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Sledgehammer 1942

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by chipm, Jul 22, 2021.

  1. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Every kind of mine from contact through magnetic, acoustic, Katy, mines with delays, ship counters and snag lines were encountered. Pressure mines seemed to play little part,

    From my notes for Logistical Support of the Army, Volume II, pp. 69-70:

    Although the Germans had sown magnetic, acoustic, and contact mines in Cherbourg harbor, these were already known quantities for the Allies. It was the new Katy mines that "proved the most troublesome." Most of the Katies were sown in the shallow anchorage of Querqueville Bay at the western end of the Grande Rade or outer roadstead, and just off the Reclamation area at the eastern end of the Petite Rade...Contrary to all expectations mine clearance proved the major factor in delaying the opening of the port..." and "[m]ost of the casualties were attributed to the unfamiliar Katy mine, which vessels “sat on” and detonated when anchoring or moving about at low tide."​

    I have always thought the Katy and the oyster were different names for pressure mines. If I am wrong about that I would be glad to be corrected.

    Yes, but they are going to be using a lot of minesweepers and at least Jubilee proved that mines in mid-Channel were no problem.

    From my notes of Morrison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XI, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944 - 1945, p. 217:

    The destruction wrought by German forces at Cherbourg prior to its fall in June of 1944 was "more spectacular than effective". A far greater problem was posed by extensive mining to both the inner and outer harbors. Many were of the magnetic or acoustical variety and there were also a number of "the concrete shoal-water kind, which could only be dealt with by divers, or by vessels 'sitting down' on them - which was not good for the vessels."​

    Again, this points to mines as being the main problem, but I am open to additional evidence (I admit Morrison isn't always a source I'd want to hang my hat on).

    Yeah, you are 100% correct. I wish I had a German document detailing their demolition plans and preparedness for 1942, but I haven't found anything remotely like that. All I can say is that the German general in charge in Cherbourg in 1944 was advocating blowing up the port facilities even before the Allies landed and had the example of Naples as well, so I have to believe that he was prepared in a way that his predecessor perhaps was not. But for all I know the guy in charge of Cherbourg in 1942 was a demolition expert and would have done a better job. The only thing I can say (again) is that there is a high likelihood that the Germans would have had a far shorter period to do their dirty work, and from accounts I've read from 1944 some of the biggest explosions in the port came 2 weeks plus after D-Day.

    ‘Green List’ Ships and Craft of Combined Operations Command, Corrected to 6th October 1942, TNA: ADM 210/1 has a total of 143 in UK waters and under the control of COHQ, 100 of which are Mk IIIs (only 2 US Mk Vs). But Mountbatten said in June that if Sledgehammer goes forward all raids would probably have to stop so you could add back in the ones lost at Dieppe (at least 5 sunk there plus at least 10 others that made it back that seem to have been too badly damaged to be further used and were deleted from the list), plus an unknown amount at Scapa Flow that Pound promised to return if Sledgehammer goes forward (I assume if that was only a few he no one would bother, but only have a figure for mid-1943 which was 44 LCTs there), plus there was scheduled to be 8 LCT Vs delivered from the US in September, so I am just guessing but I'm thinking once Sledgehammer is cancelled, and, by extension, Roundup, there is no reason to ship them over. The number I am estimating for D-Day is 150 (I think I could make a good case for 170 or more, however) and thereafter about just 120-130 of the original 150 on a 48 hour round trip (early Sledgehammer plan uses that turnaround time and years ago I met an old RN veteran who said he did 25 round trips to Normandy in 1944 in June-July 1944), so about 60 arriving/day. The Sledgehammer plan says the east coast beaches of the Cotentin has a 1 flight capacity of 200 LCTs and 70 coasters.

    Those numbers are correct, except I'm not sure of their relevance to Sledgehammer other than it shows there would be a steady/large stream of replacements available. But now that you mention it I would point out that no other month of the war approaches Sept/Oct of 1942 in terms of number of LCTs produced. In fact over the 16 months between Dec 42 and March 44 fewer LCTs are built in the US than in the 4 months Aug-Nov 1942. In fact many months there are none built. There were as many US LCTs built in those 4 months than the US used for Overlord.

    I am not aware of any being used at Guadalcanal. If you have a source for this I would appreciate if you could pass it on.

    Yup, know that. Of course more LSTs would be preferable, but an invasion across the English Channel is about the only place on the globe were their need is greatly reduced because you have an good shore-to-shore capability with LCTs, supplemented by coasters. I know there are far fewer even of LCTs than for Overlord, but the need for vehicles, which is the real amphibious lift hog, is much, much less for Sledgehammer because they are not planning on driving inland unlike in 1944. Also, in my analysis the number of vehicles landed early in Overlord is far more than necessary (I wouldn't die defending that position, however, since I would like to study it more). The question here, as in other aspects, is not what was necessary or employed in June 1944, but what is required for October 1942.

