Have any of you guys watched the video below.? What do you make of their case for implementing that plan.? Thank You
My brutal reply would be: he's using some selective and questionable 'evidence' to support his argument. Sledgehammer would have been a disaster and Giumarra does little to show how it would have succeeded. He does - rightly - say that comparing it to Dieppe is wrong, but Dieppe did show how inadequately prepared we were for cross-channel operations. Equally, I would argue, comparing Sledgehammer to Torch is comparing apples and pears. Torch involved 53000 US troops and 20,000 British troops, but against Vichy forces who, in the event, offered no opposition; the paratroop landings were a disaster. Tirch contributed to the fighting in N Africa - El Alamein had turned the course of events in N Africa, but only in Oct/Nov 42. When the Americans were 'insisting' (in around April 1942) on a landing in France in 1942, things were not going well in North Africa. I can see that a landing in French North Africa must have been very appealing to the British, who - unlike the Americans - had been at war since September 1939. Landing on the Cherbourg peninsula would have been a completely different problem. The fact that Germany was still effectively mobilising its economy for total war is irrelevant. I'll pick up on a few of Giumarra's points: Air superiority is not discussed by Giumarra - we had it for D-day but it simply did not exist over the channel in 1942. So, the invasion would have been extremely vulnerable and the proposed para drops would have been - potentially - a massacre (and that assumed we had the air transport to drop the paratroops required.) During the Diepp[e raid the Spitfire Vs were fighting towards the extent of their operational range - it would have been the same over the Cotentin. No naval commander would put serious naval power into the channel without air superiority. If they needed it spelling out, the loss of Prince of Wales and Renown brought that problem home. Apart from anything, in 1942, U-boats were having a field day with Allied merchant shipping (the second 'Happy Time') - admittedly that was focused on the North American seabord but you could forgive the RN for being somewhat distracted at the time. Specialist logistics were developed for D-day. He states that as a result of the loss of the Mulberry harbour (note that one of the two survived the storm and did great service into autumn of 1944). The idea of beaching coasters when you didn't have air superiority is ridiculous - they would have been incredibly vulnerable. Sustainment - it's impossible to see how such a force could have been sustained in the face of German naval activity and (I keep coming back to) air power. Moreover, what was this force going to do once it had landed? It certainly wouldn't be strong enough to fight its way through France, so...was it just going to hunker down and - WWI style - dig in and wait for the next 'big push' whilst sustaining massive casualties as the Germasn reinfroced. Relative forces. I have to accept his word for it that the forces in the Cotentin were 'second-rate'. However, there were other forces in western Europe which would have been rushed to the area to force the Allies back into the sea (which they would most cetainly have done) - there was no 'transportation plan' in 1942 and nor was there any similar plan for resistance effort such as we saw in June 1944. The German ability to 'counterattack' is well-earned - even in 1942, and it's ridiculous to suggest that they would have done anything other than fight like hell against any invasion attempt in 1942. The other thing is: the forces on the Cotentin might have been 'second-rate' but did the Allies know that was the case? I don't know enough about Allied intelligence to judge that; I do know that the expected 'second-rate' German forces around Dieppe fought like hell (as did those brought into the Market Graden battle in September 1944). I think Giumarra massively underestimates the forces the Germans could ultimately bring to bear. Deception. D-day was massively helped by Op Fortitude - there had been no thought to deception operations for Sledgehammer. We can argue that those operations (eg FUSAG) just helped tie down forces that would be otherwise rushed to Normandy, but the same problem would have existed - the Germans rushing forces to the Cotentin. Command and Control. Again, if Dieppe did little else (and it did do little else), Operation Jubilee adequately demonstrated the immaturity of Allied multi-service C2, let alone the difficulties of coalition warfare. There was much work to be done on this. Fortunately, Sledgehammer would not have been a multinational effort because the Americans were not ready to participate. When they were pushing for an invasion of France, they'd not even begun bombing Europe! And here's the point - it was Stalin who was pushing for a 'second front' (I've never learnt what he thought of N Africa - just a sideshow, presumably, like Italy (eventually) I guess?) or the fact that we were literally fighting for our lives in the Far East). The Americans, who had been brought into the war only a few months earlier, thought it would be a jolly good idea as well, though they had no experience of fighting the Germans and were not offering to get involved themselves - this was going to be a largely Brit-only affair, but "off you go, you Brits, and we'll cheer you on; let us know how it goes." I have no sympathy for Stalin's views - a man who suppported Hitler (because that is what he did) up until he was invaded; I see the US opinion at the time is naive and simply unhelpful. Honestly, I'd like to say, yes this would be a brilliant plan, but it just wouldn't. The more I think about what Giumarra proposes the more angry I get. As I say, he's been selective in the use of his 'evidence' and has used the advantage of 20/20 hndsight to try and bolster his questionable assertions. It's lazy, sloppy opinionating in my opinion - the sort of thing you get down the pub and you demolish in about ten minutes. I'm suprised he was given this air time and I honestly wonder why the Western Naval History Association thought it was worthwhile. On the plus side, it got me thinking!
