JUNO BEACH.

The Assembly Areas.
7 Beach Group initially established Assembly Areas immediately behind the beaches. These were for use only on D Day and separate areas were arranged for wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles and marching personnel. The three categories each had their own approach roads or tracks. In general wheeled vehicles were assigned roads while tracked vehicles used cross country tracks to avoid damaging the road surface. Personnel also made use of cross country tracks avoiding all vehicles. In the Assembly Areas vehicles carried out de waterproofing and were sorted into parties to move forward to join their units.

Control staffs for the Assembly Areas were under the command of 7 Beach Group and consisted of the Officer Commanding 59 Transit Camp plus personnel from the same plus small detachments of Movement Control and Traffic Control.

Later the Assembly Area was developed further inland and along the main forward route. This was intended to handle all vehicles and personnel landing on Mike Sector, plus a sub section at ‘Knee’ behind Nan Sector.

There were five sections, named after authors (British of course). Dickens was for Army Group troops vehicles, Byron was for Army troops vehicles, Masefield was for Corps troops vehicles and Goldsmith was for personnel. Goldsmith was further divided into Elbow, initially for 3 Canadian Division, plus Chest, Wrist and Thigh for 51 Division. ‘Knee’ on Nan Sector handled all vehicles and personnel landing on Nan regardless of unit. There was also an Assembly Area for the RAF, rather unimaginatively called RAF3.

When ‘Elbow’ was being used for the assembly of 3 Canadian Division personnel the responsibility for the organisation was shared by 3 Canadian Division and Assembly Area staff.

In the Assembly Areas formations and units collected into formed bodies and then moved forward to their formation concentration areas. Units and sub units left the Assembly Area as soon as they were complete. Ideally the Assembly Areas should be cleared every twelve hours. Units sent back guides to the Assembly Area Reception Points to lead the units forward to their destinations.

Phase A waterproofing was removed in the Assembly Area under the supervision of unit officers and NCOs. Incomplete removal of waterproofing could cause damage to vehicles and equipment. Every effort was made to salvage waterproofing hardware.

RAF Beach Squadrons personnel and RAF Provosts were responsible for RAF Assembly Area No 3.

Mike.

 

I have some of the names of the FOB Offciers and the ships allocated to them.

3 COBU – I Corps, 3 Cdn Div

64 (Capt Dodsworth RWR HMS Venus
65 (Capt Lundon RRR HMS Fury
66 (Capt Cooper CSR HMS Faulknor
67 (Capt Greenwood 7 Bde
68 (Capt Sharman (150 Fd) QORC HMS Kempenfelt
69 (Capt Sims NSR HMS Vigilant

 

REME.
REME was initially responsible for recovery on the beaches. 22 Beach Recovery Section landed on Mike and 23 Beach Recovery Section landed on Nan. Each landed an identical number of personnel and vehicles. Forty seven personnel and ten vehicles landed on the first tide and a further thirty two personnel and ten vehicles on the second tide. Also landing on the second tide to assist each of the sections were forty nine personnel from Canadian REME. This latter was to work with the Drowned Vehicle Park. Each section later received a further six personnel, a jeep, four trailers and a water trailer.

Two Line of Communication Workshops and two Line of Communication Light Recovery Sections arrived from D+3 to D+5 to further assist with beach recovery and recovery in the Beach Maintenance Area.

Drowned Vehicle Parks were established on both beaches. One was established on each of Mike and Nan by the by the Beach Recovery Sections and in addition two were later established on Mike and one on Nan. Canadian personnel could then be released to move forward with their units.

REME could give assistance to other organisations within certain limits. RASC were responsible for their own vehicles, including DUKWs, but REME could assist especially in providing welding facilities in the early days. Similarly the recovery of landing craft was a RN responsibility but REME could give assistance if so ordered or if it did not interfere with their primary roles in landing vehicles and equipment. RAF vehicles were a REME responsibility but RAF supplied spares. AVRE and Flail units had their own Light Aid Detachments but Beach group REME units could give assistance.

Two small REME detachments were attached to Beach Recovery Sections and Drowned Vehicle Parks. A small REME detachment for the 1st and 2nd line repair of RE equipment on the beaches was landed with each Beach Recovery Section. Later RE became responsible for their own repair but REME could assist if RE provide the spares. This was to prove a more difficult task than was envisaged and many RE tractors and dozers remained idle for lack of spares. Mine clearance was such a large and important task that a detachment of three REME craftsmen from the advanced Base Workshop were attached to each of the Main Drowned Vehicle Parks specifically to carry out immediate repairs to mine detectors.

Each Beach Recovery Section consisted of a Headquarters, a Drowned Vehicle Park and two sections. Headquarters had a Captain commanding, a WOII Artificer Quarter Master Serjeant and clerks, cooks, batman and drivers. Vehicles included a DUKW, an amphibious jeep, a jeep, a 3ton 4 X 4 and two motorcycles.

A Drowned Vehicle Park consisting of a Staff Serjeant and four other ranks plus personnel attached from the LADs of units in 3 Canadian Division. Attached were three other ranks for engineer equipment and two serjeants and three other ranks for AVREs.

Each of the two sections consisted of three Sherman III Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle and three Tractor, Crawler, Class I, Caterpillar D8. The BARVs each had a crew of serjeant, corporal and three men and were based on a Sherman hull fitted for deep wading. They could tow or push stranded vehicles or landing craft. The D8s had a crew of 2 men. These were also armoured but lacked the deep wading ability of the BARV. They did however have a powerful winch which the BARV lacked.

