OMAHA BEACH.

Michel

I believe you are absolutely correct.

Thank you very much. You always come through with an answer.

Chuck

 

Chuck,

Unfortunately it appears I was wrong: Annex E to OO BB-44 is the Gunfire Support Plan, not the Landing Diagram(s), according to the attached list, found on the Clark County Historical Society website. See Search Our Collections and search (using CTL-F and not the webpage search engine) for Normandy.

Michel

 

Michel,

I greatly appreciate your effort anyway. Thanks for taking the time to look. My current best guess it that it came from either the V Corps plan (perhaps not since the Army plans tend to have numbered annexes) or TF 124 plan.

The quest continues.

Chuck

 

Mike,

I am a new member, I am awed by the level of information and your willingness to organize and distribute it. Thank you.

I would like to better understand something you wrote several years ago at the start of this discussion, about the 741st Tank Battalion and the decision that somebody (see below) made to launch the DD-tanks from 6,000 yards offshore despite the rough seas. I am interested in this moment and this decision, and there are lots of different (and competing) versions of the story. You wrote "The decision was to be taken by the senior officer present, army or navy. In this case the senior officers were army captains and although the senior naval officer present had a greater knowledge of sea conditions he was over ruled." I believe this refers to 741st TB Company B and C commanders Captains James Thornton and Charles Young. Later, you wrote that "An enquiry found that the senior army captain was at fault in making the decision to launch the DD tanks but also found that the senior naval officer present should, with his superior knowledge of sea conditions, should have objected." Here's my questions:

1) Do you (or anybody) have any documents or further information regarding this inquiry? Was it formal or informal? This would be fascinating.

2) Who had the actual authority to decide to launch the DD's or send them directly ashore? I know that you wrote the "senior officer" had the authority, but a July 1944 report from Force O Commander Admiral Hall somewhat vaguely says "it was agreed the decision should be left to the Senior Army Commander and Senior Naval Officer of each of the two LCT units carrying DD tanks." That statement implies they had to agree together? Hall's report later says that Thornton failed to consult the senior naval officer on the LCT (Lt Barry) and Barry "tacitly acquiesced" by not trying to stop the launch. I interpret Admiral Hall's comments to mean that BOTH officers had to agree, but I admit his comments are somewhat vague. And, expecting two different leaders to agree in the middle of a stormy sea and battle sounds like a pretty clumsy decision-making arrangement. Your comments about the senior officer having authority to make the call makes more sense at least to me, but Hall's report (and Dean Rockwell's) strongly suggest that both army and naval leaders were expected to agree. Was there a formal policy?

Any thoughts?

Thanks again.
Patrick

 

Patrick,

Welcome to the boards. Hope you have a great experience here.

I’ve looked into this topic in some detail as it tangentially applied to a project I was working on. I'm not a true expert on this topic, but here's what I've gleaned. The following comments are a mix of what official documents had to say and my personal conclusions. Hopefully each is clearly identified, as I’m sure some of my conclusions are not universally shared.

The Western Naval Task Force OpOrd 2-44, dtd 22 May 1944, had very little to say about the matter. Annex G, Approach Plan had a diagram showing the approach time for the LCTs carrying the DD tanks, and noted the times were based on a number of assumptions. Those applying to the DD tanks follow:
“(c) Twenty minutes will be required to launch DD tanks.
“(d) DD tanks are launched 6000 yards off assault beaches.”

This order, then, did not envision any option except launching as scheduled, with no regard to sea state, and made no provision for any other decision, which would appear to make it incumbent on the Navy officers to follow that order.

In Change 3 to the OpOrder, the following comment was added to Annex L (Communications Plan): “Assault Force commanders may break radio silence after H minus 120 for communications in connection with launching of DD tanks.” Note: as used in this order, the Assault Force Commanders refers to the admiral commanding Assault Force O (Omaha Beach) and the admiral commanding Assault Force U (Utah Beach), not Army officers. So it would seem Adm Hall (Com TF 124/11th Amphibious Force), was envisioned as potentially having something to communicate on this topic.


The following is from TF 124 (11th Amphib Force) OpOrd BB-44, dtd 20 May 1944. These same words were used with both Assault Group O-1 and O-2. “Weather permitting, launch DD tanks about six thousand yards offshore and land them about H minus ten minutes. If state of sea is such as to prevent their being launched and proceeding to the beach under their own power, land them with the first wave.”

Note: this does not indicate whether the decision on the sea state was the responsibility of the naval officer (based on his professional knowledge of the sea?) or was the responsibility of the Army commander (based on his knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of his DD tanks?).