A great critique...and honest... Thank You. Air power was also a big question with me. Also.....PLUTO. How were "The Allies" going to supply the invasion force with Gasoline, or anything else for that matter.? There was a danger of German submarines and Luftwaffe presence at that point. I would argue that "The Allies' were as equally as unprepared, to invade France, in 1942 as The Germans were. The USA Army was a brand new civilian army. I am not just picking on the usa, but ALL armies have a learning curve. The Russians certainly did in The East. How many Generals and their staff were cut loose after Torch got going.? I am NOT a historian nor any kind of Military/WW2 expert. I always assumed there were good reasons that a 1942 invasion of France was delayed.
Brooke's diary entry for 8th May 1942 mentions a "difficult" Chiefs of Staff meeting which had Sledghammer as one topic. Home Forces and Combined Operations (Mountbatten) concluded that the landing craft were insufficient for the operation. Prior to this, in April, Brooke had questioned Marshall closely about what he was going to do if we had established a lodgment. He asked how the operation would be developed to defeat the Germans in France. I suspect the American army's enthusiasm for cross channel invasions was because the US had agreed to a Germany first policy with the Army in the driving seat it was embarrassing not to be seen to do anything for years, while the real competition the US Navy could always find something to be done in the PTO. Sledgehammer was a politically attractive project with the British and Canadians taking the big risks.
Actually, PLUTO is a bloody good point. There are so many things which contributed to Overlord’s success and simply did not exist in 1942 - most of all, experience.
Your last sentence is correct, I believe - the USA needed to be seen to be doing something. There was also pressure from the British public (particularly the trades unions) to help the USSR. The thing that niggles me is that the Americans exerted the pressure, but they wouldn’t have been doing it! I’m no USA-basher. I hate it when folks bang on about them being ‘late’ joining the war - until Hitler declared war in the USA they had no clear reason to join in. However, the pressure they tried to exert in 1942 was unnecessary and unhelpful - as you say, there’s a learning curve for all military forces. Thankfully, we Brits refused to give in and they eventually got the message. Job well done!
Citing Post 3 by chipm: Not my area of expertise, but I did note the British commander of the First Army in North Africa, Kenneth Anderson, who never commanded an army in the field again. See: Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer) - Wikipedia From memory there is a thread or posts on his relegation.
