Have any of you guys watched the video below.? What do you make of their case for implementing that plan.? Thank You
My brutal reply would be: he's using some selective and questionable 'evidence' to support his argument. Sledgehammer would have been a disaster and Giumarra does little to show how it would have succeeded. He does - rightly - say that comparing it to Dieppe is wrong, but Dieppe did show how inadequately prepared we were for cross-channel operations. Equally, I would argue, comparing Sledgehammer to Torch is comparing apples and pears. Torch involved 53000 US troops and 20,000 British troops, but against Vichy forces who, in the event, offered no opposition; the paratroop landings were a disaster. Tirch contributed to the fighting in N Africa - El Alamein had turned the course of events in N Africa, but only in Oct/Nov 42. When the Americans were 'insisting' (in around April 1942) on a landing in France in 1942, things were not going well in North Africa. I can see that a landing in French North Africa must have been very appealing to the British, who - unlike the Americans - had been at war since September 1939. Landing on the Cherbourg peninsula would have been a completely different problem. The fact that Germany was still effectively mobilising its economy for total war is irrelevant. I'll pick up on a few of Giumarra's points: Air superiority is not discussed by Giumarra - we had it for D-day but it simply did not exist over the channel in 1942. So, the invasion would have been extremely vulnerable and the proposed para drops would have been - potentially - a massacre (and that assumed we had the air transport to drop the paratroops required.) During the Diepp[e raid the Spitfire Vs were fighting towards the extent of their operational range - it would have been the same over the Cotentin. No naval commander would put serious naval power into the channel without air superiority. If they needed it spelling out, the loss of Prince of Wales and Renown brought that problem home. Apart from anything, in 1942, U-boats were having a field day with Allied merchant shipping (the second 'Happy Time') - admittedly that was focused on the North American seabord but you could forgive the RN for being somewhat distracted at the time. Specialist logistics were developed for D-day. He states that as a result of the loss of the Mulberry harbour (note that one of the two survived the storm and did great service into autumn of 1944). The idea of beaching coasters when you didn't have air superiority is ridiculous - they would have been incredibly vulnerable. Sustainment - it's impossible to see how such a force could have been sustained in the face of German naval activity and (I keep coming back to) air power. Moreover, what was this force going to do once it had landed? It certainly wouldn't be strong enough to fight its way through France, so...was it just going to hunker down and - WWI style - dig in and wait for the next 'big push' whilst sustaining massive casualties as the Germasn reinfroced. Relative forces. I have to accept his word for it that the forces in the Cotentin were 'second-rate'. However, there were other forces in western Europe which would have been rushed to the area to force the Allies back into the sea (which they would most cetainly have done) - there was no 'transportation plan' in 1942 and nor was there any similar plan for resistance effort such as we saw in June 1944. The German ability to 'counterattack' is well-earned - even in 1942, and it's ridiculous to suggest that they would have done anything other than fight like hell against any invasion attempt in 1942. The other thing is: the forces on the Cotentin might have been 'second-rate' but did the Allies know that was the case? I don't know enough about Allied intelligence to judge that; I do know that the expected 'second-rate' German forces around Dieppe fought like hell (as did those brought into the Market Graden battle in September 1944). I think Giumarra massively underestimates the forces the Germans could ultimately bring to bear. Deception. D-day was massively helped by Op Fortitude - there had been no thought to deception operations for Sledgehammer. We can argue that those operations (eg FUSAG) just helped tie down forces that would be otherwise rushed to Normandy, but the same problem would have existed - the Germans rushing forces to the Cotentin. Command and Control. Again, if Dieppe did little else (and it did do little else), Operation Jubilee adequately demonstrated the immaturity of Allied multi-service C2, let alone the difficulties of coalition warfare. There was much work to be done on this. Fortunately, Sledgehammer would not have been a multinational effort because the Americans were not ready to participate. When they were pushing for an invasion of France, they'd not even begun bombing Europe! And here's the point - it was Stalin who was pushing for a 'second front' (I've never learnt what he thought of N Africa - just a sideshow, presumably, like Italy (eventually) I guess?) or the fact that we were literally fighting for our lives in the Far East). The Americans, who had been brought into the war only a few months earlier, thought it would be a jolly good idea as well, though they had no experience of fighting the Germans and were not offering to get involved themselves - this was going to be a largely Brit-only affair, but "off you go, you Brits, and we'll cheer you on; let us know how it goes." I have no sympathy for Stalin's views - a man who suppported Hitler (because that is what he did) up until he was invaded; I see the US opinion at the time is naive and simply unhelpful. Honestly, I'd like to say, yes this would be a brilliant plan, but it just wouldn't. The more I think about what Giumarra proposes the more angry I get. As I say, he's been selective in the use of his 'evidence' and has used the advantage of 20/20 hndsight to try and bolster his questionable assertions. It's lazy, sloppy opinionating in my opinion - the sort of thing you get down the pub and you demolish in about ten minutes. I'm suprised he was given this air time and I honestly wonder why the Western Naval History Association thought it was worthwhile. On the plus side, it got me thinking!
A great critique...and honest... Thank You. Air power was also a big question with me. Also.....PLUTO. How were "The Allies" going to supply the invasion force with Gasoline, or anything else for that matter.? There was a danger of German submarines and Luftwaffe presence at that point. I would argue that "The Allies' were as equally as unprepared, to invade France, in 1942 as The Germans were. The USA Army was a brand new civilian army. I am not just picking on the usa, but ALL armies have a learning curve. The Russians certainly did in The East. How many Generals and their staff were cut loose after Torch got going.? I am NOT a historian nor any kind of Military/WW2 expert. I always assumed there were good reasons that a 1942 invasion of France was delayed.
