Nijmegen Bridge in 1940

Discussion in '1940' started by Gerard, Feb 1, 2010.

  1. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  2. TijgerB

    TijgerB Member

    Thanks for closing the gap. I still owe a few of Brongers books thou it is long time since I read them. By the way I agree with what yopu write on your homepage "Too little has been written on what went on in the Low Countries in a languages other can understand" and we must remember not to be mad on those Germans and Japanese who live today. Afterall it is not them who did it.

    If I remember right the SS had a few people there who later become famous on the Eastern Front. Anyway I sure will return to your interesting hopmepage whern time allow
     
  3. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Do you also have data on German losses at the Arnhem/Westervoort bridges om 10 May 1940? I know that Brongers for Westervoort estimated them at being 115 men in his book on the Grebbeberg.

    Brongers does overdo it as it comes to bitterness of battles and casualties. He sort of applies the 'scoreboard' approach, which I don't like and which I consider no way near reliable to establish if a battle was hard or not. Even a battle without a single lethal casualty may have driven all its participants nuts in later years. War is hell, wheather casualties are high or low.

    At Westervoort 19 registered SS Der Führer KIAs, mostly of 3rd Battalion and of the SS Sturmpioniere Coy. This battalion also suffered by far the most casualties during the three days' Battle of the Grebbeberg, that followed. It basically put the entire battalion out of action. Westervoort also added a few SS MIA to the list. They may have been found (much) later or not be added to the Westervoort list. In total 207.ID and SSDF had a 25 men MIA on their casualty list after the battles at Westervoort and Grebbeberg. Also a few WIA succumbed to their wounds, but have not been listed on a theatre. The main German theatre field hospital was in Arnheim, where basically all casualties of the central front were assembled. In there at least 26 WIA succumbed to wounds indured on the central front, including 6 of the 3rd Battalion SSDF.

    The number of WIA is unknown. It is however known that the Germans had around 4 tot 4,5 x the no KIA in WIA in the Dutch theatre. Although it is quite speculative to apply such a general factor on a small theatre like Westervoort, it is quite save to say that around 75-80 men were WIA at the Westervoort battle.

    Brongers adds a high number of MIA to his figures. I disagree with him. I do agree with his registry on named victims, which is verified. The MIA figures however are outdated. Currently the SS record for MIA in the Netherlands in 1940 is clean, in other words nil. These MIA have been found or identified. Brongers does not accept that theory and holds on to the MIA as they were indicated in the aft-battle reports. That is why Brongers comes to much higher KIA numbers than I do.

    By the way I agree with what you write on your homepage "Too little has been written on what went on in the Low Countries in a languages other can understand" and we must remember not to be mad on those Germans and Japanese who live today. Afterall it is not them who did it.


    If I remember right the SS had a few people there who later become famous on the Eastern Front. Anyway I sure will return to your interesting homepage whern time allow

    Tijger, for me it is imperative that history is studied in an unbiased manner. I realize that we all pick up bias along the way, one way or the other. But the Germans of today are our friends. Websites or historians that cannot lose the friend-foe bias I cannot take too seriously. Prejudice prevents us from truly learning from history and teaches traditions of hatred. Take anti-Semitism for example. A practise of almost 2,000 years old, killing millions of Jews, basically all on the assumptions and lies spread out for centuries. In Holland we still have 20-year olds calling Germans 'Krauts', based on absurd family tales, without even knowing the basics of WWII history. That is what I hate.

    The website 'War over Holland' was created when reading the international authors on 1940 time and again confronted me with authors that didn't have a clue on the events in May 1940 in the Netherlands. Still, recent international work on May/June 1940 contains loads of beloney on the events here. Although insignificant in itself, a very important issue like the German airlanding operation (the Market Garden operation the Netherlands saw during the 10-14 May 1940 episode) was already hardly appreciated by the Brits in 1940. It caused them to make the 1944 Market Garden blunder. Should they have studied the 1940 events in Holland, Market Garden woundn't have happened, although you never know with a hard-head like Monty of course. But the Brits didn't give a toss. The Dutch-English relationship was extremely cool and distant prior to WWII. People forget this nowadays. Also that aspect causes history to be written in a certain way ...