Except PLUTO made no contribution to the whole Normandy campaign and it is just as well other plans for bulk delivery of fuel existed. The aim of PLUTO was to provide 3500 tons per day through 10 pipes to Cherbourg, under code name Bambi, and getting them operational between D+12 and D+75. The pipes were scheduled for a 6 week life. And it used two types of pipe, Hais & Hamel. It was the latter that was wrapped onto the giant Conundrums. In reality between June and Oct the Bambi system delivered a total of 3300 tons. There were delays due to the late capture and clearance of Cherbourg. The first attempt to lay a Hais pipe didn’t begin until 12 Aug and it failed. The Hamel pipes which followed were no more successful. It was 22 Sept before any fuel flowed from England to France via PLUTO pipes by which time the Normandy campaign was over. Both pipe systems failed on 3 Oct and were abandoned because by then the war had moved on. By then the Allied advance meant that a second pipe network could be commissioned between Dungeness and Boulogne under codename Dumbo. By the end of Oct the first pipe had been laid and fuel was flowing. But it took until Dec to lay 6 working pipes delivering only 700 tons per day. From opening to 20 Jan the total delivered was only 62,000 tons. Pipelaying continued into May 1945 by which time there were 16 pipes in operation. Given the experimental nature of PLUTO it was just as well there was a back up plan. Two pipe networks were planned in northern France. The first, the Minor System, was based on pipes laid south from Port-en-Bessin which was capable of taking small tankers, and from offshore undersea pipes to tanker moorings just to the west, off Ste Honorine-des- Partes. Bulk fuel began flowing from tankers here on 25June. The second system, the Major System, ran south from Cherbourg. Once captured and cleared ocean going tankers were able to berth and unload. It eventually ran all the way Germany. Fuel was also being landed at Dieppe within 7 days of its re-occupation in Aug, and other French and Belgian ports became involved as the war moved forward. The most vital of these was of course Antwerp. To put it in context, approx 5.2m tons of oil products were delivered to NWE between 6 June 1944 and 10 May 1945. About 16% was delivered direct across the Atlantic with the remainder, 4.3m tons, coming from Britain. PLUTO’s contribution to that British element was 370,000 tons or about 8% and all of that after the end of the Normandy campaign. And the effort involved was so considerable that the RN was questioning the effort involved by the end of 1944. But every gallon of fuel was vital to keeping the mechanised armies in the field. Despite that PLUTO remains a magnificent technical achievement for its time.
Ewen Scott , that's great - thank you. I knew none of that! Every day is a school day, as they say, and it's really useful and interesting. "Amateurs think tactics, professionals think logistics", etc. I was going to ay that even 8%, given the parlous state of Alliance supply in September 1944 must have been worthwhile, but I see you covered that as well. Thanks again for that information.
Yes................but in 1942, would "The Allies" have been able to deliver enough fuel by ANY Means.? In 1944 they had a relatively large beachhead and air and naval machismo. In 1942, once they landed and The Wehrmacht responded..............could they have supplied the invasion.?
Indeed - one of my points in rebuttal to Mr Giumarra’s fantastic theory. Imagine beaching oil tankers for unloading!
The background chapter of Harrison's Cross-Channel Attack (the US official history) is worth a read to get a pretty neutral view of the scope and assumptions behind ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER: HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Cross Channel Invasion [Chapter 1]
The logic there - a quick occupation in the event of a withdrawal, collapse or surrender - is an interesting angle from which to view SEALION, instead of the usual doomed (fingers crossed) all-out assault.