    Coasters were the unsung heroes from D-Day and through the end of the war. Download Logistical Support of the Army, vols I & II and search on coaster, or TNA: MT 45/154 Coaster operations in Liberation of NW Europe. Firstly, in 1942 at least they were planning on using the Dutch coasters that came over in 1940 (assuming domestic ones would be needed as well, however). Some quotes...

    Logistical Support of the Army, Vol I:

    "Coasters varying in capacity from 200 to 2,000 tons were to begin arriving on the second tide on D Day, and were to constitute the backbone of the lift in this period [from D Day to D plus 8]."

    In response to the storm of June 19-22 "First Army...ordered eight ammunition coasters to be beached.... Normal discharge was impossible, but several small coasters were beached and unloaded at low tide...UTAH had not suffered as badly as OMAHA [from the storm] and by the afternoon of 23 June coasters were again being beached rapidly and unloaded directly into trucks and DUKWs."

    Logistical Support of the Army, Vol II:

    "Even the fog and storms of Aug and Sept" interfered with beach operations "for only short periods" and the "unloading of beached coasters had usually continued..."

    About 625,000 tons of British coaster tonnage was allocated to Overlord (about two-thirds of British coaster fleet)...logistical demands on the continent would not allow for the return of coasters as early as planned and in September there was still 560,000 in cross-Channel service and in November it increased to 600,000 tons. "The need for a large coaster fleet continued to the very end of the war. Early in 1945 SHAEF refused to accept a reduction of the coaster allocation below 500,000 tons, which it insisted was the absolute minimum to meet operational needs." The need for coasters lay in the fact that there was a "shortage of deepwater berths on the Continent, which necessitated the extended use of shallow-draft facilities."​

    So beached coasters were used a lot and seem to have been the go-to vessel during bad weather (maybe because, unlike LSTs and LCTs they had a proper keel?). They also played a vital role until the end of the war.

    US LSTs were often beached during Overlord so even though, yes, it was more efficient to unload them they still were stranded for the same amount of time. Most of the men unloading coasters were on the coasters themselves I believe. I'm sure there are plenty of unemployed Frenchmen in Cherbourg too. The COHQ pamphlet "MCHS 0021 - Combined Operations - Pamphlet 35C - RE Transportation Units" says that 200 tons can be unloaded from a beached coaster on one tide and describes the process in some detail.

    I don't blame you for being skeptical. When I first started to research it I was too and even wondered sometime why I was doing it. It was not until I saw the July plan for the first time that I though "OMG, this might have worked!" Anyways, I do appreciate it when someone puts it that way ("I'm skeptical") rather than some of the other retorts I have encountered along the way that are long on dismissive attitude but often a lot shorter on facts.

    Ok, the plan calls for 500 tons per division per day. From my study of Overlord logistics that seems probably 20-30% more than necessary, but it does provide a bit of a reserve, which is always nice. If we figure on an average of 6 divisions landed for the first week and 8 divisions total by week 2 then we have to have 3,000 tons a day at first and 8,000 tons after 1 week.

    The original planning called for 100 small coasters carrying 200 tons each (so they can be discharged fully during the nighttime tide), but there were also 50 larger one identified that could carry twice that (together that is well under 1/3 of coasters used in 1944-45 in DWT). So, if the number of cargo carrying trucks carried on LCTs comes to 400 per night @ 3 tons per truck that is already 1,200 tons. 15 coasters discharged per night is another 3,000 tons requiring 1000 truck loads. Presumably some of the trucks could be doing multiple round trips to the coasters and offloading in nearby dumps, but since I estimate there would be about 3500 vehicles landed on D-Day and about 1500 each day thereafter, that seems very possible. The larger coasters could be used for St. Vaast and Barfleur, each of which had a demonstrated capacity in 1944 of around 1700 tons/day (all via coasters).

    The equivalent would be the end of December 1942 which is about when I figure the Anglo-Americans might be ready to try a breakout (though they may well have gotten some "elbow room" before that). So that's enough for nearly 30 divisions, more than they would need or could possibly hope to have across the Channel at that time, which I estimate at around 20, but since the Allies had about 30 divisions in Normandy when they broke out against a German force more than twice as big, 20 ought to have been enough.

    The English Channel is a great place for U-boats...if you're a German submariner with a death wish. There is a reason they go all the way out to the mid-Atlantic and it isn't more scenic waves. The funny thing is, as with a number of Sledgehammer objections it fails to note the worse situation created by Torch. It was because of Torch (I repeat for the third time) that the Allies suffer in November 1942 their worst month of shipping losses of the entire war. Included in that total are a slew of LSIs in the Mediterranean and off Gibraltar. This is because the Allies did not enjoy the kind of ASW and air resources there that they already have operating in southern England, which, in both cases, are already the strongest in the world (same with minesweeping). Why not further leverage them rather them dilute them by opening up a whole new theater? The Anglo-Americans dispersed their efforts from Torch on and paid the price.