The First US Army OpPlan Neptune, dtd 25 January 1944, does not mention anything regarding the launching DD tanks at all, and only mentions DD tanks once when discussing LCS accompanying the leading waves and providing fire support.

I don’t have the V Corps plan.

The 1st Division Field Order #35, dtd 16 April 1944 only discusses DD Tanks in Annex 10. As regarding the landing of the DD tanks, is merely stated: “DD tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion and 743rd Tank Battalion will assault beaches in the respective Combat Team zones of action, touching down at H-Hour.” The following two paragraphs prescribe how DD tanks will maneuver from 1000 yards out from the high water mark (based on beach obstacles), which implies the DD tanks are swimming in. There is nothing in this order which grants the Army tank commanders a role in the decision to launch.

I don’t have the 16th RCT’s operations order, but its combat report merely said the DD tanks were launched 6,000 yards from the beach “as prearranged”.

The 741st Tank Battalion’s Field Order #1, dtd 21 May made no reference to whose responsibility it was to decide to launch the DD tanks, or to any other option in case of bad sea state.

From the above, it seems that there was little attention paid by either Army of Navy planning regarding a backup plan in case of bad sea state. Only the TF 124 plan addressed it, but failed to place the responsibility on anyone’s shoulders. A bit father on, I’ll add some more insights on the question of who had what responsibility.

The 19 July after action report of the 741st Tank Battalion provides insight into the decision to launch:

“At approximately H-60 on D-Day, the LCT (sic) bearing the DD tanks of Companies B and C were in position of (sic) beach Omaha at a distance of approximately 6,000 yards from the beach. Company B was commanded by Cpt. JAMES G. THORTON, JR., Company C was commanded by Cpt. CHARLES R, YOUNG. Cpt. Thornton succeeded in contacting Cpt. Young by radio and the two commanders discussed the advisability of launching the DD tanks, the sea being very rough, much rougher than the tanks had ever operated in during their preparatory training. Both commanders agreed that the advantage to be gained by the launching of the tanks justified launching the tanks in the heavy sea. Accordingly, orders were issued for the launching of the tanks at approximately H-50.”

In my opinion, this implies they felt it was either a matter of launching in bad seas, or the tanks didn’t land. Nothing in that summary indicates they were aware of, or considered, the option of landing directly on the beach. And this seems to be backed up by the weight of the OpOrders and Plans, only one of which – a naval plan - mentioned the option of landing directly on the beach. The question remains, why was this decision left to the senior Army officer for Assault Group O-1?

The after action report of Lt. Rockwell, USN provides more insight. Rockwell commanded the LCTs carrying the DD tanks for the 116th RCT half of the beach. He had been in charge of all the LCT/DD tank training in preparation for D-Day, so was basically the subject matter expert on the topic. Concerned by the state of the sea, he consulted with the senior Army company commander, and they jointly agreed to go in to the beach.

In an endorsement to Rockwell’s report, ADM Hall (Com TF 124/11th Amphibious Force) stated that the question of launching the DD tanks had been a point of discussion between the naval Assault Force Commander (i.e., Hall), the CG, V Corps and the CG 1st Infantry Division. The resulting agreement was that the decision would be left to the senior Navy and senior Army officers; in other words, it was to be a joint decision. The endorsement lauded Rockwell for obtaining a unified decision. It then placed the blame for the failure of the 741st’s DD tanks as follows: “Apparently Cpt. Thornton, U.S. Army, made the decision to launch the DD Tanks of Assault Group O-1 without consulting Lt(jg) Barry, USNR, the senior naval officer on the LCT and the latter tacitly acquiesced in the decision by his failure to take action to change the order directing the launching. Cpt. Thorton’s order was unsound and resulted in the loss of all but three of the DD tanks of Assault Group O-1.”

It seems to me that Hall was rather harsher in his judgement of Thornton and much milder in his judgement of Barry. But it does seem a fair conclusion that the debacle was due to a breakdown of the policy to have a joint decision. Lt (jg) was a grade junior to Cpt. Thornton, and that may have deterred him from exerting his authority on the matter. And he may not have gained the confidence of experience with DD tanks as Rockwell did as a result of being in charge of training. Further, there is an open question whether he offered Thornton the option of beaching; there is certainly no record he did, or that Thornton was aware of that option.

But Hall’s critique omits something. Thornton may have made the decision to launch, but he had absolutely no authority to issue commands to the crews of the Navy LCTs. Barry was not merely silent, he must have issued orders to his crews to launch. So he wasn’t merely tacitly complicit by after failing to assert his authority, he took an active role in issuing the orders, thereby endorsing Thornton’s decision.

Finally, it must be said we only have Hall’s account of the joint decision policy. Nowhere was it in writing - at least it has never surfaced. How well that policy (assuming one was indeed agreed upon) was transmitted from Corps all the way down to company level is a matter of question. As we’ve seen, it was never communicated in any order.

