Number of Infantry Companies per Battalion - Italy, September 1943 to March 1944

I posted this on Twitter but it might be of more use here. I can also add a few more comments.



This is an infographic of the number of rifle companies in each infantry battalion in Italy from September 1943 to March 1944.

This is an infographic I have created showing the number of rifle companies in British and Indian infantry battalions in Italy from 3 Sept 43 to 31 Mar 44.

Green = 4
Orange = 3
Red = 2
Black = 1

The info has been mainly extracted from battalion WDs but I also used regimental histories, brigade and divisional WDs.

Two things stand out.

One is the disparity between divisions fighting with 5th US Army and those with 8th Army. Was the fighting more intense or were less reinforcements received?

The second is the brutal attritional nature of the four weeks of fighting on the infantry of 1 and 56 Divisions at Anzio in January and February 1944.

 

Note that the number of companies is not a perfect method of estimating of strength (i.e. 1 London Scottish and 2 Loyals in Feb 44 were severely understrength but kept a four-company organisation), but it gives a very good overall indication of ongoing battalion health.

Also at times, there is some guesswork when a battalion reforms a company. A reduction is always mentioned but not an increase - a previously disbanded company will reappear in the narrative. For the latter, I have estimated the exact date, just for graphic purposes.

Another point is that the battalions were not using the same war establishment. For example, all battalions in 5 Div were using VI/587/2 until the end of December 1943 when they switched to II/233/2. 1 Division battalions landed at Anzio with all battalions using II/233/2.
Another example is in 56 Division - two brigades landed at Salerno with VI/587/2 but did not switch to II/233/2 until they returned to the Middle East in April 1944. The other brigade (201 Guards) landed with its battalions already on II/233/2.

The main difference between the war establishments was that WE II/233/2 had 122 ORs per rifle company, WE VI/587/2 103 ORs.

 

There are a number of reasons that a battalion might decide to reduce the number of rifle companies. Ultimately, the decision was down to the battalion commander - so some battalions continued to operate with four weak companies but there were guidelines (covered later).

The main reasons:

1. Steady attrition over time across the entire battalion (i.e. 167 Brigade from Oct 43 onwards).

2. A catastrophic event that affects the entire battalion with the survivors formed into adhoc companies (i.e. 9 Royal Fusiliers at Battipaglia on 10 Sep 43).

3. A company simply being lost in action (i.e. D Company of 2 RSF 'disappears' after crossing the Garigliano on 17 Jan 44) or numerous battalions having companies overrun at Anzio (too many to mention - 7 OBLI, 8 RF, 5 Gren Gds, 6 BW, 1 LIR, 10 Royal Berks etc, etc)

4. A single company sustaining heavy casualties in a single action leading to it be disbanded (i.e. A Company of 5 Foresters on the Volturno on 13 Oct 43 or B Company of 2 Cameronians at Anzio in Mar 44).

5. A divisional or higher directive restricting battalions to three companies (usually by limiting reinforcement i.e. 1 Division at Anzio in Mar 44). There is mention in the official UK history of this being an army-wide order but I haven't found evidence of this yet. It certainly wasn't followed by a large number of units if it was issued.

 

So what were the recommendations for reducing the number of companies?

1. The minimum effective size of a section is five men. If a platoon cannot maintain three sections of five men and no reinforcements are expected it should reorganise on a two-section basis.

2. If a platoon falls below the number required for a platoon HQ and two sections of five men, with no reinforcements expected, it will be disbanded and its personnel moved to the two remaining platoons.

3. If more than two companies in a battalion are reduced to two platoons (using rules 1 and 2), then the battalion will reorganise on a three-company basis (the company HQ should be kept intact and used for special tasks (i.e. administer LOB and reinforcement personnel).

4. Specialist personnel in HQ and Support companies (mortar, anti-tank, carrier, signals) should not be used to reinforce rifle companies apart from in the most extreme circumstances (this does happen with some battalions at Salerno and Anzio).

