So it Began.....Their Finest Hour

September 8th - September 9th 1940
SUNDAY SEPTEMBER 8th 1940



To many Londoners' this had been the first time that they had really experienced the effects of saturation bombing. It had been a sleepless night for most as the bombing attacks that commenced during the afternoon of the previous day carried on through the night. Anderson shelters rocked as each bomb exploded, dust managed to find its way into every hole and crack, children were screaming and crying, mothers were doing their best to comfort them. It had been a night that 'terror ran amoke' and by the early morning light of September 8th after the last of the enemy bombers had returned back to their bases, most would have said.....'We never want to go through another night like that....ever'. Little did they know that soon, London would come under heavy bombardment for fifty-seven consecutive nights, just like what they had just experienced on the night of September 7th - 8th.
But as the first light of Sunday emerged, a strange phenomenon took place, quite different from that of the previous twelve hours as London's "Daily Telegraph" reports:

After a sleepless night, while their Anderson shelters rocked with the explosion of bombs and the crash of guns, the people of East London carried on to-day with their usual amazing spirit.
Several hundred began their search for new homes as soon as the "all clear" sounded. Whole streets had been destroyed and many other houses demolished. But people gathered their possessions together and piled them into perambulators. With children in their arms, they started their walk to friends or relatives.

Their morale was astonishing. As they were walking to their new homes many were laughing and joking among themselves.

Some families took care of children whose parents were dead or injured, and made long journeys across London to escort them to the homes of relatives.

Women went on preparing the Sunday dinner, even though they had no water or gas. They borrowed water from more fortunate neighbours and lit fires to roast the joints. One of them, Mrs. W. Johnson, who had spent the night in a shelter, was preparing her meal in a house where the dividing wall between dining-room and drawing-room lay in chunks across the floors.

In a dockland tavern, where every window bad been blown out by a bomb which fell across the road, they were collecting for a Spitfire fund.

The licensee of a hotel gave up his saloon bar for housing people whose houses were no longer tenable. In several streets neighbours were making a whip-round for those who had lost their belongings.

"It was an experience far worse than the Silvertown explosion in the last war," Mrs. Cook, who with her husband and five children escaped injury, said to me. "The heat from the fires was terrific. We do not intend moving from the district, despite this ghastly raid."

The morale of the people was summed up in the words of one Mayor, who said: "They have taken it on the chin."

At 8 p.m. another all-night raid began, while London's anti-aircraft guns put up a terrific barrage.
London Daily Telegraph of Sunday September 8th 1940



But for those at Fighter Command, and at the sector and satelite stations, today was to be just 'another day at the office'.
WEATHER:

After a clear night, clouds were expected to develop over most of Britain and remain at eight tenths for most of the day. Although cloudy, it was antcipated that the day would remain dry with only far northern Scotland expecting a shower or two. Temperatures were expected to be a little cooler because of the cloud cover but this cloud was expected to break up late in the afternoon.

 

September 8th - September 9th 1940

8th September 1940

CASUALTIES:
1215hrs: Dover. Spitfire R6756. 41 Squadron Hornchurch
F/O W.J. Scott killed. (Possibly shot down by Bf109. Crashed in flames)
1230hrs: Isle of Sheppy. Hurricane P3201. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sub/Lt J.C. Carpenter killed. (Shot down by E/A. Pilot baled out but killed. Aircraft crashed at Maidstone)

 

September 8th - September 9th 1940

MONDAY SEPTEMBER 9th 1940

WEATHER:

Cloud overnight becoming showery with the possiblity of a thunderstorm in the east. Rain periods in the west while the north and Scotland should remain cloudy but dry. Showers were expected to clear from Channel areas by midday.
OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

The operations being carried out by Bomber Command during the hours of darkness are more inclined to be to the advantage of the Battle for Britain rather than the Battle of Britain. Although in the past many attacks have been made on German airfields, but these are numerous and putting one out of action really has no effect on the efficiency of the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command at present is doing far more damage to the Luftwaffe than is Bomber Command. But now British bombers are venturing further inland. As well as bombing Berlin, they are now targeting Hambourg, Bremen and Emden. Overnight a total of 133 bombers crossed into enemy territory to drop bombs on a number of towns and cities regarded as ports where Germany has vital shipping activity. The heaviest raid was by 49 Hampdens on the Blohm and Voss shipyard in Hambourg where considerable damage was done. But it was not without loss. Two Wellingtons of 149 Squadron and five Blenheims of were shot down over Boulogne and Ostend, while one Hampden of 61 Squadron was lost over Hambourg.
It was now obvious to Dowding and Park that the Luftwaffe was going to leave the 11 Group aerodromes alone, well, for the time being anyway. Already damaged airfields were just about back to any reasonable sort of order, the personnel that had been toiling both night and day busily rebuilding to make all airfields fully operational again could ease off a little. Aircraft and supplies had been replenished and although Fighter Command was nowhere yet back to full strength, they were a lot stronger than they were just seven days ago. Again, no enemy formations were detected during the morning or the early and mid afternoon sessions. Park shared with his chief controller Willoughby de Broke and also so Dowding by telephone, that the Luftwaffe tactics when targeting the aerodromes, commenced generally with a morning attack, with the last few days, when his aerodromes had been left alone, there had been no early morning attacks. It seemed that bombing raids on London seemed be be forming a pattern of commencing a few hours after midday. Park issued the order that Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Kenley push some of their squadrons forward to their satelite stations.

