Private Diary: 201 Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery, 21 May - 12 Jun, Major DF Peacock

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    TNA Catalogue Reference: WO 217/6

    Private War Diaries of Various Army Personnel, Second World War, British Expeditionary Force

    Scope and content: Private Diary of Major D F Peacock, 201 A. Tk. Bty, R.A.

    Covering dates: 1940 May, June


    Courtesy of Drew
     
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    Major D.F. PEACOCK, Royal Artillery
    Diary and Record of Experiences from 1st September 1939 21 May 1940 to 8th July 1940*.

    Part Three

    *[Please note that this must be an extract from Major Peacock's full diary as entries in the file only cover 21 May to 12 June, 1940.]



    INDEX

    1940
    21 May
    22 May
    23 May
    24 May
    25 May
    26 May
    27 May
    28 May
    29 May
    30 May
    31 May

    1 June
    2 June
    3 June
    4 June
    5 June
    6 June
    Interlude
    7 June
    8 June
    9 June
    10 June
    11 June
    Interlude
    12 June
    Epilogue

    Composition of the 51st (HIGHLAND) DIVISION
    Appendix 1 - Composition 51st Division on arrival in Somme area
    Appendix 2 - 30th - 31st May
    Appendix 3 - 1st - 2nd June
    Appendix 4 - 3rd June
    Appendix 5 - 6th - 7th June
    Appendix 6 - 9th June, 0900 hrs
    Appendix 7 - 10th June, 0730 hrs
    Appendix 8 - 10th June, 0900 hrs
    Appendix 9 - 10th June, 1400 hrs
    Appendix 10 - June 11th, 1400 hrs

    Appendix 9 (2 docs labelled as 9) - 11th June 1000 hrs
     
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    Persons mentioned by name in diary:


    Major D.F. PEACOCK [= B.C. ?]

    B.C. [Battery Commander]

    Major COULL, Second-in-Command Regiment

    Lieutenant McARTHUR, H.Q. Subaltern of 201 Bty

    Lieutenant BURNETT, commanding A Troop - Wounded

    Lieutenant MACAULAY, B Troop

    Lieutenant ANKERS C Troop

    Captain LEWIS

    L/Bombardier ANDERSON, Battery Clerk

    Sergeant McGOUGAN, the M.T. Sergeant
    Sergeant McGOUGAN of B Troop

    Bombardier KERR, Bty M.Mec. N.C.O.

    Bombardier McSHANNON, No. 1, A Troop - Wounded, POW

    Bombardier McARTHUR, C Troop - Killed

    Lance-Bombardier HELM, C Troop - Killed

    Sergeant McCORMICK/ McCORMACK, C Troop

    -

    Major HICKS, 202 Battery
    Lieutenant GRANT, 202 Battery - Wounded, POW
    Major HAILES' 202 Anti-Tank Battery
    -

    Lieutenant BOAG

    -

    Captain HODGKINS

    -

    Major PARSONS 203rd A/T Bty
    Lieutenant WARD MACRAE, 203 A/T Battery

    -

    Driver McDONALD

    -

    Dispatch Rider ROBERTSON - Wounded

    -

    Gunner T. DAVIES, B.C's batman

    -

    Lieutenant-Colonel PAGE, M.C., commanding 51st A/T REGIMENT
    Lieutenant Colonel PAGE, Commanding 3 Batteries 51st ANTI-TANK REGIMENT & 2 Companies 1st KENSINGTON H. Machine Gun Battalion.

    Lieutenant-Colonel CAMERON, D.S.O., M.C., 101st A/T., L.A.A. Regiment

    Captain KYD, Intelligence Officer, ROYAL ARTILLERY

    Major General FORTUNE
     
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    1800 hours Leaving KIRCH LES LESTRANGE 201 Bty proceeded along the narrow rough road and reaching the main road turned left to the Bridge over the MOSELLE leading to ROMBAS. The road was fairly clear until nearing the bridge when a Battalion of our own Infantry was overtaken and then movement became slow. The Infantry were on foot and after obtaining permission to pass, the Bty again increased speed. Crossing the river and entering ROMBAS our trouble commenced.

    Although several small towns; or to be really correct large villages; had already been passed through, in which there were numbers of our own troops and transport on the move the discipline was so good that no difficulty had been experienced in being passed through. 201 was moving independently to the main column and not under any march table and were not allocated any position in the order of march. At RHOMBAS however a French mechanised Infantry unit followed by a pontoon train on large lorries came barging along, paying no attention to traffic regulations, elementary driving or anything else. (We gave) them their own sweet will. The route was round the Northern part of the town, passing some blast furnaces and under two railway bridges where the street narrowed down to a bottle neck. At a level crossing entering the iron works the column was stopped and the French being on the outside of the 201 were successfully blocking all oncoming traffic. 201 Bty having halted at correct intervals the French were forced into their line of march to allow traffic to pass. When movement commenced again B.C. kept the Bty at the halt, ordered the French to pass and closed up to close interval as the route leaving the town was on the left of the French route and no risk of any of 201 being diverted was going to be taken. C. Troop Cmdr was ordered to the rear of the Bty column with instructions to allow no vehicles in column but only single vehicles to pass until clear of the town. Although on two occasions very strong measures had to be adopted with our Allies the Bty cleared the town and set off for OERVILLE. During the hold up darkness had settled and it was very dark.
     
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    En route the Bty moved in complete darkness except for one leading and one rear light. No further traffic was encountered and except for a nasty accident between two D.Rs meeting head on in the dark nothing of moment occurred until just entering VERVILLE.