After many years of absence I logged into this website and lo and behold I find this review of my WNHA presentation of two years ago. Unfortunately, the attempt at a critique posted by P-Squared is so full of errors I hardly know where to begin, and since I am not sure if he or anyone else would see my response here I think I will keep this reply relatively short and so just touch on a few of his objections. Before that, however, I want to say that rather than be angry about my presentation (a curious response to begin with) P-Squared should be thanking me for the opportunity I have given him, and, by extension, the rest of you, to correct some erroneous judgements you have accumulated regarding Operation Overlord. I am grateful to Ewen Scott for having done some of the work for me when he debunked the proposition that PLUTO, far from being a "bloody good point" as a counterargument to my presentation, was, in fact in no way necessary even for the success of Overlord, much less for Sledgehammer. I would have hoped that your acknowledgement that you "knew none of that" would have prompted a realization that perhaps some of the other parts of the narrative you are familiar with respect to Overlord are likewise more mythical than real. There are really two things to consider here: 1) just because something might have been necessary for the success of Overlord in 1944 does not mean it was necessary for Sledgehammer in 1942 given the different conditions and operation objectives, and 2) some of the things (like PLUTO) which are commonly considered to have been indispensable of Overlord were anything but. It is quite true that "amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics" and that is why when I started studying Sledgehammer almost 18 years ago the first thing I decided to do was to study the logistics, and I have not stopped studying logistics more broadly ever since. You probably did not know that in June of 1944 the average fuel consumption for a US Army division in Normandy was 55 tons/day, which rose to 75 tons/day in July (still much less than the pre-invasion estimate of 120 tons/day). So lets look at the bigger number. If you figure 3 tons/supply truck it would take all of 25 truckloads of fuel to supply each division with its daily needs. How about ammo? Well in mid-July 1944 an average US Army division was getting about 200 tons a day, so quite a bit more in tonnage than fuel, but still, at 35 truckloads a day hardly a insurmountable amount when you consider that a conservative estimate of daily discharge of vehicles for Sledgehammer would be around 1500, about a third of which would be via LCT (again, using a conservative estimate of how many could land in Normandy on a daily basis). I suspect you got a thrill knocking over the straw man of "beached tankers" but I nowhere said anything like that and would never have imagined such a ludicrous concept. I did, however, mention beached coasters. Either I forgot to mention it in my presentation (I did not replay it for myself to check it out), or you just missed it, but the idea was emphatically to do all the coaster unloading (probably the LCTs as well) under cover of darkness. Yes, it was possible, and I have the contemporaneous COHQ pamphlet that details exactly how to do it. You have to realize that the planning for Sledgehammer was ended when the decision was made to cancel it in favor of Torch so they did not have the experience of the Dieppe raid to gauge just how ineffective the GAF was against ships when they had proper fighter protection. The main mission the GAF had during the raid was to sink or damage the landing ships, but they failed to hit a single one. I think it is interesting that before Dieppe Hitler was saying in the context of a discussion regarding a possible Allied invasion of NW Europe that the "enemy has air superiority" but after the raid he upped it to "we have absolute air inferiority" (again in the context of how the Germans could stop a cross-Channel invasion). There is a ton of evidence to back up Hitler's assessment, but I am trying to keep this relatively short. You are quite wrong to say there was no deception plan contemplated for Sledgehammer. How would you possibly know that unless you, like me, have spent many hours in archives and many, many more pouring over original source documents (including German ones)? In fact, if I had time I could show you how the British found it easier to fool Hitler in 1942 than at any other time of the war. The funny thing is, they did not even have to come up with a successful deception plan because the Germans were busy formulating one on the Allies behalf. A German Navy appreciation from the summer of 1942 specifically states that in the event of an Allied landing in Normandy that no German ground reinforcements should be sent there since it would only be a ruse to weaken the defenses of German submarine bases that would be the true target of the Allies (sort of like St. Nazaire on steroids, but with the sub pens being blown up instead of a dry dock). I know it sounds cracked, but that is what they believed, and not only that, Runstedt's Chief of Staff, Gen. Zeitzler, also was convinced of the same thing. The interesting thing is that just days before Sledgehammer's D-Day Zeitzler went from being Chief of Staff of OB West to the Chief of Staff of the whole German Army, and thus man Hitler consulted with first regarding military matters (I would also point out that at the end of July Hitler declared that in the even of an Allied invasion of NW Europe he would immediately come west to take personal control of the battle, something that augured well for Allied success, IMO). Ok, this is no longer a short response, so I will wrap up. One last thing to consider: the Germans were suffering from a severe fuel crisis in September and October of 1942, far worse than anything they would experience until well after the Battle of Normandy in 1944, and the West was bearing the brunt of the shortage. They were literally stripping all the fuel they could to ship to the Eastern Front so units in the West were left pretty much on empty. I know I didn't address all the objections, but I did take on a representative sample. If anyone does see this reply and feels like they would like further replies I would be more than happy to oblige. In the meantime I would urge you all not to throw around baseless character attacks like labeling someone "lazy" when in fact that appellation might well be better applied to the authors who perpetuate myths like the usefulness of PLUTO and those who are taken in by such errors.