 

September 8th - September 9th 1940

9th September 1940


CASUALTIES:
1730hrs: Goudhurst. Hurricane P2728. 607 Squadron Tangmere
P/O G.J. Drake killed. (Engaged combat with enemy aircraft and shot down over Mayfield)
1730hrs: Farnborough. Hurricane L2059. 605 Squadron Croydon
P/O G.M. Forrester killed. (Caught in enemy crossfire and collided with He111 losing part of wing)
1730hrs: Mayfield. Hurricane P3574. 607 Squadron Tangmere
P/O S.B. Parnall killed. (Shot down during combat with Do17s and Bf109s. Crashed at Cranbrook)
1735hrs: Croydon. Hurricane P3888. 310 Squadron Duxford
F/O J.E. Boulton killed. (Collided with Hurricane of 310 Sqn during attack on enemy aircraft)
1735hrs: Mayfield. Hurricane P3117. 607 Squadron Tangmere
P/O J.D. Lenahan killed. (Shot down by Bf109 during attack on Do17. Crashed at Cranbrook)
1745hrs: Thames Haven. Hurricane P3087. 242 Squadron Coltishall
P/O K.M. Sclanders killed. (Shot down in combat with Do17s and Bf110s. Crashed at Caterham Surrey)

Although records show that only six pilots lost their lives, there were quite a number of aircraft that were damaged or lost in combat operations where pilots managed to survive. They are:

19 Squadron Duxford. 2 Spitfires damaged and both repairable.
66 Squadron Kenley. 1 Spitfire destroyed but pilot baled out and was safe.
92 Squadron Biggin Hill. 2 Spitfires destroyed with both pilots injured and 1 damaged and repairable.
222 Squadron Hornchurch. 2 Spitfires damaged and repairable with both pilots unhurt.
242 Squadron Coltishall. 1 Hurricane destroyed but pilot safe after baling out.
253 Squadron Kenley. 2 Hurricanes damaged and both repairable. Both pilots unhurt.
303 Squadron Northolt. 1 Hurricane destroyed and pilot injured and 1 damaged with pilot safe.
310 Squadron Duxford. 1 Hurricane destroyed with pilot safe and 1 damaged and pilot unhurt.
602 Squadron Westhampnett. 1 Spitfire destroyed and 1 damaged with both pilots injured.
605 Squadron Croydon. 1 Hurricane destroyed and pilot injured.
607 Squadron Tangmere. 2 Hurricanes destroyed and 1 damaged with all pilots safe.

 

September 10th - September 11th 1940

TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 10th 1940

WEATHER:

Clear duringthe early hours but cloud was expected to move in from the North Sea duringthe early morning and this would give rain over most areas during the day.
OPERATIONSIN DETAIL:

Low cloud andperiods of heavy rain over Northern Europe stopped any form of Luftwaffeair activity and any operations planned against England had to be cancelled.For Fighter Command the day was nothing but a rest day and pilots and commandleaders were trying to work out as to why Germany had decided to turn itsattacks against London. If an invasion was Germany's highest priority,why the decision to bomb London. For an invasion to be successful, Germany would have toknock out as many military establishments as possible. As ACM Keith Park stated after the war, "The decision to bomb London was Germany's greatest mistake, in those first few days of September our airfields were a shambles, pilot and aircraft strength was still at an all time low. By switching tactics and concentrating on London he will give us the time we need to strengthen our forces." There were many reasons as to why Park could do with some respite from his airfields becoming targets,the aerodromes were now functioning better than they had been for a numberof weeks, aircraft factories were still operating as normal and militaryhardware was still pouring out of the factories. The radar was functioningat full capacity and Fighter Command HQ as well as Bentley Priory wereoperating normally. These should be the targets if Germany was to continuewith its plan to make an invasion of Britain. Even the German Naval Staffcould not understand the situation, as described in their diary:
Thereis no sign of the defeat of the enemy's Air Force over southern Englandand in the Channel area, and this is vital to a further judgment of thesituation. The preliminary attacks by the Luftwaffe have indeed achieveda noticeable weakening of the enemy's fighter defences, so that considerableGerman fighter superiority can be assumed over the English area.
However.....wehave not yet attained the operational conditions which the Naval Staffstipulated to the Supreme Command as being essential for the enterprise,namely, undisputed air superiority in the Channel area and the eliminationof the enemy's air activity in the assembly area of the German naval forcesand ancillary shipping.....It would be in conformity with the timetablepreparations for Sealion if the Luftwaffe now concentrated less on Londonand more on Portsmouth and Dover, as well as on the naval ports in andnear the operational area....
Excerptfrom the German Naval Staff Diary [1]
So why turn itsattack on London. True the oil storage tanks at Thameshaven had sufferedbadly as did the London Docks, but these would have no opposition to anyplanned invasion. Suffering most were civilian properties and inconveniencecaused to the inhabitants, especially those in the East End, all majorrailway stations had been damaged but had not been completely put out ofaction. Of the attacks of the previous nights, some newspapers made comparisonsto the blitzkrieg attacks on a number of towns and cities in northern Europe,and many of the Londoner's abbreviated the name and called the attackson their city as "The Blitz" and from then on, the name stuck.
A few Germanaircraft were detected in and around the southern and eastern coastlineof England, but most of these were on either weather or reconnaissancepatrols. Fighter Command decided to leave them alone. Bomber Command sent 248 Squadron (Blenheims) on a mission to Norway but this had to be abortedbecause of deteriorating weather conditions over the North Sea. A flightfrom 236 Squadron St Eval (Blenheims) is placed on escort duty for thesteamship Scillonian and the mission is successfully completed.

