Private Diary: 201 Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery, 21 May - 12 Jun, Major DF Peacock

A certain amount of doubt has since arisen as to where the first break through took place. Certain authorities contend that this took place at FORGES but a comparison of records kept by Lieutenant Colonel CAMERON and B.C. of 201 Bty who were commanding the two areas, FORMERIE - AUMALE (Excl) and AUMALE to BLANGY (Excl) coupled with the reports of their Troop commanders would show that their records exactly coincide. These records both state that the first break through was just south of AUMALE. Just above AUMALE, running East and West there is a large spur running back towards the higher ground on which is the BAS FORET D'EU north of the AUMALE - DIEPPE Road. 101st Regiment's left hand Troop was on the south side of this spur, and 210st Btys A Troop was just on the North of it. On breaking through the enemy turned North where the spur petered out then encountering opposition swung south again.

 

Regimental Commander ordered B.C. to withdraw 201st Bty immediately and to proceed to the FOUCARMENT - LES ESSARTS road and establish a defence covering the approaches from AUMALE - ST. LEGER road and roads from the BASSE FORET D'EU area. Division had now moved back to the line of the River BRESLE from BLANGY to the sea on the 6th and OISMENT which had been Division right was in flames on the night 6th/7th. 201 Bty had been facing North West with their front running from North East to South West. Their new front on the FOUCARMENT road would now be North West to South East facing to the right rear of Division.

B.C. ordered Lieutenant McARTHUR to form up B Echelon and Bty H.Q. group and to move at once for the FOUCARMENT - LES ESSARTS area and get into cover in that area. Captain LEWIS had already gone off on his patrol on the other side of the BRESLE and in view of recent news hopes were entertained that he would not run into anything. Company Commander of KENSINGTONS was informed at once of the new situation and a D.R. sent to apprise Armour Support Group that 201 Bty had now come under Regimental command and to pass necessary orders to KENSINGTONS and ROYAL ENGINEERS lately under 201st command.

A D.R. was sent to Lieutenant BURNETT of A Troop with orders for him to withdraw his Troop and rendezvous with B.C. at ST. LEGER. The same orders were sent to Lieutenant MacAULAY of B Troop by another D.R. C Troop (Lieutenant ANKERS) being furthest away and more scattered, B.C. decided to go to himself. Reaching NEILNORMANDEAUX, the extreme left of C Troops area, B.C. contacted O.I.C. ROYAL ENGINEERS and informed him of the altered circumstances and that word had been sent to Support Group. On receiving orders from B.C. Lieutenant ANKERS proceeded to withdraw his Troop and B.C. returned to REALCAMP.

Bty H.Q. and B Echelon were now ready to move and Captain LEWIS had returned from Patrol, the time being approx. 1200 hours. Captain LEWIS reported that he coud find no evidence of French troops to the west of the BRESLE and that ROYAL ENGINEERS were preparing to blow the crossings. B.C. decided to send Captain LEWIS off with B Echelon and return Lieutenant McARTHUR to meet the Troops at ST. LEGER at 1400 hours, the time of rendezvous, while he himself went off to recce Troop positions on the FOUCARMENT - LES ESSARTS road.
(See Appendix 5)
The road from ST. LEGER to FOUCARMENT was very open and exposed and anything moving on it would be extremely vulnerable to air attack. FOUCARMENT lay very much below the level of this road and entering the town from the west the road took a sudden dip into the main street running north and south. The route to Bty area turned sharp left down this street and at the foot of it turned sharp right out of the town on to a cross roads on the main NEUFCHATEL - ABBEYVILLE road. Immediately to the left, i.e. south of FOUCARMENT this road passed between banks; 15 to 18 ft. high on either side with a row of large trees crowning each bank; for a distance of approx 150 yards before rising again to the level of the surrounding country. B.C. decided to site A Troop to the north of FOUCARMENT to cover the branch road to REALCAMP passing north of the town and also be able to fire on to the high road coming from ST. LEGER. B Troop would take over the area south of the sunken road and could also fire to the west of FOUCARMENT and cover the country roads coming from the BASSE FORET D'EU while C Troop would move still further to the south and cover the LES ESSARTS stretch of road including cross roads leading to LONDINIERES.

Having completed his recce B.C. returned at speed to ST. LEGER to find C and B Troops waiting for him but no sign of A Troop. Sending a D.R. to locate and bring on A Troop to the area the remaining 2 Troops moved off at large march intervals and speed of 25 m.p.h. This was kept up to within sight of FOUCARMENT when some light tanks were overtaken. Not wishing to risk this slow pace of the tanks through the town, which the latter were already entering, 201 halted at 200 yard intervals along the road and as soon as the tanks had cleared the main street moved on to go through the town. Orders had been passed back for all vehicles to close right up to 3 yard intervals and speed was reduced to 10 m.p.h. The Bty passed down the main street and out over the crossroads into the sunken part of the road when hell was let loose. Thirty five bombers attacked the southern exit from the town just as Bty cleared the crossing. They came from the South East and must have spotted us entering the town from the high road from ST. LEGER. Bty closed right up under the trees and embankment of the sunken road which commenced at the crossroads. The bombs came down in groups of five and places were so low that these could be clearly seen leaving the racks.
(See Appendix 5)
The crossroads and houses round about were blown up and each side of the cutting laced with bomb craters but not a single bomb landed between the banks where the Bty had halted. Personnel were ordered to lied down on the bank on the side from which the bombers were diving. The bombers would have made excellent targets for Bren ire but B.C. was in doubt as to whether they knew that Bty was in the cutting or not and did not want to give away the position by engaging them and thus run the risk of losing his guns. At each blast from the bombs steel helmets would tilt on the head and one could see the battle dress jackets of the O.Rs inflate and subside like balloons. A number of women and children refugees were in the cutting and gunners had to hold them down on the bank; they were so terrorised, to keep them clear of splinters and flying debris.

The raid lasted about half an hour but fortunately except for small cuts here and there no one was injured. B.C. was thankful that B Echelon had been sent ahead for had they been with Bty, they would have been just on the crossroads in time to catch the lot. As it was the rear vehicles were almost on the crossroads. B Troop was held in the cutting while C Troop was ordered to the section of the road south of LES ESSARTS to cover that area against possible attack from the south as soon as the raid finished.

B Troop had only three guns, having to leave one behind in the SENAPONT valley above the BRESLE. When this gun had been taken up over the rough into its position on the high wooded side of the valley one of the wheels had been damaged. A replacement had been sent up the following day and it was taken for granted that it would fit the stub axle of the gun, being standard size. In any case guns were in action on their tripod legs and a test would have meant removing sand bags and timbers to fit the wheel. On top of this an ordnance Artificer had delivered the new and taken away the old wheel and he ought to have checked the fit with his callipers. When the gun team did attempt to take out their gun the new wheel would not take even the tapered end of the axle. Removing the firing mechanism and all stores, the gun was left concealed, in the hope that they could return and collect it in the dark.

The remaining three guns were moved up to their area on the FOUCARMENT - LES ESSARTS road to positions already recce'd by B.C. and seven guns were all in position by 1800 hours. B.C. then returned to W.L. on the LONDINIERES branch road.

A Troop commander (Lieutenant BURNETT) arrived shortly after to inform B.C. that he could not get to his area on the north side of FOUCARMENT owing to the roads being blown up but that he had his four guns as near as possible to it and in action on wheels until the roads allowed him through when filled in. Difficulty had arisen in getting two of his guns out of the positions on the BRESLE and his No. 1 Gun team had a running fight with enemy cars and M.C. M.Gs on the AUMALE - DIEPPE road just after clearing the spur on the AUMALE valley. He stated that the enemy had turned south towards ROUEN. This had happened in the forenoon and he had kept his guns south west of ST. LEGER in case another attempt would be made to come into Division's rear and thus he was late for the rendezvous with Bty at ST. LEGER. This information corroborated the first report that enemy had first broken through south of AUMALE and not at FORGES for it was hardly possible for them to come through FORGES, so far South West of AUMALE and then appear travelling West and then south again on the AUMALE - DIEPPE road in such a short time and without the knowledge of the 101st A/T, L.A.A. Regiment.