Welcome back and for the detailed reply. One of the great advantages of the forum is the opportunity to learn, enhanced by the expertise that many hold.
AIUI the Luftwaffe were faced with a problem on the morning of 19 August 1942 because the landing ships had gone. After dropping of the troops in their LCA & LCP(L) around 0300, the 9 LSI all sailed back to the Solent, arriving by around 1000 to await the return of the landing craft. LSI involved were:- LSI(L) - Glengyle LSI(M) - Princess Beatrix, Queen Emma LSI(S) - Prince Charles, Prince Leopold, Princess Astrid, Prins Albert LSI(H) - Duke of Wellington, Invicta
Welcome back, Very true, and equally just because something didn't have a great impact on Overlord in 1944 it doesn't mean it wouldn't have impacted on the success of Sledgehammer" in 1942. For those of us who don't want to watch a video, could you post an indication of your timeline (very basic - when Sledgehammer was approved, when planned for, etc.). Nothing in too much depth, just so we have a general idea of the progress you would expect to see from spring to autumn 1942, and can then make a judgement of whether real-world events might have had an impact. Regards Tom
What you describe is exactly what the Sledgehammer plan called for: LSIs dropping troops with landing craft off the far shore during the night and immediately departing back to home port. I would like to point out that while Dieppe is closer to the English coastline than the Cotentin Peninsula (where the Sledgehammer plan called for the main landing, a little north of what would later become known as Utah Beach), it is actually farther from the Solent. The same is more or less true with respect to fighter bases. Even under those circumstances there is going to be 2-3 hours in which the LSIs returning from Dieppe would be sailing in daylight in the Channel not that much closer to RAF fighter bases than they were to GAF bases. I guess the way I wrote it could have been more precise since it implied I was talking about Allied shipping just off the coast of Dieppe. The way I usually put it is that with the exception of one bomb hit on one Allied ship, the small Hunt class destroyer Berkeley (which later was sunk by the RN), the GAF did not inflict serious damage on any of the ships of the invasion convoy (I wrote my response in haste under the incorrect assumption that probably no one was going to read it). Well, I have to thank you for that listing because in checking your list against what I had in my notes and then back against an original source document (COHQ Green List of 4 August 1942) I discovered that in my notes I had Prince Charles as a LSI(H), when in fact it was indeed a LSI(S). I guess that is a difference so small that few would ever notice it and I don't think there is really a practical difference as far as actual amphibious capability, but I like to be as correct in my information as possible (otherwise your listing corresponded exactly with what I had in my notes, btw). I appreciate your "AIUI" at the beginning that stands in stark contrast to the original P-Squared post that accused me of being "lazy" which, you might imagine, I didn't find at all fair given the hundreds if not thousands of hours I have devoted to research on Sledgehammer since 2005. Really, we should all be on the same team in terms of trying to advance our knowledge, which does sometimes involve correcting each other's mistakes. Incidentally, in re-reading my original post I noticed a mistake: where I wrote "35 truckloads a day" I should have written "65 truckloads a day". Ok, strictly speaking 66 2/3 truckloads a day, but in reality the US 2 1/2 ton trucks actually typically carried 5 ton loads in Normandy in 1944, though on the other hand the standard British truck/lorry was rated at 3 tons so I just stuck with an average of 3 tons of ammo per truck/lorry. There is more I could say if you really wanted to get down into the weeds, but I think my overall point stands - there was more than enough logistical capacity to supply a force on the Cotentin Peninsula much larger than what the plan anticipated would be required to hold it, and holding a chunk of territory was all the Sledgehammer concept called for (I will describe more about that in a subsequent response).