    The SS Leibstandarte, SS Der Führer as well as the entire SS Verfügungsdivision (SS-AA, SS Germania and SS Deutschland) got involved in the Dutch theatre. An ideal battle training ground and their motorised status did add to their value. I am sure that many Waffen SS careers were started or boosted in the Netherlands. But also those of regular units. Von Paulus led the 6th Army staff, that had an important role in seizing the south of the country. Kurt Student led the airlanding operation. Kesselring the airforce dedicated for the Dutch theatre (2e Luftflotte). Obviously the april-june 1940 period launched most of the German careers.
     
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  4. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  5. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    If I understand well the number of killed at Westervoort was 19 SS men (not accounting for the 207. Infantry Division) and the number of WIA & MIA estimated at about 80. Though, I always find it saver to triple the number of killed to get the amount of wounded. Together that's nearly a hundred men, which is more then I thought possible. All told, this was a small sharp battle, in which the small Dutch garrison - a couple of isolated sections of out-gunned infantry - did well given the circumstances.

    The 207.ID didn't get involved. The SS regiment was the point formation of 207.ID, like it also took care of the entire first and second day of the (three day) battle at the Grebbeberg.

    I fully agree that a 3 - 3,5 times KIA rate usually generates the average WIA number on a battle field. The odd benchmark figure of 4 - 4,5 times the numbers killed is specific for the Dutch theatre in May 1940 only. It had much to do with the used Dutch ammo. The Dutch rifle and light MG ammo were over-powered 6,5 mm full metal jacket rounds. The Ducth weapons were quite accurate, but the stopping power of the 6,5 mm FMJ round was poor. That caused many German WIA.

    Another issue typical for the Fall Gelb operation was the highly efficient German medical care and the Dutch adherence of the international codes which caused Dutch medical institutions and local docters taking care of wounded from either side without any hesitation or prejudice. This saved many lives. Many German commanding officers and doctors showed great appreciation for the prompt medical care that the Dutch gave to wounded Germans. It was an unexpected virtue of the Dutch theatre in particular. It saved many German lives otherwise lost. That may have elevated the German WIA rated on some fronts considerably.

    At Westervoort the Germans had to cross a wide river mouth (Yssel) with a strong current adding up to the challenges. The Dutch Coy defending the west bank of the Yssel river were assisted by a number of firm casemates, and a number of light guns and heavy MG's in touch pill boxes under and nearby the bridge. Such an operation usually goes with considerable losses. It was all in all a battle that took around three hours and it took three attempts to get the Dutch defence silenced all along.
     
  6. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

  7. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Gooseman - Thank you for your reply. BTW love your web-site, very well done. Good to have it in English as well, so that it really can serve its purpose of letting a broad public know what happened in Holland in early May 1940.

    Cheers!

    For the Dutch Army (and people) it was a sudden, brutal introduction to the horrors war. Dutch losses were comparatively high for five days of battle.

    Dutch and German losses were high in comparison. The five days of war (the appendix in Zeeland excluded) was 'good' for 20% of the German KIA's in the periode 10-31 May, 1940. The Dutch losses were (relatively) twice as heavy as for example the Belgian losses. The reason for that was quite obvious. The German invasion of the Netherlands was an all out offensive with three dimensions, where battles raged on five fronts simultaneously, including the costly airlanding ops around the Hague and Rotterdam. That caused both sides to pay a considerable price.

    Nonetheless, these figures are a mere footnote in the history-books on losses during WWII. The tremendous losses of German-Russo warfare and American-Japanese clashes make the May 1940 losses on Dutch soil very insignificant.
     
