. - Any information and warnings known to the Admiralty were circulated by the ‘Q’ message series. - Mine warnings were circulated through the ‘Clair Quiz’ method. - Before leaving Home waters for the French coast all ships, squadron commanders and flotilla officers of landing craft were to check the latest messages through the shore authorities. - Off the French coast the latest messages were to be checked with Captain Northbound Sailings, Captain Southbound Sailings, Mulberry B, Gooseberry Depot Ships or any major warship. - A series of messages known as NAVEAST were instituted in Eastern Task Force Area for local navigation information. Any ships or authorities discovering navigational dangers were to report the details by signal to Naval Commander Eastern Task Force. Such signals were to be ‘Important’ but could be ‘Immediate‘ if occasion demanded. During the assault wireless silence was to be broken if the information was necessary to the success of the operation. Radar. By this stage in the war ships carried a considerable number and variety of radars. There were radars for surveillance, navigation, fire control and anti aircraft warning plus sets for Identification and counter measures. Such a large number of different sets needed to be controlled both to avoid giving vital information to the enemy and to avoid interference. In general sets were to be used only by designated vessels and for specific purposes. Except for special cases no radars were to be used during the crossing. Radar 291 was a metric air warning set. 242 and 253 were the associated IFF interrogator and transponder sets. Radar 285 was a AA fire control radar. Radar 271 and 272 were centimetric target indication radar. Others were navigation and beacon sets. HDMLs 1415 and 1416 as described above were to be used for marking the entrance to Channels 9 and 10. They were equipped with Radars 291, 242, 253, 78T and 951. During the night of D-1 to D day the 291 set was not to be used for transmissions. Beacons 78T and 951 were to be trained on a bearing of 335 degrees and switched on 1½ hours before the arrival of the first minesweepers. Motor Launches 200, 201, 202 and 204 were fitted with Radars 291, 242 and 253. During the night of D-1 to D day no transmissions were to be made but a listening watch was to be kept on 291 sets for transmissions from the 78T beacons. The listening watch was to begin 1½ hours before the arrival of the first minesweepers. After crossing 50 degrees North a listening watch was to be kept for enemy transmissions. Motor Launches 196, 197 and 294 were equipped with Radar 970, 253 and Lucero. The 970 set could be used on all occasions as it was for navigation and beach recognition. Landing Craft Headquarters 185 and 269 were equipped with Radar 970, 253 and Lucero. The 970 set could be used on all occasions as it was for navigation and beach recognition. LCT(R) 331, 334, 419, 457 and 458 carried Radar 970 for bombardment ranging and beach recognition and could be used without restriction. HMS Goathland was equipped with Radar 271, 272, 291, 253 and 285. HMS Glenearn was equipped with Radar 271, 272, 291, 253 and 285 and 251M. Radar silence was to be observed except for Type 285 which was to be used at dawn and dusk for one hour to detect low flying aircraft. In the assault area IFF was banned except for the Force Headquarters Ship and Fighter Direction Ship, when they were in Area ‘S’, and any ship detailed to report. IFF was for the identification of aircraft. Outside the assault area IFF could only be used by ships or craft operating singly or by guardships detailed to do so. Bombardment ships fitted with Radar Counter Measures for jamming radar could use them until the enemy no longer used radar to control coastal batteries. Radar Counter Measures could also be used from H-8 hours until nautical twilight on D day. H-8 hours was the time when the minesweepers might be expected to be picked up by radar. All ships and certain craft were fitted with Type 27 Direction Finding equipment to replace GEE navigation signals in the event of enemy jamming or interference. Minesweepers used the then new Decca navigation system which was the most accurate available. Mike
Mike, I have heard of OCR but that is the limit of my knowledge of it. For a time I used two laptops, one to show the document and the other for word processing. I am still happier with pen and paper. Mike
Congratulations on a superb thread. The attached document may be of interest regarding Task Force S, showing the order of landing for the initial assault. I copied it some years ago at the Public Record Office (now the National Archives). It is one long document which I split into three for space reasons. I also added the colour coding - the original is just black and white.
Fantastic stuff Mike, I have a copy of the Plan of the Solent Anchorage for Neptune; It's on four sheets. I couldn't send it as an attachment as I got a 'file too big' warning even though it is about 5 MB. If no one else has posted this I will try to stich it together and resend it. Roy
tmac and Roy, Thank you both very much. tmac. I have three different versions of the same diagram but have not found a good way of uploading it. You have saved me the effort. I will continue the story of Force S very soon. Roy, I have the Solent plan on one large sheet. Like you I have not found a way to upload it in a way that is readable. If it is reduced the writing is illegible. Mike
To some extent this section overlaps the sections detailing the army landing tables. It does however concentrate on the naval aspects. Force S Assault. Ship to Shore from 0500 hours. As the convoys neared the Normandy coast all troops should have had a hot meal. The importance of providing hot food for the troops was stressed in both army and navy orders. All units were provided with a hot meal in the Marshalling Area Camps before leaving. All personnel were issued with 6oz of biscuits and 4oz of chocolate for the period between leaving the camp and arriving on board ships and craft. A mug of hot tea was provided in the embarkation area. Sea Passage Rations were provided for the crossing and these consisted of Compo Ration Type ‘F’, one tin of self heating soup per man per day plus one tin of self heating cocoa per man for assault troops only. Voyage Rations (Ship Reserve) were placed on board ships and craft but only to be used in case of emergency. Presumably the one days postponement counted as an emergency. HMS Largs, Headquarters Ship, and the LSI convoy arrived at the Lowering Position at 0510. Warspite, Ramilies, Roberts and Aresthusa were anchored in their bombarding positions down the extension of Channel 10. Scylla, Mauritius, Danae, Dragon and Frobisher were anchored along the swept loop channel from the Lowering Position to the Channel 10 extension. The destroyers were waiting to be swept into their inshore positions. The LCT(DD) convoy was just coming up to the Lowering Position. The LCT(A) convoy was late. The Lowering Position was in swept water four miles beyond the junction of the Slow and Fast Channels and midway between the two final channel buoys. It was marked by a dan buoy with a green flashing light and a yellow flag. HMS Glenearn, carrying the Senior Officer LSIs, anchored at the Lowering Position and the other LSIs anchored in close order on a line 350 degrees from the Lowering Position. When HMS St Adrian arrived she anchored close to HMS Glenearn and marked the position by showing all round green lights and a yellow flag by day. She was to remain to mark the spot in case the LSIs had to leave. If the Lowering Position came under fire the Commanding