Fixed Exxley's post, to show he was quoting Jimbo. (A change in forum software a few years back screwed up lots of quotes. I fix them when I see them). I remember Jimbo. He was shouty & over-excited too.
Oh crikey, yes ! The Jimbo...Back in the days before sarcastic moderation and serial belittlement - He could never have dealt with that. The thing that fascinates me about Sealion is the fear of it then, and for some time afterwards. It matters not whether it was ever truly possible, but the population of the U.K. clearly believed it. "Went the day well ?"
You talk a good theory. But so far all ive read is opinion and nothing else, yet you challenge other members to provide facts?.... Is that what you think your theories are, facts...... Im sorry to burst your bubble. But not only are you arrogant enough to try to bully others into accepting your own misguided beliefs. They arent even logical, or make any sense. Your just quoting old propaganda books published in the 50's/60's/70's. Things have changed a lot since then. You know, people like you used to argue the world was flat. As soon asi have the time, im going to enjoy dissecting your "logic" (and i use the word in its loosest form). Everything you have failed to mention on the plus side for England shows your lack of historical knowledge. At least during the first 1-2 years of the airwar. Oh and fyi, American eagle squadrons didnt enter combat with the RAF until early to mid 1941. Looks like you have been watching too many hollywood movies......smh
Americans seem to always forget ww2 started in '39'. As usual ya'll were a little late to the party. And lets face it, it wouldnt be the first or last time that happened.....
Im afraid your wrong. At least where the RAF was concerned. The attitude was "let them just try and come over here, and we'll fix em!" As for the population, they were far more angry than scared. Wouldnt you be?......Most civis were glad we were on our own.... We didnt have to waste aircraft on France for a start
The above quote is ,the typical stance of always blaming others ie "The management" for all the wrongs in the world. WW1 and WW2 were to prevent world domination by a particular country not protecting rich old mens property Not much you can do about appeasing a despot except fight.
You're not 'afraid'...you're looking forward to causing arguments on the internet and apparently wish to argue semantics. All the evidence that I have read and picked up from talking to people who were there at the time was that, based on the little information that they were privy to during 1940 / 1941, they saw the risk of an attempted invasion by Germany as a very real one. No-one in their right mind could have wished for that to happen, so I don't feel it unreasonable to describe that risk perception as a 'fear' Government and population clearly felt the need to take precautions against an attempted invasion. Would they have done that if they had not 'feared' the possibility ? Perhaps 'The RAF' (Who ? Higher Command ? Individual aircrews ?) didn't 'fear' an attempted invasion. They should perhaps have feared the possibility of it not being possible to continue training enough crews or providing enough replacement aircraft - although in the light of the Air Ministry's ability to claim a disproportionate quantity of the resources allocated for the armed services right through the 1930s, perhaps this was not a real concern. Had the Germans got a foot ashore (and who amongst the rank and file truly knew what possibilities they had ?) and had set up the same sort of mobile flak installations that they used in France and Belgium then I'd suggest that the RAF would have been wise to 'fear' throwing more Blenheims, Battles and Hampdens at them. Germany was 'on a roll' and only the most gung-ho would not have 'feared' what they were going to do next.
Hindsight is great when one has access to so much information not available at the time. Whether the invasion was possible or not is immaterial. What matters is what people then thought. In his published diary General Sir Alan Brooke, Commanding UK Home Forces at the time, and someone who would know what was going on, wrote " I considered the invasion a very real and probable threat and one for which the land forces at my disposal fell far short of what I felt was required to provide any degree of real confidence in our power to defend these shores. It should not be construed that I considered our position a helpless one in the case of an invasion. Far from it. We should certainly have a desperate struggle and the future might well have hung in the balance, but I certainly felt that given a fair share of the fortunes of war we should certainly succeed in finally defending these shores" Tim.
I have spent several years working on the aftermath of Dunkirk using original War Office material. There is not a scintilla of doubt in my mind that the army considered the possibility of invasion as being real and imminent and the plans and instructions for the handling of Ops Dynamo Cycle and Aerial returnees were all scoped to put fighting units back on the south and east coasts as soon as possible. Lines of communication troops were put on the back burner until trained men were in place when Lof C's were formed into roadblock companies.
Operation Sealion | Battle of Britain | RAF Museum Saturday 12 October 1940 | The Battle of Britain Historical Timeline 12th October 1940 The point had now been reached where Hitler had to decide on his next course of action. It was evident towards the end of September that Seelöwe could not be accomplished before the end of the year. Bomber Command had sunk 214 barges and twenty-one transports of the invasion fleet which in any case had been forced to disperse. He was thus compelled in October to choose between stopping this dispersal or postponing the whole projectindefinitely. As the bombs fell on Biggin Hill, Chatham and Piccadilly, Keitel circulated Hitler’s decision: The Führer [he wrote] has decided that from now until the spring, preparations for Sealion shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England. Should the Invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, orders for a renewal of operational readiness will be issued later. In the meantime military conditions for a later invasion are to be improved. The significance of this memorandum was not to be realised at the WarOffice, damaged at nine o’clock that evening by a direct hit, nor at BentleyPriory, until very much later. Hitler had admitted defeat nineteen days before the Battle of Britain officially came to a close.