And that’s the best I can do on the topic. It's a bit rushed and I probably left out a lot . Many other experts here will no doubt weigh in with better analyses. Hope it helps a bit.

Chuck

 

Chuck - Thanks for welcoming me and thanks for the thorough reply. The pre-invasion orders and their content was helpful.

I pretty much share in your interpretations of what did and did not happen with regards to the order to launch the 741st DDs between Thornton and Barry. I am really curious if Thornton pulled rank on Barry according to a pre-determined policy that gave Thornton that authority if he needed it, or if Thornton deviated in some way from a previously determined two-person army AND navy approval process. I think your point is a good one that Barry and the LCT crew had to actively participate to launch the DDs off the ship--Hall does seem to gloss over that. (We don't know if Barry participated in launching them while kicking and screaming in disagreement, or quietly followed along...or what.)

Perhaps the only thing that I might not agree on is that Thornton (and Young) felt their decision was limited to two choices: let the DD's swim or don't deploy them at all. I think they knew that taking the tanks all the way to the beach was an option. I cannot find any proof that they did definitely knew this, but given everything else it seems incredibly unlikely that they did not know this was an option. My belief is Thornton (and Young) likely knew that taking the tanks all the way to the beach was an option--depending on who had the authority to make that happen.

I know this was a small moment in time, but it was one of those battlefield decisions that had a significant impact on the day and many peoples' lives. I am hoping there is something out there that sheds more light on the policy of who had authority to launch--and as you also point out, how well that policy/authority (if there was one) was communicated. It seems like there's a big hole here, which is surprising given the massive effort made to develop, produce, test, train, and deploy the DDs--all the while knowing they could not handle anything above moderate seas. (See Gerow's comments as early as December '43.)

It seems to me like the options are:
A) There was no pre-battle decision making policy/authority OR the pre-battle policy was poorly communicated...either of which strike me as a serious oversight
B) There was a pre-battle policy that required joint army + navy agreement, as per Hall's report....on the surface this sounds good but strikes me as pretty clumsy and likely to create confusion, delay, or paralysis if the two commanders did not agree
C) There was a pre-battle policy and it gave the senior commander on site the authority to decide...which seems like the most "traditional" military approach...but if that was the case then Thornton was only "guilty" of making a bad judgement call, but he did not overstep his role in that situation
D) Other?

Patrick

 

Patrick,

I like your summation, but I would put a slight twist on it. In option C, the 'traditional' military approach would be that the captain of the ship has ultimate and unquestioned authority in the handling of his ship. As I have been reminded (jokingly?) by assault craft commanders many times in my career, "You grunts are just bus passengers as far as I'm concerned." Positional authority vs rank authority.

I did a bit more digging and think I may have found part of the answer. I assumed that the senior Army company commander would be embarked in the LCT that carried the senior Navy officer for that LCT group. But rereading Rockwell's report, I noticed that he had to contact CPT Elder (his Army counterpart) by tank radio in order to come to agreement on launching vs beaching. That indicates they were not on the same LCT. So, delving back into Larry Noel's monograph on LCTs at Normandy, I discovered Lt(jg) Barry was on LCT 549. CPT Thornton was aboard LCT 537. And even CPT Young was on a different LCT, 598. Apparently Thornton could not raise Barry for some reason, and convinced his own LCT captain to launch. Cut off from communications with Barry, this may also have limited Thornton's perspective of it being a go - no go choice, as the LCT 537 captain may not have wanted to take the initiative to go into the beach with his unarmored LCT. At any rate, Barry could have been caught by surprise seeing some of his LCTs launching their DD tanks, and conformed to the reality that was thrust upon him.

So apparently I was unfair to Barry. Or maybe not. Frankly I'm having a hard time believing none of the LCT captains would have contacted Barry first before launching, or that he wouldn't have learned about Thornton's decision via his embarked tank platoon's radio in time to influence the decision. Thornton did contact Young to make their decision, after all, so the tank radio net was functioning. So while the separation of senior Army and Navy officers probably was a major contributing factor, it still seem Barry's command of his group was questionable.

So why were the senior Army and Navy officers on different craft when they needed to make a joint decision? Good question. I know of several other instances where the company commander rode in on the same LCVP/LC(A) as the wave leader, so I can't explain why this was not the case with the LCTs. I have to assume that they realized the embarkation plan had these key people on different craft during one of the rehearsals. So why wasn't it addressed? Don't know. I haven't studied the rehearsal exercises enough to see if this came up as an issue.