Officer HMS Glenearn could order all the LCA to be lowered and the LSIs to retire out of range. On arrival at the Lowering Point troops were summoned to their boarding stations by the speakers in all troop areas. First wave troops made their way to their boarding station. It was possible for the first wave to board the Landing Craft Assault before they were lowered by their davits. Later waves would have to use scrambling nets, or built climbing frames on the Empire Weapon LSIs. The Assistant Military Landing Officer was responsible for the loading of the correct serials. The Unit Landing Officer of the infantry battalion was further responsible for the loading of his troops. Each craft had a person designated as being responsible for the troops embarked on it. Landing Craft were to be assembled into formation by the Flotilla Officer and by other naval craft equipped for navigation. Even in good visibility the shore would not be visible until the final approach and may even then be obscured by smoke from bombardment. Landing craft formed two files in line ahead, but with the files staggered as a precaution against air attack. As the shore was approached the files fanned out and formed a line abreast. All craft should aim to reach the shore at precisely the same time. The Midget Submarine X23 took up a position 7,000 yards from the beach and then flashed ‘S’ towards the Lowering Position on an arc from 350 degrees to 030 degrees from H-140 to H Hour. The Senior Officer Group 1 was to use the X23 as a point of departure for fixing any newer Launching Point decided in the light of the prevailing conditions. 3,000 yards from the beach, at Position HH was a rubber dinghy manned by Combined Operations Pilotage Party launched from X23. This was to flash ‘H’ towards the Lowering Position on an arc from 330 degrees to 050 degrees from H-80 until daylight when flag ‘H’ was to be flown. The dinghy crew were to be picked up by a LCP(L) Navigation but the dinghy was to remain moored at Position HH. The crew, COPP 9 consisted of two Lieutenants RN. If the position was accurate then an amber light was to be used. If there was an error of up to 300 yards a green light was to be shown. If there was an error of 1000 yards then a red light was to be used. From 0500 RAF Bostons had been laying smoke across the eastern flank. Three enemy torpedo boats came through the smoke and launched a torpedo attack before escaping back into the smoke. Two torpedoes passed between Warspite and Ramilies and one hit the destroyer Svenner. Another torpedo approached Largs which went full astern and the torpedo missed. The Svenner broke in two and sank. HMS St Adrian (HQ SOFC), two US Coast Guard Cutters and an empty LCI(L) earmarked for towing duties off the beaches were ordered to rescue survivors. St Adrian then marked the wreck with a buoy. Largs moved to a position inshore of the Lowering Position to watch the arrival of the convoys. It reported that the LSIs were anchored in the Lowering Position while a steady stream of LCTs passed them in two columns. Convoys were generally punctual and any that were late were able to make up the lost time on the run in to the beach. The exception was the LCT(A) convoy, together with the LCMs carrying RE stores for the beach obstacle clearance teams. The LCMs were due to collect RE personnel from the LSIs Princess Astrid and Maid of Orleans. A second empty LCI(L) earmarked for towing duties was sent to take the men in. The LCMs actually arrived but the personnel found it difficult to board them in the rough sea and it was decided that the LCI(L) should take the personnel and the LCMs would accompany them with the stores. LCI(S) 190 and 191, carrying Commandos, closed with Princess Astrid and Maid of Orleans so that their LCA, also carrying Commandos, could form on them. LCAs from the LSIs met up with the LCT convoys although the rough seas caused them some problems and all groups except the LCT(A)s moved off on time and in correct formation. The times of leaving the Lowering Position and of Touch Down were based on the speeds of the craft in the various groups. These were to be: - LCT. 6 knots. - LCT(A) and LCT(CB). 5 knots. - Minor Landing Craft. 6 knots. - LCI(S). 12 knots. - LCI(L). 10 knots. LCT and LCI except those in Groups 2 and 15 were allowed five minutes for deployment into line abreast. Groups 2 and 15 were allowed ten minutes on account of the size of the groups. Orders for Craft Beaching. If beach obstacles were thin enough not to need an alternative landfall then major landing craft should proceed at full speed for the last 2,000 yards, avoid obstacles if practicable but force a way through if necessary. Minor landing craft were to avoid obstacles if possible. If not they should follow through a gap made by major landing craft. LCT(AVRE), LCT(A) and LCT(CB) all had scrambling nets over their quarters to assist infantry in LCA landing across them if necessary. Faulty landfalls. It was recognised that despite all planning and precautions the leading waves might still land in the wrong place. If the DD tanks landed on the wrong beach subsequent groups were not to follow them. A landfall of up to 1,000 yards west of White Beach would not seriously affect Army plans but a landfall of more than 500 yards to the east of Red Beach would be very serious and might entail having to haul off and touch down again at the correct beach. A landfall east of Ouistreham was to be avoided at all costs. Assault Brigade. Group 1. Group 1 consisted of the LCTs carrying DD tanks and the various navigation and support craft which would accompany them. It left the Lowering Position at H-125 hours (0520), giving it two hours to make the run in. Accurate timing and navigation was of great importance for this wave. They would have no one to follow, indeed the entire force was to follow them. To achieve this accuracy a considerable array of navigation craft was provided including miniature submarine X23 and a Combined Operations Pilotage Party (in a rubber dinghy) to show lights to seaward, two LCP(L) Navigation and a Motor Launch. Some of the LCP(L)s equipment had suffered in the crossing but they nevertheless succeeded. Craft were also provided with low level photographs of the coastline with landmarks indicated and with sketches of buildings and other obvious landmarks. Communications were vital, not only to assemble the craft but to monitor their progress and report back, to coordinate fire support and in the worst case scenario report failure. All craft in Group 1 were equipped with a variety of wireless sets. All wireless equipped craft kept a listening watch on Eastern Task Force Joint Force Broadcast Wave. The wireless nets listed are all naval nets and waves. In many cases, especially DD tanks, AVREs, RMASG and Field Regiments RA could also communicate using their vehicle sets. Landing Craft Headquarters Serial 185. LCH Serial 185 was a LCI(L) converted as a headquarters craft. It carried the Support Group Commander who commanded Group 1 and the Commander 27 Armoured Brigade was also on board. The following wireless nets were used. Initially these were for listening only except in case of emergency. Silence was broken for the launching of the DD tanks. Force S Command Wave. Force S Auxiliary Wave. Force S Naval Beach Wave. Force S Fire Command Wave. Force S VHF Senior Officers Wave. For two way radio speech communication. DD net. Until DD tanks were launched at which time the sets switched to Landing Wave. Red Beach Landing Wave. White Beach Landing Wave. Army DD net (naval set with army operators) 7 Field regiment RA net (Army set and operators.) LCP(L) Navigation. Two LCP(L) Navigation were to lead ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons of the 13/18 Hussars and their DD tanks. These used the DD net, as did LCA (LCOCU) and submarine X23. 