With cloud coverpersisting during the late afternoon, radar picks up various single aircraftcoming across the Channel from 1700hrs onwards. With Fighter Command againnot responding, a number of attacks were made by the Luftwaffe. A coupleof lone bombers ventured into 10 Group territory and made some nuisancedrops. Another lone raider attacked West Malling again but causing no seriousdamage. Tangmere reported that it had come under machine-gun strafing withnearby Portsmouth was attacked by single Do17s.

 

10th September 1940
CASUALTIES:
1100hrs:Stapleford. Hurricane P3525. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sgt S. Andrewskilled. (Crashed and burnt out for reasonsunknown after an uneventful patrol)
1530hrs:Thames Estuary. Hurricane V7232. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sgt W.A. Peacocklisted as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
1600hrs:Romney Marsh. Hurricane P3770. 504 Squadron Hendon
P/O A.W. Clarkelisted as missing. (Crashed and burntout near Newchurch after combat over coast)
1600hrs:Croydon. Spitfire II P7298. 611 Squadron Digby
Sgt F.E.R. Shepherdkilled. (Caught fire during combat. Pilotbaled out but aircraft crashed into houses)
1600hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Hurricane V6667. 213 Squadron Tangmere
Sgt A. Wojcickilisted as missing. (Shot down in Channelduring combat with Bf110s. Body never recovered)
1615hrs:South London. Hurricane V6665. 303 Squadron Northolt
F/O A. Cebrzynskidied of injuries 19.9.40 (Shot down duringcombat. Made a failed attempted crash landing)
1615hrs:Romney Marshes. Hurricane R2682 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Sgt S. Duszynskilisted as missing. (Last seen pursuingJu88 over Romney. Aircraft crashed at Lydd)
1615hrs:Dungeness. Spitfire K9793. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O F.N. Hargreaveslisted as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
1615hrs:Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane V7240. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Fl/Lt D.P. Hugheslisted as missing. (Last seen interceptingJu88s. Failed to return to base)
1620hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Spitfire N3282. 602 Squadron Westhampnett
Sgt M.H. Spraguekilled. (Shot down by Bf110s over Channel.Pilots body washed ashore at Brighton 10.10.40)
1625hrs:South London. Hurricane V7242. 303 Squadron Northolt
Sgt S. Wojtowiczkilled. (Crashed and burnt out at Westerhamafter being shot down by Bf109s)
1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
P/O P.C. Wickins-Smithlisted as missing.
P/O A.W.V. Greenlisted as missing
Sgt R.D.H. Wattslisted as missing. (Believed shot downby Bf109 during escort mission to Calais)
1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
P/O N.B. Shorrockslisted as missing.
Fl/Lt F.W. Floodlisted as missing
Sgt B.R. Sharplisted as missing. (Failed to return fromescort mission to Calais)
1900hrs:Smeeth (Kent). Spitfire P9464. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O H.D. Edwardskilled. (Shot down by Bf109 during combataction and crashed into woods)

[1]John Frayn Turner The Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p116
[2]Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin Magraw-Hill 1961 p344

 

September 10th - September 11th 1940


WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 11th 1940

WEATHER:

The heavy cloudcover was expected to disperse overnight giving way to a fine day in mostareas, occasional cloud and some local showers in the midlands and thenorth with the exception of the English Channel and south-eastern Englandwhere cloud was expected to continue.
OPERATIONSIN DETAIL:

This was theday that Hitler had planned to invade Britain. But in reality, Germany was no where nearer ready for an invasion than they were three or four weeksprevious. Britain's coastal defences still stood firm along the southernand eastern coastlines, naval ports and other small seaports that werebeing used by the Royal Navy along the southern coast of England were stillintact and most of Britain's Civil Defence forces were just waiting forthe word that would put them into action. On top of this, RAF Bomber Commandhad been continually bombing ports from Calais to Boulogne and along theDutch coast destroying many of the barges that were to be used in "OperationSealion".