C.O. went round Troop positions and approved of them. At 200 hours Captain LEWIS asked for and received permission to return to the BRESLE with a 3 ton lorry to try and recover the lost gun. Bombardier KERR one of the M.Mec. N.C.Os of the Bty and about the best driver we had volunteered to drive and the gun Sergeant and his team demanded the right to go as well. They set off in the dark without lights not knowing where the enemy might be by this time. Returning about 4 a.m. the following morning, all as black as the devil, with the gun on the lorry. In the vicinity of REALCAMP they dodged two groups of the enemy and reaching the SENAPONT valley drove the lorry up over the fields to the edge of the woods and loaded the gun on it. Captain LEWIS reported that only the excellent and clever driving of Bombardier KERR had made the journey a success. Passing the old Bty H.Q. in the wood near REALCAMP Captain LEWIS went in to look around and reported that it had been shelled to pieces and we had been lucky to get out when we did. The ROYAL ENGINEERS who had been under Command 201 had also done their job well, having completed all blows.

Lieutenant WARD MACRAE of the 203 A/T Battery who went into ROUEN for some supplies on the evening 7th June, ran into the German tanks there and had to make a run for it.

 

51st ANTI-TANK REGIMENT H.Q. had moved to the village of CLAIS, about eight miles by road South West of 201 Bty's position, and 204th A/T Bty were covering part of CLAIS and LES ESARTS roads on 201's right. These positions were retained throughout the day until the late afternoon when orders were received by 201 to withdraw and follow the Regimental H.Q. to the FORET DE ROBERT area.

Main French Forces were now behind the SEINE and 51st DIVISION were ordered to withdraw behind the River BETHUNE further north than the SEINE. The Division was now under command of a newly formed IX CORPS which was attempting to hold the enemy while the main French force consolidated behind the River SEINE. Time of withdrawal was 2300 hours on the 8th. The whole of the 51 DIVISION were tired out by this time by morale was still high after a 300 mile march from the SAAR and eight days' fighting and bombing from the air, not to mention continued change of positions and movement to comply with the variably policy of the French command.

Throughout this period Lieutenant-Colonel PAGE, M.C., commanding 51st A/T REGIMENT had been tireless in his many duties as A/T defence officer for the 51st DIVISION. His coolness, clear-sightedness and unfailing cheerfulness endeared him to all ranks.

After a hot tiring march 201 Bty arrived in the dark at the FORET DE ROBERT having had many stoppages and traffic blocks on the way by other units also on the move. No exact location had been given but Captain LEWIS had gone ahead with C.O. and was waiting at the cross roads near LA CHAUSSEE to guide Bty into a hide. Manoeuvring the vehicles into a large orchard about 2400 hours, and getting a hot meal, all ranks turned in for the last night's sleep before capture.

Note
Lieutenant WAR MACRAE reported to Division his experience with the enemy tanks in ROUEN, on the morning of the 8th (Report of Major PARSONS 203rd A/T Bty)

 

At 0730 hours C.O. warned B.C. 201 that he was to come under Division commander's orders direct at 0900 hours and would probably require 2 Troops. B.C. gave orders to A and B Troops to ffed at once and prepare to move. Ration question did not arise as standing Bty orders since coming to the SOMME area were all Troops must always carry 2 days emergency rations surplus to immediate requirements. Both Troops were ready to march before B.C. left to join C.O. at Division H.Q. about quarter of a mile down the road.

Arrived at Division H.Q. B.C. had to wait for some time before Divisional Commander was free to give his orders. After a short consultation and recourse to the map Div Commander decided that one Troop of 201 Bty with a platoon of the 7th N.F. (Heavy Machine Guns) should go at once to the TOTES crossroads in the Division's rear where enemy tanks and recce groups were reported to be. TOTES was approx. 10 miles south of Division just North of CLEVES and on the main LE HAVRE road. Four roads all meet at this point and it was an open approach into Divisional area. Arrangements had been made for the ROYAL ENGINEERS to blow the crossroads as a last resort. A second Troop with another platoon of Infantry would go as soon as the latter could be obtained to the ST. SAENS cross roads where the main DIEPPE and LE HAVRE roads crossed. This point was approx. 9 miles West of TOTES and right on the reported line of the enemy's penetration.

Contact with 7th N.F.s was had immediately but they who were Heavy Machine gunners and as cumbersome to move as the A/T guns, had no transport of their own available. B.C. wanted to get the A/T Troop off at once and the Platoon of M.Gs was to follow by Division Commander would not permit this. A 3 toner of 201 Bty was offloaded at once and collecting the M.G. Platoon proceeded to Bty hide. Warning was given to the Adjutant 7th N.Fs that 201 would not be responsible for transport to carry the platoon in the event of withdrawal as the 3 toner would not be available. B.C. decided to sent A Troop to TOTES and gave Lieutenant BURNETT the Troop Commander his route and a free hand in siting his guns at TOTES. The Troop Commander was to send back his D.R. with word when his guns were in position and the Troop left Division H.Q. at 1100 hours. Returning to Division H.Q. to find out if another Platoon was available for his second Troop B.C. found that no words had been received from the KENSINGTONS re this platoon and Division Commander who with his G.S.O.1. had a terrific amount of work to do, was engaged with the French liaison officer and British Naval officer at that time.

(See Appendix 6)
1400 hours After waiting for two hours and getting no information or satisfaction from G.S.O.2. B.C. instead on going to contact Division Commander himself and was fortunate in getting hold of G.1. knew exactly what Division commander had arranged and sent off at once for the Infantry Platoon. This platoon with its own transport materialised about 1530 hours and B Troop (Lieutenant MACAULAY) set off for ST. SAENS via BELMESNIL, TIRCY and BELLENCOMBIE.

1530 hours At this time B.C. had to rely entirely on the discretion of his two Troop commanders, of whose ability he had no doubts, for the following reasons. He was now acting directly under Division commander's orders and had to keep contact personally with Divisional H.Q. as he still had one Troop (C ) and his B Echelon at LA CHAUSSEE. C Troop might have to be used to move to any area at a moment's notice. He could not go off with B Troop for he was awaiting word as to what happened with A Troop at TOTES and likewise could not go to TOTES in case of trouble arising with B Troop.

Shortly after seeing B Troop en route for ST. SAENS B.C. received word by A Troop's D.R. that the Troop had all four guns in positions by 1300 hours. Troop Commander reported that he had been compelled to place two of his guns south of the crossroads in order to cover all approaches to Division rear and his H.M.Gs according to cover the guns against ground attack. This was quite satisfactory and orders were sent back that no move from the area was to made except under orders from B.C. or Battery Captain. This precaution had become necessary owing to previous experience of interference with guns by supposed authority which was bogus. By this time all types of French troops had started to straggle westwards in Division's rear and the roads between H.Q. and A and B Troops' position were becoming congestion with M.I. belonging to French XI Corps.