14 LCT Flotilla. Eight LCT3 of 14 LCT Flotilla carrying the DD tanks. These used the following wireless nets. Serial 101 only. Force S Command Wave. Serials 105 to 108. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serials 101 to 104. White Beach Landing wave. All. DD net and Army DD net (naval set with army operators) LCG(L) and LCS(L) Three Landing Craft Gun (Large). Two LCG(L) serials 507 and 508 fired on defences on White Beach from H-45 to H-15. They then fired on defences to the flank from H-15 to H+30. One LCG(L) serial 512 fired on defences on Red Beach from H-45 to H-15. It then fired on defences to the flank from H-15 to H+30. For the run in the LCGs 4.7” guns fired high explosive in a bombardment role. After H Hour they used armour piercing ammunition for use against emplacements and strongpoints. Any left over High Explosive ammunition was used however to fire over the seafront houses at targets inland. Three Landing Craft Support (Large). Three LCS(L) serials 522, 523 and 524 fired on active strongpoints on Red and White beaches from H-20 to H Hour and provided close support for DD tanks. From H Hour to H+30 they engaged active flank defences. On completion of their support duties they were to stand by off the beaches for towing duties. They would then report for despatch duty, one for Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group Two, one for Headquarters Ship Largs and one for Senior Officer Assault Group. Support Craft used the following wireless nets: Serials 507 and 512 only. Army DD net (naval set with army operators). All Force S Command Wave and Force S Fire Command Wave. LCP(L) Smoke. Three LCP(L) from 707 Flotilla for smoke and rescue duties. One failed to arrive.. Force S Fire Command Wave. LCP(L) for FOO. Three LCP(L) from 704 Flotilla for Forward Observation Officers from SP Regiments RA. One failed to arrive. ML Navigation Leader. One ML as Navigation Leader for 2 LCT Division. Force S Command Wave, DD net and Army DD net (naval set with army operators). A flashing light from X23 provided an additional navigation check but at this time the beaches could be clearly seen and identified. The LCTs were formed in two columns of four craft with Serial 101 leading the right hand column and Serial 105 leading the left hand column. The LCP(L) Smoke followed, ready to make smoke on demand. This was not required and they acted in their secondary role of assisting in launching DD tanks and as rescue craft. It was decided by the Brigadier Commanding 27 Armoured Brigade and Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group One that because of the sea conditions DD tanks would be carried closer to shore and launched at 5,000 yards. The orders for Force ‘S’ laid down that the distance from shore at which the DD tanks should be launched was to be decided by the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group One after consulting with Brigadier 27 Armoured Brigade. The plan called for the launch to be at 7000 yards from shore but discretion was given to launch further out if enemy action made this necessary. Launching closer to shore does not seem to have been envisaged. In emergency DSOAG One also had permission to screen the launching position with smoke but only if absolutely necessary and only the minimum amount was to be used. 34 DD tanks were successfully launched. On LCT 467 the leading tank slewed and damaged its flotation screen. Since it could not float the 13/18 Hussar officer designated as craft commander troops wished to jettison the damaged tank and launch the remainder. The RN craft commander over ruled him and decided to beach the craft and land the tanks. The RN officer was within his rights since while still at sea he was responsible for the craft and everything in it. There was, and still is, some debate as to whether his decision was correct. RN orders stressed the need to land all army assets regardless of difficulty or loss. However his decision meant that his load of five tanks arrived late. LCT 465 had a ramp chain torn off by the swell. The ramp was lowered using the existing chain and a temporary rig of two cables. Four tanks were launched but the fourth broke the cables and the fifth tank could not be launched. The LCT returned to the UK with the remaining tank. The LCP(L)s Navigation led the tanks in without problems. Two DD tanks sank on the run in but the crews escaped and were picked up by the LCP(L)s after using their dinghies. The accompanying LCP(L) with Forward Observation Officer RA could not receive signals through equipment failure, presumably caused by rough seas and damp. However the support craft provided close support. The LCS(L) covered the DD tanks on their approach using their 6pdr guns and Oerlikens to fire on targets of opportunity including pillboxes and machine gun posts on the beach. The LSG(L)s supported the final approach. They opened fire first at H-65 minutes (0620) on a battery to the eastwards of the beach area which had opened fire. Later on they engaged defences on White Beach. After H Hour they shifted fire to the flanks to avoid endangering own troops. At 1040 contact was made with FOB 80 and then engaged targets with directed fire. Group 2. Group 2 consisted of the craft carrying troops scheduled to land at H Hour including ARRE, RMASG and infantry. Plus navigation and support craft. LCH Serial 269. LCH Serial 269 was a LCI(L) converted for use as a headquarters craft. It carried the RN Commander of ‘E’ LCT Squadron who was also commander of Group 2. Its communications were as for LCH 185 except it had AVRE net and Army AVRE net (naval set with army operators) in addition. 45 LCT Flotilla Ten LCTIV from 45 LCT Flotilla carrying 5 Assault Regiment RE. These used the following wireless nets. Serial 113 only. Force S Command Wave. Serials 113 to 116. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serials 109 to 112. White Beach Landing wave. All. AVRE net and Army AVRE net (naval set with army operators) Only one LCA(HR) survived the crossing and arrived on time to support the AVREs. It was not wireless equipped. 100 LCT Flotilla. Six LCT(A) from 100 LCT Flotilla. Two had not arrived. One LCT(CB) also carrying a Major, Royal Marines from 5 Squadron RMASG. These fired on shore defences on the approach from H-10 to H Hour. From H Hour they fired on outer flank defences until disembarked. They used the following wireless nets. Serials 532 and 544 (Column leaders). Force S Command Wave. 532, 534, 544, 540 and 548. (RMASG troop leaders). Force S Fire Command Wave. Two LCF. The primary role of the LCF was the protection of the assault groups until AA protection could be landed and established ashore. They did also use their considerable number of automatic weapons against targets on shore. This was not always coordinated and on occasion they had to be asked to cease firing at sea front targets as the shells were going over the target and landing on dump area behind. After the assault phase the four LCFs of Force ‘S’ were deployed in their AA role with two carrying out patrols from the beaches out to 6000 yards. One patrolled from 6000 yards to the Lowering Position. One remained in the vicinity of HMS Largs. LCF used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Force S Fire Command Wave. ETF Joint Force Broadcast One LCP(L) Smoke. Force S Fire Command Wave. Serial 561. LCAs. Ten LCA from 535 Flotilla. Carried A and B Companies 2 East Yorkshire Regiment. Major