You know, this "greatest something or other" in fact does not bring much to the table, it's not really important. For instance the Operation Bagration offensive ("Destruction of Army Group Centre") was much larger in scope and effectives, conquered a lot more territory, caused a lot more casualties, etc, etc, but never sounded as much in Western ears. This kind of pissing contests and grandiloquent titles may be fine for the History Channel (with deep voice bullshit narrative added!) but are rather out of place here, where we tend to prefer serious history
Vista 52, you'd do well to read this PDF http://www.strom.clemson.edu/publications/sg-war41-45.pdf Excellent article Za!!
Za "I am not worthy." As Alice Cooper said to the Guys on "Wayne's World" - "your worthy" ! That looks like a good read - I will have to print it as I can't read of a PC , but thank you - proves that good stuff can be had on the internet.
According to Anthony Cave Brown in his Bodyguard of Lies,the Kursk offensive was betrayed: by German pro Russian army officers of colonel rank. by information from the British that had been derived from Ultra. by Russians own wireless intelligence. Regarding Ultra,I do remember reading a reference that the Russians were notified of "the preparations to regain the initiative on the Russian front" through official channels but the source as all sources of information given to Stalin could not be revealed.(It should be remembered that Stalin dismissed Ultra information giving the exact date of Barbarossa and more detailed information from Alexander Foote (a long standing covert communist) and a Soviet agent in Switzerland,who,in fact was a agent supposedly controlled by Claude Dansey's "Z organisation" and whose task was he should infiltrate Soviet Intelligence for the British.Foote went on to feed Stalin with Ultra information along with others who fed it to the Nazi anti establishment via Switzerland, the others with official sanction, him not, although Foote was able to maintain the security of its source.) There was also another dimension to the outcome of the Kursk offensive.It was a gamble by Hitler, not only as a strategy of land operations but he was also forced to balance his forces on the Russian front with activities elsewhere and that is where the British deception plan Mincemeat had its affect on Hitler's strategic thinking. Hitlers was convinced that the Mincemeat documents were genuine and the plan would impose a perilous situation in the Mediterranean,particularly the Balkans.He was not too troubled about a second front in 1943 but he was about the Balkans whose security was the responsibility of the Italians. So much so, he wrote the the Duce "I regard the situation ......with the gravest concern" (This was the historic invasion route into the heart of Europe......An enemy landing inthe area,backed by local nationalist and communist uprisings,might lead to....the worse nightmare of all,to the exposing of the German southern flank in the East and an eventual gigantic turning movement...a joint Anglo -American-Russian enterprise....into Germany itself.) Clearly,Hitler was worried about his Balkans southern flank especially as the SD had uncovered a plot in Rome to overturn the Duce and surrender to the Americans and the British.German forces in the Balkans were sparse,6 divisions in Greece and Yugoslavia and a paratroop division on Crete with the Italians having 33 divisions in the Balkans.Should Italy drop out of the war, Hitler would have to find 33 divisions to replace the Italians and equally important he would lose 10 Italian divisions in Russia. The result caused a major crisis in Hitler's strategical thinking at the time when he was balancing the requirements of the Kursk offensive against the threats implied by the Mincemeat documents.
Good post, Harry, thank you. Thank you all the others for the accolades, but my only merit was to find the text and eventually recognise its value, nothing else, true merit goes to the author
This kind of pissing contests and grandiloquent titles may be fine for the History Channel (with deep voice bullshit narrative added!) but are rather out of place here, where we tend to prefer serious history I agree. Absolutely. As mentioned by others, that is a great link. Had to smile at the "you'd do well to read this" which sounds straight out of the Soprano's, but I know what you mean. That link is over 100 pages long, so it will take me some time to read and digest. As others read it, I would imagine it becoming quite the source for future Topics. So, Thank you and Goodnight, I've got to catch a plane to London.
I didn't want to sound paternalistic or whatever to you, I just thought you'd like to read something better than the popular press The Eastern Front is an immensely rich field, and it goes way way beyond the self congratulating German memoirs. There is a lot of postwar writing, even enshrined in the US Army "lessons learned" literature on the Red Army expressly written by Germans who congratulate themselves on how they managed to outsmart the Russians, but in fact they never explain how the dumb Russians won against so bright people, and believe me, I'm not talking about "human Wave" attacks by faceless "Oriental Hordes"! With the opening of the Soviet archives a number of Western historians has been able to provide a more balanced view. After you've read this one (or before that ) I'll give you some more. What the hell, if I want to read about Elves defeating Orcs I'd be reading Tolkien, not this forum! More than time to dispel ignorant myths, you deserve better than that, Vista. Have a nice flight!