Brooke's diary entry for 8th May 1942 mentions a "difficult" Chiefs of Staff meeting which had Sledghammer as one topic. Home Forces and Combined Operations (Mountbatten) concluded that the landing craft were insufficient for the operation. Prior to this, in April, Brooke had questioned Marshall closely about what he was going to do if we had established a lodgment. He asked how the operation would be developed to defeat the Germans in France. I suspect the American army's enthusiasm for cross channel invasions was because the US had agreed to a Germany first policy with the Army in the driving seat it was embarrassing not to be seen to do anything for years, while the real competition the US Navy could always find something to be done in the PTO. Sledgehammer was a politically attractive project with the British and Canadians taking the big risks.
Actually, PLUTO is a bloody good point. There are so many things which contributed to Overlord’s success and simply did not exist in 1942 - most of all, experience.
Your last sentence is correct, I believe - the USA needed to be seen to be doing something. There was also pressure from the British public (particularly the trades unions) to help the USSR. The thing that niggles me is that the Americans exerted the pressure, but they wouldn’t have been doing it! I’m no USA-basher. I hate it when folks bang on about them being ‘late’ joining the war - until Hitler declared war in the USA they had no clear reason to join in. However, the pressure they tried to exert in 1942 was unnecessary and unhelpful - as you say, there’s a learning curve for all military forces. Thankfully, we Brits refused to give in and they eventually got the message. Job well done!
Citing Post 3 by chipm: Not my area of expertise, but I did note the British commander of the First Army in North Africa, Kenneth Anderson, who never commanded an army in the field again. See: Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer) - Wikipedia From memory there is a thread or posts on his relegation.
Except PLUTO made no contribution to the whole Normandy campaign and it is just as well other plans for bulk delivery of fuel existed. The aim of PLUTO was to provide 3500 tons per day through 10 pipes to Cherbourg, under code name Bambi, and getting them operational between D+12 and D+75. The pipes were scheduled for a 6 week life. And it used two types of pipe, Hais & Hamel. It was the latter that was wrapped onto the giant Conundrums. In reality between June and Oct the Bambi system delivered a total of 3300 tons. There were delays due to the late capture and clearance of Cherbourg. The first attempt to lay a Hais pipe didn’t begin until 12 Aug and it failed. The Hamel pipes which followed were no more successful. It was 22 Sept before any fuel flowed from England to France via PLUTO pipes by which time the Normandy campaign was over. Both pipe systems failed on 3 Oct and were abandoned because by then the war had moved on. By then the Allied advance meant that a second pipe network could be commissioned between Dungeness and Boulogne under codename Dumbo. By the end of Oct the first pipe had been laid and fuel was flowing. But it took until Dec to lay 6 working pipes delivering only 700 tons per day. From opening to 20 Jan the total delivered was only 62,000 tons. Pipelaying continued into May 1945 by which time there were 16 pipes in operation. Given the experimental nature of PLUTO it was just as well there was a back up plan. Two pipe networks were planned in northern France. The first, the Minor System, was based on pipes laid south from Port-en-Bessin which was capable of taking small tankers, and from offshore undersea pipes to tanker moorings just to the west, off Ste Honorine-des- Partes. Bulk fuel began flowing from tankers here on 25June. The second system, the Major System, ran south from Cherbourg. Once captured and cleared ocean going tankers were able to berth and unload. It eventually ran all the way Germany. Fuel was also being landed at Dieppe within 7 days of its re-occupation in Aug, and other French and Belgian ports became involved as the war moved forward. The most vital of these was of course Antwerp. To put it in context, approx 5.2m tons of oil products were delivered to NWE between 6 June 1944 and 10 May 1945. About 16% was delivered direct across the Atlantic with the remainder, 4.3m tons, coming from Britain. PLUTO’s contribution to that British element was 370,000 tons or about 8% and all of that after the end of the Normandy campaign. And the effort involved was so considerable that the RN was questioning the effort involved by the end of 1944. But every gallon of fuel was vital to keeping the mechanised armies in the field. Despite that PLUTO remains a magnificent technical achievement for its time.
Ewen Scott , that's great - thank you. I knew none of that! Every day is a school day, as they say, and it's really useful and interesting. "Amateurs think tactics, professionals think logistics", etc. I was going to ay that even 8%, given the parlous state of Alliance supply in September 1944 must have been worthwhile, but I see you covered that as well. Thanks again for that information.
Yes................but in 1942, would "The Allies" have been able to deliver enough fuel by ANY Means.? In 1944 they had a relatively large beachhead and air and naval machismo. In 1942, once they landed and The Wehrmacht responded..............could they have supplied the invasion.?
Indeed - one of my points in rebuttal to Mr Giumarra’s fantastic theory. Imagine beaching oil tankers for unloading!
The background chapter of Harrison's Cross-Channel Attack (the US official history) is worth a read to get a pretty neutral view of the scope and assumptions behind ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER: HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Cross Channel Invasion [Chapter 1]
The logic there - a quick occupation in the event of a withdrawal, collapse or surrender - is an interesting angle from which to view SEALION, instead of the usual doomed (fingers crossed) all-out assault.