Commanding. Ten LCA from 536 Flotilla. Carried A and C Companies 1 South Lancashire Regiment. Major Commanding. These craft were not generally wireless equipped. Section and Flotilla Officers craft were equipped with BP412 receivers and kept a listening watch on ETF Joint Force Broadcast. Communication from officers craft and others was by loudhailer or flag. Each LCA was provided with a container of hot tea for consumption on the run in. It was planned that during the run in the LCTs would form two columns with columns of LCA on the flanks. For the last 2,000 yards the craft would form a line abreast with the LCT in the centre and the LCA on the flanks. This neat arrangement did not work perfectly in practice. Group 3. Group 3 consists of five LCT(R). Serials 526, 527 and 528 fired a salvo of rockets at H-10 to cover an area 1400 yards long and 300 yards wide on Red Beach. The remaining two fired at H-4 minutes on an area 1400 yards long by 300 yards deep on White Beach. Launchers could not be aimed or trained so that the LCT had to be aimed on bearing 188 degrees. and be positioned exactly 3,500 yards from the target area. There was to be no fire on the beach after H Hour. As an alternative in the case of late arrival it was ordered that the craft would move to the flanks where three would be prepared to fire at Ouistreham and two at Lion Sur Mer up to H+60 as required. The LCT(R) could not see the target area through the smoke and dust caused by the bombardment but used their radar Type 970 to fire accurately. Having fired they retired to a position two miles at 270 degrees from the Lowering Position and reloaded. Working parties of Royal Marines, two NCOs and 20 men each, from ships of the Bombarding Force were sent to assist with reloading which took 4½ hours. They then reported to Naval Commander Force ‘S’ and stood by in case they were needed. LCT(R) used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Force S Fire Command Wave. Group 4. The Self Propelled artillery in LCTs. ML. Three MLs to act as Control Craft, one for each of the three SP Artillery Regiments. They used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Serial 561. FOO Wave 1 and Army SP Net Wave 1 (76 Field Regiment). Serial 562. FOO Wave 2 and Army SP Net Wave 2 (33 Field Regiment). Serial 571. FOO Wave 3 and Army SP Net Wave 3 (7 Field Regiment). LCT SP. LCT(SP)s Serials 272 to 277, 331 to 336 and 278 to 283. H-35 to H Hour. Red and White Beaches. Firing on course 188 degrees. Lifting 300 yards at H-5. Serial 272 (76 Field Regiment). Force S Command Wave, FOO Wave 1 and Army SP Net Wave 1. Serial 278 (33 Field Regiment). Force S Command Wave, FOO Wave 2 and Army SP Net Wave 2. Serial 331 (7 Field Regiment). Force S Command Wave, FOO Wave 3 and Army SP Net Wave 3. Serials 275, 281 and 331. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serials 272 and 278. White Beach landing Wave. Landing Craft Group 4 consisted of the three self propelled field artillery regiments. These departed from the Lowering Position at H - 65 minutes and followed the assault infantry into the beach, giving fire support as they approached. They did not however land at this time but turned away to return when required. Group 4A. 76 Field Regiment. Group 4B. 33 Field Regiment. Group 4C. 7 Field Regiment. Each Group consisted of six LCT4 and one Landing Craft Control, a Fairmile ‘B’ Motor Launch. Self propelled guns were loaded with one troop per LCT to allow normal fire control methods to be used. Loads included the four self propelled guns, Sherman Observation Post and Gun Position Officers tanks, plus M14 ammunition halftracks. 120 rounds per gun were carried in the LCT so that the guns had a full load of ammunition when they land. Any ammunition remaining after the shoot should be dumped at sea. At H-90 minutes the LCTs passed the Lowering Position and the flotillas took stations for the run in shoot. 7 Field Regiment was in the centre with 33 and 76 Field Regiments 400 yards to either side and 400 yards behind. The three Field Artillery Regiments fired a barrage from LCTs following the assault waves from H-35 minutes. They were then some 4,000 yards out. Forward Observation Officers in LCP(L)s observed the fall of ranging shots and order corrections if necessary. When the assault wave beached the LCTs retired and came back to land the self propelled artillery when the beach exits were ready. Regimental Adjutants acted as fire control officers and were in M14 wireless halftracks loaded on the Flotilla Leaders LCT. The Adjutant was in wireless communication with the batteries in his regiment and with the Regimental Commanding Officer on the Landing Craft Group Control Craft, the Fairmile ‘B’ Motor Launch. The Flotilla Leader was in wireless contact with his other five landing craft and the Deputy Senior Assault Group Commander (RN) on a Landing Ship Headquarters. The Commander Royal Artillery’s representative was on the Motor Launch acting as Control Craft for the Commander 27 Armoured Brigade. The Commander Royal Artillery was with the Divisional Commander on the Headquarters Ship. Group 5. LCAs. This Group departed from the Lowering Position at H – 60 minutes and carried the remaining companies of the assault battalions in thirty eight LCA. It also carried two Landing Craft Obstruction Clearance Units. At this point all the rifle companies of two battalions, plus their headquarters, should be ashore and moving off the beach. This group was timed to land at H + 20 minutes. It was accompanied by two LCF. LCF used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Force S Fire Command Wave. Group 6. Commandos. Departing from the Leaving Position at H – 50 minutes this group carried 4 Commando plus two troops of the French Commando who moved off to secure the flanks. They were carried in two LCI(S) and fourteen LCA from LSIs Princess Astrid and Maid of Orleans. Landing Craft Assault also carry Headquarters 1 Special Service Brigade. This group was timed to land at H + 30 minutes. Landing Craft Infantry (Small) used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Red Beach Landing Wave. LSIs Princess Astrid and Maid of Orleans also carried 263 Field Company RE. Their equipment was being carried on eight LCMs which were to collect the personnel from the LSIs and form part of Group 6. In the event bad weather delayed the LCMs and the personnel were carried ashore in a spare LCI(L). Group 7. Priority Vehicles for Assault Brigade. This group brought in the priority vehicles for the infantry assault battalions on nine LCTIV. These were the carriers with mortars, anti tank guns and wireless sets plus machine guns from the Machine Gun Battalion. At the same time the wading squadron of the 13/18th Hussars landed from four LCTIV. The plans show three LCT but a spare one was provided at the last moment. Departing from the Lowering Position at H -40 minutes they were timed to land at H + 45 minutes. The LCT used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Serial 217 only. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serial 210 only. White Beach Landing Wave. Group 8. Reserve Battalion. This group carried the reserve battalion of the assault brigade in three LCI(L) and eighteen LCA. Departing from the Lowering Position at H -20 minutes it was timed to land at H + 60 minutes. LCI(L) used the following wireless nets. Force S Command Wave. Serial 230 only. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serial 228 and 229. White Beach Landing Wave. Group 9. Commandos. This group carried 6 Commando and 45 Royal Marine Commando, plus 1 Commando Brigade Headquarters in twelve LCI(S). Departing from the Lowering Position at H + 35 minutes it was timed to land at H + 75 minutes. Group 9A. This group carried 3 Commando and 45 Royal Marine Commando in ten LCI(S). It departed from the Lowering Position at H + 65 minutes and was timed to land at H + 105 minutes. LCI(S) used the following wireless nets. Serial 256, 261, 284 and 289. Force S Command Wave. Serial 261, 284 and 289. Red Beach Landing Wave. Serial 256. White Beach Landing Wave. Group 10. Second Priority Vehicles. This group brought in the remaining priority vehicles and stores for the assault brigade. Departing from the Lowering Position at H + 35 minutes it was timed to land at H + 120 minutes. It consisted of nine LCTIV carrying vehicles and two LCTIV carrying stores. LCT used the following wireless nets. Serial 296. Force S Command Wave and White Beach Landing Wave. Serial 301. Red Beach Landing Wave. Follow Up Brigade. In these later groups the command structure is simplified. In LCI and LCT groups the senior craft is also the senior craft for White Beach and uses Force S Command Wave and White Beach Landing Wave. The senior craft for Red Beach uses Red Beach landing Wave. It is generally assumed that the Senior Officer is in the leading craft of the right hand column and that this craft is for White Beach. Motor Launches acting as Control Craft use Force S Command Wave. Orders from flotilla officers to individual craft to start the run in, form line abreast etc. were often given by the age old method of hoisting signal flags. Prearranged signals were hoisted as a warning and were to be executed when lowered. Group 11. This Group carried the three battalions of 185 Brigade and Brigade Headquarters in nine LCI(L). Departing from the Launching Point at H + 95 minutes it was timed to land at H + 150 Minutes. Three of these LCIs were equipped as battalion headquarters craft with extra accommodation and communications equipment. Two of these were LCI(L) MkII, with a modified superstructure and a higher conning tower. HQ Ship HMS Dacres accompanied this group Group 12. This group carried the Staffordshire Yeomanry on eleven LCTIV. This was a normal Sherman equipped regiment of 27 Armoured Brigade assigned to support 185 brigade. Departing from the Launching Point at H + 95 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 185 Minutes. A Motor Launch accompanied them. Group 13. This group carried Beach Group personnel in six LCI(L). Departing from the Launching Point at H + 160 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 215 Minutes. Group 14. This group also carried Beach Group personnel in six LCI(L). Departing from the Launching Point at H + 175 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 230 Minutes. Group 15. This group carried priority vehicles for 185 Brigade in sixteen LCTIV. Departing from the Launching Point at H + 155 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 250 Minutes. Two LCT with stores also landed. Reserve Brigade. Group 16. This Group carried the three battalions of 9 Brigade and Brigade Headquarters in nine LCI(L). Departing from the Launching Point at H + 225 minutes it was timed to land at H + 270 Minutes. This wave was accompanied by Headquarters Ship HMS Locust. Group 17. This group consisted of five Landing Ships Tank carrying divisional troops. They were not to land all their vehicles at this time but launched DUKWs which would swim to shore. Departing from the Launching Point at H + 266 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 330 Minutes. All LST groups used Force S Command Wave for senior officer’s ships. All LSTs used Force S Unloading Wave. Group 18. This group carried the East Riding Yeomanry in eleven LCTIV. This was a normal Sherman equipped regiment of 27 Armoured Brigade assigned to support 9 Brigade. Departing from the Launching Point at H + 240 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 330 Minutes. Group 19. This group carried priority vehicles and stores for 9 Brigade in twelve LCTIV. Departing from the Launching Point at H + 275 Minutes it was timed to land at H + 360 Minutes. This wave was accompanied by a Motor Launch. Close Support. Apart from the craft mentioned above with the assault groups there were a number of destroyers which also gave close support. The roles of the Close Support ships and craft were: - To engage in direct fire the enemy sea front defences up to the moment of touch down of our own troops. - To continue to engage sea front defences on the beaches on either side of those being used by our forces. To carry out the roles Commanding Officers were to close their ships or craft to decisive range. The attack was to be pressed regardless of loss or difficulty. Fire was to be directed where practicable on targets in clear view. If smoke obscured the targets destroyers were to engage in blind fire up to H-20 minutes. If necessary the DSOAG 1 was to order the redistribution of fire. The DSOAG 2 was to be prepared to take over if necessary. The following destroyers were also to keep a watch on the VHF Fire Command Wave and might receive calls for support fire from the DSOAG. HMS Scourge. Call sign Maypole. HMS Serapis. Call sign Ropewalk. HMS Middleton. Call sign Polecat. ORP Slazak. Call sign Banjo. Destroyer tasks. HMS Eglinton and HMS Kelvin. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 03884 to 058825. This stretch of coast believed to contain one large post and two small posts, two 75mm and two 50mm. HMS Virago, HMS Verulum and HMS Serapis. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 058825 to 076813. This stretch of coast believed to contain one large post and two small posts. ORP Slazak and HMS Middleton. H-45 to H-10. Ref. 076813 to 098803. This stretch of coast believed to contain two large posts and four isolated pillboxes. H-10 accompany LCT AVREs with Slazak to the west and Middleton to the east. Remain close inshore to give support until H+30. HMS Scourge. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 098803 to 110800. This stretch of coast believed to contain two posts. Stord and HMS Scorpion. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 110800 to 126784. One large post and a battery position. Frobisher may be engaging the battery at 117799 from H-40 to H+50. HMS Saumarez and HMS Swift. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 126784 to 165791. Five small posts. Two 81mm mortar at 162793. 75mm at 153793. Blind harassing fire on batteries 248780 and 254284 may be carried out if no other suitable targets are available. ORP Svenner. H-45 to H+60. Ref. 165791 to 205797. Four small posts. Blind harassing fire on batteries 248780 and 254284 may be carried out if no other suitable targets are available. (Of course Svenner was sunk in the early hours of D Day and did not carry out any of these tasks. It seems insensitive to point out that her role was the least vital, being well to the east of the actual landing beaches and so her loss caused little disruption to the plans. Of course it was possible to attack her because she was right out on the eastern flank from where the torpedo attack came.) Smoke. Plans were made to lay smoke screens if necessary. These were separate from the plans for AA smoke screens. The following were available: - Four Motor Launches and 4 LCP(L under the command of Naval Commander Force ‘S’. - Three Motor Launches and 5 LCP(L) under the command of Senior Officer Assault Group 3. - Five LCP(L) under the command of Senior Officer Assault Group 2. - All destroyers. - Two squadrons of Bostons RAF. At 2½ hours notice. Smoke could be ordered on the following: Lowering Position. Return Position. Waiting Position. The Beach. Mike.
