To me, there is no doubt about three things: 1. The plan to advance beyond Caen stalled and the battle became one of attrition in unfavourable terraine. This led to a major recasting of the plan (as Mongomery had carried out before at el Alamein and Mareth), but by denying this he denied himself credit for flexibility. 2. Infantry casualties in Normandy were far higher than forecast beforehand, which had a major influence on subsequent 21st Army Group operations. Goodwood was an attempt to use armour in order to save infantry casualties. 3. The Americans had to contend with even worse bocage than the British and, combined with relative slowness in taking Cherbourg and the slowness of the buldup of forces and supplies, due to weather, they were in no shape to stage an earlier breakout battle, somehting they had not been originally tasked to do (this comes back to the British advancing to a line beyond Caen). As it happens, of course, the attrition battle which developed led to the Falaise pocket, the collapse of the German position in France and the liberation of much of France and belgium by early September when the supply crisis really struck home. But it is my contention that if Montgomery had admitted that things did not go according to plan, hius reputation would be all the greater. And as for Montgomery's tactical abilities, as an army group commander it was his job to operate on the strategic/operational level and leave the tactics to subordinate commanders at corps and division level. I think there were occasions when he micro-managed 2nd Army.
The way I see it, and we know, things did not go to plan on D-day, I pointed out many things that went wrong on Sword beach and changed things, the new priorities being to link up the beaches and to reinforce the lightly armed airborne. Was Montgomery responsible for this change in plan? from my readings no, it was crocker. So why is Montgomery held responsible? He is damned if does interfere and he is damned if he does not. The chance of Caen went on D-day and as a few historians and former commanders have said, Caen was a big ask, but as we now know with hindsight, with enemy posisitions and strength now known, it could have been taken. But only IF things had gone to plan. As for bocage and supplies well, 2nd army suffered the same with the latter, and the British in the Western sector around Rauray and Fontenay and even Villers had just as much bocage, but had to deal with elite SS units. Cheers for the reply Angie Andy
Originally posted by ham and jam@Aug 20 2005, 03:06 PM The chance of Caen went on D-day [post=37863]Quoted post[/post] I think the chance of Caen went at Villers Bocage, which was always part of the contingency and had been discussed pre-invasion, but Dempsey intended to do it a day or two earlier. In the event, weather etc. slowed the buildup and it was just a bit too late. Even 24 hours earlier and the German line would have been open. I personally do not blame Montgomery - or anybody - for failing to take Caen on D-day. I do think that it could only have been done under near perfect conditions. But I do think that Montgomery tried to make out later that Caen was never part of the plan at this stage and that in fact everything had gone according to plan, which was not the case. This went a long way later towards undermining his reputation.
This went a long way later towards undermining his reputation. If you believe everything US historians write, who have tried their hardest to slur the mans reputation since 1944. Failing to take Caen made no strategic difference, it was just something the Americans kept chewing on to cover up their own bodges such as Bradely's decisions for Omaha or lack of them. Montgomery made Normandy successful, it was Monty who gave the Americans easy access out of the bridgehead which he intended all along and theres no evidence to say he did not. When I see how Field command decisions went during September and onwards its a shame Monty was given the boot, but politics are politcs. Andy
Thought I'd resurrect this ancient thread and post my two pences worth: Any discussion of strategy in Normandy would benefit from a look at the outline discussed at a meeting between Montgomery and his Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff on 7 Jan 44: "Task of the American Army will be the clearing of the CHERBOURG peninsula and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG. They will subsequently develop their operations to the South and West. Task of the British Army will be to operate to the South to prevent any interference with the American Army from the East. It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from CAEN to NANTES with the British Army being built up through CHERBOURG and the American Army through BRITTANY." The document is noted as being signed by Lt.Col. H. Mainwaring, MA to C-in-C 21 Army Group, and dated 10 Jan 44. Although subsequent operations obviously didn't develop exactly in this way, that this basic framework was consistently borne is mind by Montgomery and his army generals is evident from much of what actually took place and what was said at the time. Regards Tom
I though Caen was taken weeks after it was planned to be captured? NWE 1944 isn't really my thing but I'm sure I read ages ago it was planned to be taken within 48 hrs and was eventually taken by the Allies weeks after 6th June?
Not going to get too deep in to this but there is much talk of the Americans changing history. There was plenty of criticism from British senior officers. The fear that made British Generals blood run cold was European static warfare along with express warnings by the QMG about severe manpower shortages. Static warfare raised casualty rates both physical and mental. Most American official publications are very generous in their appreciation of British and Canadian forces much of the gripes seem to come from those that cannot see that as good as Montgomery was he did not get it right all of the time - no general officer ever has. British officers who had regard for him openly admitted that had he said, look I got it wrong but I put it right, he would be held in higher regard than bluffing that it was his idea from the start!
