Hello! I hope that this topic fit in the General section, if not im very sorry for this. 2 years ago I went to normandy to discover Operation overlord. When I stod on Omaha Beach at the Dog Green sector I read in a book called Bloody Omaha about that the Dog Green sector was the worst and bloodiest of all sectors. Was The Dog Green sector the bloodiest? or was any of ther other even worse. Im also curious about how the machinegun nests at WN 71 and Serverlohs mg nest were constructed? I have seen many different constructions of the nests. Everything from the big bunkers on Saving Private Ryan to a flat plateau with sand sacks to cover. Scaned in this pic from my book, shows Dog Green sector WN 71, anyone could tell or show a pic of these MG nests. It doesnt describe the MG nests much in the book except the ones in a tobruk or the twin ones located up the valleys. Also in the book it says: Corporal Serverloh's position which was little more than a fox-hole but had a good field of fire in the direction of WN61. Anyone could be more specific or link some pic of how this fox hole prob looked like // Johan
First wave casualties on Dog Green were significant. A Company, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division lost 95% of it's men within the first 5-10 minutes of making the shore, with most never advancing more than 100 yards across the beach. Company C of the 2nd Ranger Battalion also landed to A Company's immediate left (east) and the right-most platoons of that formation were also wiped out almost to the man. You will not see A Co. appear on any beach maps following the initial assault as it no longer existed and had to be rebuilt pretty much from scratch sometime later. I'm not too keen on comparing "bloodiest" engagements because these are men we are talking about, but to say the men of A Co./116th IR/29th ID paid an exceptionally high cost trying to get ashore would be accurate. A good to read about the initial assault would be The Bedford Boys. The 29th ID was a National Guard outfit and a large portion of A/116th came from Bedford Va., home of the National D-Day Memorial. It will break your heart when you read horror those good men faced and then understanding the great loss that small town endured in one day. It was reminiscent of the losses by the Pals Battalions from the British Army in the Great War.
Thx for your reply, interesting to hear. 95 %! thats alot. But do you or anyone know more about Corporal Serverloh's mg nest how it looked like and the MG nest at WN71?
There was a long discussion of WN71 over at WW2F several years ago. I'll see what I can find on that site.
This is identified as Severloh's firing position from this website: Omaha Beach The man himself also wrote a book, translated into English not too long ago: WN 62: A German Soldier’s Memories of the Defence of Omaha Beach, Normandy, June 6, 1944: Amazon.co.uk: Hein Severloh: Books For a good over view of fortifications in the area as well as what they looked like try this book:
First wave casualties on Dog Green were significant. A Company, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division lost 95% of it's men within the first 5-10 minutes of making the shore, with most never advancing more than 100 yards across the beach. Company C of the 2nd Ranger Battalion also landed to A Company's immediate left (east) and the right-most platoons of that formation were also wiped out almost to the man. You will not see A Co. appear on any beach maps following the initial assault as it no longer existed and had to be rebuilt pretty much from scratch sometime later. I'm not too keen on comparing "bloodiest" engagements because these are men we are talking about, but to say the men of A Co./116th IR/29th ID paid an exceptionally high cost trying to get ashore would be accurate. A good to read about the initial assault would be The Bedford Boys. The 29th ID was a National Guard outfit and a large portion of A/116th came from Bedford Va., home of the National D-Day Memorial. It will break your heart when you read horror those good men faced and then understanding the great loss that small town endured in one day. It was reminiscent of the losses by the Pals Battalions from the British Army in the Great War. Great post Geoff The devastating impact of these costly operations on the many small towns and cities throughout the Allied nations is a sad legacy. Windsor, Ontario had it's turn when only 51 of 553 Essex Scottish returned from the Dieppe raid.
Windsor, Ontario had it's turn when only 51 of 553 Essex Scottish returned from the Dieppe raid. It is interesting that you mention Dieppe in this context. There was a thread here (I think) about the value of the lessons (if any) learned at Dieppe, and their impact on subsequent amphibious operations. If you look at the US V Corps plan for OMAHA, though, you see that several of the most obvious lessons of JUBILEE were overlooked. As at Puys and Dieppe harbor, the OMAHA assault troops landed directly opposite the strongest points in the enemy defenses, namely the draws leading up from the beach. As at Dieppe in 1942, the terrain canalized the advance and formed natural funnels into which the Germans could simply pour fire. V Corps was only able to get off the beach when the troops gave up on the draws and went straight up the bluffs between them instead--as the plan should have specified in the first place. The commander of V Corps, Leonard Gerow, had a great reputation as a planner--he had been head of War Plans at one point--but I have no idea whether he studied Dieppe or not; if he did, he didn't learn much. Gerow made an equally rigid and overambitious plan for the November 1944 attack on Schmidt in the Hurtgen Forest, a disastrous action that virtuallly destroyed the 28th Infantry Division. Despite these failures, Gerow was promoted to command 15th Army in the closing days of the European campaign. Go figure.