RAF FighterCommand was now known to Luftwaffe Intelligence that it had not been defeatedand that most aerodromes were on standby. Adolph Hitler had no option butto re-schedule the warning of the invasion which had been scheduled forSeptember 14th, and by bombing London and other important centres it wouldbe regarded as a strategic as well as a tactical concept, and wouldbreak the will of the British people and bring the British fighters outto fight a final pitched battle. Hitler now decided that the next warningof the planned invasion would be September 24th 1940.


The effortof the Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over England is ofcourse the crux of the whole war. So far, it has failed conspicuously.....forhim (Hitler) to try to invade this country without having secured masteryin the air would be a very hazardous undertaking.
Nevertheless,all his preparations for invasion on a great scale are steadily going forward.Several hundreds of self-propelled barges are moving down the coasts ofEurope, from the German and Dutch harbours to the ports of northern France,from Dunkirk to Brest, and beyond Brest to the French harbours in the Bayof Biscay.

WinstonChurchill broadcast September 11th 1940 [2]


[ Document 48: Winston Churchill speech ]


At the time, thepostponement by Hitler was not known, as stated here by Churchill to thepeople, that an attempted invasion was imminent. The sector controllershad received notification from Keith Park that it was obvious that theGermans had changed tactics from two or three separate attacks during thecourse of the day, to mass raids of 300 to 400 aircraft that were comingacross the Channel in two waves in quick succession. He further informedthem that with this change in tactics, that they were not to place toomany squadrons to intercept the first wave, and that enough aircraft hadto be held back to intercept the second wave which so far had proven tobe larger in number than the first.
He told thecontrollers that paired squadrons were to be used wherever possible. Spitfireswere to concentrate of the enemy fighters that were at higher altitudewhile the Hurricanes are to attack the bombers and close fighter escort.With the two German waves, generally only fifteen minutes apart, Park orderedthat those squadrons brought to 'readiness' first were to attack the firstwave and their escorts. The squadrons available and at "Readiness fifteenminutes" were to attack the second wave. Squadrons held in reserve and'Available thirty minutes" were to be vectored to reinforcements to thosesquadron requiring assistance and to provide protection to industrial centresand sector airfields.

The morningperiod was just as quiet as previous mornings of the last four days, andit appeared that things were to take the usual practice of large formationsof bombers coming over at about 1700hrs. It was a fine morning, not aswarm as many other mornings but pleasant, and many pilots just lazed aroundoutside their dispersal's doing what they usually done. Some read old newspapersor magazines, many tried to write letters home while the rest fell asleeptaking full advantage of the lull in activities. But after lunch, theirafternoon 'siesta' was interrupted by radar detection of a large build-upfrom Calais to Ostend. The Luftwaffe were to come early today.

1445hrs:Mostof the radar stations along the Kent coast detected and followed the coursepattern

 

September 10th - September 11th 1940

11th September 1940


CASUALTIES:
1100hrs:Stapleford. Hurricane P3525. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sgt S. Andrewskilled. (Crashed and burnt out for reasonsunknown after an uneventful patrol)
1530hrs:Thames Estuary. Hurricane V7232. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sgt W.A. Peacocklisted as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
1600hrs:Romney Marsh. Hurricane P3770. 504 Squadron Hendon
P/O A.W. Clarkelisted as missing. (Crashed and burntout near Newchurch after combat over coast)
1600hrs:Croydon. Spitfire II P7298. 611 Squadron Digby
Sgt F.E.R. Shepherdkilled. (Caught fire during combat. Pilotbaled out but aircraft crashed into houses)
1600hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Hurricane V6667. 213 Squadron Tangmere
Sgt A. Wojcickilisted as missing. (Shot down in Channelduring combat with Bf110s. Body never recovered)
1615hrs:South London. Hurricane V6665. 303 Squadron Northolt
F/O A. Cebrzynskidied of injuries 19.9.40 (Shot down duringcombat. Made a failed attempted crash landing)
1615hrs:Romney Marshes. Hurricane R2682 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Sgt S. Duszynskilisted as missing. (Last seen pursuingJu88 over Romney. Aircraft crashed at Lydd)
1615hrs:Dungeness. Spitfire K9793. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O F.N. Hargreaveslisted as missing. (Failed to return aftercombat action. Presumed crashed into the sea)
1615hrs:Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane V7240. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Fl/Lt D.P. Hugheslisted as missing. (Last seen interceptingJu88s. Failed to return to base)
1620hrs:Off Selsey Bill. Spitfire N3282. 602 Squadron Westhampnett
Sgt M.H. Spraguekilled. (Shot down by Bf110s over Channel.Pilots body washed ashore at Brighton 10.10.40)
1625hrs:South London. Hurricane V7242. 303 Squadron Northolt
Sgt S. Wojtowiczkilled. (Crashed and burnt out at Westerhamafter being shot down by Bf109s)
1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
P/O P.C. Wickins-Smithlisted as missing.
P/O A.W.V. Greenlisted as missing
Sgt R.D.H. Wattslisted as missing. (Believed shot downby Bf109 during escort mission to Calais)
1730hrs:Channel area. Blenheim. 235 Squadron Thorney Island
P/O N.B. Shorrockslisted as missing.
Fl/Lt F.W. Floodlisted as missing
Sgt B.R. Sharplisted as missing. (Failed to return fromescort mission to Calais)
1900hrs:Smeeth (Kent). Spitfire P9464. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O H.D. Edwardskilled. (Shot down by Bf109 during combataction and crashed into woods)