As many of the members of this forum will know most of Caen - or at least what was left of it - was liberated on 9 July 1944. The southern suburbs of the city were finally liberated only on 19 July. Caen had been one of the main Allied objectives on D-Day, 6 June 1944. But it was not to be. Caen became "a city martyred for peace". I am not sure why this thread has been resurrected from the ashes. But then, Caen was a city that arose from the ashes after WW2. ------------------------ One of my uncles was with the 3rd British Infantry Division in Normandy in 1944 and for most of June and July was based at Plumetot, a small village adjacent to an airstrip just to the north of Caen. The 'War Report' broadcast in the BBC on 11 July 1944 included General Montgomery speaking about the liberation of Caen: "... very heartening". If anyone would like to read his eye-witness account of the Battle for Caen, click on the following link: BBC - WW2 People's War - An Eye-Witness Account of the Battle for Caen ----------------------- Attached are photographs of some modern views of Caen. The city looked nothing like this in July 1944. Such is the difference between war and peace. Photographs: Caen (1) - Memorial sculpture to the 3rd British Infantry Division Caen (2) - Caen Castle Caen (3) - St Peter's Church, Caen
Not having studied D Day and the follow on cannot really comment on whether Caen should have been captured or not on D day etc ...BUT....from my studies on other campaigns it is evident that Monty used Caen and the airfields around as a sop to Tedder in order to get as much air support as possible - so on looking back at their history in the desert - Tedder was still fighting the Battle of Britain as was Coningham - and it was not until they both went off to join with Eisenhower in Algiers and Harry Broadbent with Monty's encouragement came up with the Cab Rank support at El Hamma and Tunis -BUT Tedder again took over for Sicily - and seriously failed to stop the evacuation of 60,000 axis troops to fight in Italy.......so Monty may be been seriously non plussed to see Tedders angst with Leigh- Mallory's plans and Monty tried to offset this by offering Caen in the early stages of that invasion - it's an option .... Tedders hatred of Monty played a BIG part in July '44 when both he and Coningham conspired to have Monty fired but Monty again won by being on the Seine by his 90 days forecast......but I repeat - "what do I know - I haven't studied that campaign yet " Cheers
One considerable hindrance to the capture of Caen on D-Day was that the armoured support to the breakthrough brigade (185th) of 3rd Division was snarled up in an almighty traffic jam on the beaches and moving inland. 2nd Bn Royal Warwickshire Regiment was supposed to have been supported by elements of 27th Armoured Brigade (specifically the Staffordshire Yeomanry) but despite its best efforts, the latter could not get through. The Royal Warwicks were held at Lebisey, and the advance stalled into 7 June and onwards.
It appears the Air Commanders were using Monty and Caen as an excuse to intefere in the ground campaign. The scale of in-fighting and backbiting in the RAF puts everything else in the shade. For instance I have no idea why the fall of Caen would be considered the lynch pin of the Campaign. Even if it fell on day one the Germans still held the high ground south of the Orne/Odon and it took a further 4 weeks from the capture of Caen to dislodge them. As I see it Normandy was not a place where sweeping outflanking movements were possible and the game was to wear down the German numbers rather than chase them to better defendable areas in central France. Neilands made a telling observation that it took Monty as long to get to Caen as it took Bradley to cover the last 5 miles to St Lo. However none of this will have any effect on the generation brought up on the film Patton and decades of unjustified character assassination of Montgomery.
One of the best and - I would suggest - one of the most moving personal accounts about the Battle for Caen is that by the Caennais, M. André Heintz. It can be found on the BBC "People's War" website: BBC - WW2 People's War - André Heintz's D-Day: The Resistance in Caen In spite of the length of time it took between D-Day (6 June 1944) and the day of liberation (9 July) the inhabitants were still grateful when the Allies arrived.
I strongly suggest that those interested in this subject read Carlo d'Este's Decision in Normandy. A classic example of Monty-bashing. The whole book is one long whinge about Monty and the Commonwealth performance in Normandy. A terrible tome. The book has dated badly and D'Este must have regreted the book because he is somewhat more balanced in a later 3 part magazine article. Monty: World War II’s Most Misunderstood General, Part 1 » Armchair General (1)
Terry Copp has also written some very credible rebuttals to the views held by D'Este and other writers of that era. It was a popular point of view even amongst Canadian and British historians until recently. And for context, you can't beat George Blackburn.
I would put Beevor in the 'Monty Bashing' category. Whilst not as strident as your Hastings/Keegan or D'Este he still has a number of digs in his D-Day book. Mind you given the number of second rate secondary sources he used it is no wonder he picked up a virus!
Characterizing a serious book by a competent scholar as "one long whinge" and "Monty bashing" is, I think, both unfair and exaggerated. We need to be careful about the language we use. I should point out that I don't agree with everything D'Este said in his book. I happen to think that the performance of the British troops was better than he made it out to be, certainly so in the case of the 50th Division. (Copp says the same, and I agree with him.) D'Este was actually a good deal fairer to Montgomery than other authors I have read. He points out that Montgomery adapted quickly and well after his initial plan went awry, pinning the German armor in the east while 1st US Army progressed in the west. However, from the evidence presented by D'Este and others it seems clear that was NOT his original plan. There is no shame at all in changing a plan if it doesn't work; great generals do that all the time, it simply shows intelligence and flexibility. Montgomery had those virtues, and under his management the Allied armies won a major victory in Normandy. With his emphasis on planning, preparation, and set-piece attacks, Montgomery was the perfect commander for D-Day. I think he did damned well; the only thing he did wrong was claim that all ran just as he had planned from the start, when it didn't quite do so. That does not diminish Montgomery's achievement, though apparently he thought it did.
It all depends where you start from. Clearly D'Este went to town on Montgomery and if you have (lets say) a 'negative' opinion on Montgomery to begin with then you will think him a good author. I am not someone who thinks Monty was anything special but I can see when an author has a bias and Decision In Normandy is far from an objective look at the Commonwealth performance in 1944-45.. The false claim 100,000 UK infantry replacements were being 'hidden' in the UK to help preserve the post-war empire is another pointer as to how D'Este saw the British.
I do not study history in the sense of who did what and who was braver or better - frankly much of it must be nonsense. Strategy,tactics, admin and logistics is of interest, especially when we see the same errors occurring 20 or thirty or more years later. Therefore, if I were to look in as an interested newcomer what would I conclude? - Well as usual with history I have to make a decision on which historians to believe reading forums is interesting, 'do not read that rubbish', followed by read it - the only true account!