I tend give more credence to the idea that the company commanders of the 741st didn't know they had the option to land directly on the beach. Faced with a sea state that was that bad, if you knew you had any other option, surely they would have at least decided to continue on and at least launch the tanks from just 2,000 or 1,000 yards. What rational guy would not have chosen that and instead launched from as far away as possible, posing the greatest risk to his men and mission? That plus the 16th RCT's comments that they were launched 'as prearranged' make it seem as if they were under the impression it was a go - no go matter. But that's just my conclusion, and it's just based on scanty facts and my version of what a rational man would do. And perhaps I'm not rational enough myself to assess it correctly!

Hope this helps.

 

This should help:








Michel

 

Michel - thanks for sharing the documents. Yes, I have already reviewed those prior and I believe Chuck has too from his comments.

 

Chuck -

It's been really helpful chewing on this with you. (Michel - thank you again for sending those documents. I had read them before, but you made me pour over them word-for-word.) Here's my notes on the key points. (I am working on book about leadership decisions during D-Day...not a military history book but a business leadership book examining the military leadership lessons.) Your help has been great. Let me know what you think of my notes below. See my "Comments" and "Reactions".

Source: Rockwell report of 7-14-44

• Barry (on LCT 549) in charge of 8 LCTs to launch 741st DDs toward Fox Green and Easy Red – Force “O-1”
• Rockwell (on 535) in charge of 8 LCTs to launch 743rd DDs toward Dog Green and Dog Red – Force “O-2"
• Arrive 6000 yards offshore at 0515
• “Long before this time…” knew seas were “not ideal” and before leaving Portland Rockwell raised the question of what to do if the seas were too rough…said he insisted that the decision be made by “one senior army officer for both battalions” but the “question of launching was finally left to senior army officer of each battalion” (i.e. Thornton – 741 and Elder – 743)
  • My Comments:
    • This clearly implies that Rockwell believed the decision to launch was the sole authority of the army officer.
• At 0505 Rockwell contacts Elder via tank radio and “we were in perfect accord” to not launch and take the tanks to the beach
  • Comments:
    • This statement does not suggest that Rockwell believed he had any authority on whether to launch or not, it just says that Rockwell agreed with Elder about not launching.
    • If this is true, it was Elder’s authority/decision to go to the beach, not Rockwell’s. Rockwell just advised and concurred.
• “Meanwhile” Force O-1 proceeding at at 5000 yards “the decision to launch was made by Captain Thorton, senior army officer” aboard LCT 537 (all except LCT 600 which goes all the way to beach with 3 DDs after first one damaged screens of others then sank)
  • Comments:
    • Barry on LCT 549 but Thornton on LCT 537
    • Rockwell does not mention if Barry and Thornton discussed the question via radio before Thornton’s decision
• Rockwell reports “all officers-in-charge of DD LCTs in Force O-1” were “amazed when the order came in to launch” and were “ready to go to the beach and unload there.”

Source: Leide Endorsement of Rockwell’s Report (7-20-44)

• Prior to the invasion, “meetings were held with all the officers-in-charge of the DD tanks in Force “O”. It was unanimously agreed that any seas running, the tanks should be brought to the beach… “No doubt existed in his mind nor those of the officers-in-charge of what should take place in the event of rough weather.”
  • Comment:
    • The officers-in-charge would have the naval commanders of the LCTs…does not state if the army commanders attended these meetings.
• “It is our opinion that not only a senior army officer, but a senior naval officer should make the decision to launching based on weather conditions.”
  • Comment:
    • My interpretation here is that Leide is advocating here a CHANGE to the policy, which according to Leide had been the decision to launch belonged only to the senior army officer.

Hall’s Second Endorsement (Date? Stamped 9-22-44)

• “The question as to who should decide whether to launch DD Tanks was discussed at length…” and “it was agreed that the decision should be left to the Senior Army Officer and Senior Naval Officer of each of the two LCT units carrying DD Tanks…”
  • Comments:
    • It seems that Hall contradicts Rockwell and Leide who pretty clearly believed the authority was only the senior Army officer’s.
• “The two unit commanders were to inform each other by radio of the decisions reached.”
  • Comments:
    • My interpretation is Hall is saying that the pair of Army+Navy commanders of each LCT (Force O-1 and O-2) unit were to compare their decisions via radio.
    • No data if this was actually done on June 6 morning.
• “The procedure adopted by…Rockwell...and Thornton…was correct…”
• Thornton “made the decision without consulting LT(jg) Barry”
  • Comments:
    • If Hall is right, Thornton’s failure to consult Barry was a violation of policy.
    • If Rockwell/Leide are right, Thornton’s failure to consult Barry was unfortunate and unwise, but not a policy violation.