FORCE ‘S’ POST ASSAULT. Orders were issued as a guide to the conduct of ships and craft after the assault. Obviously the plans could not be precise since events could not be precisely foretold or losses predicted. The details of what happened in practice are not available to me but there are no reports to suggest that there were significant variations to the plan. The crews of minor landing craft that were to remain off the beaches had be fed, rested and maintained by headquarters ships or by the authorities to whom they are attached until the Ferry Base could be established. It was acknowledged that by the end of D Day the crews would be exhausted. This was issued even before it was known that many of the crews would have had to struggle to cross the Channel independently before working off the beaches. Headquarters Ships. HMS Largs remained as Headquarters Naval Force ‘S’ who would control area Sword. HMS Goathland, Headquarters Commander Assault Group S3, remained to control the anchorage. HMS Dacres, Headquarters Commander Assault Group S2, assumed the duties of Captain, Northbound Sailings. HMS St Adrian, remained as Headquarters Senior Officer Ferry Control. HMS Locust became a spare Headquarters Ship. This was not the easy task it sounds as there was always essential work to be done. Landing Ships. Landing Ships Infantry were to sail for Portsmouth using Channel 10 as soon as the LCAs were recovered. If the Lowering Position was under fire the Commanding Officer HMS Glenearn, the senior officer, could order the LSIs to sail without waiting for LCA. These would be collected and returned to the UK when the LSIs returned on Build Up personnel duties. LSTs of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tides returned to the Isle of Wight Area. An exception was be that the first two LST of 2nd tide to complete discharging were to return to Tilbury. Landing Craft. LCT3s were to form a return group when they were clear of enemy fire and sail for Fort Gilkicker (Portsmouth). Stores LCTs were to dry out and remain until they were emptied. The remaining LCT4 were to form return groups when clear of enemy fire and sail for Fort Gilkicker (Portsmouth) or Newhaven. Thirty LCT4 were required to return to Newhaven. DSOAG2 was to send the LCT of the Intermediate Brigade plus as many from the Reserve Brigade as were required to make up the number. RN 104 and 107 LCT Flotillas from the Western Task Force joined Force ‘S’ for Ferry Service as soon as possible on D Day. LCT(A) and LCT(CB). Two or more of these as decided by DSOAG 1 were to remain off the beaches to assist in towing off stranded craft. A Lieutenant RN was be in charge of the salvage operation. The remainder were to withdraw to the Lowering Position until required for the Ferry Service. LCI(L). DSOAG 2 was to detail LSI(L) as required to accompany returning LCT groups. Thirty Five LCI(L) were to return to Newport, the remainder to Fort Gilkicker (Portsmouth). It was ordered that at least one LCI(L) should accompany each LCT convoy to act as navigation leader. LCI(L) Serial 374 from the Reserve Group was to be detached to Senior Officer Ferry Control in HMS St Adrian for Ferry Control duties. LCI(S). 200 Flotilla was to report to Commander Force ‘G’ (Gold). 201 Flotilla was to report to HMS Largs where two would be detailed to each of HMS Dacres, HMS Goathland and HMS Locust for despatch duties. The remainder would be retained at HMS Largs. Some would be required later as Headquarters Craft for Senior Office Ferry Craft and Ferry Squadron Commander. LCH. These were to continue duties as Headquarters Craft for DSOAGs. One LCH was to be made available for Senior Officer Ferry Craft as soon as practicable after D Day. LCM. Serials 425 t0 432 were to report to HMS St Adrian at the Lowering Position and remain in this vicinity until required by Senior Officer Ferry Craft for Ferry Service. LCA. Serials 161 and 180 (LCOCUs) were to remain off the beach for obstacle clearance. Serials 231 to 248 (from the Reserve Battalion) were to report to DSOAG One who would detail craft for despatch duties as follows (or in equivalent proportion). Three for DSOAG One. Three for DSOAG Two. Six for HMS Goathland. Six to HMS Largs for allocation to HMS Dacres and HMS Locust when they arrive. The remainder of the LCAs returned to the LSIs for hoisting. If the LSIs had been forced to sail without them they were to report to HMS Largs and would eventually be hoisted by LSIs on their return as personnel ships in the Build Up. LCP(L). The various LCP(L)s were to complete their initial tasks and then report as follows: Serial 502. Remain with LCH serial 501 for despatch duties. Serial 519. Remain with HMS Goathland for despatch duties. Serial 551. Remain with LCH serial 531 for despatch duties. Serials 520, 521, 552, 553 and 554. Report to GS 2 for smoke duties. Serials 503, 504, 514 and 515. On completion of DD smoke and FOO duties report to GS3 for smoke duties. Serials 505, 506, 516 and 517. On completion of DD smoke and FOO duties report to HMS Largs for smoke and despatch duties. Serials 516 and 517 were reserved for landing 3 Division Commander. In addition: Naval Commander Force ‘J’ was to transfer 702 Flotilla to Force ‘S’ before noon on D Day. Naval Commander Force ‘G’ was to transfer half 700 Flotilla to Force ‘S’ before noon on D Day. After leading DD tanks one LCP(L) Navigation was to proceed to the mark dinghy and transfer the Combined Operations Pilotage Party party to X23, escort X23 to the Lowering Position and then report to DSOAG One. The second LCP(L) Navigation remained with DSOAG One. Both LCP(L) Navigation were to be ready to carry out inshore survey and were not be used for despatch boat duties. One LCP(L) Survey from each of Force ‘J’ and Force ‘G’ were to be sent to Sword area as soon as practicable after the initial landings. These craft were to be used for surveying the site of Gooseberry 5 and the coaster hauling off slot. Escorts, other than those escorting heavy bombardment ships, were released as soon as practicable and in any case not later than 2300. Naval Commander Force ‘S’ will assigned them as necessary to returning convoys and groups. Anti submarine trawlers other than those assigned for return convoy escort duty remained in the vicinity of the Lowering Position and stood by to carry out anti submarine patrols as ordered by Commander Force ‘S’. These four trawlers were joined by one each from Force ‘J’ (HMS Lancer) and Force ‘G’ (Northern Foam) under the command of the Senior Officer on Northern Wave. Trawlers Northern Reward and Hugh Walpole were assigned for return convoy duty to Portsmouth. En Avant was to tow X23 to Portsmouth. MLs. Senior Officer 13 ML Flotilla was to assign four MLs to report to HMS Largs and three to report to HMS Goathland for smoke duties. One ML from Force ‘G’ was to join the latter group about noon on D day. HDMLs 1415 and 1416 which had been marking the northern entrance to Channels 9 and 10 reported to Captain Northbound sailings for convoy assembly duty by 2300 on D day. The following craft were to stand by in case they were required to support Operation Frog or Operation Deer on the night of D Day – D+1. They were not required as these operations were cancelled. Two Navigation Leaders. Two LCT(R). Two LCS(L). One LCA(OC) if available. Captain Group S3 was to detail the craft and they were to report to Naval Commander Force ‘S’ at 1600. At 2000 they were to rendezvous at the flagship of the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force off Sword. Their briefing would be undertaken at this time. Mike.