At 1830 hours Lieutenant MACAULAY of B Troop reported back that he had been unable to get his guns into position at ST. SAENS but had come further west on the LE HAVRE road and was in position at the first by road running north to Division's rear. B.C. immediately set off to investigate for it did not seem that the new position chosen would close the gap in Division's right rear. Reaching B Troop's area an exact report was given by Lieutenant MACAULAY of what had happened.
(See Appendix 6)

B Troop had moved to their first position via branch road to BELMESNIL - TORCY main road, turned left through TORCY and then right our south downtime main DIEPPE road to BELLENCOMBIE. Here the Troop commander halted his Troop and went forward through ST. SAENS to recce his positions covering the cross roads. At the cross roads he saw enemy A.F.Os. approaching from the direction of FORMERIE. Hurriedly returning for his guns he arrived to find his Troop had been subjected to M.G. and rifle fire from a wood on their south west. Getting the Troop on the move at once he moved to ST. SAENS, entering which place the Troop were again Machine Gunned from another wood on their right. Hoping to get clear of this fire he continued to the main DIEPPE - LE HAVRE crossroads, his original objective, but immediately on arriving there further M.G. fire opened on the Troop from a large wood opposite on the south side of the road. Realising that to attempt to get guns into action was hopeless under this fire the Troop Commander turned west along the LE HAVRE road. Hardly were they clear of the fire from the wood to the south when a final burst of M.G. fire came from a small wood on the south side of the road on the Troop's right. Continuing until the first by road running north the Troop commander halter and brought guns into action to cover the LE HAVRE road which was the route along Division's rear.

As B Troop's present position left the main DIEPPE road through ST. SAENS and TORCY absolutely open to enemy A.F.Vs. to get into Division rear. B.C. withdrew the Troop to the BELMESNIL - TORCY road which commanded the road from the south and also the branch road from DIEPPE road into Division rear. By this time, 2200 hours, French M.T. were tearing along the BELMESNIL - TORCY road three abreast, presumably going to new locations. B.C. returned to Divisional H.Q. to report. G.S.O.1. decided that action on or near any of these roads would be impossible and would not permit of effective fire on the enemy. Despite assurance to the contrary he ordered the Troop to be withdrawn to LA CHAUSSEE immediately south of Divisional H.Q. B.C. returned to B Troop at 2400 hours and brought it bak to LA CHAUSSEE.

As definite information was received to the effect that the enemy held ROUEN and had blown up all the bridges, the original plan, of the 8th for IX French Corps to withdraw via ROUEN and join the main French army south of the SEINE, had to be abandoned. IX CORPS were not to withdraw on HAVRE. With this end in view, Brigadier STANLEY CLARKE was to take a force consisting of 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE, "A" Brigade, who had joined 51 DIVISION on the SOMME, 6th R.S.Fs, 1st KENSINGTONS (less 2 Companies), 17th and 75th Regiments, ROYAL ARTILLERY, 204 A/T Battery ROYAL ARTILLERY, 236th Field Company and 239th Field Park Company and hold the line BOLBEC - FECAMP through which IX CORPS would pass. At the same time the was ordered to embark his forces at HAVRE should the enemy get through between his force and IX CORPS.

 

On the morning of 10th June 201 Bty reverted to Regimental command and Lieutenant-Colonel PAGE went with B.C. 201 to the CLERES - DIEPPE road where he gave orders for two Troops to cover this road in depth and left it to B.C. to sight them and a third Troop to cover the branch roads entering the right flank of Division's route to LE HAVRE. For this purpose word has been despatches to A Troop on the TOTES cross roads to return via BELMESNIL. In this area there was a network of roads all negotiable by Armour Forces and all more or less leading into Division's flank and rear.

B.C. returned to LA CHAUSSEE to collect B and C Troops and also contacted 7th N.Fs. An attempt on the previous night to get transport for their platoon under command A Troop met with no success and the Platoon would have to take its chance of getting back on its flat feet. Atmosphere the previous night was somewhat strained and on the following morning B.C. found that no attempt whatever had been made for ways and means of returning the M.G. platoon. B Troop still had the KENSINGTON Platoon under command and a word must be said in credit of this Platoon and its commander. They had received most of the M.G. fire at BELLENCOMBIE and although no one was hit their vehicles and range finder were well peppered and Troop commander reported that they behaved very well indeed under fire. Their young Platoon commander was up to his job and a cool young soldier.

(See Appendix 8)
Proceeding from LA CHAUSSEE with B and C Troops and KENSINGTON Platoon. B.C. saw each of B Troop guns sighted in the positions he had already selected for them and Troop commander established his H.Q. in the junction of the LA CHAUSSEE - DIEPPE and CLERES roads. For this defence 201 Bty had been given 4th R.C. of S. wireless trucks in order to control Bty by W.T. and also to connect with R.H.Q. which was now at OUVILLE approx 10 miles North East by North on the coast road with Divisional H.Q. B Troop were in depth from BELMESNIL back to the LA CHAUSSEE branch road. C Troop were sighted with 2 Guns on the road from BACQUEVILLE going north to join the LA CHAUSSEE - LONGUEVILLE - OUVILLE road and 2 guns on a branch road running between the BACQUEVILLE - OUVILLE and the LA CHAUSSEE - OUVILLE roads. Bty H.Q. was in a little farm on the LONGUEVILLE - OUVILLE road.

Shortly after C Troop had moved to their area B.C. went down on a motor cycle through B Troop's position to BELMESNIL to find out if there was any sign of A Troop returning from TOTES. Coincident with his arrival at approx. 1100 hours A Troop appeared coming up the road with only 3 guns. It looked more like a circus than an A/T Troop, for Lieutenant BURNETT had mounted the 7th N.F. M.G. Platoon on the tip of his guns and the tilts of his gun towing 15 cwt trucks, M.Gs and all and brought them in with him. 'Fat boy' as we called him was never stumped for a way out until severely wounded later on. He reported that he had one gun to cover the blow of the TOTES cross roads. This gun was not seen again but later authentic news was obtained that they remained on their own south at TOTES until the No. 1, Bombardier McSHANNON and three out of his five gunners were wounded and his Driver killed. They destroyed their gun before being taken prisoner.

Giving A Troop their gun positions B.C. returned to B Troop, spent a short time with them and returned to Bty H.Q. A 3 Ton Q lorry arrived there from B Echelon and left rations for the Troops also the information that Lieutenant McARTHUR had received orders from the C.O. that B Echelon was to rendezvous with that of 2020 and 203 under Major COULL and proceed on their own to HAVRE. Fortunately all Troops had loaded extra 2 Pr ammunition extra petrol and all the S.A.A. (tracer) that we had. This was the last we were to see of any of B Echelon except one 3 toner.

(See Appendix 9)
At 1200 hours Bty received a W.T. message from Regiment to withdraw A Troop and sent it to OUVILLE to protect the southern approaches to Divisional H.Q. At this time it became very evident that enemy A.F.Vs. were between Division and Brigadier STANLEY CLARKE's force in the south. A further W.T. message to Bty at 1400 hours ordered C Troop to join LOTHIAN AND BORDER HORSE who were ordered south to clear up the situation. This left B.C. with one Troop only and a H.M.G. Platoon to cover a fairly large area on Division's right flank for Division were withdrawing along the line DIEPPE - OFFANVILLE - OUVILLE road to the north of B Troop's area.

At 1430 hours one of Division Intelligence Officers stopped at Bty H.Q. and reported that enemy tanks were on the BELMESNIL - DIEPPE road just South West of Bty H.Q. This sounded awkward for B Troop who were in this part of the road but no W.T. message had been received from them as ordered. Calling up B Troop commander B.C. received the assurance that no enemy tanks were on this road as far sought as BELMESNIL at any rate but the road was crowded with French M.T. and troops coming north through this area. He asked what action was to be taken if enemy did appear in view of the French troops on the road. He received orders to engage the enemy irrespective of who was on the road.

At 1530 hours B Troop reported that they were being shelled but ineffectively and this news was relayed to R.H.Q. R.H.Q. asked how near the bursts had been and a reply from B stated about 150 to 200 yards on their left. As the afternoon progressed the shelling became more intense and the detonations could be felt almost at Bty H.Q. B Troop called up at 1730 hours to say that shells were now dropping round Troop H.Q. and dangerously close but no A.F.Vs. had yet appeared. By this time all British Troops in our immediate rear had moved out and we felt very much alone. Several instances of wireless interference had been experienced during the late afternoon and by 1800 hours no contact either with Regiment or B Troop could be obtained.

B.C. was just about to leave to investigate what had happened when B Troop turned up at Bty H.Q. minus their Signal truck and one gun. Troop Commander reported that he had left his 8 cwt truck at Troop H.Q. with his D.R. and Signal truck and had been patrolling the road from one gun position to another throughout the afternoon on his D.R's motorcycle. He had left Troop H.Q. on one of these runs just after reporting the shelling at 1730 hours. When he arrived at his furthest gun near BELMESNIL, and was observing the road to the south, a Military car marked with Divisional sign drew up near the gun and a staff officer alighted and gave him orders to withdraw his Troop at once. He informed this officer that he would have to verify this order with his B.C. before withdrawing and returned at sped to Troop H.Q. Arriving there he found only his D.R. and recce truck. His D.R. reported that just a short time before a Division Staff car had stopped and a Staff Officer had ordered the Signal truck to report back to Regiment saying that the was going down to BELMESNIL and would give the necessary orders to the Troop Commander to withdraw his Troop. Signaller not being able to get any answer from Bty assumed that something was wrong and drove off. This he ought not to have done.

The Troop Commander learning that no contact could be obtained with Bty H.Q. decided that the order was bona fide and withdrew his Troop to Bty H.Q. In getting one of his guns out of the small spiny beside the road he had to cross a fairly large ditch and in doing so, by man handling, the banking gave way and the gun turned over on its side into the ditch. Not being able to get the towing vehicle anywhere near the gun he had to leave it after removing the firing mechanism. B.C. was definitely put out over the whole affair and ordered B Troop back to the DIEPPE road but Troop Commander said this would be impossible, as while he had been able to come up the road with the tide of French traffic he was sure he could make no headway against it trying to get back. Although unable to communicate with R.H.Q., B.C. was sure that the Staff Officer and his orders were bogus and set off on a motor cycle to investigate the stat of traffic on the DIEPPE road. He found that Troop commander had been correct in his opinion re. the possibility of going back to his old positions. The traffic was made up of all types of M.T., farm vehicles and refugees. Vehicles were travelling three and sometimes four abreast making for DIEPPE and the coast.

Returning to Bty H.Q. he disposed B Troop on wheels to cover the immediate approaches and waited for word from R.H.Q. All attempts to get into touch with W.T. failed so there was nothing to do but sit tight.

At 1900 hours an Officer of ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS known to B.C. stopped to get road directions to Divisional H.Q. as he had no map and had gone off his route. He informed B.C. that all Divisional troops had cleared the area and that he had been left with emergency petrol supply to help any lame dogs on their way and was to return himself when satisfied that all had passed. Owing to the reports of enemy mobile forces in the ROUEN area Division had been ordered to withdraw on the night 10/11th behind the River DARENT.

After waiting until 1930 hours without any word and in view of the information received, B.C. decided to move B Troop north west to OUVILLE. Reaching this place he contacted the C.O. with a certain amount of trepidation as no orders had been received to withdraw. C.O. was justly annoyed at what had happened but on being informed of the conditions prevailing he agreed that after vacating the first positions and the time of return only being a half hour earlier than he intended to recall the Troop, no harm was done except the loss of the gun. He informed B.C. that the had already recalled A Troop which arrived just as he was speaking. C.O. gave orders for 201 Bty, less C Troop, which was still with the LOTHIAN AND BORDER HORSE to follow R.H.Q. to the village of CAILLEVILLE at 2100 hours. The route was to be by a road running parallel to but south of the main Division route of retrial as, expecting less traffic, C.O. hoped to make good time to the new area. The other Btys of 51 ANTI-TANK were operating under command of the two remaining INFANTRY BRIGADES (152 & 153).

Lieutenant MACAULAY asked permission to return and retrieve his lost gun and after consideration C.O. agreed to his going and Captain LEWIS went with him.

At 1930 hours the LOTHIAN AND BORDER HORSE reported that the enemy held CANY and VEULETTES and could not be dislodged. Earlier they had reported ST. VALERY clear of the enemy. These positions were right across Division line of retreat and it was evident there was a considerable force of armoire in our rear. During the late afternoon enemy pressure on Division front, to the North East, had slackened and his attempts to break through entirely frustrated. Apart from his superior strength he had all the air to play with for Division had nothing at all. In view of the enemy in the rear, the plan to withdraw that night behind the River DARENT was abandoned and Divisional Commander decided to form a bridgehead round ST. VALERY-EN-CAU and embark Division from there. Our gallant commander had, during the last 13 days, no bed of roses to lie on with regard to our allies. They were just an unknown quantity and he had more or less to consider a front all rondo him from the 7th onwards except to the sea. On top of this our friends kept pushing into Division area, blocking roads and movement so that apart from fighting, only the excellent Division control prevented complete dislocation and breaking up of Brigades. No Divisional Commander had ever more difficult decisions to make and none ever maintained a more level balance and inspired his troops by the force of his own personality than Major General FORTUNE.


Regimental B Echelons
On first hand information obtained afterward from Major COULL and Lieutenant McARTHUR this small force from 51st ANTI-TANK REGIMENT had a tough time. Starting off to go by FONTAINE - FULTOT - CANY and thence to the coast road and on to HAVRE they reached FULTOT to lear that the enemy tanks held CANY. Knowing that the enemy were also to their immediate south Major COULL decided to turn north through CAILLEVILLE - ST. VALERY and try for the coast road via VEULETTES and FECAMP. Just before reaching VEULETTES at a right angle turn on the road where there was a sudden rise they ran into an ambush. 201 B Echelon who were leading caught a heavy cross fire from M.Gs. and mortars , also tanks. Personnel dismounted and engaged those of the enemy they could see. Very soon it became a case of sauve qui peu. 201 Drivers managed to destroy their 3 toners with all papers and documents also their ammunition and petrol trucks. 202 who were immediately behind 201 also caught a heavy fire. 203 managed to get most of their people away . About half 201 personnel escaped to get home, the remainder were killed, wounded and taken prisoner. Lieutenant GRANT of 202 put up a fight for some time but was finally wounded and he with his small party were taken prisoner when ammunition was expended. Lieutenant GRANT stated that the German tanks took them into ST. VALERY which at that time 1630 hours was full of enemy tanks. The LOTHIAN AND BORDER HORSE cleared ST. VALERY of the enemy at 1800 hours but the prisoners were taken away in tanks. From their statements they were very well treated indeed by the enemy. That was the end for B Echelon.


At 2130 hours C.O. followed by 201, followed by H.Q. trucks commenced the night run to CAILLERVILLE about 3 miles south of ST. VALERY-EN-CAUX. Shortly after crossing the railway on the OUVILLE - BACQUEVILLE road 201 column was broken by transport going north and a slight night fog came down. B.C. halted on the FONTAINE road to allow vehicles to rejoin and in so doing lost C.O's car. Proceeding on the way he arrived at a road junction with one road; a very narrow, poor road; going went and one which apparently was the main road going slightly South West. Disregarding the narrow branch road B.C. continued on the main road. As many new and good roads had been made just prior to the war and were not shown on the maps it was very easy in the dark to make mistakes between roads running in the same direction. As Regiment was travelling on a route of their own there was no traffic control. C.O. had taken the branch road to the north which was the road Battery should also have taken.

As the road now being followed was excellent and going in the right direction B.C. decided to continue on it. No traffic whatsoever was encountered up until 2400 hours and Battery travelled at sped. Division had commenced the withdrawal at 2300 hours and the chance of being held up by traffic congestion on the main route by withdrawal was avoided altogether which congestion was very bad indeed owing to French Troops encroaching on our area.