My Reactions:

1) If Rockwell is right, then Elder deserves just as much—and perhaps more—credit for the decision to take the tanks to the shore. But Rockwell has gotten most of that praise.

2) Rockwell and Leide believed it was just an army decision…Hall says both senior commanders had to agree…don’t know who is correct.

3) I think this information strengthens my belief that Thornton (and Young) would have known that going to the shore with the DDs was an option available to them. Hall says EVERY DD LCT officer-in-charge had been briefed on this option. I find it unlikely that Thornton (and Young) would not know this too, either because they had been briefed before June 6 OR because the officer-in-charge on each LCT that morning would have told them so. But that’s just my theory. No smoking gun to prove it.

4) If Rockwell and Leide are right, Thornton did not violate any policy as some histories state he did. Just bad judgement. (Really bad.)

Thoughts?
Patrick

 

Patrick,

Mike and Michel are two of the best researchers and analysts on this site and are always willing to help on questions like this. I know they have been a great help to me over the years. Hopefully they will pitch in if they see anything going off the rails here.

I think you have summed up the pertinent facts very well and have a tightly reasoned and logical analysis. While you and I tend to disagree on one point, that certainly falls with the 'two reasonable men' rule, and your analysis is defendable.

There are a couple other points that bother me - although I do not think they will affect your logic.

The first is, where is Lt Barry's action report? I have never been able to find it. Whether that's a reflection on my research abilities, the haphazard archival process, or Adm Hall censoring what got into the official record, I don't know. But when a key player in a fiasco leaves no record of his part in the mess, I begin to wonder what has been left unspoken. I do not believe Barry made any post-war comments either, which is strange given how many authors were interviewing anyone they could.

Second, much the same can be said for the action reports of Thornton and Young. I haven't found theirs, either. The closest thing was the one line in the battalion action report. I guess one might excuse this based on the fact they were busy reconstituting their companies while being engaged in continuing direct combat (unlike Barry whose duties were markedly more routine). But I'm not sure that excuse holds up given that other Army units equally engaged in ongoing combat managed to produce action reports. I seem to recall neither Thornton nor Young survived the war. I'd have to go back and relook that - but if it is the case, it may explain why their side of the story has never surfaced.

The third item concerns Adm Hall. Given: 1) WNTF order was changed to specifically authorize Hall (and his Utah beach counterpart) to break radio silence for the sole purpose of the matter of launching DD tanks; and 2) Hall's claims that the question of who should be responsible for the launching decision was of such importance to him that he made it the subject of a Navy/Army flag officer conversation; then 3) it seems very odd to me that seeing the state of the sea that morning, he apparently took a completely passive, if not uninterested role regarding the DD tanks as the day played out. With that background, I consider it extremely odd that neither he nor one of his staff officers was monitoring that part of the operation. Yet nowhere does Hall indicate he took the slightest interest. Again, naval officers have the sole responsibility of handling their ships so that they deliver their embarked troops to the beach selected by the landing force commander. Hall's actions seemed to have been directed to trying to shift that responsibility off to others, and he then failed in his command supervisory responsibility - which includes intervening during the execution of the mission to prevent part of the plan going off the rails. His subsequent 'blame by endorsement' effort in which he tried to put the onus of error by commission on the Army officers, and admitting only error by omission by Berry, smacks far too much of 'I think he doth protest too much'. Compare that with the Army take on it which basically was, yeah, there was a mistake, but made no effort to throw mud any anyone. My father used to say that the man who immediately jumps up to place the blame on others is usually the one who actually effed up.

The same criticism cannot, I believe, be levered at the Army commanders for the simple reason that they could not influence the action due to known interruption of communications. The commander of the 741st Tank Battalion rode ashore in the same LCVP as the commander of the 16th RCT. All of their radios were thoroughly water proofed and unable to be used until they waded out of the surf and unwrapped them. The same can be said for the assistant division commander of the 1st ID, whose radios were similarly waterproofed for his landing 15 minutes after the battalion and regimental commanders. In other words, none of these three leaders could communicate to influence the matter until about H+120, well after the point the could do anything about it. As was true for all amphibious operations of the era, there was a discontinuity in comms within the Army chain of command during landing operation due to water proofing radios. And this is one of the many why the onus is on the naval forces to deliver the troops when and where desired.

The conflict between Rockwell's, Leide's and Hall's understandings indicates the supposedly agreed upon policy was not uniformly understood within Navy channels any more than the Army orders reflected that they might have a role in making the launching decision. My opinion is that if you are going to deviate from longstanding doctrinal command relationships, it had betted be in writing, included as part of the orders issued by both services, and well understood by all involved. Clearly this was not the case here.

Anyhow, these are just my thoughts, for what they're worth.