    Approx 0200 hours A D.R. belonging to Regt. waiting to direct us to the Regtl Hide in a wood about a mile further on, drew attention to a plane in the beams of several searchlights which seemed to be in difficulties. As we watched several parachutists were seen suspended and slowly coming down. As no allied planes had been seen or were known to be over the area the first conclusion was that this was enemy parachutists. 201 immediately sent off an officer and three armed D.Rs to follow the movements of the parachutists and help other troops in the vicinity if necessary. Ultimately it transpired that the people in question were the crew of a British bomber which had been in a raid over GERMAN and which was caught by A/A fire crossing the frontier. Finding the plane steadily losing altitude the crew decided to abandon it and bailed out. Regtl H.Q. personnel located the airmen as they came down and brought them to H.Q. where they received hot food and blankets to spend the night.

    201 continued towards the hide and Captain LEWIS was waiting at the entrance to a side road in the wood. Vehicles were swung in under cover, cooks prepared a meal and then all personnel were ordered to turn in. Lieutenant MACAULAY who had been detached en route to locate the two missing D.Rs turned up shortly afterwards with the injured men. Both had head injuries and their machines were smashed. As it was imperative to get them to a hospital Captain LEWIS set off with them at once and was successful in getting them under the care of our own F.A. before dawn.

    Throughout the day 22nd May, all vehicles were overlooked, petrol shortages made good, and the Colonel gave a short talk to all ranks on various precautions and routine to be observed from now on. One Q vehicle had returned and salvaged that two damaged M.Cs. Orders were issued for the move to take place that night and otherwise everyone rested.

    At 2100 hours 51st Anti-Tank Regiment less A and C Troops of 201, and J Troop of 204, Batteries marched to HAUDIEMENT, a small village South West of ETAM where 51 DIVISION was established. Reaching this village in the early hours of the morning, Btys went into hides once more. 201 Bty were up a deep cut ravine road having a wooded overhung bank on one side and all vehicles were put under cover and personnel turned in until daylight. Rail fell heavily through the night and sleeping on the sloping ground under dripping trees was no sinecure.

    On the night 22/23rd May A Troop withdrew from action with the LOTHIAN and BORDER HORSE. Actually Lieutenant BURNETT, commanding A Troop did not receive notice from the latter that they were moving out and as he was under cod this Regt. on finding out for himself that they had gone some time he proceeded to withdraw his troop. One of the guns which he had taken over from 203 Bty had been in action on its wheels and when withdrawing this gun one of the stub axles snapped after going about 50 yards. This was a bit of a contretemps, as here he was still in front of the MAGINOT, all Div supply, L.A.D. and other troops gone, and he left with a gun that couldn't be towed. Nothing daunted he and the gun team lifted the gun on top of its own 15 cwt towing vehicle, already loaded with its Ammunition and stores, and too it first of all 10 miles through two night journeys to rejoin his Bty. Finally gun and vehicle travelled the remaining 200 miles to the SOMME area by train just as he had loaded it up. Only an Anti-Tanker who knew the overloaded condition of 15 cwt vehicles can appreciate the ingenuity and perseverance of this young officer and his men.

    C Troop with Lieutenant ANKERS withdrew with the 1st GORDONS without mishap and J Troop 204 Bty with the 4th SEAFORTHS.
     
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    Regiment, less the three Troops left behind, remained at HAUDIEMENT. Vehicles were overlooked, petrol tanks filled up. 201 returned 203's guns and took back their own belongings to B Troop. Personnel rested most of the day after moving blankets etc to a saw mill which had not been noticed in the dark. The adjacent woods were full of wild pig but B.D. had no luck.
     
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    A, C and J Troops rejoined 201 and 204 Btys in the early hours of the morning of 24th May. Another full day's rest was expected but this was not to be. Approx 1100 hours 202 Bty, who had been warned to move in the early morning with 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE, moved off to CHATEL after waiting for hours in the Brigade to move. 201 and other Btys were warned at 1700 hours that they would march at 1800 hours from an S.P. in the village of HAUDIEMENT. Although the warning was short 201 passed the Starting Point early and the march via VERDUN to the small village of SENUC commenced. At this time Division was in French Army Reserve. Apparently there was fear of a German breakthrough in the area adjoining LUXEMBOURG Eastern border and the point where the MAGINOT Line petered out and 51 DIVISION were directed to this area. SENUC lay to the North East of GRANDPRE just East of the MAAS.

    The night march was cold and tedious and considerable traffic congestion occurred. It was like a game of blind man's buff, for Regiment had omitted to give B.C. route or destination. Fortunately traffic control was in Divisional hands and our own very efficient Provost Company had guides at all points. 201 had only to follow the Regiment but this is not so easy as it sounds on a long line of march in the dark. The line of march keeps going out and in like a concertina as speed increases and decreases and other single vehicles may enter the column for a short distance and then suddenly turn off. No lights were used except one on the leading vehicle and small rear light on the rear vehicle of each Bty. Finally our destination beyond SENUC was reached about 0100 hours. Captain LEWIS who had gone ahead to find a hide for 201 was waiting at SENUC and rejoined the Bty. Regimental H.Q. was further along the main road in a ruined farm. This area was well wooded with open grazing ground between the woods and one of those woods about half a mile off the main road was 201's area. The road in was only a cart track with a fence on the right and a high sheer bank on the left. Had we seen it in daylight it is doubtful whether we would have attempted it. With very great care and moving very slowly the whole Bty including the 3-ton Q lorries negotiated this half mile track in the dark and more or less felt their way into hides in a semi-circular clearing of the wood. In daylight it was found that the clearance on either side of the 3 toners was not much more than a foot. All ranks immediately bedded down except for the night Bren post.
     
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    Orders were received for Division to move North on 25th May. All guns and doubtful vehicles were to move by train from ST. MENEHOULD for NEUFCHATEL immediately 202nd Bty moved from CHATEL to a small village in the VARENNES - SENUC area slightly in rear of 201. Guns were despatched under Lieutenant McARTHUR, H.Q. Subaltern of 201 and duly entrained with rest of Regiment's guns, all under command of Major COULL, Second-in-Command Regiment. Vehicles returned to Bty position except one carrying damaged gun on top. Regiment less 201 and 202 Batteries moved to a hide near ST. MENEHOULD at 1800 hours and 201 settled down again under Command 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE whose H.Q. was at VARENNES about five or six miles away. Bty Captain moved with H.Q.
     
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    Regiment less 201 and 202 Btys moved next morning at 0300 hours. Division were moving to the SOMME area in three separate groups, all except the guns and faulty vehicles, by road. The first group comprised H.Q. Division and H.Q. various Regiments with 152 INFANTRY BRIGADE H.Q. 51st Anti-Tank with 203 and 204 Btys were with this group. The latter arrived at SOMMEPIERS near VITRY at 0830 hours on the 26th, after a long march, rested until 1300 hours and marched to SEZANNE. B.C. 201 liaised with H.Q. 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE on morning of 26th luckily just at the moment when orders arrived for the remainder of Division move. He was instructed to ascertain if 202 Bty were still in the area and if so to pass an order for them to march that afternoon with 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE and if not to take 201 Bty and join them (154) himself. If 202 were available then 201 were to remain behind and move with 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE the following day. As 201 were some six to eight miles North East of VARENNES and actually on the left of a French tank Regiment, communication could only be by D.R. and 153 had none available. B.C. arranged to come back and leave a 201 Bty D.R. at Brigade H.Q. and also confirm which Brigade he would move with.

    B.C. located 202 and passed on Divisional orders to move at 1400 hours to 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE near VITRY area and then returned to Bty. Orders were issued for the move on the following day and B.C. returned to VARENNES with a D.R. to report. He was asked to provide a mobile light A/A defence for the 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE throughout the march with Bren guns, given the Brigade movement table and order of march. This entailed leaving SENUC early enough the following morning to pass the S.R. in VARENNES at 0700 hours and 201's position in the column was the last group, as any low flying air attack would be likeliest to happen from the rear. Returning to SENAC preparations were made to provide the A/A defence. Only two Motley mountings were allowed on the Bty establishment, one of which was mounted on the O.M. truck and the other on one of the four Q. 3-tonners. As this was totally inadequate for the move ways and means had to be found to utilise the other 11 Bren Guns. By turning the tilt covers forward and careful manipulation of 2-pounder Ammunition, S.A. and pioneer stores, each 15 cwt gun tower could have its Bren Tripod mounted on it for A/A purposes. A short practice with 2 gunners each sitting on opposite sides of the truck gave two 180 degree Arcs of fire. All gunners were trained to the use of the Bren either for ground work or on its tripod for A/A and every gun on coming into action invariably mounted its Bren for A/A defence. A very little practice soon speeded up the passing of the control from one man to the other as direction of target changed.

    Having liaised with the French tank commander on our right 201 were well posted as to happenings in front and it was known that enemy M.C. m. gun patrols had penetrated into the area immediately in front and the French had several brushes with them. In view of this an L.M.G. post was always manned. On the 26th a certain incident (Schoolchildren) and a warning from the French necessitated putting out several extra posts as there were no Infantry of any kind near to 201. While at SENUC several A/A duels were witnessed between the French A/A and enemy craft. Three planes were brought down on one afternoon. 201 had no contact with the enemy and the whole area round about was deserted by the farm people leaving cattle and all behind. These were afterwards rounded up and moved inland by the French.
     
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    At 0700 hours 201 Bty moved to Starting Point at VARENNES. Time of starting had been put back one hour and word of the altered timing brought to Bty by its own D.R. left at Brigade H.Q. Arriving at VARENNES the Bty had to wait from 0800 hours to 0930 hours before it moved at the rear of 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE. Bty order of march was as follows.

    B.C's 8 cwt Recce truck
    O.M. truck with motley mounting and 1 Bren.
    A Troop 3, 15 cwt trucks with Brens mounted for A/A.
    B Troop 4, 15 cwt trucks with Brens.
    (1 Troop comers. 8 cwt Recce truck leading each Troop.)
    1st and 2nd Ammunition trucks, Petrol truck.
    Q 1, 2, 3 three-tonners with motley wand Bren on Q 2, and lastly the water truck.
    In all 23 vehicles having 13 Bren guns mounted for A/A. 201 were the last unit of 51 DIVISION moving North West.

    After a very hot drive Bty halted in the centre of Brigade area at SOMMEPIERS in such cover as permitted the use of Brens should the need arise, about 1400 hours. After a hot meal all personnel rested except the Bren gunners. Brigade moved again at 2000 hours for SEZANNE area.

    The Regiment less 201 and 202 Btys marched to VILLINAIWE, stayed about 4 hours and then marched via FORGES to NEUFCHATEL and thence to LES ESSARTS. 203 returned to NEUFCHATEL and collected all guns from there.
     
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    133 INFANTRY BRIGADE arrived in SEZANNE area in the early hours of the morning and went into hides for the day. 201 were in narrow ride in deep woods throughout the day. Regiment less 201 and 202 Btys at LES ESSARTS.

    At 2000 hours 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE moved to GIZORS. It was an extremely dark night and 201 Bty had a considerable distance to travel to join the rear of Brigade column. While on the preliminary move to S.R., B.C's truck was signalled by a French woman from a large house standing back from the road. Slowing the column to a walking pace in order to ascertain the trouble, the woman informed B.C. that there were several strange men, certainly not French, who were in the woods thereabouts and who had been recording all British traffic in the area. She appeared rather perturbed and suggested that the Bty had and round up the men. Being dubious about the whole affair B.C. decided to proceed and informed the woman that he would send back Divisional police at once and ordered her to put out the rather large display of lights in the house.

    Joining the main column at a cross roads half a mile further on B.C. reported to Divisional Provost Section attached to 153 BRIGADE the woman's story. He learned two days later that an hour after passing this point, it was bombed by the enemy. Whether coincidence or 5th Column work the fact remains that, had a halt been made to search the woods, the Bty would have 'caught a packet'. The lighted house so near to Brigade S.P. was suspicious and 201 may have been mistaken for a group of the main column which at the time it had not joined.

