No. 68 anti-tank rifle grenades

Hi, 2,667,000 of the No. 68 anti-tank rifle grenades were produced in 1941. A few questions:

1. Did these see worldwide service or where they reserved for home defence?
2. Does anybody have any information on what the official allocation of these grenades was, e.g. 1 per section, 5 per platoon etc?

Capable of penetrating 52mm of armour... so sounds a useful asset... but I've never read anything on its use in combat...

Cheers,

Neil

 

Standard issue. Ordered replaced, with the EY rifle and Boys Anti Tank Rifle as PIAT became available from September '43.

I was just reading an old handwritten note I made at Kew (yes, handwritten!).

Edit to add detail: In WO 204 however I didn't record the serial ref. (it wasn't what I was looking for).
Army Council. 16 June 1943.

 

thanks for that

 

They feature on several War Establishments for British and New Zealand infantry units as used in the Middle East (North Africa). A couple of NZ docs refer to 442 No.68s for an Inf Bn, so 26 boxes worth. Whether they were used in great numbers or whether they even had them available in these numbers I don't know. There was supposed to be one cup discharger per Rifle Section and one per carrier in the Carrier Platoon. The No.68 does not feature on the British Inf Bn equipment table issued in mid-1943, though perhaps a little oddly it does have six grenade dischargers per Rifle Coy, these being deleted via an amendment (probably before the end of 1943). NZ WEs had deleted references to both by 1944 at least.

Gary

 

That's great info, thanks Gary

 

They were definitely used in India/Burma too. I have read accounts of their use on Chindit I/Longcloth and in the Chin Hills/Tiddim Road fighting of 1943. Can't recall any later than 1943.

 

Gary, from your site (see link below), it appears that the cup discharger wasn't on the TO&E until 1942. I'm specifically interested in Operation Crusader (Nov 41), am I correct in thinking that they weren't in use in North Africa at that time?
site http://www.bayonetstrength.uk/BritishArmy/BritInfBn/Org of the British Inf Bn 1938-45.pdf

 

I can't give a definite answer either way I'm afraid. The amendments to the Inf Bn WEs are very patchy and all the early war ones I have were from Tony Chadwick and are not themselves complete. The absolute earliest I can find ref for the No.68 is a Mar 1941 amendment to the Recce Bn WE of Dec 1940. This shows 17 No.68 grenades being added to each Inf Pl of the Recce Bn (along with 34 No.69 and 12 No.36 grenades). Previously there were simply 180 grenades for allotment as required on the WE, with no breakdown by type. The Jun 41 Inf Bn WE just states 528 grenades 'of various types' and makes no mention of cup dischargers. Those are shown on the Middle East WEs for 1942, however those tables delete any reference to ammunition. Over 500 grenades does sound like it would include more than just No.36 and No.69 hand grenades, to me anyway.

Gary

 

Technically correct. 52mm is the maximum amount of armour it could hole. It's questionable if the German tank crew would have noticed such a hole though. Trails carried out by MD1 indicated that the maximum penetration if you wanted an effective behind armour effect, was under 1 inch.

 

Thanks again Gary.

Listy, is your comment on armour penetration applicable to all British armour penetration statistics?

Cheers

 

No, why would it be?

Part of the problem with the No68 was it was using an utterly new principle that was barely understood. For example they worked out that hollow charge round projected by gun were achieving lower penetration scores that the same warhead detonated in a static position. They'd detected the change, but could not figure out why it was occurring. they focused their attention on the warhead, but couldn't work it out.

Also early No.68's designs had a domed liner, which was later changed to a cone. You also have the lack of understanding about a relationship between calibre of the warhead and stand off, or even the importance of stand off. All this resulted from the MD1 testing.

 

I think it's fair to say the comment is generally applicable. A projectile that expends so much of its energy getting through the armour that there's none left to cause damage behind it is a waste of a shot. A certain amount of overkill was necessary.

 

As a hollow charge projectile (HEAT), velocity on impact is not the issue. The 'monroe principle' relies on the inverted molten cone of the projectile and the fragments of the hole to inflict damage inside a vehicle - by penetration and burning.

The problem with the No.68 Grenade was it didn't optimise the hollow charge principle, as Listy said, the internal design was changed a couple of times however it still detonated on main impact rather than as 'stand off'. The 3rd production model's 52mm was at 90°. Rarely possible with a trajectory weapon. Tests show 30 - 35mm was nearer the norm at battle angles. Fortunately enough was learned for the designers to ensure the PIAT round was effective.

 

I imagine the real issue was that the No.68 / cup discharger combo was essentially an indirect fire weapon. The chances of your average Tommy hitting a moving panzer must have been so close to naff all that the penetrative capability became irrelevant. Whatever its faults, PIAT was, at least, 'point-and-shoot'.

 

Well part of the problem was recoil, and you could not fire the grenade discharger from the shoulder, thus you had to find something to brace it against.

The testing I mentioned earlier was MD-1 learning about hollow charges, and the PIAT projectile was the direct result of the tests.


For interest:
My No.68 Drill round: