Operation Royal Marine

Discussion in '1940' started by Drew5233, Jun 19, 2010.

  1. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Never heard of this until the other day. It gets a few mentions in Prelude to Dunkirk by , Sir Edward Spears (1954).

    Here's a wiki link to give you a bit of background details until I bring Spears book home from work.


    Operation Royal Marine - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Anyone know anymore on this?
     
  2. Andy H

    Andy H Member

    Hi Drew

    There's quite alot of information concerning the proposed operation with the War Cabinet files at the NA.

    CAB 65/12/8 which is free to download, has within Appendix 1
    it has the following discussion/information:-


    We were requested by the War Cabinet to review the proposed operation and to report to the War Cabinet, with particular reference to the following aspects:

    (a) How much notice should be given before the operations begin, so that neutral traffic can gain a place of safety.

    (b) The timing of the various phases of the operations, having regard to the importance of avoiding the premature disclosure of a new, and possibly decisive,
    weapon.

    (c) Possible enemy reprisals.

    2. We have examined the operation in detail and we agree that it holds out promise of important results, and should be carried out as soon as possible.


    In addition there are several other files where this operation is discussed, just use the search function and they'll be listed.

    Its note in one of these other files and dated early April that reports had been recieved about the Germans placing nets across the Rhine. This obviously brought about thoughts concerning operational safety breaches etc but it was thought unlikely.

    Regards

    Andy H
     
  3. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Volumne 1

    The Genesis of 'Royal Marine' August 1st - 23rd, 1939

    At Strasbourg, looking at the Rhine flowing under the Kehl Bridge, on which French and German posts stood watch within pistol-shot of each other, and remembering that later the river passed through German territory on either side and under bridges of all kinds vital to their mobilisation, I susggested that mines should be launched in the stream on the declaration of war. It seemed to me that mines linked by cables and urged on by the current would lash themselves round the piers of the bridges and explode, while shoals of smaller mines could blow a way through the nets the Germans would certainly endeavor to stretch across the river. Churchill thought at the time this was not a good plan, but tiny submarines might possibly be useful to blow up bridges further down stream. Later he would put my idea into practise; but by then he believed it was his own idea;


    February, 1940

    Churchill had briefed me in connection with his plan, 'Royal Marine', which, as I have recounted earlier, had its genesis in some remarks made during our trip of the previous summer. Under the impulse of his powerful imagination a chance conversation had become a project of vast magnitude well on its way to realisation. A naval detachment was to be stationed within the Maginot Line about five miles from the Rhine. It was to have a stock of 2,000 fluvial mines, and an assured minimum supply of a further 1,000 a week. These mines, when launched, would disrupt the river traffic for 10o miles below Karlsruhe.

    The naval operation was to coincide with one by the Air Force, which by mid-April was to have sufficient supply of mines to lay in the river reaches between Bingen and Coblentz on every moonlit night. (The mines were so constructed as to become harmless before reaching the Dutch frontier.

    It was obvious that this operation was certain to disrupt German communication and, if launched when they were themselves preparing their attack, would disorganise it, as the Rhine Bridges would be either damaged or destroyed and river traffic prevented until counter-measures had been devised.

    In January Winston had described the plan to Gamelin and Georges, who had been very receptive. They had pointed out that the French controlled the head waters of the Saar and the Moselle as well as the Rhine. It was thus possible to give even greater amplitude to the operation than at first planned.

    Churchill, who had hoped to launch this attack in February, now disired to do so in March, but there had lately been indications of a certain reserve on the part of the French.


    More to follow....
     
  4. Andy H

    Andy H Member

    the balance of this particular file:-

    Amount of notice required.
    3- Under The Hague Convention, relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines, it is forbidden (Article l) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless ono hour at most after the person who laid then has ceased to control them. Belligerents are also bound (Article 5) to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a Notice to Mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. No period of warning is laid
    down, though we have followed the practice of giving from 48 to 96 hours ourselves.