    Following this incident and within half an hour of its happening another doubtful occurrence took place. French had taken over the traffic control as we thought, for passing through the next small town there was at the intersection of the main streets the orthodox French lighted traffic indicator but when 201 passed it no one [was] in attendance. By the map the correct route would have meant a complete left turn but the indicator showed the route as half right swing. Thing that this was short by-pass not shown on the map; any number of roads had been made since the maps were made and the latter were not accurate in this respect, and seeing the Division Ammunition supply Company immediately in front, 201 followed on.

    In a very short time the road entered a deep forest and grew steadily narrower. The darkness on the open road was bad enough but in the forest it was intense. After about a mile of this the column halted and the C.O. Divisional Ammunition Supply came back on foot to B.C. 201 Bty and reported that he had reached a blind end and could go no further. He said that on attempting to turn left in the town just passed, a French soldier apparently in charge of the traffic signal had stepped out and swung the column half right. Ammunition Supply Company had over 100 vehicles and 201 had 23. There was no possible place where vehicles could move and swing round in column. The only remedy was to cut timber, fill one of the ditches in either side of the road and turn individual vehicles on this improvised bridge. Starting with the 3 ton Q lorries and backing all other vehicles to the turning point, the Bty was soon reversed and moving back to the correct route. Passing through the town once more it was noticed that the traffic signal light was gone.
     
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    Owing to the delay caused by this false direction the main journey was accomplished in the [/B]early hours of the 28th[/B]. No lights was the order as usual and coming down a very steep part of the road Q 3 lorry rammed the one in front. The back of the forward lorry too the drivers dashboard on the left hand side and stove it in, badly crushing the ankles of L/Bombardier ANDERSON, the Battery Clerk who travelled in this vehicle.

    Lieutenant BURNETT, A Troop, took away the injured man to hospital ahead of Battery. Sergeant McGOUGAN, the M.T. Sergeant very soon faked up the 3 tonner and it was able to continue after the Bty with its driving seat and cabin more or less swinging in the air. Sergeant McGOUGAN of B Troop did excellent work on this night drive by relieving sleepy drivers of vehicles and continually patrolling the column on an M.C. throughout the night. Bty arrived in its hide in the GIZORS area about 0500 hours. This hide was approximately 3 miles from Brigade H.Q.

    The night drive had been the worst yet experienced and all ranks were dog tired. A hot meal and rest at once was the order and B.C. went off to report and get orders at Brigade H.Q. Reaching the latter place he received instructions re. a commanders conference for 1400 hours and the information that Brigade would not likely move until the next day. Returning to Bty for some food and sleep B.C. found everything quiet and instead of turning in proceeded to go round the vehicles etc.

    Proceeding to Brigade H.Q. at 1400 hours for the Commanders Conference, he arrived in time to receive movement orders which meant that 201 had to pass the Starting Point in an hour's time. Setting off at once he returned to Bty, a distance of over 3 miles, withdrew all vehicles out of their hides and set off hot foot for S.P. forgetting all about speed regulations.

    1500 hours. Passing the S.P. on time 201 Bty proceeded to NEUFCHATEL where Captain LEWIS was waiting to guide the Bty. to its hide in LES ESSARTS near Regimental H.Q. 202nd Battery had rejoined the regiment from 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE the previous night. Arrived at LES ESSARTS B.C. reported to C.O. and Captain LEWIS turned all vehicles into some orchards. Having been without the Bty Captain and H.Q. Subaltern since the beginning of the march from SENUC by Regiment, B.C. had considerable extra duties to do and no sleep for three days, so he turned in and let Bty Captain carry on.

    202 Bty moved to W.L. in FORET D'INCHVILLE again under Command 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE. Remainder of Regiment at LES ESSARTS.

    It is here advisable to give a short resume of the general circumstances relating to Division and the role they were to play in this area.

    The 51st DIVISION was to relieve the 2nd and 3rd French Divisions Legions Cavalerie, then holding a thin line from ST. REMY to the Sea on the extreme left of the French armies, a front of 18 miles. The Germans held 2 bridgeheads over the River SOMME at ABBEYVILLE and ST. VALERY-SUR-SOMME (A Divisional front is reckoned to be 5 or 6 miles).

    No defences had been dug nor erected and no information was available as to the enemy dispositions. Relief was to be completed by the morning 2nd June.

    On 28th May Divisional Commander decided to hold the front with
    1st LOTHIAN AND BORDER HORSE (Light tanks) right;
    132 INFANTRY BRIGADE centre,
    154 INFANTRY BRIGADE left, and
    153 INFANTRY BRIGADE in reserve covering the River BRESLE in case of sudden enemy attack

    River BRESLE took a turn southward at BLANGY roughly on Division's Right Flank (See Map on Page 101 Parts 1 & 2). [Not included]

    Anti-Tank Batteries were allocated as follows
    204th Battery to 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE centre,
    202nd Battery to 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE on left,
    201st Battery to 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE on the BRESLE crossings, and
    203rd Battery less one Troop at Regimental H.Q.
     
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    (See Appendix 2)

    On the morning 30th May C.O. and B.C. 201 went to Divisional H.Q. at ST. LEGER then B.C. proceeded to locate and recce Bty H.Q. at REALCAMP just North East of ST. LEGER, close to 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE H.Q. The area to the right of Division was doubtful as the German main break through had taken place North East of our present area and the state of affairs in that direction was a matter of conjecture.

    B.C. 201 received 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE Commanders Orders re Anti-Tank defence from C.O. in the afternoon of 30th May. The area to be covered by 201st Bty was the line of the BRESLE, running roughly north and south, from (Excl) BLANGY to (Incl) AUMALE, a distance of 12 miles. In the valley of the BRESLE there were 2 main roads, one on either side, and a railway. Between BLANGY and AUMALE there were 8 separate valleys running like the spokes of a wheel from the ST. LEGER - ROULCAMP area as centre down to the BRESLE valley. All roads running through these valleys were negotiable by armour forces, although the valleys were wooded and fairly narrow, except 3 of them, and deployment by enemy forces would be difficult until near the upper ends. Here a perfect network of roads spread all through Divisional area and once in these A.F.Os. could play merry H..l .

    On the other side of the BRESLE the main approaches were opposite the three larger valleys. The first of these on Btys left was at NEILNORMANDEUX where Brigadier wanted 2 guns sighted. Almost in the centre of Bty area and opposite a wide valley with a spur in the middle of it at SENAPONT, was the second and the last was opposite the third valley just south of AUMALE. The main road crossed at AUMALE going to DIEPPE. In rear of Btys left was the HAUT FORET D'EU. Brigade wanted 4 Guns sighted in the SENAPONT valley and 2 Guns in the AUMALE valley. This accounted for 8 out of 12 guns available and B.C. had five other valleys to cover.

    It was perfectly evident that to be effective and get an arc of fire to be suitable to cover such a wide area, guns would have to be sighted as near the lower ends of the valleys as possible. In this way the River BRESLE, which might act as a tank ditch and the two main roads running across the front of Bty area could be swept by gun fire.

    Owing to enemy advantage of air recce orders were to move onto the area after dark. 201 therefore left LES ESSARTS about 1800 hours so as to pass FOUCARMENT on the left rear of the area just as darkness would be coming down. The early start was due to the amount of traffic on the roads at this time. Bty H.Q. was in a wood to the East of REALCAMP where Bty drew under cover in the dark. B.C. then reported to Brigade Commander at REALCAMP and reported that he was going to put guns forward to position that night and the following morning in order to conceal positions from possible air recce. Only one map in possession of B.C. was available and he had hoped to get other three from Brigade. In this he was disappointed and had to set to in the wood and prepare sketch maps for Troop Commanders for even tracing paper was not available.

    B.C. decided that C Troop (Lieutenant ANKERS) would sight 2 guns at NEILMOMANDEAUX covering the bridge and road over the BRESLE at this point, and his other 2 guns at the mouths of the next two valleys in such a way as to be able to fire into the arc of the troop on his right. C Troop's first two guns were widely separated but within view of one another and each could cover the others dead ground if necessary. The second two guns could certainly support each other and the right hand gun had a field of fire on the opposite side of the BRESLE.

    B Troop had all four guns in the longest valley with the spur in the centre. One gun in the left hand entry, one in an indentation forward on the spur able to cover both entries and two sighted in the right hand entry, one of which was well up the valley defiladed and able to take in anything the right hand gun might miss.

    A Troop were on the right with one gun on the AUMALE - DIEPPE road covering the AUMALE crossing, one gun to the latter's left rear on the ST. LEGER road where a wide plateau gave a large arc of fire and enabled this gun to cover the right flank and the gun on its right. Of the remaining three valleys only one would be accessible to A.F.Gs. without having to run the gauntlet of B Troop's guns on the left, and A Troop's first two guns on the right, so the remaining two guns of A were sighted in this valley. Eight out of the twelve guns were sighted in positions on the verge of the woods on the slopes of their respective valleys and were well concealed. No entry was made near the actual positions as this would be easily spotted from the air. Although it necessitated taking the guns up over the rough and plough, they were taken into the woods and through them to their actual positions.
     

    Attached Files:

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    Completing the sketch maps Troops were sent off to get under cover as near positions as possible in the early hours of the morning. Troop commanders were ordered to dig and strengthen gun positions and excavate trench shelters for gun teams at once as soon as light permitted. Bty H.Q. and Q lines were in the wood already mentioned, all vehicles camouflaged and slit trenches etc. were dug right at once. Bren gun pits were prepared and the motley mountings, for which bases had been made, were installed with their Brens and Ammunition in them.

    B.C. proceeded to Troop areas, agreed with final gun positions selected by Troop areas, agreed with final gun positions selected by Troop commanders and returned to report to Brigade that guns were in position by 1100 hours 31st May although not finally dug in. Here he learned that 153 INFANTRY BRIGADE were ordered into the main Divisional front and were leaving 4th BLACK WATCH behind to take over the area BLANGY - AUMAULE with 210st Bty and ROYAL ENGINEERS under command.

    Reporting to O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH at 1330 hours B.C. learned that the former had no wire or pickets for wiring his Company areas and he was in the throes of trying to locate some and get the necessary transport to collect. The Anti-Tank gun dispositions were given to him on the map and ground defence for the guns arranged for. A 3-ton lorry from 201 was provided to hunt for wire etc. that afternoon and B.C. arranged to go round G.Ps the following morning.

    R.H.Q. 51st Anti-Tank and 203rd Bty moved from LES ESSARTS to BAZINIAL during the day 31st May.
     
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    (See Appendix 3)
    O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH and B.C. 201 went round G.B. on the morning of 1st June. In order to get suitable ground for his Infantry platoons covering the guns O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH asked for 2 guns in the SENARPONT valley to be moved slightly.

    Finishing the round of positions B.C. had travelled up a long exposed road above NEILNORMANDEAUX on the high ground. As he was returning he was chased by a German plane and machine gunned from the air, fortunately by erratic driving only one or two bullets hit his recce truck. This was to be a common experience in the next few days. Returning to the village, O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH asked him if he had heard the plane and also found that the same plane had peppered the 201st Bty 3 toner which had just arrived with wire etc. This certainly put people on their toes.

    R.H.Q. and 203 Bty less one Troop at BAZINVAL. 1 Troop at HELLECOURT. 202nd Bty at AIGNEVILLE with 154 INFANTRY BRIGADE. 204th Bty with 152 INFANTRY BRIGADE.
     

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    O.C. and B.C. 203 Bty arrived at Bty H.Q. 201 at 0930 hours to go round 201 Gun positions. Starting from the left at NEILNORMANDEAUX. O.C. agreed with first three positions but did not agree with the 4th gun of C Troop. He contended that it was too far forward. B.C. could not agree about this as drawing the gun further back into the valley in question left room for A.F.Vs to get through. O.C. finally agreed to leave the gun.

    Leaving C Troop's position the party drove right along 12 miles to AUMALE to inspect A Troop which was in depth and then to come on to B Troop in the large valley at SENARPONT. O.C. O.K'd Nos. 1 and 2 guns of A Troop but disagreed with No. 3 as it was too exposed. B.C. again much against his will altered the position and later found that the O.C. was right definitely in this case.

    In the centre area B.C. stopped a rocked alright. This was the large valley which the Brigade Commander 153 and O.C. had originally pin pointed the 4 guns on the 30th. B.C. had altered two positions to suit O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH under whose command he was. As this had been done the previous day B.C. had not managed to get to the exact positions finally selected by the Troop commander O.C. did not approve at all and ordered the reversal to the original plan, selecting one position himself well up the right hand branch of the valley. All matters being finally settled O.C. returned to his H.Q. and B.C. to REALCAMP, about 1400 hours. En route the party had a meeting with O.C. 4th BLACK WATCH.

    B.C. 201 reported back to 4th BLACK WATCH H.Q. at 1500 hours where he learned that the Battalion were to move that night and rejoin Division in the SOMME area and 201 Bty were to come under Armour Support Group 1st ARMOURED DIVISION who were in reserve and covering the area from AUMALE to FORGES immediately on 201 Bty's right. Bty Captain was sent off to liaise with A.S.G. at their H.Q. several miles to the South and on his return B.C. was called to a conference there at 1900 hours. After some difficulty H.Q. A.S.G. was located and the information that the BORDER REGIMENT were to move in and take 4th BLACK WATCH's area over that night, was imparted. As B.C. knew the route and area he was asked to guide the Battalion in. This he proceeded to do and by 2400 hours the BORDER REGIMENT, under whose command 201 now came, were in the REALCAMP area. Nothing more could be done until daylight so it was called a day and rest sought for.
     
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    As it was decided that Division were to change from defence to attack on the 2nd of June and the attack was due to commence on the 4th of June movements of other Btys from now on are rather disjointed.

    On the morning 3rd June B.C. took O.C. BORDER REGIMENT round the BRESLE area and gun positions. The latter was satisfied with the Anti-Tank defence and proposed establishing his own Battalion positions that day. Returning to REALCAMP at 1400 hours he found orders awaiting him to move to the Division forward area which with his Battalion he proceeded to do, leaving 201 for the third time on its own. A message was awaiting B.C. 201 Bty on return to his H.Q. from H.Q. A.S.G. This intimated that B.C. 201 now took over command of the area (Excl) BLANGY to (incl) AUMALE with 1 Company KENSINGTON H.M.G. Battalion and the ROYAL ENGINEERS Company under command. This was a tall order should the enemy break through on Divisional right. A front of 12 miles and only 12 Anti-Tank guns and a Company of heavy M.Gs to cover it. The latter not much use for ordinary ground defence purposes.

    On the night of 2nd June just before dark Bty H.Q. were bombed by enemy aircraft and although plenty of splinters whistled through the trees no on was hurt. In the afternoon of 3rd June enemy aircraft numbering 35 swept the edges of the woods in each of the valleys leading down to the BRESLE and bombed two small villages of which there were several in the Bty area. A few bombs dropped close to B Troop's positions and one gun of A and one of B Troops had their shields tested out with M.G. bullets. It was quite evident that the enemy knew that troops were in the woods along this part of the BRESLE but from their method of spraying the verges it was also evident that they did not know the exact locations. Although every gun had its Bren mounted for A/A, orders were that no planes were to be engaged unless a definite low flying attack was made on a gun position. Our primary object was to shoot up tanks should they come and not risk the A/T guns by giving away their positions.

    Approx. at 1800 hours on the 3rd the Company Commander of the KENSINGTONS reported to Bty H.Q. and on B.C.'s suggestion established his H.Q. with Bty. B.C. gave him exact gun locations on the map and asked for ground defence to be established at NEILNORMANDEAUX, the large valley at SENARPONT and above AUMALE. The selection of sites adjacent to the positions were left entirely to the Company commander and only two stipulations were made namely that positions would be occupied under cover of the woods and on no account must tracks of vehicles or personnel be able to be seen from the air. The M.G.s went to their area that night and prepared to complete defensive posts the following day. About 1900 hours Bty H.Q. was again bombed and machine gunned without any effect except damage to trees from splinters. H.Q. and Q. personnel simply slipped underground until the raid was over.

    As far as intelligence or information regarding the state of affairs on the Bty front, which was facing right from Division front, was concerned, this was nil. B.C. had therefore established an M.C. patrol consisting of Captain LEWIS and Lieutenant McARTHUR beyond the high ground on the opposite side of the BRESLE in the French area that morning doing the 12 mile run once in the morning and once in the afternoon. Troops were entirely self-contained and Troop commanders were living with their Troops. B.Q.M.S. collected rations daily from Regimental H.Q. and with the water truck delivered them and water to Troops daily. Incidentally this truck had to run the gauntlet with enemy aircraft on some part of its 24 mile run each day.
     
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    51st DIVISION attacked on this day with objective the River SOMME. The attack was unsuccessful on the whole and the original line of defences was resumed. The whys and wherefores of this failure are recorded elsewhere.