FORCE ‘S’. BUILD UP Naval Officer in Charge, Area Sword. This officer was responsible to Naval Commander Force ‘S’ for: - The establishment of the naval organisation required to discharge all craft and shipping in Area Sword. - The provision of the communications necessary to carry out the above. - The despatch of ships and craft after discharge to sailing areas. - The inshore repair of ships and craft. - The administration of all naval personnel ashore. Senior Officer Ferry Base. In fact there were two officers with this title referred to as Senior Officer Ferry Base ‘One’ and Senior Officer Ferry Base ‘Two’. Both will issue orders signed simply Senior Officer Ferry Base. Senior Officer Ferry Base ‘One’ was based on HMS Cap Tourane. Senior Officer Ferry Base ‘Two’ was based on HMS Danae. They were jointly responsible for the administration, welfare and regulating of squadron and flotilla staffs, relief crews and crews of ferry craft standing off. A Sea Transport Officer 2, a naval staff officer concerned with shipping, was on the staff of the Naval Officer in Charge. He had under him six Sea Transport Officers 3, two working with the Senior Officer Ferry Control and two working with the Deputy Naval Officer in Charge. They dealt with all problems and requirements of Red Ensign (Merchant) Shipping, advised on unloading and assisting ships Masters in bringing in ships to unload or coasters to beach. The Naval Commander Force ‘S’ or Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group was responsible for sailing the Shuttle Service Convoys (Craft) and Hospital Carriers direct from the Assault area to he UK. Before the establishment of Captain Northbound Sailings (about daylight D+1) LSI, LST and any other shipping were sailed direct by the Naval Commander Force ‘S’. Such convoys were designated ‘Bluesky …..’. After the Captain Northbound Sailings was established Naval Force Commander ‘S’ sailed shipping from the sailing areas to Captain Northbound Sailings in accordance with the convoy programme below. Convoys sailed from the Point of Departure as follows: - Personnel convoys sailed when ready. - MT Ships and LST Convoys sailed at 0900 daily. - Coasters sailed at 1100 daily. - LSTs sailed at 1600 daily. - Any ships missing their convoy sailed at 2000. In the early stages when craft cleared the beach they proceeded to Position RR. Here senior officers reformed their groups and proceeded by Channel 6 to the Collecting Area. Ships and craft which had received no orders and were unlikely to receive any proceeded independently by Channel 6 to the Collecting Area. Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group decided when to form convoys and passed the relevant information to the Naval Commander Force ‘S’ who in turn passed it to Commander in Chief Portsmouth. There were in fact two Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group called DSOAG One and DSOAG Two. After groups cleared the beach Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group sent Senior Officers a signal giving information about the convoy in the following form. - Convoy Name and Number. - Senior Officer. - Estimated composition of convoy. - Time of departure. - Destination. Example: Bluesky 3. LCI(L) 130. 24 LCT and 3 LCI(L). 1230. Newhaven. The senior officer formed the convoy and confirmed the details, including actual numbers, to Naval Commander Force ‘S’ who confirmed the information to Commander in Chief Portsmouth. Channels. After the initial assault minesweepers were to progressively widen and merge the channels. Channels 9 and 10 would not be used after the assault. On D Day and D+1 Channels 5 and 6 were merged into a single channel two miles wide and designated Channel 56. Channels 7 and 8 were to be similarly merged to form Channel 78. Eventually there would be only one wide channel for the Eastern Task Force. This was formed by clearing the area between Channels 56 and 78 to form Channel 58. On D Day and D+1 northbound shipping for Sword was to use the eastern side of Channel 78. Southbound shipping would use the western side and would consist of tugs towing Mulberry and Gooseberry units. When Force L, the follow up force for all three beaches, arrived it was to use Channels 7 and 8 and then the shipping for Sword would divert. Channels were marked with buoys. Channels 56 and 78 had buoys on the centreline. Those on 56 had lights flashing every 10 seconds. Those on 78 had lights flashing every 2½ seconds. Shipping was to keep to starboard side of the Channel, that is east for northbound and west for southbound. There were two other Channels. Channel F was from Portsmouth to Area Z. Channel E was marked by five buoys from Area Z to 50 degrees north. Anchorages. Vessels and convoys waiting to depart were held in Waiting Areas near the Point of Departure. As soon as Captain Southbound Sailings was established all convoys arriving passed through his hands. All convoys in Area Sword were directed to anchorages by Senior Officer Assault Group. Gooseberry 5 arrived in two groups, the first about 1500 on D+1. Two small tugs for positioning Gooseberry ships to be retained by NOIC Sword arrived. Eight Corncob blockships arrived under their own power. Two large tugs accompanied them to help with positioning and then returned to Selsey. On D+2 at 1400. Courbet arrived towed by two large tugs, Empire Jonathan and Empire Sophie. Anchorages were planned around Gooseberry 5 and the anchorages were kept as compact as possible for defence and ease of communication. They still covered a considerable area. A Ferry Haven for craft was laid out south of Gooseberry 5 with the eastern half being used for LCMs and LBV while the western half was for LCVP. Two trots of hauling off buoys for coasters were laid out to the east. Six moorings for the use of Rhino Ferries were laid out in a line one cable south of, and parallel to, the north face of the Gooseberry. Buoys were a cable apart. Traffic from the LCT Arrival Anchorage passed to the west of the Gooseberry. Traffic from coaster and shipping anchorages passed to the east. A Seaward DUKW Control Point consisting of an army launch was established. This showed an amber light at night in the direction of the Beach DUKW Control Point. DUKWs travelled between the two Control Points before being directed either to the ship/coaster they were to discharge or to the inland dumps. Snippets. HMS Danae on completion of bombardment duties returned to Portsmouth and then returned to Sword to act as Depot Ship. One ASIS (ammunition stores issue ship) arrived on the second tide. One Eagle ship, HMS Thames Queen arrived for AA duties at Ouistreham. Naval Party 1502 landed for port clearance work at Ouistreham.