 

Arriving in a small village South of FONTAINE at approximately 0130 hours, 201 Battery were halted by a column moving South on the FONTAINE - ST. LAURENT road. Tis was 152 INFANTRY BRIGADE who had mistaken their route and were for the moment lost. Very few 1/2" maps were available and almost useless for movement on a night as black as pitch. The immediate vehicles blocking the route to 201 were those of 4th CAMERONS which were halted. Seeking permission to pass through their column B.C. contacted their Second-in-Command and learned that they ere also making for the CAILLEVILLE area. On receipt of the information that they were headed in the opposite direction, orders were issued at once for vehicles which had passed the road end that 201 intended to take, to turn about and take this road. 201 had therefore to wait for nearly one and a half hours before being able to cross and continue their route which now swung north to FONTAINE. This road was now heavily congested with Divisional traffic gradually converging in the ST. VALERY area especially at the point just north of FONTAINE where the route turned west again to GOETTUVILLE which was the next objective. At this point 201 again joined the C.O. who had been travelling parallel to Bty on a road to the north of them. Time was now about 0330 hours.

Reaching the outskirts of GOETTUVILLE approx at 0430 hours it was found that there was a complete traffic block and all vehicles were halted. C.O. sent the Adjutant back to 201, who were halted just opposite a field track which looked as if it might be crossing the fields downhill to see the main FULTOT - CAILLEVILLE road, to see whether 201 could move out of the block by this road. The darkness was intense and there was a grave risk taking vehicles and guns over this unseen track but B.C. decided it could be done. With difficulty the Bty negotiated the gate into the first field and more or less felt their way downhill. Crossing several fields over banks and shallow ditches the main road was ultimately reached just south of CAILLEVILLE. Owing to the large amount of traffic on the main road B.C. decided to by-pass the little town and enter it from the west. This manoeuvre worked alright and Bty drew up in a semi-circular avenue or crescent under the trees just on the main NEUVILLE - CAILLEVILLE road. Abut half an hour later C.O. turned up on the main road and told B.C. he as going to locate Divisional H.Q. and would send back word.

About 0630 hours C.O. returned and ordered 201 to follow to Divisional H.Q. which was in a large Chateau facing the road to ST.VALERY. C.O. omitted to tell B.C. that the Bty could draw into the orchard of the Chateau which was behind the high surrounding walls and could not be seen from the road. Bty was halted therefore at the main gate and after waiting there for the C.O's return for some time was finally turned into an orchard on a side road opposite Divisional H.Q. where all ranks completed a very much needed meal.

(See Appendix 9)
At 1000 hours Bty moved into the orchard at Divisional H.Q. and orders were received to destroy all kit and clothing except what was being worn. This order was duly carried out. At 0930 hours Lieutenant Colonel PAGE took over command of the Division Anti-Tank defence with 3 Batteries 51st ANTI-TANK REGIMENT and 2 Companies 1st KENSINGTON H. Machine Gun Battalion.

1030 hours C.O. called a B.C.'s conference attended by Major PARSONS, 201 Anti-Tank Battery, Major HICKS 202nd Anti-Tank Battery and B.C. 201st Battery. The coast line at ST. VALERY-EN-CAUX runs almost due east and west with the sea on the north. Division were going to form a bridgehead round ST. VALERY, combined with the French IX CORPS originally, but those plans were altered. LOTHIANS with C Troop 201 Anti-Tank Bty were already holding the area to the South West of ST. VALERY and 2nd SEAFORTHS, 1st GORDSON and 4th CAMERONS were holding a long line from LE TOT on the coast road through the south of ST. SYLVAN and the line of the railway to the FULTOT - CAILLEVILL road. 152 and 153 INFANTRY BRIGADES held the eastern side from VILLE LES ROSES to ST. PIERRE while A.S.G. and French were holding the southern side.

C.O. had taken over command of the whole Anti-Tank defence. He allocated the Eastern face to 203rd Bty who were already in the area and gave 202nd By the Southern face and right of Eastern face. 201 who were standing by H.Q., less C Troop which was still with the LOTHIAN AND BORER HORSE somewhere to the South West were given the Western face from the main FULTOT - CAILLEVILLE road to the road at LE TOT. C.O. also placed 1 Company of KENSINGTON H.M.Gs under command 201 and as this area had not been recce'd, arranged for O.C. KENSINGTONS to go out with B.C. 201st Bty.

1130 hours It was not until 1130 hours that O.C. KENSINGTONS materialised and B.C. set off with him leaving word or Troop Commanders of A and B to join him at the village of INCONVILLE. Word was sent off to try and locate the LOTHIANS in order to have C Troop returned to Bty. The recce was carried out with difficulty owing to disorganised French crowding into the area. THere was a perfect network of sunken roads and large areas of open ground easily negotiable by tanks. On top of this the front was so wide that there were large gaps between the infantry positions covering it. O.C. KENSINGTONS, who's H.M.Gs were as difficult to handle as the 2-Pounders could not agree to A/T guns going well forward as it would make his ground defence of them very difficult so a compromise was made.

1200 hours B.C. joining his Troop commanders at INCONVILLE decided to sight B Troop with 2 guns in front of INCONVILLE covering the gap between 1st GORDSONs and 6th CAMERONS and 2 guns covering the 1st GORDONS and part of the gap on the latter's right. A Troop with its 3 guns would be spread across the gap between 1st GORDONS and 2nd SEAFORTHS and C Troop would cover 2nd SEAFORTHS when it turned up. The reason for leaving the coast side to the last was the information that this was partly covered by the French who were supposted to have A/T guns. All the M.G. defence was relegated to the areas of A and B Troops were ground attack was most likely to develop through the gaps.

Troop Commanders returned to CAILLEVILLE at once to get ready to move to position and B.C. returned via ST. VALERY in the hope of getting word from C Troop. While carrying out the recce at LE TOT a low flying enemy plane kept circling overhead. On arrival at ST. VALERY the first enemy shells landed in the town setting fire to two houses. B.C. had to dodge several shell bursts at the head of the harbour.

1300 hours Returning to CAILLEVILLE B.C. found that C Troop had at last been located but LOTHIANS sent a request to retain one gun and Lieutenant ANKERS the Troop commander was awaiting a reply to this request before returning. As 201 were already one gun short for the long line to be covered and no specific reason was given for retaining a gun, C.O. agreed that all four guns should return to Bty as quick as possible. Word was sent back accordingly.

1330 hours At this time B.C. was not aware of the close proximity of the enemy on the western face although aware of the fact that they were between Division and the route to HAVRE. Having been more or less out to the rear flank and in the blue so to speak for the previous three days detailed information was not available of what was taking place. All the data already written from the 7th June up to date was acquired afterwards from the officers of the various regiments engaged and from Divisional Staff. Only at 1030 hours on the morning of the 11th was he informed that an attempt to embark at ST. VALERY was to be made. At least 2 Troops of the Bty could have been in their ultimate area by 0900 hours that morning. It must be pointed out that the general opinion was that the main attack would come from the east where all enemy pressure had been exerted up until the previous day and no idea of the real strength of the enemy armour in rear had been obtained. Furthermore 2 Anti-Tank batteries were already in position ready for action more or less in the areas where they had been with the Infantry Brigades under whose command they were before reverting to Regimental command. Since the departure of Brigadier STANLEY CLARKE's force and other casualties sustained, Divisional strength was greatly depleted and it is the writer's personal opinion that assistance in the final phase from the French was very much discounted by Division Commander.

Leaving word for C Troop to follow to INCONVILLE when they returned 201 set off for that village. En route C Troop was met returning up the main ST. VALERY road and ordered to turn and follow. All roads were congested with abandoned French transport and groups of ten and twenty riderless Cavalry horses were galloping about on the roads.