    As far as some of your other comments: I don't think there were any German destroyers around, but they wouldn't last long if there were and they tried to attack a naval force even half as strong as what the Allies had for Torch (see my earlier post for more details). Yes, E-boats would score some hits and maybe a sub or two would sneak by and sink some ships (probably just minutes before they were themselves destroyed). That's war and Allied invasion convoys took losses in every amphibious operation in the Med but that didn't stop them (Ok, technically I don't know about Anzio, but I bet there were some ship losses there too).
     
    Last edited: Apr 7, 2023
  2. Steve49

    Steve49 Well-Known Member

    Ah by the use of 'uncomfortable' wasn't referring to the unpleasantness of sea sickness, but rather my British tendency to understate things. I meant it as in having the uncomfortable experience of being stuck in the middle of an angry sea and facing up to the prospect that you might not make it back to port. Happily an experience I've never had to face head on, but I know more than a few colleagues who have, but had the good fortune to reach safe harbour, though for a couple it was near run thing, but I digress. So from the weather information you've provided, it certainly seems that considering the time of year, in 1942 the weather gods were on the Allies side and for the majority of the period the seas would have been relatively calm. As you note, winds with an easterly component would be troublesome for the beach based logistics being considered, but as these turned out to be the exception during this period, it would seem it would have been manageable, considering the short periods involved. And yes the stronger winds from the west would have made the Channel a bit rough, but the shelter from the peninsula would have minimised the swell/wave heights encountered on the beach.

    One correction, regarding the Dieppe LCT losses. Yes five were lost, but only five more were badly damaged, as follows;

    Five lost (LCT121, LCT124, LCT126, LCT145 and LCT159).
    Five badly damaged (LCT125, LCT127, LCT163, LCT165, LCT307, I'm not sure of the repair/future status of the first four, but LCT307 took part in Op Husky and all seem to have subsequently returned to service in some capacity, before being sold/scrapped post war).
    Two slightly damaged (LCT166 and LCT309)
     
  3. Ewen Scott

    Ewen Scott Well-Known Member

    Re tank position:-

    Very few M4 Shermans would have been available in Oct/Nov 1942. Production had only begun in Feb 1942 and was still ramping up with more factories being brought on line. So while 8017 Shermans were built in 1942, 2,432 were M4A4 production from Chrysler that didn't begin until July, who only built 671 to the end of Sept with 502 in Sept itself. Then allow for delivery time which could be 4-5 months. Only 90 of 514 Ford M4A3 produced in 1942 had been built by the end of Sept.

    When 364 M4A1/A2 (including those to make up losses in transit) were sent to the MIddle East in July 1942, they were taken from the factories as well as units in training in the USA, principally the US 2nd Armd Div.

    US 1st Armoured Div arrived in Britain in April 1942 with M3 Lees. The first element deployed in Torch with M3 while the follow up element in Dec 1942 stripped other independent tank battalions just arrived in Britain to re-equip with M4/M4A1.

    Of the c2,600 Lend Lease M3 for Britain only 119 Lee & 67 Grants were delivered to the UK, the rest went to the Middle East, India & Australia.

    The 6th Armoured Div, which was deployed in Torch, received Crusader II in May 1942, Valentines in Aug and Crusader III (6pdr) in Oct, deploying to North Africa with a mix of tanks. It seems to have been the most ready of all the armoured divisions in Britain in 1942. For the other UK based armoured divisions it seems to have been a mix of Valentines/Crusaders/Covenanters.

    As for the Churchill tank, some 6pdr equipped Mk.III were deployed during Operation Jubilee in Aug 1942 (18 of 30 deployed). By early 1943 when the 25th Army Tank Brigade deployed to North Africa thay had mostly Mk.III/IV with only a handful of earlier marks.But although many had been produced there was a rework progamme ongoing to bring them up to an acceptable standard.

    As for Airborne Forces, The RAF contribution would have been 3 squadrons (295/296/297) of Whitley V (a fourth squadron existed briefly 24 Aug-19 Oct 1942). 38 Wing as it then was, was part of Army Co-Operation Command. Each Whitley could carry 10 paratroops. Albemarles didn't begin to be received until Jan 1943, with some Halifax V in Feb 1943. When it came to deploying the 1st Parachute Brigade in North Africa in Nov 1942 from Gibraltar, there was only sufficient airlift (29 USAAF Dakotas) to drop one battalion. The others went by sea.

    By Sept 1942 there were 3 USAAF TCG in Britain (60th, 62nd & 64th) which all went to North Africa in Nov as part of 12th AF. Another, the 61st, formed in July 1942 and went to NA in 1943. But it was 1943 before they trained with gliders. The 315th TCG formed July 1942 for 8th AF left the US in Oct/Nov but was delayed in Greenland for a month by bad weather. In 1942 each TCG was supposed to have 52 C-47 plus 4 reserves (numbers grew by1945 to 80-110). Each aircraft could carry 28 paratroopers.

    Gliders. Production of the Waco CG-4A didn't start until Sept 1942. So any gliders would have to come from British stocks. Horsa production began in early 1942 with c650 built that year. But the USAAF C-47s will probably need modified to tow them and the crews trained in glider towing as that is something that was only beginning when these TCG left the US.