    4. It would appear from the preamble to this Convention, which reads as follows:" inspired by the principle of the freedom of the seas as the common highway of all nations" that the Convention could not be held to apply to rivers and waterways in the enemy's country, which are not international highways. If this view is correct, no warning would be required before the laying of mines in these waterways, since any neutrals in enemy territory must take their chance of being involved in military operations. From the military point of view we should, of course, prefer that no warning should be given.

    5. If it be decided that, for humanitarian reasons, some warning is desirable, the length of xvarning to be
    given is governed by the following considerations:

    (a) A mine introduced near Karlsruhe would take 18 hours to reach Mannheim, which is the highest point at
    which neutral barges are believed to operate.

    (b) If 24 hours' notice were given, there would thus be a period of 42 hours from the warning before the
    first mine reached Mannheim.

    (c) If Dutch barges at Mannheim started moving downstream on receipt of the warning, they v/ould have 42 hours start over the mines. It would take them 65 hours to clear German territory under the influence of the current alone, but with any kind of motive power this time would be much reduced. They would in any case be moving downstream at least as fast as the mines which would be following them, and should easily maintain their lead.

    (d) On the other hand, if only 24 hours' notice is given, neutral barges, who might reasonably expect the attack to come from the air, would imagine that they had not got time to escape from bombing aimed at the lower reaches of the river. For this reason, it might be desirable to give 48 hours' warning.

    (e) The giving of 48 hours' warning, however, would give more opportunity for the enemy to penetrate the secret, and take precautionary measures.

    6. We conclude that, from a military point of view, the ideal would be to give no warning, but
    that, if warning must be given, it should be limited to 24 hours.

    Timing of the Operation.

    7. Vie recommend the following time table: 11th March. 8 p.in. Issue of warning declaration. 12th March. 8 p.m. Naval operation begins at a rate of 300 a night, settling down to 1,000 a
    week. March Moon Period. Royal Air Force do not begin operations, unless a (i.e. week before German offensive appears and week after full imminent, or unless some moon). other special reason makes it essential, (see para. 8 below).. April Moon Period. Royal Air Force begin operations in the Rhine. May Moon Period. Royal Air Force begin operations in canals and estuaries.

    8. We do not recommend that the Royal Air Force should start in March, as they will not have had sufficient time for training; nor will their supplies of mines be in sufficient quantities. It would be better to wait till they can operate at full pressure in April.

    9. We nevertheless consider that the naval operation should start on 12th March. The sooner the traffic is interrupted the better, and the scale of the naval operations is large enough to cause the enemy very serious dislocation, and c:.n be sustained indefinitely.

    The effect of enemy retaliation.

    10. The enemy might retaliate in due course on the English rivers, though he has not any means of inserting mines in them except from the air. Lighterage traffic on the Thames and Humber estuaries is of considerable importance, but the scale of defence of those areas should be sufficient to prevent any heavy scale of minelaying. We believe that transport on the waterways in France is of great importance, but it is for the. French to say whether they consider that German retaliation in kind would cause them more than inconvenience.

    11. We do not believe that the operation of dropping mines from the air would bring on unrestricted air warfare. The Germans cannot be looking for an excuse for indiscriminate bombing, as they have not hesitated to indiilgs in the bombing of civilians in Poland 3 0 1 in passenger liners, when they thought it suited them. We therefore conclude that the fear of -reprisals or retaliation should not deter us from
    carrying out the operation.

    Form of proposed public declaration.

    12. An important point arises in connection with the public declaration which will have to be made to
    announce our intention. We are faced with the alternatives of declaring the Rhine only as a dangerous area, or of including in our announcement all the navigable waterways of Germany. From the military point of viex? we recommend that the declaration should be as wide as possible to cover all waterways, for the
    following reasons:

    (a) The need for a subsequent declaration when we propose to extend operations to canals or the Danube would be avoided.

    (b) As soon as the nature of the attack is revealed, neutrals may be frightened off
    the Danube , which would be to our advantage.

    (c) The Germans would have to dissipate their protective arrangements. It should be noted that the German estuaries are all covered by our existing announcement, made at the beginning of the war.