The above are guidelines only and each battalion and its circumstances were different, as were their Commanding Officers opinions. Generally, any reorg would take place when out of the line, with the obvious exception of when a company was lost through enemy action.

 

7 Armoured Division, 1 Airborne, 4 Division and 1 Guards Brigade, and1 Canadian Division are missing from the graphic. Some of them I've done but they wouldn't fit on the graphic and still make it readable. Others I don't have all the war diaries yet.

If anyone wants the full-size picture let me know.

 

I suspect officer casualties might have been a factor. What commanders are available might determine whether a battalion loses a company, maintains a company HQ with no platoons.or keeps four platoon sized companies.

There is a question of how effective a weak unit might be. The majority of the firepower.rests with the automatic weapons and mortars. In defence a weak battalion might be able to hold the line and even put out a fair ampunt of firepower. However, it would lack the numbers to launch an assault.

The Germans had to fight with reduced strength units. One of the accounts of the Cassino battles mentions companies/battlaions of C50-100 men being fought linke big fighting patrols..

 

Yes, good point, that could have been a factor, but I haven't seen it mentioned explicitly yet. Once I've entered all the WE returns into my database I'd be able to do a better analysis.

From the fragmentary nature of German documentation, it seems they were loath to disband companies and continued to operate them sometimes with wide disparities in strength, even in the same battalion. i.e. 1. Kompanie may have 29 men, 2. Kompanie 60 and 3. Kompanie 110. This must have caused the battalion commanders a few headaches.

In 1944, the Germans did start rating their battalions based on capability (Kampfwert) as well as numerical strength - German Unit Strength Definitions (panzerworld.com)

 

Could you possibly post a larger resolution image, as I find I cannot read the labels in the image?

 

Unfortunately, the width is constrained to 1024px, so even at low resolution, it is too small.

Message me with your mail and I'll send you the full size pic.

Edit - the Twitter version is legible - Gary Tankard on X: "This is an infographic I have created showing the number of rifle companies in British and Indian infantry battalions in Italy from 3 Sept 43 to 31 Mar 44. Green = 4 Orange = 3 Red = 2 Black = 1 The info has been mainly extracted from battalion WDs. Two things stand out. /1 https://t.co/b86CWbISUe" / X (twitter.com)

 

Gary.

I was surprised they had four Rifle Companies still standing after their experiences in the First Battle Camino in Nov 43.

Regards

Frank

 

There is certainly mention in literature that Infantry Battalions were ordered onto a three Rifle Company basis, and similarly that Armoured Regiments were to move to a Squadron of four Troops (rather than five) on a theatre scale, as of September 1944. Some Armoured Regiments were still on the last Middle East WE table for such a unit, which only had four Troops per Squadron anyway (VI/560/4). The Field Force Committee plans for March 1945 do show a couple of Armoured Regiments reduced by the strength three Cruiser Troops and the AA Troop, but most are down as the full 692 all ranks (or 630 for the ME WE).

I did hope there might be some discussion on the late 1944 reduction of Infantry Battalions in a few things I had copied but not even Progress Bulletin Infantry (Italy) makes a mention. I have wondered whether there was a subsequent reinstatement of the fourth Rifle Company, where personnel levels permitted, and have likewise noted the above that Companies being disbanded was more remarked upon than their being reformed.

Gary

 

Hi Gary,

I know about the 30th August 1944 order to move to a three company organisation, but I'm referring to earlier in the campaign. The official history of the campaign mentions a temporary army level reduction to three companies in March 1944, but it is not referenced. I haven't found any such order yet; if there were one, it seemed to be ignored. There is, however, a reference to a 1 Division order in March 1944 that all battalions were to temporarily organised on a three-company basis, which, to be honest was a mute point, even for 18 Infantry Brigade.