1400 hours Reaching INCONVILLE, where there was plenty of cover from the air, B Troop, who were leading were deployed into the farm yard of a large farm from whence the guns could be got to position, and left to the Troop commander to deal with. Here B Troop must be left for the moment.
(See Appendix 10)

A Troop under Lieutenant BURNETT immediately proceeded on the ST. SYLVAN road to their positions. No sooner had the Troop cleared the village than a perfect hail of M.G. fire opened on them from their left; i.e. the south; this was followed immediately by shell fire. This at once enlightened B.C. to the fact that enemy ground troops were between Bty and 4th CAMERONS and in the gap between the latter and 1st GORDONS. Waiting long enough to see that A Troop carried on to their positions and that no vehicles stopped B.C. took over C Troop which had now arrived, but without its Troop commander. The original intention had been for C Troop to follow A Troop thence through ST. SYLVAN and across by side track to positions recce'd by B.C. that morning.

1415 hours In view of what happened to A Troop and the fact that C had more than double the distance to go on this road B.C. decided to take a by-road down to the outskirts of ST. VALERY and come up the ST. SYLVAN road from whence he could cross to the LE TOT area with the hope of keeping the Troop intact.

1430 hours The altered route only meant a delay of 15 minutes at the most. The by-road fortunately was clear of traffic and C Troop moved at speed and were very soon travelling up the ST. VALERY - ST. SYLVAN road. This road like most of the roads in the area was a sunken road with 4 to 5' banks on either side. When almost opposite the INCONVILLE road end enemy tanks were seen crossing the fields towards the LE TOT - ST. VALERY road from the coast about 800 yards distant. They were making for a gap between two small woods on the far side of the LE TOT road evidently intent on getting on to the latter and thence straight into ST. VALERY. Fortunately the road banks were low at this point. B.C. ordered C Troop into action at once but only one gun could be brought to bear at the low part of the bank. As No. 1 Gun came into action Lieutenant ANKERS arrived. The first round struck the leading tank and stopped it in the gap. The remaining tanks quickly dodged behind the wood to its left and although No. 1 fired got off another round or two there was no visible effect. Realising that the enemy could still make the LE TOT - ST. VALERY road further down and if once in ST. VALERY they could create havoc B.C. ordered C Troop to limber up and make for ST. VALERY to cut them off.

Sketch of West side of ST. VALERY Harbour

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=74242&stc=1&d=1329135468


1300 hours [handwritten below 1500 hours] Captain LEWIS, whose own truck had gone off with B Echelon had been driving B.C. and taken the truck out of the line of fire at the first action. As soon as C Troop turned back to ST. VALERY and failing to find his truck B.C. set off at the double after the Troop and arrived as Troop opened fire. They had won the race for the point where the LE TOT road entered the town. The two roads ran almost parallel until the outskirts were reached where they began to converge. The LE TOT road was considerably higher than the ST. SYLVAN road as it ran along the slopes rising to the flat cliff top on the west side of the town. It ooh a sharp turn behind the houses in the town and joined the main front street at the harbour further in than the causeway crossing the latter. The ST. SYLVAN road entered the town between, firstly, houses with orchards on either side and then on the left side of a row of shops with dwelling houses above. There were no passages between the later, one shop butting the next. Where the ST. SYLVAN road joined the main street running round the harbour it formed an acute angle, in the apex of which was a triangular grass plot with a 4' 6" high wall round it. (See Sketch).

1530 hours Lieutenant ANKERS had placed 2 Guns just alongside the grass plot able to cover the whole west side of the harbour or swing right round and fire up the ST. SYLVAN road. In order to get elevation to clear the houses and fire on to the LE TOT road he had taken his other 2 guns round into a back street, the end of which was a cul-de-sac (marked I/I in sketch). It soon became evident that the enemy, from the higher road, spotted this. The tanks, of which 15 had been counted, immediately disbursed troops armed with L.As and motor combination cycles accompanying them, L.M.Gs into the orchards and the top flats of the houses overlooking the guns in the road below. As soon as the 2 guns in the side street opened fire the tanks swung off the road up the slope and on to the hill top west of the town. L.A. and rifle fire then commenced at 20 yards range on the first two guns on the main road from the partially opened steel shutters of the houses. The left hand gun was fairly safe but the right hand gun caught it right at once.

Bombardier McARTHUR who had taken the layer's seat was killed immediately. Lieutenant ANKERS immediately jumped to the tail of the gun and swung the muzzle on to the nearest house while the Bombardier was moved to the roadside. The gun was loaded ready to fire and Lance-Bombardier HELM jumped into the layer's seat to lay on the house windown from which fire had been observed (marked X 1 on sketch). He dis not managed to fire the gun for the next bullet killed him at once.
MCARTHUR JG, 825700, 201 BTY 51 ANTI TANK REGT, 11/06/1940, ROYAL ARTILLERY, COLUMN 9.
HELM D, 1441083, 201 BTY 51 ANTI TANK REGT, 11/06/1940, ROYAL ARTILLERY, C, 30.

1545 hours Another gunner took the seat as Lieutenant ANKERS lifted HELM clear and fired through below the window sill of the house. This quietened that particular window but for good measure he put another 2 rounds through and left a big gap in the wall. Sergeant McCORMICK of the left hand gun and 2 of his gunners had, during this time, been keeping down enemy fire from other windows with their rifles of which each gun team had three. McCORMACK's gun could not be brought to bear on the top flats being so close to the buildings. Keeping up his fire with the one gun Lieutenant ANKERS very soon silenced the next house in the same manner as the first.

1600 hours Another man was wounded and Lieutenant ANKERS then did a very brave act. He ran across the 50 yard space to the Harbour side where he had parked his truck in full view of enemy riflemen and under their fire, started up the engine and drove back to the guns. Here he loaded on his wounded man and his dead and drove off to the little hospital in the town with them. B.C. took over control and continued the good work on the houses. The next house was not so difficult to quieten but the last house (marked X 2) took some time. There were 2 windows, one to the front and one on the gable, and it was not clear from which or from both that the L.A. fire was coming. The corner of the building was almost shot away before it quietened. There was still considerable fire from the gardens up the ST. SYLVAN road in rear of the 2 guns and Sergeant McCORMACK got one bird out of a tree with this rifle. Lieutenant ANKERS returned and took over his Troop after half an hour's absence.

Captain LEWIS had returned with B.C's truck but was sent off on C Troop's m.c. to Regiment H.Q. to keep contact if necessary. B.C. was of the opinion that the position with C Troop was too doubtful to leave it and decided that the other two Troops would have to carry on themselves. Shortly after the enemy fire died down word was sent down the ST. SYLVAN road that tanks were coming down that road. One gun was therefore trained up the road and B.C. went up to recce.

1630 hours Going up the road and coming back the same sniper missed him twice by a small margin, but no tanks were to be seen. Brigade Major R.A. with one or two followers set off the lower end of the LE TOT road to clear the orchards and Captain GULLY, O.C. Division Provost Company started the same business from the ST. SYLVAN side. By this time shells and heavy mortar bombs were landing all over the town and several fires were blazing merrily.

B.C. heard someone calling on the ST. SYLVAN road and going up to investigate found D.R. ROBERTSON staggering down the road. He had been left with A Troop for contact with B.C. and on the way to report had been shot off his cycle some mile or more up the road. He was pretty badly hit, but getting him down to C Troop guns, a Driver was found who took him off to hospital. Scarcely was the D.R. away when Gunner T. DAVIES, B.C's batman, arrived on foot from INCONVILLE to report that B Troop were under fire from our own Artillery. DAVIES had run most of the way and was all out, having had some narrow squeaks from enemy Infantry.