    B.C. 201 and Company Commander of KENSINGTONS proceeded to NEILNORMANDEAUX firstly to liaise with O.I.C. ROYAL ENGINEERS and secondly to go over the area. Just as they arrived in the village it was raided. About 15 to 20 bombs were dropped, one or two houses hit but the most serious thing was the noise and the excitement in the inhabitants. One point that struck them forcibly was the fact that there were too many French troops (who) had suddenly appeared in this locality. There was a large petrol dump in the SENAPONT valley with the necessary guards but that was six miles away. The bombers continued their career right along the BRESLE valley, bombing and machine gunning the woods at the valley entrances. This continued at regular 3 hour intervals throughout that day.

    Meeting O.I.C. ROYAL ENGINEERS as appointed B.C. 201 gave his orders. All crossings i.e. bridges foot and railway, which were necessary for traffic from the other side and which had not yet been mined to be completed as soon as possible. All locks on the BRESLE in Bty area to be ready for closing for flooding purposes. No attempt could be made to close the locks in Bty area as what little water there was had to be allowed to pass to the section of the BRESLE where it turned west in Division front, for the same purposes. All roads leading into Division rear to be mined and road blocks of timber prepared to close them. A small amount of this work had already been done. Orders for blowing the seven bridges in the area were:-
    ROYAL ENGINEERS in charge of the blow in each case to do so without further orders on the approach of enemy forces of any kind, first allowing any Allied vehicles or personnel across only so long as enemy were out of range or to blow on the orders of Captain LEWIS or Lieutenant McARTHUR of 201 Bty who were on the daily patrol.

    Completing all other details with O.I.C. ROYAL ENGINEERS a tour was made of the whole of the gun positions. Twice during the tour cover had to be sought from M.G. fire from the air. AUMALE received its share of the bombing that day. French refugees started to come across the BRESLE in larger numbers and it was a sorry sight to see the children whenever they heard the sound of a plane. They were terrorised. Bty H.Q. area and two of the adjacent villages were bombed in the afternoon and evening.
     
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    On the 5th the Germans attacked, too MOYENNEVILLE and got through to the BRESLE near EU. Divisional line was withdrawn to the railway on the night of 5/6th. Major HICKS with 2 Troops 203 Battery had been sent to the village of SAUCOURT beyond the BRESLE where he was to liaise with a company of Infantry at 0700 hours. Unfortunately the infantry failed to appear. Nothing daunted he held the village with his Bren guns and the few rifles he had until 1600 hours on his own and took a pretty heavy toll of the enemy. Captain HODGKINS and D.R. were wounded, the Captain latterly dying as a result of his wounds. This was a very fine officer lost to Regiment.

    B.C. 201 made his daily morning round of the guns on an M.C. At almost every gun position he had to get into shelter from air attack and twice was fired on from the air between gun positions. The little town of AUMALE received its biggest raid that day and it was impossible to pass through it on to the DIEPPE - ST. LEGER road. The sights in AUMALE were pretty bad, as only civilians were killed there being no troops in the town. All gun positions throughout the day were machine gunned from the air repeatedly and guns were kept dodging in and out of their shelters.

    The enemy bombers very often crossed the Bty area to bomb towns and villages in Division rear. Returning they would almost hedge hop off the high ground round ST. LEGER and REALCAMP and fly down the SENAPONT valley below the level of the woods on either side. One of those returning alone was too big a temptation to Sergeant McGOUGAN of B Troop. Seeing only one plane flying very low; almost levelly with his position on the flank of the valley he waited for it and opened up on it with his Bren gun. The Sergeant was HYTHE trained and very good with a Bren and he had the satisfaction of seeing the plane crash land below him and the French guard at the petrol dump run out and collar the crew.

    In the evening of the 5th a French Mechanised Infantry Regiment with several guns came into the Bty H.Q. hide at REALCAMP. The senior French Officer informed B.C. that the enemy were close to OISEMENT and round in rear of it at one point. OISEMENT was the left of the French Army front and not far to the North West of the Bty front so we might look forward to armed recce groups at any time. Lieutenant McARTHUR immediately went off to warn Troop Commanders to be on the 'qui vive'. French officer stated that they had lost 300 men including their C.O. the previous day and they certainly had been knocked about a bit. There was not much fight left in them.
     
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    Owing to the precarious state of affairs and lack of information on Bty front, which was Division right flank, B.C. left H.Q. early to go round gun positions on his daily visit and Captain LEWIS left to do a patrol on the opposite side of the BRESLE. Visiting A Troop first on the AUMALE - ST. LEGER positions B.C. learned that No. 1 gun team had primed and laid mines in depth on the two main roads in the beds they had prepared three days earlier to help out the over-worked ROYAL ENGINEERS. This gun team had also felled several large trees and had laid them across the roads, staggered in such a way as to allow traffic through but able to be closed at a moment's notice.

    Owing to three large bomb craters on the main road just above AUMALE station and the amount of debris, passage with an M.C. was impossible without serious risk to the cycle. Returning part of the way to ST. LEGER and taking a by-road A Troop's second two guns were reached. No. 3 gun were a bit shaken up as they had received a heavy machine gunning early that morning from several planes which had followed one another diving at their side of the valley and spraying the verges of the woods with M.G. bullets. Their gun shield was starred with bullet marks and the ground round their shelter torn up with them. Fortunately no one was hit. Although all gun positions had been subjected to bombing and machine gunning at 3 hourly intervals by groups of from 30 to 40 bombers for 4 days, 201 had not a single casualty and the men were quite used to the roar and whine of the diving planes. Only three men out of the whole Bty showed any signs of being rattled and they were transferred to W Lines as being a menace to the others whose moral had stood the test up to date.