    So a total of about 5,000 airborne troops in one lift seems possible.
     
    Tom OBrien likes this.
  4. Rob Crane

    Rob Crane Well-Known Member

    This has been a bit of a thought provoker for me (which is great!).

    Sledgehammer, do you know if they ever got as far as planning where on the Cotentin peninsula they were thinking of building the new airfields? I've not yet come across any primary sources to back it up, but a number of secondary sources suggest that the eventual decision to land in Calvados rather than Cotentin was because, from a geological point of view, the Calvados plateau was considered better suited for constructing temporary airfields.

    I've not yet seen a date suggested for when this realisation was reached, although it is often attributed to a Royal Engineers geologist called William [Bill] King.
     
  5. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    The British COS weren't keen as WSC reported to FDR on 13 Jul 42 (FO954/18B/418):

    FO954-18B-418 - PM to FDR - 13 Jul 42.jpg

    Regards

    Tom
     
    Sheldrake likes this.
  6. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    No one will ever know what would have happened in an Alternative Time Line. One can hypothesise conditions all day long that might have led to success, but they did not sway the professional leaders of our armed forces. No one senior in the British command thought that the conditions under which Sledgehammer was a sound sensible enterprise idea were likely to occur.

    Their best use is to inform about the thinking at the time and the relations between the decision makers. Sledgehammer was a good idea - for the US Army. It was a clear aggressive statement and a call for action this year. But the American Army weren't going to bear the costs beyond some token forces. This, like Roundup in 1943 was an invitation for Britian to gamble its last army in a risky venture. Marshall gets brownie points even when the British don't want to play, Its a win win for him.
     
  7. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    For most of those, the answer is "yes", but not all of them in fine detail. That would include landing beaches (the main one being just north of Utah Beach), drop zones (the two main ones just outside of Lessay and Carentan - the two transportation choke points at the neck of the peninsula, but also a company sized drop near the 320th ID HQ at Valognes), beach gradients (very useful chart - Appendix K - listing the LCT and coaster capacity of various beaches, their lengths, the number of exits, etc). As far as "bombardment targets" if you mean aerial targets, the answer is also "yes". They plan on starting on D-7, one of the first targets includes dropping a railway bridge across the Seine at Rouen, an action the plan characterizes as "quite uncompromising"; there is also a list of marshaling yards and rail stations that would be targeted beginning D-3. If you mean shore bombardment, then there is only some general talk about naval ships targeting shore batteries (which, at this point in time are still in open emplacements such as you are familiar with either side of Dieppe).

    There is a list of ground units available which includes for the British 2 "new model" armoured division, 2 "new model" infantry divisions, and 1 "old model" infantry divisions, plus 7 Commandos as well as 8 airborne battalions (4 parachute + 4 glider); for the Americans it list 34th ID, 1st ID and 1st Armored as well as 1 parachute battalion and possibly 2 more. It does not mention the 1st Ranger battalion which will finish its training with the Commandos in mid-August. It does not list the specific British divisions but an earlier Sledgehammer document lists 78th Composite Divsion (amphibiously trained), 6th Armoured and 4th ID. I would think that the amphibious training of the 2nd Canadian Division would recommend it for early inclusion as well and certainly that would be a better use than its sacrifice at Dieppe.

    The plan says the USAAF will have 156 C-47's available of which 41 can carry 1 battalion, the rest of which will be available as glider tugs. No. 38 Wing has just 50 Whitley available, so the 182 needed (@58 aircraft/battalion) will have to come from bomber units it says, which will temporarily take away from the total bombing effort. I have more on the glider question near the end, but I would just say the planners were quite eager to get 6 pounder AT guns to the airborne troops landing near Lessay (the furthest drop zone from the landing beaches), even suggesting landing transport aircraft on a nearby beach to do so, but I think that Horsas could have done the job better.

    For Torch, not a lot because there is so little shore to shore capability (3 LSTs and a handful of LCTs that come over from Gibraltar). That also greatly handicaps the logistical buildup because they have to use the same small and medium (LCM) landing craft to land troops and haul supplies and many of those are lost on D-Day due to the horrible surf and beach conditions at many of the landing sites. These are not factors for Sledgehammer because beyond the favorable surf and beach conditions they have lots of shore-to-shore capability relatively speaking with around 150 LCTs and coasters (see my earlier post on that). That shore-to-shore capability is a huge advantage over Torch, even though the numbers sound small compared to Overlord.

    No, indeed, but if you go to the original document it's clear he is talking about the option of doing it at Le Havre, which was briefly considered in July before the consensus fell on Cherbourg by both British planners and American advocates like Eisenhower. They key doctrinal breakthrough was when the planners realized they could use drop tanks on the fighters and that there would be enough of them to last several weeks. Up to that point the Cherbourg option had everything recommending it, including defensibility due to the narrow neck of the peninsula, except the air cover dimension, which the drop tank realization solved[/QUOTE]

    I can do better than that. If you are able to DM me here on ww2talk with your email address I can send you a PDF.
     