1700 hours By this time there were about 100 enemy tanks on the cliff top west of the town and being the only guns directly between them and the road into town, B.C. decided to hold C Troop where they were. Giving Lieutenant ANKERS instructions to hold fast where he was B.C. went off to locate Division ROYAL ARTILLERY to get word to the Bty who were firing on B Troop. Being unsuccessful in locating Division ROYAL ARTILLERY he was on the point of moving off to locate the Bty when a 15 cwt gun tower belonging to A Troop drew up and the Driver reported that he had just taken Lieutenant BURNETT into hospital wounded seriously. His was the only vehicle left out of A Troop's three and only one gun of A Troop was fireable. He could not say how many of the Troop remained and said that enemy Infantry were all over their area. It was very evident from what happened that there was not and never had been any French troops between the LE TOT road and the sea which was the immediate right of 201 Bty.

As the time from the first shelling of B Troop until the time that DAVIES reached B.C., plus time lost looking for R.A. contact was long enough for irretrievable damage to have been done or for B Troop to clear, B.C. decided to make R.H.Q. and report to C.O. The route was up the main ST. VALERY - CAILLEVILLE road which was under fire and had vehicles abandoned and smashed all along it and was still receiving shells here and there. On the way not a singe person was met until close to CAILLEVILLE. Fortunately just entering the latter place Major HAILES' Troop of 202 Anti-Tank Bty were sighted along the road and Major HICKS, B.C. was with them. He gave the new location of R.H.Q., which had moved to a small village west of CAILLEVILLE. Hearing of 201's experiences throughout the afternoon B.C. 202 expressed his annoyance at having to sit tight where he was, for they hadn't seen hide nor hair of the enemy all day. He also told B.C. 201 that he was the first to come up the road for the past 2 1/2 to 3 hours and they did not know what was happening on the west at all.

Reaching H.Q. and after half an hour's wait 201's report was given to C.O. who, tireless as usual, had been out on foot over the south and east front. Captain LEWIS set off at once to see if Lieutenant BURNETT was alright with Regimental Driver. Assistant Adjutant drew B.C's attention to his truck which had two bullet holes through the windscreen and a number through the sides and tilt. B.C. certainly never heard them strike for he had been too well occupied with dodging holes, vehicles and riderless horses on the way. C.O. agreed with B.C's decision to hold C Troop on the west of the town and also agreed that B.C. should remain with them. No armour had attempted to penetrate B and A Troops' area and CAMERONS and GORDONS were still holding their posts although enemy were behind them at several points.

1830 hours Arriving back after an exciting journey at C Troop, B.C. found that only one gun was fit for use. Firing off the wheels had shown up an earlier fault in the traversing arrangement of the 2-Pounder. The centre upright pinion on which the piece revolved was much too light for the discharge of an H.O. gun. This pinion rose from the centre of a broad base plate with an upright lip. An inverted plate with a lip, fitted over this lower one travelling on rollers between the two lips. On the upper plate was the saddle etc carrying buffer and piece etc. Inside the two circular cups thus formed was the ratchet of the traversing gear. Constant firing in a limited arc on wheels threw part of the discharge shock, owing to the light centre pinion, on to the rearward rollers at the outer edges, which could not stand it and play or lash took place between the traverse actuating cogwheel and the circular ratchet arm. This caused loose engagement and after laying accurately with traversing hand wheel a touch on the breech put the gun several degrees off its alignment. This left C Troop with only one gun in order. At Lieutenant ANKERS' suggestion B.C. agreed to his taking the sound gun across the harbour to try and fire up on the cliff top. In this way he could still cover the end of the LE TOT road while the remaining gun on the ST. SYLVAN road could be fired at a pincer.


B Troop
1900 hours Lieutenant McAULAY reported to B.C. in ST. VALERY with B Troop and the remnant of A Troop personnel and his report of what happened with him from 1400 hours is as follows. B Troop went to action stations at 1415 hours and were immediately engaged by enemy M.Gs. on their right flank. One such gun was in a hedgerow very close. Troop commander ordered one of his Bren guns and the accompanying KENSINGTON V.G. to silence this gun if possible, accompanying the party himself. His intention was to cover the heavy M.G. with the L.M.G. while the former was brought into action. The Sergeant of KENSINGTONS took the L.M.G. himself and quickly silenced the enemy gun. The Vickers was then brought into action to cover the flank and left with the Bren for this purpose. B Troops arc of fire was from North West to South East of INCONVILLE.

1530 hours
Approx. 1530 hours Troop commander observed our own artillery fire dropping about 150 yards in front of his guns. He contacted one of the officers of this Bty who returned to have their range increased as shells were falling dangerously near the Anti-Tank guns.

Troop commander then visited his M.G. posts and while there he witnessed enemy gun fire blow up at least two of A Troop's three gun towing vehicles. He presumed that A Troop, after getting guns to position, could not withdraw their vehicles further away owing to enemy rifle and M.G. fire.

On his return to the gun positions he found that instead of our Artillery fire being lifted, shells were now dropping on his guns and the farm house beside them. His vehicles and those of the KENSINGTONS, under B Troop command, were in a small wood adjoining the Farm. During his absence B Troop Drivers had taken their rifles and Bren guns along with all S.A.A. from their vehicles and had then assisted the KENSINGTON Drivers to get their vehicles clear of the wood in an attempt to follow with their own when the track was clear of the former. Farm house and wood however were soon in flames and owing to the heat it was impossible to reach the vehicles. KENSINGTON vehicles had moved down the ST. VALERY road prior to Troop commander's return. Their V.G. and detachment remained on right flank of B Troop until they had to vacate the position owing to shell fire from the rear.

2-Pounder gun positions became untenable by own artillery fire so Troop commander ordered the withdrawal of firing mechanisms and took up position in rear of guns with rifles and Bren guns.

1600 hours Approx at 1600 hours Troop commander with 2 Nos. 1 attempted to salve the V.G. which had been left on the right flank. They could not reach it owing to enemy M.G. and S.A. fire so made another attempt to reach their 2-Pounders. Guns were reached but the position was untenable so firing levers etc were destroyed. Word was sent to B.C. that shell fire had forced the Troop to leave their guns.

B Troop commander withdrew his personnel to form a ground defence in front of 152 INFANTRY BRIGADE H.Q. as enemy M.G. and S.A. fire had greatly increased in that area (152 INFANTRY BRIGADE H.Q. had moved early in the afternoon to take over Western face, and 153 took over the entire eastern face). As the Troop were withdrawing they were subjected to rifle fire from French Infantry on their flank. Captain KYD, Intelligence Officer, ROYAL ARTILLERY, who had been with B Troop throughout the shelling and after, attempted to reach the French unsuccessfully. Taking advantage of a sunken track personnel were withdrawn without casualty and established their position in front of 152 H.Q. Captain KYD returned to Division for information. Troop remained in defence with rifles and Brens until relieved by GORDONS when B.C. sent word to withdraw the personnel to C Troop in ST. VALERY.

During the attempt to re-occupy gun positions Troop commander and Nos. 1 were subjected to M.G. fire from either flank. He believes the fire from the left was French in error, but that from the right was enemy. Both A and B Troops were the object of enemy M.G. and rifle fire, going to and in action stations, from enemy definitely between them and our own infantry. Neither Troop saw tanks throughout the day. B Troop commander thought that A Troop were firing on enemy M.Gs.

B Troop commander was positive that shells dropping on his guns were from the same source as those which destroyed the farm, wood and vehicles. (Captain KYD has since verified this report). In the state of the ares of A and B Troops, interwoven with enemy M.Gs etc, our Artillery may have been attempting to clear the area not knowing Anti-Tank Troops were there, after hurriedly moving into the area.

A Troop's gallant dash to their positions through a hail of enemy fire was in keeping with the traditions of the old double L Battery and although under fire all afternoon and evening they remained 'hid'. On their way to position one enemy shell wen through the tilt of one vehicle and burst just beyond it.