Good luck with your book. It looks like my book is scheduled for released in the Fall (it's a D-Day topic, but doesn't overlap with your focus). The process just took a bit too long to make it out in time for D-Day.

Chuck

 

Chuck -

Best wishes on your book! Keep me informed...

- I agree with you regarding the missing AAR for Barry... It would help a bunch. I have found almost nothing on him--not even his first and middle name.
- Both Thornton and Young died during the war. Thornton went MIA and presumed KIA on 9-14-44, and Young on 2-3-45.
- CPT Elder died on 7-11-44...I suspect that is why he's received little credit for the decision to take the DDs all the way in. (That, and Ambrose heaping praise on Rockwell.)
- Your comments about Hall are interesting. Much to think about there.
- Thanks for explaining about the radios and waterproofing. I did not understand that reality and it helps give everything else context.

Patrick

 

Just a random thought that popped into my head, and I feel kind of guilty for raising it and then scuttling away because I'm snowed under in other stuff at the moment, and it may be something previously settled:

Could it be that the naval element of deciding whether or not to launch didn't involve the LCT men at all, but was in fact a responsibility that fell on the Scouts & Raiders in the pilot boats that were guiding them in?

 

Rob,

I am not aware of any information that points to the pilot boats as playing a role in deciding to launch or not launch the DDs.

Patrick

 

Does anybody have a copy of Dean Rockwell's oral history? It's cited by Ambrose and one author (Symonds, Craig L. Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings) who also cites it and says its in the National World War Two Museum collection. The more I dig into this, the more I wonder if some of the confusion around the launching the DDs lies with Rockwell's oral history. For example:

1) In Rockwell's July 44 AAR, he clearly states that he believed the authority to launch the DDs was the senior army officers'. However, according to Ambrose (and Symonds) Rockwell in his oral history appears to say it was his authority. (At least that's what those authors report.)

2) Symonds sites Rockwell, in his oral history, as saying he talked over the question of whether to launch or not with Elder, "the senior Army officer on board." But Rockwell and Elder were in different LCTs. So I don't know if this is Symonds' error or an error in Rockwell's oral history? The point is important because it's relevant to the use (or not) of the radios...

3) Ambrose and Symonds say Rockwell tried to use tank radios to tell the other flotilla (which was O-1 under Barry) to NOT launch, but they did not get the message. This event, if it occurred, is not in Rockwell's AAR, nor any other source that I can find.

Help?
Patrick

P.S. I can post the relevant passage from Symonds if helpful.

 

I hope that I am not abusing the privilege of this group with my requests for help...I apologize if so as I a new member.

Does anybody have the full copy of Dean Rockwell's report regarding the DD's dated 30 April 44? The full document title appears to be "U.S. Navy, DD LCT Unit Commander, Lieutenant Dean L. Rockwell, Memorandum for Commander, Eleventh Amphibious Force, 30 April 1944." I have checked around online and came up empty. Hardcopy appears to be in the National Archives (2, RG 407, Box 24377, File 659, NA II.)

Thanks for any help!
Patrick

 

Joseph Balkoski's Omaha Beach probably provides the best description of what happened, because, contrary to wannabe "historians" of the Ambrose breed, he does quote the primary documents verbatim, without dubious rephrasing or unacknowledged interpretations. I am copying his pages 97 to 104 below, adding between square brackets the respective sources as given:

John C. McManus' The Dead and Those About to Die - D-Day: The Big Red One at Omaha Beach includes most of the above quotes and provides a more detailed description of the sources as follows:

Major William Duncan, Results of training, tests, and tactical operations on DD tanks at Slapton Sands, England, April 30, 1944, and
Lieutenant Dean Rockwell, Evaluation of DD LCT Operations, April 30, 1944,
both items in Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 19313, Folder 659, Pre-Invasion Planning Files;

741st Tank Battalion, AAR, June 1944, Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 13053, Folder 4;
741st Tank Battalion, Unit Journal, June 6, 1944, Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 13503, Folder 1;
741st Tank Battalion, Field Order #1, May 21, 1944, Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 13053, Folders 4 and 5;
741st Tank Battalion, unpublished history, p. A14, Sarah Katz file;

741st Tank Battalion, LCT assignments and landing spots, Robert Rowe Papers, Box 27, Folder 7;
A and B Companies, 741st Tank Battalion, boat assignments, Robert Rowe Papers, Box 12, Folder 3;

Assault Force O, Action Report on DD tanks, July 14, 1944; and
Reports from LCT commanders to Lieutenant Dean Rockwell on the launching of DD tanks, summer 1944, both items in Robert Rowe Papers, Box 13, Folder 1;
Millard Case, interview with Robert Rowe, July 18, 1987, Robert Rowe Papers, Box 8, Folder 11;
Ralph Woodward, interview with Robert Rowe, July 17, 1987, Robert Rowe Papers, Box 8, Folder 13, all at USAMHI;


The Robert Rowe Papers were not known to me and must be extremely interesting...