[1]John Frayn Turner The Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p116
[2]Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin Magraw-Hill 1961 p344

 

September 12th - September 14th 1940

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 12th 1940

WEATHER:

Cloud cover could be expected in all areas and showers turning to rain for most of the country. Low cloud would persist over the Channel areas and most of the south coast could expect showers that could be heavy at times.
OPERATIONS:

The morning period is virtually a non-event as far as combat action is concerned. Radar reports that a number of lone aircraft are detected well offshore both over the Channel and the North Sea. Fighter Command decide to leave these aircraft well alone as they are probably reconnaissance patrols and not doing any harm and that valuable fighters should not be placed at risk even to lone aircraft.
By midday, a few small formations are detected, some of these break up into individual raids sometimes consisting only of one or two aircraft. In 10 Group, Warmwell despatches just one section of 152 Squadron (Spitfires) to intercept a sighting out from Swanage, the bandit is recognised a lone Ju88 but it makes full use of the low cloud and disappears.

Shortly after, another enemy sighting is made and 238 Squadron at St Eval (Hurricanes) are scrambled. The squadron records show that one Ju88 is destroyed and another had been damaged.

605 Squadron (Hurricanes) stationed in the north at Drem also claim one enemy aircraft destroyed, possibly a reconnaissance aircraft that had ventured too close to the coast. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 602 Squadron Westhampnett (Spitfires) both claim to have damaged at least one enemy aircraft in spasmodic and isolated actions. Looking at these figures, it can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.

One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S. Dewar who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems obvious that his Hurricane had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was strafed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.

The bombers of III/KG51 and I/KG54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers on previous attacks often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murky conditions. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a H.E. delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Pauls Cathedral. It buried itself some thirty feet into the ground and the two officer who defused the bomb, Lieutenant R. Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personnel to receive the George Cross for their actions.

Other spasmodic and isolated raids occurred at Hull in Yorkshire, an area north of Wolverhampton, Liverpool and a number of small ports along the east coast of Suffolk and Essex.

CASUALTIES:
Time not known: Over Channel. Hurricane V7306. 213 Squadron Exeter
W/C/J.S .Dewar killed. (Circumstances not known. Body washed ashore at Kingston Gorse Sussex 30.9.40)

 

September 12th - September 14th 1940

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 13th 1940

WEATHER:

No sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods in all areas. In areas in the south and east there was a possibility that there could be breaks in the cloud to give sunny periods. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day.
OPERATIONS:

Many of the German commanders are pushing for an exact date for 'Operation Sealion' to commence. Already the weather seems to be closing in and with these deteriorating conditions it appears that any chance of a successful invasion may be out of the question if Hitler cannot make up his mind. Already, the date previously set for September 11th had been postponed, and Hitler had said that he favoured September 24th at the most likely date, but if conditions continued as they are, it would be an impossibility for the barges to cross the Channel should the expected winds that are prevalent at this time of the year accompany the heavy cloud and rain squalls.
A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organised prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readiness. Soon, he said, we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready. But, he stated, our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital.

The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined to preparations of any forthcoming invasion and the commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that they were beginning to think that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt was the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer, there were no fresh orders, he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.

In Britain, the radar operators lay in wait for the tell tale blips that would indicate enemy intrusion across the Channel. Pilots sat around waiting for the telephone to ring, but it was the same story of the last few days. A small piece of action occurred high over Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, but these were recognised as weather reconnaissance aircraft when the British "Y" Service picked up their conversations. No action was taken against these aircraft and Fighter Command allowed them to return back across the Channel without any interception.

A Focke-Wolfe 200 is detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the enemy has penetrated this area and proof that Ireland is not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship 'Longfort' just off the coast at Belfast and also submitted an unidentified vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage. [1]

For both sides, there were further tactical developments within this period. Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Park had more time to assess the situation and gave them greater time to intercept the enemy. Keith Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. The original order of this instruction went out as early as September 5th.

On the other hand, Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command was that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organisation than the tattered remnants of a defeated defence as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given the instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may decide and order the formation to disengage. This order was given by the German High Command.

Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending single aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the enemy. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an aluminium factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and as previously mentioned, the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred. [2]

Small raids did occur during the morning period when two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defences and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked and this time damaged had been sustained to the Royal Chapel.