The genesis of Sledgehammer dates back to March of 1942 when British military planners proposed a limited cross-Channel invasion to aid the Soviets on the Eastern Front, the idea being to at least make the GAF engage in large scale combat. The planners considered landings on either the Pas de Calais, or the Cotentin Peninsula, but by July, when Gen. Marshall and Adm. King came to London to try to convince their British counterparts to go ahead with Sledgehammer the planners had settled on the Cotentin (up until that point the Cotentin had everything favoring it except in terms of fighter coverage, but the Sledgehammer planners had a "Eureka" moment when they realized that fighters could use drop tanks to extend their range; the plan stated there would be sufficient supply of drop tanks to operate for 7 weeks and as the plan also called for the early landing on special RAF engineering battalions to reopen captured airfields that the Germans had abandoned and to open up new one, that should have been more than enough by a wide margin). It was limited in that there was no plan to break out of Normandy like in 1944. The idea was for Sledgehammer to serve as a preliminary for a larger invasion the following spring, Operation Roundup (when I say "larger" Roundup was planned to be significantly larger than Overlord). If the Allies had decided to go ahead with Sledgehammer during the July meetings the next window that had the proper tidal conditions that fell outside the 10-week preparatory period the plan called for (though a lot of preparations had already commenced, including the reopening of English Channel ports previously blocked as an anti-invasion measure, the conversion of a number of ships into infantry assault ships as well as around 1000 Thames River barges to supplement purpose built landing craft like LCMs and LCTs, and the construction of hards for the LCTs) would have started on Oct 4. The 4th was probably far too foggy, but Oct 5 had almost ideal weather conditions and most of the rest of October had favorable weather conditions as well (I know that many sources claim that after mid-September weather conditions in the English Channel made a cross-Channel operation impossible but this is contradicted by the climatology section of the Sledgehammer report, the German experience of the previous two autumns guarding the Channel coast, the experience of the autumn and winter of 1944-45, and, most importantly, the actual weather reports from October 1942). The intent was to capture Cherbourg within 3 days in any event, which, though that sounds hopelessly optimistic if your only frame of reference in Overlord, in the context of 1942 was very doable since between the beaches of the eastern Cotentin Peninsula and the "back door" of Cherbourg there were practically no forces in the way and though there was a defensive line on the map to guard a landward attack on the port the Germans did not have any troops available to man it. There were also the minor ports of St. Vaast and Barfleur, which, as experience in 1944 showed, had between them sufficient capacity to maintain the Sledgehammer force on the peninsula even without Cherbourg. The "real-world event" that was bound to have the greatest impact on Sledgehammer, assuming the Allies were able to secure their foothold on the Continent, was the surrounding of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in late November. Although I cannot say with 100% certainty what would have happened it seems almost unbelievable that the Anglo-Americans would not decide to broaden their shorter term goals in order to take advantage of that development (and for anyone familiar with the history of the Eastern Front over the following months would know the crisis continued for the Germans until late February, quite the window of opportunity), i.e., not wait in place for Roundup. It would undoubtedly require some weeks for the Allies to build up their logistics on the peninsula and some weeks of probably costly fighting to break out (but, of course, there was costly fighting required to break out in 1944 and we are talking about a scenario where the Western Allies could deduct the losses from Tunisia, Sicily, the Dardanelles and Italy from their casualty ledger). A breakout in early 1943, however, would have found Germany in a far weaker position than they were in 1944 since the number of operational tanks, for instance, was reaching near a wartime low and AFV production was also much lower than it would be later in the war (also most German tanks at the time were the obsolescent Mk IIIs), and the number of available fighter pilots was also far lower than later in the war, and, worse, the pilot replacement pipeline was practically dry since the GAF had been forced to shut down 4 of 5 fighter pilot schools due to the severe fuel shortage at the time (contrary to what you might have been led to believe the German fuel situation on the even of Overlord was the best it had been since before Barbarossa). Ok, there is a lot more I could add, but you said make it short and it seems like I've failed in that already! One more thing, however. I know you said that you wanted to avoid watching a video, but if you change your mind, or if anyone else wants to watch a video presentation regarding the conclusions of my research regarding Sledgehammer I would recommend watching the second of the two-part presentation I made last year (one year after the WNHA presentation): Part 1. Part 2. Again, if you just have one hour or so, watch the first 65 minutes of the Part 2 (youtu.be/FISAtXP35qM) which corresponds to the presentation part of the video (the rest of that video is Q&A).