Michel

 

Hi everyone,

I am searching for a Lt. (j.g.) with the initials E. C. P.. This Lt. (j.g.) served on either LCT(6) 602, or on the staff of Flotilla Twelve or Task Force O-1 for the Normandy Invasion. Do any deck logs or any sources listing officers exist for LCT(6) 602, Flotilla Twelve, or Task Force O-1 on or around June 6, 1944? I have found the muster rolls, but these omit officers and only list enlisted men. I know that most of the crew came across the Atlantic on LST-286 with the remaining crew coming from USNAAB Plymouth. I have a list of the crew of the LCT(6) 602, but I am missing the Lt. (j.g.):

P., E. C., Lt.(j.g.)
Harkey, R. L., Ens
Boring, Wilbur J., 8218620, MoMM1c
Carpenter, Randal Rex, 8527783, S2c
Christopher, James Clinton, 8222472, S1c
Dibiasio, Albert C 8237126, GM2c
Donoghue, Cornelius J., 7079204, MoMM2c
La Comis, Bernard, 8205549, SC3c
McQuain, Randall L., 6014515, S1c
Padua, Peter John, 8078807, S1c
Pauciello, Michael J., 2455105, S1c
Rigney, George L., 7585508, Cox
Sailer, John J., 2445900, MoMM2c
Schumacher, Charles A., 8683032, EM 3c
Weeks, Joseph W., 5569943, S1c

I know it is a long shot, but thanks in advance!

 

Chuck,

I think this is very much the crux of the matter here. I spent some time over the last few days trying to find out more about this, and had to go back to basics before I could find anything of relevance, but here it is finally.

Let's first establish the precise composition of the LCT(DD) waves. The Landing Tables for CT 16 and CT 116 and the Final Ship Assignments tables as well as the Landing Diagrams result in the following match between Craft Serials and Hull Numbers.

Force O-1 Column

Co B 741st Tk Bn (EASY RED)

Serial 55 = LCT(6) 603
Serial 56 = LCT(6) 537
Serial 57 = LCT(6) 600
Serial 58 = LCT(6) 599​

Co C 741st Tk Bn (FOX GREEN)

Serial 59 = LCT(6) 601
Serial 60 = LCT(6) 598
Serial 61 = LCT(6) 602
Serial 62 = LCT(6) 549​

Force O-2 Column

Co B 743rd Tk Bn (DOG GREEN)

Serial 90 = LCT(6) 589
Serial 91 = LCT(6) 587
Serial 92 = LCT(6) 586
Serial 93 = LCT(6) 535​

Co C 743rd Tk Bn (DOG WHITE)

Serial 94 = LCT(6) 590
Serial 95 = LCT(6) 591
Serial 96 = LCT(6) 713
Serial 97 = LCT(6) 588​

However, a last minute amendment to the LCT Assignment Table for 116th RCT (attached) reversed the craft assignment between Co B & Co C of 743rd Tk Bn as follows:

Force O-2 Column (amended)

Co B 743rd Tk Bn (DOG GREEN)

Serial 90 = LCT(6) 590
Serial 91 = LCT(6) 591
Serial 92 = LCT(6) 713
Serial 93 = LCT(6) 588
​

Co C 743rd Tk Bn (DOG WHITE)

Serial 94 = LCT(6) 589
Serial 95 = LCT(6) 587
Serial 96 = LCT(6) 586
Serial 97 = LCT(6) 535​

This change was mentioned by the Force O Commander in his NEPTUNE Report (Part V.—Comments and Recommendations; 13. Combat Loading; (A) Comments):

A few mistakes were made, but these were detected in ample time to correct them ; in one instance two companies of DD tanks were loaded on the wrong L.C.T.s, necessitating a change in the L.C.T. Assignment Table of the Operation Order.​

As per the Landing Diagram (and the usual practice), the landing (or launching) disposition was to be in Craft Serial sequence from right to left when facing the beach, i.e.:

DOG WHITE - DOG GREEN
97 96 95 94 - 93 92 91 90​

Rockwell reported that:

We were met at Point King by LCSs that were to lead us to the line of launching. Those in Force "O-2" proceeded down the Fire Support Lane on the right hand of the assault area, arriving at 0515 at a point approximately 6000 yards from the beach so designated by PC 1225, which we had picked up on our way down the swept lane. The eight (8) LCTs then did a column left movement and proceeded slowly parallel to the beach as we had ample time.
(...)
Accordingly, all ships did a 90° flanking movement and proceeded to the beach​

It ensues that Craft Serial 97 was the lead craft in the Column, which is consistent with Lt Rockwell sailing on board LCT(6) 535 (Serial 97 as per the amended LCT Assignment Table).