Kudos Mike! At the risk of sounding liking a patronising b'std the amount of work you've put into this subject, coupled with the fact that you're providing it to the masses free of charge is outstanding. Arty
I have 'cut' the Solent Anchorage file into four pieces and will try to attach to this message. Roy View attachment Solent Assembly_1_1.pdf View attachment Solent Assembly_2_2.pdf View attachment Solent Assembly_3_3.pdf View attachment Solent Assembly_4_4.pdf
Roy, That works for me. Nice clear and readable images. Thank you. Arty. Patronise away. Simple philosophy. If I give you all my knowledge I still have it so it is no loss. If you give me all you knowledge in return we are both twice as well off. In fact although I paid for a large quantity of documents on military matters all the naval documents have been given to me. This would be a good place and time to say thank you for all the assistance given me on this project. All contributions large and small are much appreciated. Also being somewhat old fashioned and low tech I cannot really understand complex matters until I have written the information and then tried to present it to an imaginary reader. If I can not explain it then I have not understood it. Why stop at an imaginary reader? I take more care if I have to present information to real readers. Mike.
Mike, Roy, This thread is a superb piece of work and is an invaluable source of information. And Mike, I admire your ethos: If I can not explain it then I have not understood it.
Mike, Thanks again. I have recently being looking at the Marshalling Areas for Tilbury and the London Docks. I am not sure if Hornchurch quite comes into the area but it must be near to it. Mike
Mike, the Marshalling area came quite close to Hornchurch but I think you are right - we were just outside it (not that I was here at the time!). Seem to recall Ockendon and Dagenham might have been involved. Just remembered there used to be a Phoenix element on the Thames at Dagenham, used as a small wharf. Not sure whether it was recovered from Normandy or it was an element that was not used in the Mulberry. Phoenix Timber (no longer there) used the wharf and was named after it.
Mike, Lots more to investigate then. I have just had a quick look at what material I have. Brentwood was the centre of the Tilbury Marshalling area. The barracks there were demolished and the site used for Fords admin. offices. The garrison church still seems to be there. The Thames role in the Normandy landings seems to be another neglected area. Mike
I am trying to establish details of my father's activities during Operation Neptune .. he was a driver in 39 Coy General Transport RASC, and as far as I can ascertain ( entries extracted from 39 Coy GT RASC War Diaries) he landed on Sword Beach (101 Beach Sub Area) at 02:00 on June 8th. My query concerns the operating strength of 39 Coy GT RASC when landing .. 10 Officers and 383 Other Ranks. (from the War Diaries). An entry in the Landing Table (kindly posted on a sub-Forum) states under LTIN 297, that 39 Coy was transporting 15 lorries and ammunition .. I'm probably missing something here, but 10 Officers and 383 ORs seems out of proportion to transporting 15 lorries and ammunition. I suspect the Landing Table entry I have looked at is not the full story. There is a brief entry in War Diary for 39 Coy, June 8th .. "remainder of 2nd and 3rd Tide landed." What does this refer to ? Can anybody possibly point me in the right direction ?
I will look at this as time allows. Certainly 15 lorries is only a small advanced party. 2nd and 3rd tide parties were those scheduled to land on the 2nd and 3rd tides. That is late on D day and early D+1. Unloading was seriously delayed and many did not land until D+2. In general the detailed landing tables that have survived only cover D Day. Mike.
Easier than I thought. 39 General Transport Company. This company landed on LCTs which each carried 200 tons of stores. This was mostly ammunition but included ten tons of roadway material for Royal Engineers. Two LCTs would land at H+120 and two more at H+240. The lorries of 39 GT Company would carry 6pdr anti tank guns of the Beach Groups. These would be carried forward to form part of the anti tank defence plan. The lorries would then transfer the ammunition to Sector Stores Dumps immediately behind the beach. H+120 White Beach. 15 men. Includes an officer. 5 3ton 4 X 4 GS , Austin. Carry 3 6pdr Anti Tank guns from 1 Buckinghamshire Regiment. 6 Beach Group. Red Beach. 15 men. Includes 2 NCOs. 5 3ton 4 X 4 GS , Austin. H+240. White Beach. 15 men. 6 3ton 4 X 4 GS , Austin. Carry 3 6pdr Anti Tank guns from 5 Kings Regiment. 5 Beach Group. Red Beach. 14 men. 6 3ton 4 X 4 GS , Austin. Carry 3 6pdr Anti Tank guns from 5 Kings Regiment. 5 Beach Group. H+7 hours. 1 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin, with 3 crew from 39 General Transport Company. H+12 hours. (Second Tide). The LSTs brought in further 3ton 4 X 4 GS lorries which were pre loaded with stores for the dumps. They should have moved forward to the large dump areas set up by 6 Beach Group but these dumps were not yet ready. The landing was delayed by problems with Rhino Ferries. 49 3ton 4 X 4 GS Austin. 2 Jeep. 1 15cwt 4 X 4 GS (CMP). 17 motorcycles. 154 men. H+16 hours. 1 3ton GS, Albion, with 2 crew. 1 3ton Workshop, Albion, with 2 crew. 1 3ton Breakdown, Albion, with 2 crew. H+22 hours. (Third Tide). 39 3ton 4 X 4 GS, Austin. 1 3ton 4 X 4 Albion. 1 Albion 6 X 4 Breakdown. 1 15cwt 4 X 4 GS (CMP). 1 15cwt water. 1 Humber Heavy Utility 4 X 4. 1 jeep. 68 men. H+25 hours. 9 3ton 4 X 4 GS , Austin, with 19 crew. All ashore by end of D+2. Mike