The August 1944 directive certainly caused a few grumblings amongst the battlaions and some continued with four companies as long as they could, until lack of reinforcements forced them to comply. The infantry battalions in Italy reverted to a four-battalion organisation in March 1945.

Regards,
Gary.

 

Hi Gary,

I hope you are well, thanks for posting this up.

That's a very interesting question - especially given the weight given in some historiography to analysis of combat effectiveness that relied on statistics of British divisions under command of 5th US Army. Were Monty and his successors more careful of British lives, was resistance weaker on the Adriatic coast or did 8th Army staff set up attacks more effectively than their initially inexperienced US counterparts. That sounds like a good research question for a PhD!

Regards

Tom

 

Thanks!

 

That's a very good point which I hadn't considered.

I should be starting the research MA I mentioned in October, hopefully on the subject of infantry reinforcement/capability in Italy.

 

Excellent work!

Mostly I think it was a case that 8th Army was much better led! (until January anyway)

The rather patchy casualty information in the Official History seems to bear this out, for example:

"[Casualties in 5th Army]between 7th October and 15th November 7,000 American and 3,000 British; in 14th Panzer Corps between 11th October and 10th November, 6,500, including 1,886 sick."

"[Casualties in 8th Army] 1 The extant records do not allow of breaking down casualties date for date. As illustrations however: Killed/Wounded/Missing/Total 8th Army during November 591/1,956/295/2,842 76th Panzer Corps during November 345/788/1,379/2,512.

As a whole though casualties for the period do not seem excessive, from the OH again:
"From 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944 the British armies in Italy suffered about 46,000 battle-casualties. Of this total about 26,500 fell on the Infantry. ‘There were a large number of casualties from illnesses, e.g. 20,748 from malaria between July 1943 and June 1944."

 

As follow-up, this is an interesting breakdown of personnel by company for 2 Cameronians in March 1944. It is rare to find this sort of document in a WD. It shows the high number of personnel needed in HQ and Support companies and those LOB. The war establishment was 792 for non-attached ORs and the battalion had 617, a shortfall of 175. However, of these, 270 men were in HQ & Support companies and another 60 LOB in Naples. This left 283 men in the rifle companies, 45% of posted battalion strength.



As can be seen, B Company only has 19 men and was disbanded shortly afterwards. The attached report details how the best part of two platoons were lost (one literally). The company had already lost a platoon in a German raid (7 dead, 15 wounded, 15 missing) the previous day. This took place at Anzio during a 'quiet' period at 'The Fortress', a location made famous by Raleigh Trevelyan in his book of the same name.

 

Hi Gary, I've been working through the war diary of 10 Corps DDMS for the 1943 campaign in Italy and thought this extract might be of use (WO 177/345):


HYGIENE REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER, 1943, BY THE ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR OF HYGIENE, 10 CORPS
Office of the D.D.M.S.
Rear H.Q., 10 Corps.
16 December, 43.

[...]

Typhus – 160,000 c.c.s. of Anti-Typhus Serum had been made available for the protection of Corps personnel. Inoculation of the majority is approaching completion, but, to fully protect all, additional supplies have been requested. 46 Division personnel although almost 100% fully protected before departure from North Africa have, through battle casualties, sick evacuation, missing, etc., had reinforcements amounting almost to 50% of the Divisional Strength. A large proportion of these have never had an initial or final dose.

Regards

Tom

 

Gary,

This might be of interest as well. It shows the predicted and actual rates of casualties suffered by 10 Corps at Salerno. Useful, perhaps, for comparison for any planning for reinforcement supply. (WO177/345 - 10 Corps DDMS Nov 43 War Diary - Appx II)



It would, of course, have been even more useful if the casualties had been split up across the different arms of service. Maybe that could be found in AFHQ files?

Regards

Tom

 

The British kept cumulative returns (sometimes daily, sometimes twice a week). However, although they split it between 5th US and 8th Army, they didn't split the arm of service breakdown between the two.