 

13th September 1940
September 12th - September 14th 1940

CASUALTIES:
0700hrs: Norwegian Coast. Blenheim L5491. 248 Squadron Sumburgh
Sgt W.J. Garfield Listed as missing.
Sgt A. Kay. Listed as missing.
Sgt B.W. Messner. Listed as missing. (Failed to return from reconnaissance flight over Norwegian coast)
Night Sortie: Calais. Blenheim Z5721. F.I.U. Shoreham (Time not known)
F/L R.G. Ker-Ramsey. Taken PoW.
W/O E.L. Byrne. Taken PoW.
W/O G. Dixon. Taken PoW. (Baled out near Calais. Exact circumstances are not known)

 

September 12th - September 14th 1940

SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 14th 1940

WEATHER:

Again no sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods and a chance of thunderstorms in all areas. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day, but the chance of showers should persist.
OPERATIONS:

Keith Park and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding confer (by telephone as there is no record of any meeting between them on this day) and they discuss the constant postponements of the intended invasion by Germany. Park again points out that he could not understand why the switch to bombing London was made when the situation at the time was a critical one for Fighter Command, and there was every chance that the Luftwaffe could have finished off with the continued bombing of the airfields. The only thing standing in the way between Germany and the invasion was Fighter Command, now, Fighter Command was almost back to full operational strength and Göring would have to start all over again if he wants to destroy the Command. Dowding mentions, that the bombing of London was his biggest mistake, and one that could cost him the war.
By mid-September the Germans had assembled about 1,000 assorted invasion craft in the Channel ports, with some 600 more in the Scheldt. RAF bombing crippled about 12 per cent of this armada; what remained was still sufficient for the first stage of invasion as planned, but the combination of the bombing, and a sharp riposte by Fighter Command to a renewed attempt at a daylight attack on London on September 9, forced Hitler to yet another postponement of SEALION. It was deferred until the 24th, which meant that a final decision should have been made on September 14 (ten days’ notice was the German Navy’s very reasonable stipulation). With Hider, however, nothing was ever normal; the decision he actually took on that day was to bring forward SEALION to the 17th. He had been misled again by Goering, himself in turn misled by the Luftwaffe’s faulty Intelligence.
It was not so much the evidence that was at fault — rather the ability to interpret it correctly. The 9th had shown that Fighter Command was still very much a force to be reckoned with; the 11th & 14th, however, spoke with equivocal voices. On each of these days Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses were equal, though this was not appreciated by the Air Ministry at the time. On the 14th, particularly, to the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.

John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p210

 

September 12th - September 14th 1940

14th September 1940
CASUALTIES:
1605hrs: Tonbridge. Hurricane P2542. 73 Squadron Debden
Sgt J.J. Brimble killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft and crashed at Parkhurst Farm Chart Sutton)
1615hrs: Rochford. Spitfire X4275. 222 Squadron Hornchurch
Sgt S. Baxter killed.(Badly damaged by gunfire from Bf109s and crashed attempting to land)
1620hrs: Orsett (Essex). Spitfire R6625. 19 Squadron Duxford
Sgt F. Marek killed. (Crashed during routine patrol. Possibly oxygen failure. No other details)
1800hrs: Bredgar. Hurricane P5184. 253 Squadron Kenley
Sgt W.B. Higgins killed. (Shot down in flames after combat with Bf109. Pilot did not bale out)



2 x Hurricanes of 253 and 610 Squadrons shot down but no details are known except the pilot of the Hurricane of 610 Squadron is listed as missing. The Hurricane of 253 Squadron was shot down near Faversham Kent.
[1] Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw-Hill 1961pp347-8
[2] Hough & Richards The Battle of Britain-A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p272

 

September 15th 1940 (morning)

Sunday September 15th 1940
Details of the mornings action


The "hour of destiny" was September 15th, a date thereafter commemorated as "Battle of Britain Day". The title has been disputed; Alfred Price, for one, says that September 15th "has singularly little to commend it.....the day when the British victory claim was furthest from the truth....." Yet, forgetting the "numbers game", it is hard to dispute Churchill's verdict that it was, in fact, "the crux of the Battle of Britain". He made that judgment in the light of his knowledge of what happened to Operation SEALION - which was, of course, from beginning to end, what the Battle of Britain was really about. The Official History sums up with clarity:
"If 15th August showed the German High Command that air supremacy was not to be won within a brief space, 15th September went far to convince them that it would not be won at all."

John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 pp210-211

 

Page 43: September 16th 1940

Monday September 16th 1940


One of the British newspapers highlights the efforts of the RAF
But even though the figures were more often than not quite considerably very much overestimated by newspapers, the radio and the authorities, it gave a sense of security to the people that even though they had to bear the discomfort of days and nights of bombing, the British forces still had the upper hand and winning the war.
The true figure was 56 German aircraft had been shot down to the RAF's 27, and not as shown by this newspaper.