    Regards

    Andy H
     
  5. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

    Cutting to the chase:

    One thousand seven hundred mines were 'streamed'. They produced immediate results. Practically all river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz was suspended, and extensive damage was done to the Karlsruhe barrage and a number of pontoon bridges. The success of the device was however lost in the deluge of disaster.


    Does anyone have a start date for the RAF's involvement in this?
     
  6. Andy H

    Andy H Member

    Hi Drew

    Hope this helps

    From hyperwar HyperWar: The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 [Chapter III]

    One unusual form of operation, operation 'Royal Marine', had been prepared during the winter. It was designed to damage the heavy traffic of barges and other water transport using some of the main German rivers. Floating mines were to be launched into these rivers (1)1 from tributaries and (2) from the air. The first was a naval operation, carried out by Royal Marines under command of Commander G. R. S. Wellby, R.N. It started as soon as the German attack began and by May the 24th over 2,300 floating mines had been streamed into the Rhine, Moselle and Meuse. The second method was only used by the Royal Air Force in the closing days of the campaign


    and in addition I have found the following in The Whitley Boys (4 Group Bomber Operations 1939-1940) by G L “Larry” Donnelly, published by Air Research 1998

    Pg139
    On June 14th the Germans entered Paris and that night two Whitley Sqns were called upon to use a new weapon against Germany; the W Bomb. These so called bombs were in fact mines……designed to destroy barges and bridges on Germany’s inland waterways…….The design being attributed to a manufacturer of pipe organs!
    Pg140
    From the end of 1939 when a plan of attack was devised by the War Cabinet, designs had been submitted and experiments carried out. Despite numerous failures a meting on December 29th 1939 at the Air Ministry gave the contract to a firm for 10,000 bombs and containers…..
    By April 1940 a supply of the weapons had been sent to 18 unsuspecting Bomber and 8 Coastal Command stations.
    In then goes on with some technical details about the bombs and how they are to be dropped etc
    Plans to drop them in the Rivers Rhine, Elbe, Wesser, Main and Neckar and the famous Dortmund-Ems and Mitteland canals on the full moon night of April 22nd were cancelled. However, the use of the bomb was resurrected again in June when oil targets moved up the list of priorities and it was envisaged as the most suitable weapon with which to attack oil barges en route from Romania to Germany by way of the Rhine. The Whitley Sqns were lumbered with this unenviable task on the night of June 14th/15th 1940
    It the gives some details of this operation and others till Pg143, were it states:-
    There was some good news for the Whitley Sqns on June 19th when it was announced that no further raids using the dreaded W bomb were envisaged.
    On Pg145
    During the morning of June 22nd there was a tragic sequel to the W bomb debacle. An explosion occurred in the bomb dump at Dishforth resulting in two airmen being killed and three injured. Defective W bombs were one of the suspected causes as they were being defused at the time.
    Volume 1 of the Air Historical monograph ‘Armament W Bomb produced after the war states:-
    The W bomb is an example of a weapon conceived in great haste and developed so rapidly that weak points in design were inevitable. Its outstanding disadvantage lay in the fact that it could not be stored. Small batteries and soluble plugs deteriorated rapidly and were intended for immeadiate use. The bomb, too, was never completely safe. Dissolution of soluble plugs which formed part of the safety device and the possibility of electrical shorts made it a constant source of danger during carriage, storage or under preparation.

    Pg148 to Pg152
    Summary of operations by 4 Group June 1st-30th 1940
    14th-15th Mining River Rhine
    10Sqn 7 aircraft allocated, 5 took off and 2 bombed
    51Sqn 5 aircraft allocated, all took off, none bombed
    17th-18th
    10Sqn 7 aircraft allocated, 4 aborted and 3 bombed
    51Sqn 4 aircraft allocated, 3 aborted, 1 bombed

    Regards

    Andy H
     
  7. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    I don't have very many details at all - but the idea of floating mines on Axis waterways didn't end there ;) Paddy Fermor was involved in some kind of SOE operation to float oil-bomb mines in the Danube immediately before he was first seconded to Crete as a BLO.
     
  8. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot 1940 Obsessive

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