Similarly, as Senior Naval Officer in Column O-1, Lt(jg) Barry was sailing in the leading craft in the column, i.e. LCT(6) 549 (Serial 62). However, the Senior Army Officer (Capt Thornton) was indeed not in that same craft but in LCT 537 (Serial 56). Why?

The answer lies in the respective origin of the various LCT(DD). As stated by Lieutenant Commander Leide, commanding LCT-6 Flotilla 12:

all the craft, except four, including those used on Utah Beach, came from LCT Flotilla 12.​

After checking every LCT(DD) in Force O against the Green List and other sources, the "outsider" craft, i.e; those not from Flotilla 12, turn out to be:

LCT(6) 713 – LCT Flotilla 26, Group 76, Division 151
LCT(6) 537 – LCT Flotilla 19, Group 55, Division 109 and
LCT(6) 549 – LCT Flotilla 19, Group 56, Division 111​

Now that I knew where to look, I found the Report by Commander LCT Group 55 (see attachment):

(a) LCT(6) 537, the only LCT of GROUP 55 in the DD wave launched her tanks 6000 yards on schedule. Her Officer-in-Charge, Lt.(jg) J.E. Barry, was changed to LCT(6) 549 in order that he might lead this wave.​

From the Report by Commander LCT Group 56 (see attachment):

(a) LCT(6) #549, equipped with DD ramp, was the first ship of Group 56 in an assault wave. Under the able command of Lt.(jg) J.E. Barry, Officer-in-Charge of LCT(6) 537, she successfully led a wave of DD LCT's to within 6000 yards of the beach and launched DD tanks. (Lt.(jg) Barry and Ens. McKee, Officer-in-Charge of LCT(6) 549, had previously changed command for this assault, at the order of Lt.(jg) D.L.Rockwell, Officer-in-Charge of DD LCT's.)
​

In summary, Lt(jg) Barry as OiC LCT 537 was initially to be in the same craft as Capt Thornton, as Chuck surmised, but was changed to the lead craft by order of Lt Rockwell.

While, as Chuck also noted, it was normal (and logical) practice to have the Army and Naval commanders of a landing wave in the same craft, for obvious reasons of easier mutual consultation and decision making, it was also usual and logical to have the Naval wave commander in the lead craft. In this particular case these two practices were incompatible and it seems that Lt Rockwell chose the sailing/navigation logic over the "launching or not" decision logic. Other solutions existed (and were used in the Eastern Task Force) that would have allowed both commanders to remain in the same craft while still leading the column at least until launching/landing time, but they probably involved skills above those Lt Rockwell judged Lt(jg) Barry possessed at the time.

Michel

Source for LCT Assignment Table for 116th RCT: ww2lct.org

 

Michel --

What a great piece of detective work. Thank you. This explains why Barry and Thornton were in different LCTs.

A couple of follow up questions:

1) I have read several historical accounts that say Rockwell said after the war something along the lines of "I chose the wrong man". (Zaloga) I have not seen formal citations or an original source, and so I can only assume this comes from his oral interviews after the war given there is nothing in his AAR about this. From this research you just shared, Rockwell would have been speaking of replacing McKee with Barry. Did you encounter anything more about that aspect to all of this? Why the switch? Was Rockwell disappointed in Barry because Barry did not more vigorously lobby for the tanks to be taken all the way to the beach?

2) You wrote that the Eastern Task Force used different "solutions". Can you shed any light? (Balkoski in UTAH Beach writes "U.S. Army and Navy D-Day action reports do not agree on why the LCTs brought the DD tanks closer to shore than originally planned, nor do they specify who gave that order. But regardless of the order’s origin, that decision proved eminently wise...") I am really curious about why two American Naval Task Forces would apply different decision making solutions to same problem, if that is what happened?

3) Do you have any theories about why Hall says so emphatically in his Endorsement of Rockwell's AAR that the decision to launch was a joint army and navy call ("The question as to who should decide whether to launch DD Tanks was discussed at length...it was agreed that the decision should be left to the Senior Army Officer and Senior Naval Officer of each of the two LCT units carrying DD Tanks…”) when so many other first hand accounts report it was solely the army battalion commander's decision. (See Leide, Rockwell, Duncan, and according to Rockwell both Skaggs and Upham). Any thoughts or ideas? I think Chuck's ideas about Hall make a lot of sense, but would value your thoughts if you have any on that little mystery.

Patrick