  8. Ewen Scott

    Ewen Scott Well-Known Member

    Good point. Leigh-Mallory noted in 1944 that the best opportunities for Airfield construction lay in the British sector, but the failure of ground forces to capture ground east and south-east of Caen hampered things. On the other hand the US position did not greatly improve until the advance progressed to Le Mans and beyond.

    In terms of planning, minimum specs for landing grounds were only agreed in July 1942. After that 5 RE Airfield Construction Groups were to be formed and ready by Feb 1943, and there seems to have been a lack of urgency once Operation Roundup was canned. Only 2 were formed by the end of 1942.

    The RAF Airfield Construction Service was also in its early days, with a big issue being a lack of mechanised equipment to save on manpower.

    So by 2 July 1944 the US airfields constructed north of a line between Isigny and Lessay were:-

    ELS-1 Pouppeville 7 June
    A-6 Beuzeville 17 June (just north of Saints-Mere-Eglise
    A-10 Carentan 24 June
    A-7 Azeville June 27
    A-8 Picauville June 29

    By the same point in time there were another 5 US airfields between Isigny and Golleville-sur-Mer to the east (I.e around the Omaha Beach area). At the same time there were 11 in the British sector.

    After that the following were captured/built in the Cotentin Peninsula:-
    A-14 Cretteville 3 July
    A-15 Maupertus, 3 July. a pre war Airfield east of Cherbourg
    A-16 Brucheville 7 July 1 mile inland from Utah Beach
    A-24C Binniville 17 July
    A-23C Querqueville 29 July pre war French Navy air base west of Cherbourg
    A-11 St Lambert 6 Aug 2.5 miles south of Isigny
    A-25C Bolleville 7 Aug
    A-30C Courtils 13 Aug
    A-17 Meautis 16 Aug
    A-20 Lessay 26 Aug pre-war grass Airfield.

    There is a note in “Invasion Airfields Then and Now” that “the Cherbourg peninsula did not lend itself to the construction of airfields”. When you look at the map, there are 2 around Cherbourg in the north and 2 on the south west side of the peninsula. The remainder are in an area constrained by an arc to the north of Carentan and the east coast. The area in the north and west seems more hilly and less suitable for airfields.

    As for the effort involved that depends on what kind of Airfield is required. Those in Normandy began in the following order:-
    Emergency Landing Strips
    Refuelling and Re-arming Strips
    Advanced Landing Grounds
    Airfield
    All-weather airfield.

    Only the last of these was to receive hard-surfaced runways. With winter fast approaching a Sledgehammer then more work would be required by the engineers to build them. Airfields in Holland & Belgium turned to quagmires in winter 1944/45. So maybe more work is required in a short timeframe in 1942. And of course nothing could be built too near the front line, which would rule out about 5 or 6 of the above noted sites based on an Isigny-Lessay front line.
     
    Rob Crane likes this.
  9. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Brooke Trident 1945-1946.png

    This was May 13, 1943 during the Trident Conference in Washington, DC, in a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If he was wrong in 1943, it is at least possible he was wrong in 1942.
     
  10. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Hi,

    I'm looking at the COS Committee meeting minutes for 17 March 1942 and noted that it includes the following instructions which were designed to prepare the ground for an operation in mid-summer 1942:

    CAB79-56-9 - 17 Mar 42 - Sledgehammer - Instructions to JPS etc.jpg

    On 8 May, 1942 the directive still called for a landing in Pas-de-Calais to draw off German air forces or even divert possible German air reinforcement from the Eastern Front but it seems the timing had been delayed to August.

    The sustained discussions in early July 1942 do seem to have created some misunderstanding as can be seen by this snippet from the COS discussions on 17 July 1942:

    CAB79-56-74 - 17 Jul 42 - Cherbourg or Brest.jpg

    It looks, though, that the "new" Sledgehammer (outline plan produced by 12 Aug 42) was a fore-runner of "Rankin" and "Eclipse" - an "opportunist operation" which could be mounted at 60-days notice.

    CAB79-57-8 - COS Committee - 22 Aug 42.jpg

    I can't see any discussion at the British Chiefs of Staff level of a change to a Cherbourg focused operation in July 1942. Have you got a date for the proposed use of 'drop-tank' equipped fighters to provide fighter cover over the Cotentin Peninsula? It would be interesting to see whether the "Cherbourg SLEDGEHAMMER" planning was briefed to the COS.

    I'll look for more details tomorrow as this is a fascinating period - the dark days of spring and summer 1942 being very much in the forefront of the British chiefs of staff unsurprisingly.

    Regards

    Tom
     
  11. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Sledgehammer appreciation air excerpt 21 July 42 WO 199-3008.png

    This is from C.C. 42 (38), 3rd Draft, 21st July, 1942. Marshall put his final appeal to the British COS the next day and basically acknowledged they were at am impasse and for all intents and purposes it was dead. I am not sure if this is absolutely the first version of Sledgehammer plan that features the "new developments" that have "altered the air considerations" but if it came in an earlier version it could not have been more than a few days at most (new drafts were coming out fast and furious at this time from what I can tell; as the title indicates this is already the 3rd draft of the then current version). Some minor revisions are made to the plan, which is renamed Wetbob, up until early August, and then it is put on the shelf.