By the time that most people had either emerged from their Anderson's or had risen after another rather uncomfortable nights sleep, the daily newspapers were busy informing them of the events of the previous day. The 'Daily Telegraph' stated that "Of the 350 to 400 enemy planes launched in two waves against the capital and south-east England, 175, or nearly 50 per cent were shot down according to returns............The Germans loss yesterday was their highest since Aug 15, when 180 were shot down. On Aug 18 they lost 153. In personnel their loss yesterday was over 500 airmen against 20 RAF pilots.' The 'Daily Herald' told a similar story, but added that AA gunfire had brought down four of the 175 German planes. On the subject of the RAF victory, they went on to say that in both of the raids, the gallant pilots and squadrons of the RAF harassed the bombers so much that those that were not shot down, were harried and chased right back to the Channel. The Germans had encountered their most gruelling reception so far.
Of course, the figures had done wonders for British morale, newspapers and radio had a field day, but just like their German counterparts, all the figures had been completely blown out of all proportion. We have now learned that the true figure was that 56 German aircraft had been shot down and the Royal Air Force lost 27 Hurricanes and Spitfires. But if the British public really wanted proof that day, they only had to go down to the open fields of Kent and Sussex to see the scattered remains of bent and broken aircraft, and most of them were German.

But at the meetings held this morning, on both sides of the Channel, two completely different attitudes were emerging over the analysis of the previous days combat actions.

Keith Park, the C-in-C of 11 Group, even though the success of the previous days events had exhilarated him, he still felt that improvements could be made, he was not going to rest on his laurels as there was always the chance that Goring would send his Luftwaffe over again with an if not stronger force. He was concerned that individual squadrons were failing to rendezvous at the right times at given vectored positions. That paired squadrons were meeting up with each other far early and too low for that matter. And he also showed concern that paired squadrons were not committing themselves to the task that paired squadrons were supposed to do. 'In paired squadrons' he said, ' Hurricanes are to go after the bombers and the Spitfires must attack the fighter top cover.' Reports had got back to the 11 Group commander many Spitfires had been seen attacking the bombers while in other instances Hurricanes had been struggling with Bf109s. But this was not always possible:

The philosophy of taking on German bombers and fighters was based on the fact that the Hurricanes should attack the bomber formations and the Spitfires the fighter cover. Of course it never worked out like that. Either you weren't together with the Spitfires when the raid happened or, by the time the first flight went in to attack the bombers, the fighters were already coming down—so one of you had to play rear guard action and take on the fighters. This usually fell to my lot, although I did get mixed up with bombers on occasions.
If you had the time and the height, you got into a favourable position up-sun—but again that didn’t usually work out, because one was always scrambled on the late side. This was because, until the controllers were certain that it was a raid and not a spoof to draw you into the air, there was no point in launching you. If it was a spoof, by the time you were refuelling, the main raid would come—and this was what the controllers were trying to avoid.

Flight Lieutenant P.M. Brothers 32 Squadron Fighter Command

 

Page 44: September 17th 1940

Tuesday September 17th 1940




Since first light on August 15th until the last squadron of Fighter Command landed on September 15th, the intensity of the air combat was at its peak. 201 Fighter Command aircrew had been killed during this period and 495 aircraft had been destroyed. This was an average of 6.29 pilots killed each day and 15.47 valuable aircraft lost or destroyed on a daily basis. If we take a look at the Luftwaffe figures, one can understand as to why Göring was not impressed. The Luftwaffe lost 1,132 aircrew and 862 aircraft. This averaged out at 35.37 aircrew lost each day and 26.93 aircraft lost or destroyed every day for the last 32 day period.
It was also during this 32 day period that things were at their most difficult and daunting for the Germans. First of all, they made the fundamental alteration regarding strategy, which did not benefit themselves but played into the hands of Fighter Command where it appears that it gave them a new lease of life. It was prompted by the overall success of Keith Park's policy of refusing battle, as far as possible, with German fighters and concentrating against their bomber force. [1]

We must also appreciate the fact that Germany was not producing the amount of new aircraft at the same rate as they were in Britain, a feat that all accolades must go to the Minister for Aircraft Production Lord Beaverbrook. If the battle were to continue for the next 32 days with the same amount of attrition, then the Luftwaffe would surely be a spent force. Aircraft production in Britain, despite the number of attacks on the aircraft factories, still managed on many occasions to produce more aircraft on a daily basis than were being shot down.

When Beaverbrook became Minister of Aircraft Production on 14 May, the planned production of fighters for that month was 261 machines. The actual output for the month was 325. For June the planned programme was 292; the actual output was 446. In July and August the improvement still continued: the total planned production was 611 but the total actual output was 972. Already by early July the supply of fighters had become so satisfactory that it was decided to allocate an additional four aircraft to each of thirty Hurricane and six Spitfire squadrons — though, unfortunately, there were not the pilots to go with them.
Hough & Richard's The Battle of Britain - A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p102

 