    From A Troop's area B Troop was reached by going along the main road on the West side of the BRESLE. This road was pitted with groups of bomb craters every hundred yards or so and two small villages between AUMALE and SENAPONT were badly smashed up and entirely deserted. This was a pity (in) more ways than one for in one of them there had been a nice little estaminet which was a welcome halt in the 12 mile run each day. Reaching the first fork of the valley it was quite apparently that bombers had been active here as well and Gunners of No. 112 guns B Troop had been doing the same good work as A in mining the roads leading into their valley and preparing road blocks. No one had been hit in these positions although in receipt of a heavy machine gunning from the air. Some part of the plane brought down the previous day were still awaiting removal by the French guards who had apparently taken on this duty. After visiting the other two guns of B Troop and one of C Troop's, B.C. decided to return to Bty H.Q. in case of orders having arrived from A.S.G.
    (See Appendix 5)
    Before leaving B Troop's area B.C. learned that a French Cavalry Regiment 900 strong had come through the woods behind the guns that morning. Not being able, in the time available, to locate their officers he gave orders to B Troop commander to keep them clear of his gun positions and not allow movement in his area.

    On return Bty H.Q. a message was awaiting from A.S.G. Brigade Major, saying that 2 enemy A.F.Vs had come through at EU and were making for the HAUTE FORET D'EU in Bty's rear. B.C. immediately went to C Troop area, begin the nearest point to the FORET and took two guns from the Troop's right to cover the rear left flank on wheels. This area was crowded with refugees all in a parlous state of nerves and panic. Leaving Lieutenant ANKERS in charge and returning to H.Q. again he found a second message stating the first to be an error and that 13 enemy vehicles had penetrated South of AUMALE and were reported to be in the BAS FORET D'EU which was on the right of Bty's area and between Bty and H.Q. A.S.G. This was more serious. A D.R. was sent off to bring Lieutenant ANKERS and his two guns to ST. LEGER, just South of the BAS FORET and to meet B.C. there. 9th LANCERS (tanks) were lying at ST. LEGER refitting and resting. When B.C. reached their H.Q. he found that they had only two tanks fit duty and the others unable to move. G.1 1st ARMOURED DIVISION happened to be at LANCERS H.Q. to find out what had been done there. C.O. LANCERS was informed that 2 Anti-Tank guns were coming to cover the ST. LEGER - BAS FORET roads and he managed to tow out his powerless tanks which suitably placed could defend his immediate vicinity.

    On the arrival of Lieutenant ANKERS with his guns he was given all available data and directed to sight the guns to cover all approach to ST. LEGER from the south. B.C. then set off on an M.C. to scout the many roads in the BAS FORET D'EU about 3 miles south of ST. LEGER. Striking the main road running East and West through the FORET he went throughout its length and then started on the side roads leading South. Nothing unusual was to be seen so the journey was continued South of the FORET about another 3 miles through two villages. In the most southerly of these information from a Frenchman stated that several German vehicles had passed through the village without stopping going South West. That enemy armed recce parties had gone through was afterwards verified by an officer of the ROYAL ENGINEERS who was in the rearward area on this date and engaged them with a scratch defence party he was with on the FORGES - NEUFCHATEL road.
    (See Appendix 5.)
    On 201 Bty right i.e. from AUMALE to FORGES the A/A. A/T Regiment holding this south section had large gaps of open country which they could not possibly cover and through which enemy could penetrate unseen by avoiding main roads.

    As petrol was running short and there was no sign of enemy near Bty area B.C. had to return to ST. LEGER. Reaching the town word was passed to the LANCERS that there was no immediate danger and five French A/T guns found in the area were ordered to cover possible routes into Division's rear until 1700 hours. The French guns withdrew to their own command at this time and after waiting until 2000 hours Lieutenant ANKERS was ordered to return to his own area.

    On this afternoon 202nd Bty (Major HICKS) lost a Troop; 4 guns and 5 vehicles which were heavily mortared by the enemy who had reached the BRESLE near PONT ST. MARAIS. Lieutenant BOAG was wounded and some of the Troop killed and wounded.

    At 2100 hours Lieutenant McAULAY (B Troop) reported to H.Q. Bty that his Troop had shot down a second plane that afternoon. The bomber had definitely been hit by A/A, probably 44 L.A.A. of ours, and was limping home down the SENARPONT valley flying very low. Sergeant McGOUGAN of B Troop and a Bren of C Troop opened up on it and brought it down in flames. Nothing was left of the plane or the crew.

    Bombing of the area had been kept up at regular intervals throughout the day at intervals of not more than 3 hours. Driver McDONALD of the motor truck had to wait until the afternoon before starting on his 24 mile run round gun positions with water and rations and on this day he was making the run alone. At a small village about two miles from REALCAMP he ran into trouble. Just as he entered the village the enemy suddenly appeared and started to bomb it. The Driver had to slow up his truck as smoke and debris was flying around. One bomb dropped just beside him and when he came to he was still sitting at the wheel of his truck but he and the truck were no longer on the road but sitting in the middle of the duck pond of the village. He tried to get the vehicle out but without any success so he footed it to Bty H.Q. for assistance. Borrowing one of the French trucks from our visitors, Captain LEWIS set off to recover the truck which he was successful in doing. The Captain reported that the truck must have been lifted bodily by the blast and dropped into the pond as there were no signs of wheel marks on the soft edge and mud round the pond and the truck would have bogged itself before reaching the centre where it lay. Driver McDONALD deserves the greatest credit for fulfilling his duty so well throughout the seven days bombing and Machine Gunning on the BRESLE.

    At approx 1030 hours Regimental commander appeared at Bty H.Q. and informed B.C. that 30 German tanks had broken through south of AUMALE in the are held by the 101st A/T., L.A.A. Regiment. Command of this Regiment had just been taken over the previous night by Lieutenant-Colonel CAMERON, D.S.O., M.C. who had only returned to FRANCE that day after getting away with the B.E.F. from the north. The Colonel had hot footed across country without maps and took over his command not knowing Bty positions or anything, in the dark of the 6th/7th. His area was from 201st rig tat AUMALE south to FORMERIE. Owing to the length of his front there were considerable gaps which it was impossible to cover with the force at this command. Nevertheless one of his Btys nearest the break through took a heavy toll of the enemy in both tanks and guns and their casualties showed just what a fight they put up.
     

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