    EDIT: It is possible that the COS have not reviewed this as they were in intensive consultations with the American delegation then in London. On the other hand, you might think just because of its significance to the Americans and the Soviets who have been hectoring the Western Allies for a Second Front for quite a while, as you may well know, there's an argument that it was incumbent on the COS members to keep on top of the latest planning. Regardless, I think most of them are so firm against the very concept, whether it was feasible or not, they may have just felt like there was no real need to do so.
     
    Tom OBrien likes this.
  12. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Agreed, I have made essentially the same statement multiple times in this discussion. The main value in telling the Sledgehammer story is to correct the errors in the historical narrative introduced or amplified by Sledgehammer skeptics that are far less modest in their hypotheses as it regards their certitude of failure. I am only saying it was feasible and offer a lot of new evidence to support that whereas the skeptics typically present their counterfactual as beyond doubt (I except you from that group because in your book you say it would "almost certainly" fail, a characterization I can live with because it leaves at least a little room for doubt, even if I don't agree with it) and use information that is often dubious if not outright false. See below, for example, my response to your incorrect claim that "the American Army weren't going to bear the costs beyond some token forces".

    As my snippet from the minutes of Trident that I posted earlier show, none of them were infallible as Brooke was quite wrong about the Anglo-Americans not being able to conduct "major operations" across the Channel until 1945 or 1946 demonstrates.

    What happened to "just give us the tools and we'll finish the job"? That was Churchill in late 1940. In 1942 the US lend-leased over 8000 AFV to Britain, but they contrived to implement an Anglo-American strategy that meant they could not be used until 1944 at least, and, as I stated just above, then argued "No, lets wait until at least 1945". Getting across the Channel was not a favor to the US Army or even the US government. It was the path of the decisive campaign for the Western Allies. That is hardly deniable. The only question is the timing. The British clung to their strategy of exhaustion that they formulated before the Soviet Union and the US entered the war on their side. It is a perfectly cogent concept and I had been alive at the time and in a position of responsibility (but without supernatural foreknowledge) I might have actually been on their side! Their conclusions were wrong because some of their premises were wrong. I am not actually blaming them so much for that - as you might have noticed for the most part I have avoided harsh criticisms of anyone who was opposed to Sledgehammer at the time - but more so postwar historians for failing to see it and resisting anything that goes against it.

    The Germans were not worn down between the spring of 1943 and Overlord. In fact it is a period of recovery for them as is implicit in your own book when you note correctly the large increases of their armaments output. Their fuel situation improves dramatically as well. They also, as you also point out in your book, refocus their efforts beginning in late 1943 on defending the West. No I cannot prove beyond any possible doubt (and I am not trying to) that an earlier cross-Channel invasion would have succeeded and would have brought about a more favorable outcome for the Anglo-Americans (for the British most of all, I feel) but I do feel telling the Sledgehammer story highlights that in 1944 the task of defeating the Germans in the West had become a much more difficult one.

    Absolutely false. This is a claim I hear again and again, but I would point out that after the April London meetings Marshall is careful to point out that the only reason he had advocated a later date for Sledgehammer (at that point he was only arguing that all preparations should be made for its execution, not that a firm decision should be made to go forward) because he did not want to advocate any such action prior to the time that the US Army could make a substantial contribution. The late July versions of the Sledgehammer plan make clear that the Americans can take more or less half of the burden in terms of ground troops at the outset of Sledgehammer and even suggests it could rapidly become more than half.

    I am sorry to say that Brooke either is unaware of or purposely ignores Marshall's good intentions in this case when, on the evening of July 22 makes "factually challenged" presentation to the full British War Cabinet in which he tries to cast the Americans, and by inference Marshall, in precisely that unfavorable light. Brooke falsely states that the base of the peninsula spans 100 km, almost exactly 4 times a long as what is in the Sledgehammer plan. There is a whole section detailing what defensive line to defend and none of them come close to 100 km or even half that. The whole advantage of the Cherbourg option for Sledgehammer since spring was that the peninsula offered a more easily defensible front line compared to Calais. The significance is that to defend the 100 km front would require, as Brooke states, some 10 divisions (which seems reasonable) but then he says the Americans can only provide 3 of the 10. The implication is exactly the one you suggest, but the fact is that there will already be 3 American divisions in the UK by August, with 2 to follow every month after that, meaning at least 5 by the time Sledgehammer goes forward and 7 within a couple of weeks of its D-Day. Now this is a story I could have led with if I were interested in casting Brooke as the bad guy, but I have held off on it until now because I did not want to go down that path. I will now even defend him by saying if he had been right about the strategy he was advocating he is justified in a few shenanigans to make sure it did not get sidetracked by an alternate one. It's just I don't believe he was right.