It is interesting that you mention Dieppe in this context. There was a thread here (I think) about the value of the lessons (if any) learned at Dieppe, and their impact on subsequent amphibious operations. If you look at the US V Corps plan for OMAHA, though, you see that several of the most obvious lessons of JUBILEE were overlooked. As at Puys and Dieppe harbor, the OMAHA assault troops landed directly opposite the strongest points in the enemy defenses, namely the draws leading up from the beach. As at Dieppe in 1942, the terrain canalized the advance and formed natural funnels into which the Germans could simply pour fire. V Corps was only able to get off the beach when the troops gave up on the draws and went straight up the bluffs between them instead--as the plan should have specified in the first place. The commander of V Corps, Leonard Gerow, had a great reputation as a planner--he had been head of War Plans at one point--but I have no idea whether he studied Dieppe or not; if he did, he didn't learn much. Gerow made an equally rigid and overambitious plan for the November 1944 attack on Schmidt in the Hurtgen Forest, a disastrous action that virtuallly destroyed the 28th Infantry Division. Despite these failures, Gerow was promoted to command 15th Army in the closing days of the European campaign. Go figure. I doubt strongly that Gerow looked at Dieppe as there is ample evidence that no US Normandy planners even looked at the large number of landings that had alreadly been conducted in the Pacific by their own army and the USMC.
I've seen an interview of Severloh on TV and was surprised that he spend hours firing from the same position. I'm going to really show my ignorance here but why didn't the destroyers laying very close inshore engage him? Some were only a couple of hundred yards off the beach. Thanks, Dave
This is identified as Severloh's firing position from this website: Omaha Beach The man himself also wrote a book, translated into English not too long ago: WN 62: A German Soldier’s Memories of the Defence of Omaha Beach, Normandy, June 6, 1944: Amazon.co.uk: Hein Severloh: Books For a good over view of fortifications in the area as well as what they looked like try this book: In the book I have it says that those tobruks was mortar, never heard that he was in a tobruk
I've seen an interview of Severloh on TV and was surprised that he spend hours firing from the same position. I'm going to really show my ignorance here but why didn't the destroyers laying very close inshore engage him? Some were only a couple of hundred yards off the beach. Thanks, Dave Dave Was there not a significant delay before the destroyers were ordered close inshore to support the infantry? My recollection was they were held offshore to fulfill their primary mission of protecting the landing craft from seaborne attack until the point was reached where that was deemed to be unlikely and conditions on the beach were known to be dire. Again, as memory serves me, they were indeed quite effective and were an influence in the first troops breaking through but this was several hours after the initial landing.
Captain Sanders, COMDESTRON 18 Commander was in the USS Frankfort, arriving off the beachead just before 0900. Concerned about increasing casualties on the beach, he ordered ALL destroyers to close on the beach as far in as possible and support the assault troops. Close-in fire support by navy destroyers speeded up much improved conditions all along the beach at Omaha by 1000. After action report: (personal letter from Sergeant James E. Knight of the 299th Combat Engineer Battalion wrote to the crew of the USS Frankfort)..."There is no question, at least in my mind, if you had not come in as close as you did, exposing yourself to God only knows how much, that I would not have survived the night. I truly believe that in the absence of the damage you inflicted on Geman emplacements, the only way any GI was going to leave Omaha was in a mattress cover or as a prisoner of war."...Sergeant Barton Davis, 299th Combat Engineer Battalion wrote to say: " How well I remember your ship coming in so close. I thought then as I do now that it was one brave thing to come in so close...Your ship not only knocked out the pillbox but the mortar positions above us...I always thought how great it would be to tell the Captain of this ship how grateful I am..." ( a personal letter to Captain James Semmes, CO of the USS Frankfort). Colonel S.B. Mason, USA, Chief of Staff of the 1st Division, wrote the following letter to Rear Admiral Hall after an inspection of the German defenses at Omaha. They should have been impregnable" "But there was one element of attack they could not parry...I am now firmly convinced that our supporting naval fire got us in; that without that gunfire we positively could not have crossed the beaches."... Almost scraping the bottom with destroyer keels off Omaha Beach were the: USS Frankfort; USS McCook; USS Doyle; USS Thompson; USS Carmick
Severloh apparently abandoned his position at WN62 only due to the concentrated fire from a USN destroyer. This after he had switched to tracer ammo after running out of regular ammunition. He had fired 12,000 rounds with his MG42 and over 400 rounds with two Kar98 carbines.