  8. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    The railway bridge at Neerbosch, just south of the Rhine and Nijmegen, was intended to be taken by an SS wheeled AFV squad, shortly after followed by a troop train containing a battalion of infantry of 254.ID. The train was intended to continue along the track, cross the Maas-river near Ravenstein and as such be able to get infantry into the rear of the Dutch main defences in the south. This strike force was called 'Sonderverband Weber'. It comprised the SS-AA (of the SS-V division) with 25 wheeled AFV's, the 15th heavy MG battalion and a battalion of infantry of 254.ID, as well as some arty and engineers additions. But the endeavours at Neerbosch also failed. A bright and well drilled Coy of border infantry repelled the German attempts, assisted by a timely destruction of the bridge. Two of the SS AFV's were taken out.

    This entire affaire is described on my website on the Dutch campaign in May 1940, including a map. Part I: The actions at the Maas-front [War over Holland - May 1940: the Dutch struggle]

    I feel compelled to edit and correct myself on this one. Careful study proved me lately that this supposingly German troop-train at Neerbosch was in fact a regular Dutch train. It did not contain a German batallion and such plan never existed either. The old history books mention the German troop train but appear to be wrong.

    The quite extended German plan for the raiding of the bridges between Nijmegen and Roermond (Maas-Waal canal, Maas river) did include for three trains containing an infantry batallion crossing the Meuze and getting behind the main defences in the Peel swamp area. Besides the bridges had to be taken by surprise attacks. German command didn't feel comfi with the basic idea of blitz units surprising the Dutch bridge guards and therefore appealed to the 'Ausland Amt' of the 'Abwehr'. There they got a few hundred Brandenburger (Baulehr zbV 800) raiders as to see that bridges could be taken by stealth action. Amongst these raiders were also some SS NCO trainees and Dutch fascist volunteers. All sorts of disguises were thought of in order to get as undetected as possible near these bridges. Most of these actions succeeded up to the point where the bridges were reached. Since the Dutch army had been on the full alert since late on the previous night, most bridges were destroyed in time. The bridges at Hatert, Malden and Gennep were not. Of these only the latter helped the Germans to some extend (e.g. it was much less of help to the Germans than many Dutch sources try to sell).

    Anyway. These plans are all detailed in the German KTB of SS-AA (SS-V Division) and 254.ID as well as XXVI.AK and 18.AOK. All Freiburg remnants of these reports are in our possession. A train at Neerbosch was not part of the scheme. The reason for that seems quite simple. There was no direct track leading towards Neerbosch. There was the Kleve-Nijmegen track, but that needed to be followed up to the Nijmegen station, where the engine could be shifted and the train could be led onto the track that leads to Den Bosch. That would mean that a German train would first have to enter Nijmegen, then wait for the shunting process to be concluded and only then move on towards Neerbosch. No way that such an operation would pay out. All other (seven) German operations with trains against the Dutch outer defences were designed on tracks that had a direct approach of the targetted area. Neerbosch didn't.

    The train that was shot with the AT-gun, was a Dutch train. A Dutch NCO says: "Shortly after we repelled the German scouting party (Gooseman: in fact, the SS formation), a Dutch train appeared on the track opposite the bridge (which was blown). With red signals we waived the engine driver off. The abandoned engine was shot to pieces shortly after."
     
  9. Gooseman

    Gooseman Senior Member

    Major Weber was found asleep when a messenger of XXVI.AK staff found him in the afternoon of the 10th. A furious SS report was written on the affair. The SS felt betrayed that they could not win the day and that the failure had been more or less written on their account.

    And on this section too, I do need to apologize for an error. This time I knew better but have hastily work as an excuse, causing me to mix Oberstleutnant Weber (256.ID) who operated a reinforced regiment around Mill, with Major Einstmann, commander of the taskgroup Grave and who was the commander of I./484. I do apologize for this error, for I added on it later on again. Hopefully set straight with this one.
     

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