    This is exactly the sort of personalization that gets us nowhere. Unless you have direct evidence of such base motives on Marshall's part I don't see the value of such a comment. I think the story I told in my last section shows at least he was careful to not make the British pay the whole price for his gambit and therefore does him some credit. I do believe that Marshall is probably right about this but he was probably wrong on other things. Even if he is right, it might just be a question of having the right prejudices at the right time so I don't have to hold him up as a paragon of infallibly good judgment.
     
    Last edited: Apr 7, 2023
  13. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    I don’t see a basis for your statement that the Cherbourg option had been identified since the spring - if that is what you are in fact saying here. There in fact seems to be two Sledgehammers - the first is the British Pas-de-Calais option for mid-summer and then the second is the sudden change to a Cherbourg option in July after the operation had been in effect rejected in favour of “Super-Gymnast”. This appears to have been accepted as a contingency plan by the British, much as were many of the other “plans” which come and go if you follow the course of the war via the COS minutes.

    Does that agree with your understanding?

    A Pas-de-Calais bridgehead would have been totally indefensible so I suppose a peninsula bridgehead would have been “better” but still a tough job. It’s also worth thinking about the mid-Jul 42 context. The Middle East was a disaster for the British - Brooke was planning to go out to find out what was wrong with the “Desert Generals”; the German AG South was pushing rapidly east with what must have appeared alarming ease; the U-boats had just spent 6 months enjoying easy-pickings off the east coast of the USA and were increasing in number each month. Brooke et al don’t have our hindsight about Alam Halfa, Alamein, Stalingrad, the breaking back into the U-boat Enigma etc.

    Regards

    Tom
     
  14. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Could you share your source for that figure (which, presumably, is the same as some as for the other production figures you have in your post)? I am in no way doubting you, but I have been saying 8500 for a while based on a graph that is kind of hard to read, so it would nice to have a source I could cite that has clear numerical figures, and, of course, when I say or write something I want it to be correct, especially for objective data like that.

    I never envisioned there would be hordes of Shermans at the beginning of Sledgehammer. Perhaps 50-150 and maybe none at all for some of the reasons you cite. It's not that more than that have not already been produced, over and above what is sent to the Middle East, but there is the transportation and training time. I think 50-150 are possible, but it's equally possible they would just decide to go with the M-3 at the beginning. I do think the changeover to Shermans would have occurred somewhat faster than in Tunisia, however and by the end of the year probably would have been accomplished. The 3 Panzer divisions in the West in October 1942, have a total of around 300 German tanks (Mk III and IV) of which about 70% are Mk III or Mk IV short. The Sledgehammer plan mentions Churchill tanks, at least for one of the initial tank forces to land.
     
  15. Sledgehammer

    Sledgehammer GaryG

    Screenshot 2023-04-07 150824.png

    Not really, but there are so many operations going on and code names and code name changing and variants on the same operation with the same code name I get confused myself from time to time. As you can see from the image above (it's from WO/106/4175 "History of Sledgehammer from 15th March, 1942 to 14th July, 1942") there were 3 options being considered from the very beginning. Le Havre seems to drop out until July when it comes back in, in addition to a Brest option to make it 4 different options! For most of the time it seems like it was pretty much Calais vs Cherbourg, with the "heads I win, tails you lose" propositions that at the Pas de Calais, while fighter support will be ample, it will take too long to build up a sufficient force to secure the bridgehead, and for Cherbourg the bridgehead could be secured but it is too far from England for proper air protection. Note that the Object at the top of the image would change

    I mostly agree with that. Technically 1st El Alamein had demonstrated the the Germans could be stopped under conditions similar to Sledgehammer's (secure flanks forcing them to try to reckon with Allied firepower), but not sure that would be evident to anyone at the time. If it had not been for the strong advocacy for Sledgehammer by King, and even more so by Marshall, I am not sure I would have the temerity to even suggest it might have been a good idea. But they did advocate it strongly, for good reason or bad. And it is not unprecedented for a losing side in a war to suddenly turn things around and probably that is what they consciously aspired to. There can be little, question, in my mind, however, that their favored strategy involved the most efficient employment of Allied global logistics and that is a message I want to get through. If logistics are truly the key factor in modern war, then that is no small point.
     
  16. Ewen Scott

    Ewen Scott Well-Known Member

    The 8,017 figure comes from Steven Zaloga "Armoured Thunderbolt" Appendix A Table 3 which breaks annual Sherman production down by model, factory & year. There is a limited preview here on Google books that might be viewable depending on the web browser you use. Works for me on Firefox.

    Armored Thunderbolt

    Further on you will find details of Lend Lease shipments (note not arrivals) for British use in Appendix C table 3. For 1942 these were

    M4/M4A1 268
    M4A2 456
    M4A4 147
    Total 871

    And we know that the July shipments to North Africa incl replacement for those lost at sea were 264 M4A1 and 90 M4A2. A small number of early production vehicles made it to Britain as early April 1942 (Churchill inspected the now preserved M4A1 'Michael' on 8 May 1942 - one of two very early test vehicles).