You also have this old thread that is rather useful, if you discount the ideological bovine faecal matter somebody tried to inject in it. If you want to continue with that thread I have no objection http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/eastern-front/6489-calm-discussion-eastern-front.html
My very first post in this forum read: Stalingrad was a triumph of the military art as it was a fine example of application of the classic Principles of War: • Objective – a clear and achievable objective was defined: isolate the 6th Army from flanks and relief forces, and cut his line of communications off. • Offensive – the Soviets took and retained the initiative and never let it go. • Mass – an overbearing amount of force was used against select weak sectors at the flanks to ensure success. • Manoeuvre – both arms of the attacking forces after breakthrough traveled long distances into the Axis operational rear to reach their final objective. • Unity of Command – there was a single mind with clear ideas behind the plan execution, allowing flexibility but not divergence. • Security – the enemy was not allowed to acquire any advantage nor to disrupt execution. • Surprise – the Axis simply did not see what was coming, the Soviet command managed to ammass a large schock and manoeuvre force on both flanks of the city without it ever being detected, while at the same time feeding 62nd Army in the city with just the enough force to just keep the Germans at arms length, but slowly advancing all the time. I suppose if the Germans finally managed to eliminate all resistance in the city itself that would be totally irrelevant considering what was pending on the flanks. • Simplicity – two prongs, one north, one south of the objective meeting midway behind the enemy, while the middle kept the enemy busy. Build an inner ring to keep who’s in inside, build an outer ring to keep who’s out outside. Keep It Simple, Soldier. German 6th Army was literally at the end of it’s logistical tether, always on the brink of victory but never quite, while entrusting it’s flanks to allies (Italian 8th Army, Romanian 4th Army) who suffered from lack of absolute numbers, lack of equipment, weak reserves, weak supply, too extensive fronts to cover. At the same time they were faced by an enemy who had already tasted victory the previous winter, and who was confidently ammassing more than sufficient force in secret to accomplish a realistically near objective instead of running off as Stalin’s often displaced optimism demanded. Besides the very large amount of fighting troops captured, a large number of staff troops and specialists were captured too, and these were the ones who knew how to run an army. Entire divisonal, corps and army staffs were captured, something that had never occurred before to the German armed forces, just as it happened in a similar organisational disaster a few months later in Tunisia. Then the thread was highjacked, but this might be a good base for some more enlightened discussion as well.
I´m no specialist in The Great Patriotic War, but after watching last night a NatGeo documentary about Kursk, the little dwarf that sometimes shows up on my shoulder during restless nights told me that I should be a bit more interested in such a skirmish, the biggest steel-on-steel clash of all time. To keep him satisfied, I dare to ask you Ostfront buffs out there, which was the real cause of the Nazi defeat? A while ago I read that the massive Russian "pakfronts" were just to much for the Panzerdivisionen, Tigers and all, but last night I heard that it was industrial capacity which in reality doomed Manstein´s master plan, taking into consideration that Zukhov´s machiavelic approach to war didn´t exactly care about the life of your common Ivan.
Just found this on the net, downloadable PDF and all: Kursk, The Greatest Tank Battle, by M.K. Barbier. Good bless technology!!! :indexCANAHAIH:
Warlord, did you read the rest of the present thread? Some good food for thought in here. Another good PDF here: Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 by Col. D. Glantz. This will hopefully explain things a bit, after you read them we'll be able to discuss a bit. And for the last time, Kursk was not a tank battle.
Just found this on the net, downloadable PDF and all: Kursk, The Greatest Tank Battle, by M.K. Barbier. Good bless technology!!! :indexCANAHAIH: Wait wait wait! Isn't this work copyrighted? Aren't you infringing any laws and putting this forum at risk? Better watch it!
Links to file sharing websites are rather dubious. Please do not link to them. Cheers for heads up Za.
To keep him satisfied, I dare to ask you Ostfront buffs out there, which was the real cause of the Nazi defeat? A while ago I read that the massive Russian "pakfronts" were just to much for the Panzerdivisionen, Tigers and all, but last night I heard that it was industrial capacity which in reality doomed Manstein´s master plan, taking into consideration that Zukhov´s machiavelic approach to war didn´t exactly care about the life of your common Ivan. To keep this ball rolling, the reasons for the German defeat at Kursk are very complex, there was a large number of factors at play, strategic, operational and tactical. Suggested reading: Amazon.com: Kursk 1943: The Tide Turns In The East (Campaign): Mark Healy: Books Amazon.com: The Battle of Kursk: David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House: Books Amazon.com: Russo German War, 1941-45: Albert Seaton: Books