1930 hours B.C. retained B Troop personnel along with the remnants of A in case of need as defence for C Troop's guns as there was no other ground defence available at that time.

 

It had been decided to embark the Division and IX French Corps, in equal numbers, at ST. VALERY the night 11th/12th. With this end in view O.C. 7th NORFOLKS was to establish a line of inner defence round the outskirts of ST. VALERY. The withdrawal was to be carried out by one Company from each Battalion falling back to the NORFOLK line and holding this while the fighting troops withdrew through them and embarked. All remaining non-fighting vehicles and stores were to be destroyed during the day. All movement through the inner defence was to be on foot and nothing except weapons able to carried to be taken. Necessary embarkation arrangements were left to Naval officer attached to Division. The cliffs to the west of the town had been in the original line of inner defence and now that the enemy held them the selected beaches for embarkation were under fire. No word was received from the Navy by 1600 hours to confirm that boats would arrive, when they would arrive or how many could be taken off at one time. This made it impossible for Division to draw up a time table.

At 2130 hours Divisional commander gave verbal orders to all unit reps assembled for their receipt. 51 ANTI-TANK REGIMENT were to be among the last to embark if that were possible.

2000 hours C.O. visited 201 at West side of ST. VALERY and gave final instructions for the withdrawal to the beach. Enemy fired had slowly decreased and only a few intermittent bursts of M.G. fire and a few shells kept coming into the town. Several buildings on the east of the harbour front were blazing and lit up the whole area. 201 were to assemble in the Station square at some time the next morning. C.O. arranged to meet B.C. about 2140 hours.

The C Troop gun which had moved to east side of harbour could not be seen from Bty position on the west but was presumed to be there as fire had been observed from this area earlier. As the fires on that side had made the first position impossible it was assumed that Lieutenant ANKERS had moved further back. Leaving Lieutenant MACAULAY in charge Captain LEWIS and B.C. set off to try and locate ANKERS. In search they were both unsuccessful and returning to search from the centre of the town, met the C.O.

2140 hours C.O. intimated that 201 would meet him at the Station at 0330 hours. Meantime he asked for information about ANKERS and his remaining gun, which was not available. He gave orders to Captain LEWIS to borrow six guns from 202 Battery and to sight them to cover any attempt at Tank penetration from the western cliffs. B.C. suggested that he would try and locate ANKERS and failing this would return and join Captain LEWIS with the new defence. C.O. agreed to this proposal as B.C. knew the whole western area and Captain LEWIS didn't. DAVIES, the B.C's batman, who had been following B.C. with a rifle over his arm, since reporting in the early afternoon was still with B.C. Both set off on foot while Captain LEWIS went off to 201 for his guns. Apart from fires on the sea front every place was in darkness.

2200 hours Thinking that ANKERS had probably moved up the CAILLEVILLE road in the hope of crossing by one of the many side roads to the area close to and slightly to the south of the cliff top and level with it, B.C. decided to go up the LE TOT road on the opposite side next the enemy and try to locate him. This was the quickest route and while enemy Infantry were now to the north of LE TOT and scattered on the ST. VALERY - LE TOT road there was little risk in the dark. Stray bullets were flying about and an occasional mortar bomb lit up the area just on the outskirts of the town. Going quietly and carefully, the outskirts of the town were left behind and the end of the ST. SYLVAN road to INCONVILLE reached. Moving South East along this road and exploring the by-roads leading from it, no sign of ANKERS was seen. At one point the enemy seemed to be between the searchers and ST. VALERY and B.C. was convinced that he was through their line in this area. Drawing a complete blank in the search he decided to return to Captain LEWIS' defence, arriving there shortly after 2400 hours. Captain LEWIS had only managed to get 4 guns from 202 and had them all in action before 2300 hours.

 

0330 hours After the dreary wait it was a relief to get on the move once more and B.C. collected remaining personnel while Captain LEWIS put finis to the borrowed guns. No word was heard about Lieutenant ANKERS and his gun team nor were they seen again. Proceeding to the Station square 201 awaited the arrival of the C.O. All other troops except scattered groups still on the outer and the inner defence line had moved to the beaches or into hides near them.

0340 hours C.O. arrived with 202 Battery on tow and they with 201 following proceeded down the east side of the town to a point under cover near the beach. The weather had broken and a think wetting rain was falling. Luckily all ranks managed (to get) into a nearby store shed and lay down on a large quantity of filled sacks therein. There was still no word of the looked for boats and C.O. set off to get information.

As dawn was approaching it was decided to disperse the large number of troops gathered in the beaches area and to return and strengthen the last defence line with the hope that boats would arrive that night. Troops moved out to various areas again but it was not until nearly 0700 house that 51 ANTI-TANK REGIMENT joined the remnants of 23rd Field Regiment in a wood to the South East of ST. VALERY.

0700 hours With a few shovels picked up here and there the Anti-Tank Regiment started to dig in with the idea of protecting their area with what rifles and Brens they had. It was a pretty hopeless look out as all guns had been rendered useless and the R.H.A. and Field Regiment had hardly any ammunition left in any case. All ranks were feeling hungry by now as their last meal had been 1100 hours the previous day. A few abandoned stores were picked up and shared around. Our Divisional ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS, who had been marvellous in their supply throughout, managed even on this morning to feed several units.

5th GORDONS were ordered to secure the high ground east of the town while 4th CAMERONS and 2 companies of BLACK WATCH were to hold a line across the CAILLEVILLE road. 4th SEAFORTHS were to hold themselves ready to take the western cliff top. Divisional Commander ordered an officer to remove a white flag hoisted by the French on the church tower.

Senior officers expressed the opinion that owing to the large number of unarmed personnel in the reduced Division area, casualties were going to be high whenever the enemy brought up more guns. One Brigadier informed Division that French were surrendering everywhere in large numbers and IX Corps commander under whom 51 DIVISION were, estimated that enemy forces were far too numerically superior to attempt resistance.

A written order was brought to Division by a French officer from Commander IX French Corps. Division commander very reluctantly agreed and Division surrendered at 0940 hours.

All compasses and arms that we could destroy we did. German troops soon appeared on the scene and Division were marshalled into various groups.

Then commenced the hell of the 200 odd mile march to GERMANY and captivity, but that is another story.

 

Brigadier STANLEY CLARKE's force fought their way to HAVRE and embarked for ENGLAND. 204 Anti-Tank Battery, fighting a rear guard action with this force distinguished themselves and stopped the enemy armour Division following the Brigade, gaining at least one decoration.

A number of 51 Anti-Tank B Echelon escaped and also got home.

Three vessels of light draught did attempt to come in. One ran aground and was useless, one with wounded aboard was shelled and set on fire and one got away with its compliment of troops.

Lieutenant ANKERS was last seen fighting his guns South East of the town at 2130 hours on the night of 11th June. When word went round later that it was sauve qui peut, which it did, he collected about 50 Other Ranks and got home with them.

Small groups managed to get afloat in fishing boats round the coast but enemy planes made short work of most of them and those not killed or drowned had to swim from the boats to the shore.

Casualties on the beaches and in the 2nd SEAFORTHS were heavy while the enemy attack on the east side was held by 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Divisional Strength and Dispositions on the various moves during the period in the SOMME follow.

 

Composition of the 51st (HIGHLAND) DIVISION
(showing Brigs., Div. Staff & Os.C. Units also att. Units & Units coming under Cmd.)
30th May 1940 - 12th June 1940

 

Composition 51st Division on arrival in Somme area.

 

30th - 31st May

 

1st - 2nd June

 

3rd June

 

6th - 7th June

 

9th June, 0900 hrs

 

10th June, 0730 hrs

 

10th June, 0900 hrs

 

10th June, 0900 hrs

 

June 11th, 1400 hrs
From ST. VALERY looking South.