    And we know that the US Army preference for combat versions of the Sherman was the Cyclone engined M4/M4A1. Most of the other models issued to them went to units training in the US, some later being remanufactured for Lend Lease in 1944/45. In 1942/43 the diesel engined M4A2 and the Chrysler multibank M4A4 became the principal Lend Lease versions.


    The Sherman Minutia site has production figures that tie back to Zaloga's overall, and provides breakdowns of monthly production for some models or some factories. It is the go to place for virtually all things Sherman. Then you have oddities like west coast Pacific Car production which mostly went to Californian training units or to the Pacific theatre for shipping reasons.

    Sherman minutia homepage

    As for the British 6th Armoured Div, it didn't change over to M4A2 Shermans until Feb/Mar 1943 when in North Africa and after it had seen combat and suffered losses. Early 1943 was seeing large jumbers of M4/M4A1 for US forces and M4A2 and M4A4 for British and French forces shipped direct to North Africa to re-equip units there. The Canadian 1st Army Tank Brigade seems to have been the first to take the M4A4 into combat in Sicily in July 1943, having received them in Britain before shipping out and after at least one regiment gave up the Churchill's it had at Dieppe in Aug 1942.

    And of course M7 GMC and M10/M10A1 (639 in 1942) were being built using the same chassis and engines starting in 1942.

    Edit. The first reported US Army combat use of the Sherman was 6 Dec 1942 by elements of US 1st Armoured Div. As I noted previously, that division's initial deployment to North Africa was with M3 Lees. It was the follow up part that took M4 Shermans out.

    Edit 2. Note out of the 8,017 Shermans built in1942 only 2,260 were M4/M4A1 models which the US Army considered acceptable for their own combat use, less those delivered for British use = 1,992.
     
    Last edited: Apr 8, 2023
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  17. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    An interesting thread on a set of issues that I was not aware of. Several questions come to mind:

    1) the French reaction to such an operation. Was de Gaulle aware of the planning? Politically could the UK-US plus Canada etc invade France and in effect stop, challenging the Germans to react? Would the French Resistance be in a position in mid to late 1942 to assist? They certainly had a role pre-D-Day. How good was the intelligence picture of German activity, I am thinking of engineering and fortification works, not troop deployments?

    2) To what extent had the German planners etc considered their options and Allied options? I would not be optimistic such documents survived their defeat.

    I am mindful of the Battle of Vercors, which acted as a diversion from D-Day, but lead to the French Resistance being defeated. A landing could have set off similar acts of resistance, small and large. See: Battle of Vercors - Wikipedia
     
    Last edited: Apr 8, 2023
  18. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Hi, I did some research into U-boat operations in November 1942 and don’t agree with all of this. It is true that November 1942 saw the worst month for U-boat inflicted shipping losses during the entire war. However, it is not clear that this was “because of Torch” at all. I’ll post up some of the details later but it is obviously interesting how far in advance the Germans and Italians had identified the preparations for TORCH in late-October and had begun to move anti-shipping units (air and sea) into place before that operation was launched. Given that the Germans had broken the Allied Convoy Code (No. 3?) there must be a good chance that they would have identified a concentration in southern British ports for an October 1942 cross-channel attack and similarly made preparations to meet it.

    Regards

    Tom
     
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  19. JimHerriot

    JimHerriot Ready for Anything

    Great discussion folks, though it's got some way to go to equal The Mousetrap. 14 years and still going. Keep putting gas in the tank and it will run and run.

    From thesis (maybe?) of 2009 (available within a thread here from conjecture command central aka "alternatehistory.com" within this thread):

    D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France

    Scroll down to Carl Schwamberger (who is Carl Schwamberger?) post of Aug 2, 2021 and get it while it's hot (or perhaps by now lukewarm?)

    Put me straight into the sledgehammer skeptics please. I'd quite like the company of Douglas Porch, George F. Howe, and FDR. He was a great President. Made some great decisions. Partaking in the bining of sledgehammer and favouring (what would become) Torch just two of them.

    Hmmmm. Sledgehammer - the Germans would have had a name for it - fleischwolf. And they would have been turning the handle.

    From George F Howe's "Northwest Africa: Seizing The Initiative in the West". A mighty work (pdf version attached below courtesy of the great work of Davidbfpo in another thread. Thank you David).

    SACRIFICE.jpg

    Kind regards, always,

    Jim.

    P.S.

     

    Attached Files:

    Last edited: Apr 8, 2023
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  20. Steve49

    Steve49 Well-Known Member

    Regarding the 1st CATB at the time of Dieppe, it only had two thirds of its required tanks. The 14th CATR was at full strength with 58 tanks, but 11th CATR only had 23 tanks and 12th CATR had 25 tanks. (Figures from 1st Army War Diary (WO 179/1000A).

    If Jubilee still went ahead before Sledgehammer, then the Brigade would also have had to find replacements for the 29 tanks lost on the Raid.
     
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