A spur off from my rekindled research into the various airmen lost around the Channel Islands has been the discovery of the plans for Operation Blazing. This was a plan hatched by the British high command to land a force of 3,000 troops on the most northerly Channel Island of Alderney in May 1942. The initial plan was to re-take and hold the Island indefinitely, as the plan was considered further this was reduced to 24 hours. From the plans it appears that the AOC RAF Bomber and Fighter Command had deep reservations about the whole project, and this maybe why it was shelved. In the initial proposal of 16th April 1942, the object given was :- To take the island of Alderney by assault and hold it. The advantages of holding the island were :- (A) A small craft base for cutting the enemy coastal convoy route (B) An advance RDF station to extend the Fighter Command Coverage (C) An emergency landing ground (D) A diversion which may cause withdrawal of enemy air forces from other fronts, including the withdrawal of bombers from Norway (E) A diversion which may cause the withdrawal of military forces from other fronts (F) An opportunity for bringing enemy air forces to battle under reasonably favourable circumstances (G) A spring board for further combined operations. The force required for this operation were Naval 6 Hunt Class Destroyers 5 Infantry Assault Ships (4 LSC 36 ALC) 8 MGB’s 4 Shore based ALC 18 TLC 30 ‘R’ Craft 4 Schuyts Military Four Infantry Battalions One Parachute Battalion One Commando and two troops One Squadron and one or two troops of army tanks Thirteen Bren Carriers One Light Battery One Field Company RE One MG Company Signal, RAMC, and RASC detachments Ten Pioneer Sections Three Light AA Batteries Four Bulldozers Some transport to follow RAF 330 bomber sorties, including 4 squadrons for low level bombing 40 Parachute Dropping Aircraft 8 Smoke Aircraft Fighter Wing for the protection to returning aircraft Fighter Wings for cover over shipping in the harbour Fighter Wings to cover the withdrawal of the shipping on D1 Four Intruder sorties against enemy aerodromes on the night of the assault One anti-flak Squadron One close support Fighter Squadron Fighter Sweep t anticipate the first enemy reaction Offensive sweeps to met the air situation with develops One close support Fighter Squadron at call RAF Servicing Commando After a further deliberation on the 5th May 1942 the AOC reduced the operation to a large scale raid, to take and hold the island for 24 hours, or may be longer if the situation and enemy reactions allowed. The anticipated Parachute drop was abandoned. The force required for this operation were Naval 6 Hunt Class Destroyers 5 Infantry Assault Ships (5 LSC 33 ALC and 2 MLC) 8 MGB’s 17 TLC 30 ‘R’ Craft I Hospital Carrier Military 6 Troops S,S. Brigade (550 All Ranks) 14 Churchill Army tanks Thirteen Bren Carriers 4 3.7 Howitzers One Field Company RE I troop (4 Guns) Bofors AA I field ambulance RC of Signals Services Total Military Force 3,000 all ranks RAF 200 to 250 Medium and Heavy Bomber Aircraft 24 Blenheim Bombers – 500lb HE and 250 lb Smoke 14 Smoke Laying (Army Co-Operation) Blenheims 18 Long Range Coastal Fighters 8 Spitfire Wings (24 Squadrons) 12 Intruder Fighter Aircraft 24 Night Fighters. The 1st Guards Brigade was put on notice to move to the Isle of Wight for training, but in the end the whole operation was abandoned in favour of Dieppe. I wonder what the outcome and the enemy reaction would have been if the British had retaken Alderney, compared to the other Channel Islands it was/is strategically places to command much of the Channel, and cut off the coastal supplier routes to Western France, as well as most of the Cherbourg peninsular. If I get chance and if anyone is interested I’ll transcribe the Outline Plan and seperate phase of the operation tomorrow night.
Hmmm... I'm not sure I see the point; the stated advantages seem "woolly" to me. Possibly as a rehearsal for D-Day, it may have caused less casualties than Dieppe - I'm assuming it was less heavily defended. But there would have been a lot more sea to cross. To hold it indefinitely would have tied down too many of our forces, as well as the Germans. By the way, what were "R-craft" and "Schuyts"?
Not sure it would act as a suitable rehearsal for D-Day. But as you say, if the island been held it would have tied up troops for very little gain. Mind you it would have exposed the fact that there were concentration camps on the island, and may have acted as a spring board for the invasion of France a few years later, though this in turn may have forced the German high command to move troops to the Normandy area and prevent the allies from use it as the site for the invasion a couple of years later.
I cannot understand the fundamental military reasons why manpower and equipment would be jeopardised on why appears to be a foolhardy operation.It was proposed by Mountbatten as one of his 'good for morale and prestige' operational ideas but turned down after assessment and feasability by the Chiefs of Staff Commttee. This committee were aware of the fact that the Committee of Imperial Defence had viewed that the Channel Islands had no strategic value for the British. When it was suggested that RAF (B.C) would reduce the coastal defences,Sir Alan Brooke's view was negative.Eventally,Chuchill was told by the Chiefs of Staff that they considered the operation was not worth a candle, forcing Mountbatten to back down. Mountbatten was given approval for another one of his ideas,that of Operation 'Lancing',the raiding of positions in the Boulogne -Le Touquet area which came to nought as did his resurrection of a series of operations against the Channel Islands. The RAF (F.C) were against the plan pointing out that the Luftwaffe had two operation airfields within 20 miles of Alderney.Assessment of the Luftwaffe response was that 84 fighters were expected to be put up from the Cherbourg area and 24 fighters from the Channel Islands.There were others who poiinted oiut that the lesson of Crete had not been learnt Additionally Aderney was a fortess island with no civilian population as a source for prepared intelligence.In addition to the military presence it was the base for forced labourers (Russia POWs and Eastern deportees ) engaged in the contruction of the fortress defences.Acts of severe brutality were noted after the liberation.It was a forbidden location as far as the Channel Islanders were concerned excepting those who stepped out of line and were deported to Lager Nordeney on Alderney in reality an SS concentration camp.Survivors recorded that at the time of the Normandy landing they were forced to dig 'fox holes' which they interpretated as their graves.It was later discovered that the concentration camp population would not have survived in the event of an invasion as there was a stipulation from Hitler's HQ that the forced labourers should be liquidated on this eventuality. Overall,the occupation of the Channel Islands cost Hitler the continual deployment of a division of men and the resources of the Todt Organisation for an invasion which never came. The Atlantic Fortress would be broken another way, although Hitler in his gut military thinking always thought that the Channel Islands might offer the British a chance to return to the European mainland.
Good post Harry, Just finished 'The German Occupation Of The Channel Islands' by Cruigshank myself so this is all fresh in my mind.
There were other factors written in and considered by Churchill and the High Command, one being the possible reprisals on the local population, this would not have been an issue with Alderney so much as the population had been evacuated, however if Operation Attaboy had been initiated, the reprisals against the population of Jersey could have been significant. This document may interest some, the treatment of the Jews in the Channel Islands. It's something of an eye opener and shows the local authorities in two different lights. http://www.jerseyheritagetrust.org/occupation_memorial/pdfs/jewishresidents.pdf