Page 44: September 17th 1940
17th September 1940
CASUALTIES:
1540hrs: Ashford. Hurricane P3820. 501 Squadron Kenley
Sgt E.J. Egan killed. (Shot down in sudden attack by Bf109. Aircraft burst into flames. Pilot did not bale out)
1540hrs: Beltring. Hurricane P3933. 607 Squadron Tangmere
Sgt J. Lansdell killed. (Shot down during combat with Bf109. Failed to bale out)
1600hrs: Faversham. Hurricane V7529. 504 Squadron Hendon
Sgt D.A. Helcke killed.(Lost control during attacking practice and failed to bale out)


[1] John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p206
[2] Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin MacGraw Hill 1961 p461

 

Page 45: September 18th 1940

Wednesday September 18th 1940



It now appeared that the Royal Air Force were starting to gain the upper hand, but even though London suffered serious damage and hundreds of casualties from September 7th onwards, the battle was far from being over, although the turning point could be said, happened on September 15th. Adolf Hitler may have postponed the invasion once again, but the intensity of day and especially night raids were about to increase.
Göring was under instructions to continue bombing attacks on the British capital although personally, he would have like to revert back to destroying the fighters, the airfields and ground support installations of the RAF, but unlike the British chain of command, he was under instructions from Hitler personally. Daytime attacks would still continue, and by increasing Bf109 and Bf110 escort duties to the bombers, he could hopefully destroy at least some of Fighter Command by forcing them to send fighters into the air, but with instructions to concentrate on the industrial areas of London's East End and bombing London itself, it was going to be a big ask if the targets were not the fighter aerodromes themselves. Night time bombing would continue, and this was to become more widespread with greater intensity and with more high explosive bombs followed by thousands of incendiary bombs.

Keith Park was now under pressure to pursue the tactics of flying his squadrons in pairs. The instruction was given by the Air Ministry, mainly under pressure by those in favour of the "Big Wing" theory and as it had turned out, that the British tactical position had improved greatly. [1]

The flying of squadrons in pairs was more of a compromise on the part of Park who refused to send up the number of squadrons as Douglas Bader and Leigh-Mallory had wanted, although it must be admitted that Bader's "Big Wing" was destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft when given the opportunity. The combination of the "Big Wing" and other squadrons flying in pairs proved how successful the method was during the British victory on September 15th. We were not to see the last of paired squadrons yet.

During the early hours of the morning, Bomber Command flew a number of sorties which comprised of some 194 aircraft. Seventy-five per cent of the bombers were attacking the Channel ports as they had done throughout September, with special emphasis on Antwerp targeting the barges that would be used in any impending invasion. 187 of the bombers despatched reported successful missions with only two Hampdens being lost during the night operations. [2]



WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 18th 1940

WEATHER:

Conditions were expected to be a continuation of the previous day except that the low to medium cloud that brought the rain periods would disappear. The day was expected to be bright and clear although the squally winds would continue.

 

Page 45: September 18th 1940
18th September 1940


CASUALTIES:
0950hrs: Ashford. Spitfire X4323 603 Squadron Hornchurch
P/O P. Howes killed. (Shot down in combat with Bf109s. Pilot did not bale out)
1230hrs: Chatham. Hurricane V7442. 46 Squadron Stapleford
Sgt G.W. Jeffries killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft, baled out but parachute failed to open)
1325hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane V6600. 249 Squadron North Weald
Fl/Lt D.G. Parnell killed. (Crashed and burnt out after combat with enemy aircraft)

[1] Len Deighton Battle of Britain Jonathan Cape 1980 p186
[2] Middlebrook and Everitt Bomber Command War Diaries Midland 1995 p84
[3] Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1984 p112
[4] John Frayn Turner Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p151

 

Page 46: September 19th 1940

Thursday September 19th 1940



Dawn: As the first light of day takes over from the dark of the early morning, members of the Civil Defence, the fire services and many civilians count the cost the nights bombing. About 2200 hrs the previous night, German bombers attacked a number of installations in Northumberland and County Durham causing considerable damage. But it was again on London that the bombing was most severe. Just before midnight, heavy bombing occurred along the Thames and as the night wore on this was extended closer to the city centre. By daylight, the extent of the damage was clearly seen. The once high class shopping areas of Regent Street, Bond Street and along Piccadilly, was a scene of devastation. Many shop fronts had been blown in, many of the once beautiful facades that had formed a part of London's history for many years now lay in a crumpled mass of bricks and mortar in the streets.


WEATHER:
Heavy cloud was expected to continue throughout the day and rain periods, heavy at times was expected over most of Britain. The Channel areas could expect a very low cloud base with early morning fog and mist patches in coastal districts.
OPERATIONS:

Waking up to a rather dismal and damp morning, it was obvious to many of the British pilots that it was certainly not going to be a day that one should be up there in that dull grey murk and they hoped that the Luftwaffe would see it in the same way. They were not going to be disappointed. Radar stations along the Channel coast were idle, the CRT screens blank.
On mornings where there is absolutely no activity, it is like a gift from God. We are able to take things that little bit easier, have breakfast in comfort and generally most of us are in a very relaxed frame of mind, but there was always someone to keep an eye on that screen.....just in case.
Margaret Farmer. Radar Operations.