There were also a Scammel Breakdown Tractor, a Mack Breakdown Tractor and a Ward La France Breakdown Tractor. Each had a crew of three men. These were for work on the beach and the exits and each had advantages. The Scammell and Mack both had a winch and a recovery crane. Both also had low pressure balloon tyres which could be deflated to give a good grip on soft sand. An earth spade had been developed especially for beach recovery work since normal earth anchors would not hold in sand. The Ward La France with six wheel drive and dual rear tyres had a better grip on firm ground and its twin cranes could be arranged to allow a sideways pull.

Mike.

 

Medical.
Medical units of 7 and 8 Beach Groups, and 32 Casualty Clearing Station were responsible for the treatment and evacuation of all casualties of Allied Fighting Forces and for Prisoners of War in the Beach Maintenance Area. 293 Pioneer Company assisted in the collection of casualties in the Beach Maintenance Area and their embarkation on craft at the Casualty Evacuation Post and Beach Dressing Stations.

Landing on Mike were an Advanced Surgical Centre consisting of 2 Field Dressing Station plus 33 and 34 Field Surgical Units, 110 Surgical Team and 13 Field transfusion Unit. 1 Field Dressing Station operated in its normal role. The Light Sections of 1 and 2 Field Dressing Stations each established a Beach Dressing Station. 2 Casualty Evacuation Post was established on the beach to evacuate casualties onto medical DUKWs of a platoon of 633 GT Company RASC. Attached to the medical units of Mike were the Headquarters and seven sections of 293 Pioneer Company. One section was attached to each Beach Dressing Station and to 1 Field Dressing Station while the headquarters and four sections were attached to 2 Casualty Evacuation Post.

Landing on D Day were:
1 Field Dressing Station RAMC. 95 men. 9 vehicles.
2 Field Dressing Station RAMC. 91 men. 10 vehicles.
30 Field Dressing Station RAMC. 45 men. 4 vehicles.
33 Field Surgical Unit RAMC. 9 men. 1 vehicle.
34 Field Surgical Unit RAMC. 9 men. 1 vehicle.
13 Field Transfusion Unit RAMC. 4 men. 1 vehicle.
4 Field Hygiene Section RAMC. 2 men.


On Nan were an Advanced Surgical Centre consisting of 33 Field Dressing Station plus 45 and 46 Field Surgical Units, 112 Surgical Team and 14 Field transfusion Unit. 34 Field Dressing Station operated in its normal role. The Light Sections of 33 and 34 Field Dressing Stations each established a Beach Dressing Station. Attached to the medical units on Nan were three sections of 293 Pioneer Company, one section to each Beach Dressing Station and 34 Field Dressing Station.

Landing on D Day were:
33 Field Dressing Station RAMC. 91 men. 10 vehicles.
34 Field Dressing Station RAMC. 96 men. 9 vehicles.
45 Field Surgical Unit RAMC. 9 men. 1 vehicle.
46 Field Surgical Unit RAMC. 9 men. 1 vehicle.
14 Field Transfusion Unit RAMC. 4 men. 1 vehicle.
3 Field Hygiene Section RAMC. 2 men.
21 Port Medical Detachment. 3 men.

32 Casualty Clearing Station landed on Nan on the second tide and set up in the position shown on the First Key Plan. This was a 102 Beach Sub Area unit.

293 Pioneer Company supplied stretcher bearers for the medical units to which they were attached. They were also responsible for collecting the equipment of casualties at the Casualty Clearing Station or Casualty Evacuation Post. Burial parties were also supplied by them.

The medical DUKW platoon of 633 GT Company landed in two groups. The first twenty one landed from LSTs of the first tide and were landed on time, not having to rely on Rhino ferries. Twelve more landed preloaded with stores which they had to discharge before reporting for medical duties. All reported to an area near the Casualty Evacuation Centre from which they were to operate.

21 Port Detachment RAMC landed on Nan and proceeded to 14 Ordnance Beach Depot where they were responsible for the care of medical stores.

Medical Officers from several units of Beach Groups and 102 Beach Sub Area were attached to Beach Dressing Stations before rejoining their units later. The Medical Officers of 8 Kings Regiment, 114 LAA Regiment and 11 Port Operating Group were attached to Beach Dressing Stations and Advanced Dressing Stations on Mike. Those of 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment, 86 HAA Regiment and 30 Line of Communication Transport Column were attached to the units on Nan.

Initially the Beach Dressing Stations carried on independently. They were responsible for the collection of casualties on the beach and in the area immediately behind the beaches. They were assisted by sections of 293 Pioneer Company acting as stretcher bearers. The collection of casualties from the Beach Dressing Stations was co ordinated by the Beach Group commanders.

14 and 22 Canadian Field Ambulances each detached four 4 stretcher ambulances and four jeeps which were to report to 2 and 33 Field Dressing Stations. With the assistance of stretcher bearers from 293 Pioneer Company they were to collect casualties left behind by sections of the Canadian Field Ambulances when they moved forward with their brigades. They were also used for evacuation of casualties to the Casualty Evacuation Point.

The Senior Medical officers of Beach Groups detailed sections of 293 Pioneer Company to Walking Wounded Collection Points. These points were on roads in the Assembly Areas and their position had been made known to the assault units. The pioneer stretcher bearers were to sweep the area for casualties and take them to the Walking Wounded Collection Points. Casualties were collected from the point by transport from Field Dressing Stations and evacuated them to either 2 or 33 Field Dressing Station. The Medical Officers of 11 Port Operating Company and 30 Line of Communication Transport Column were detailed to the task of collection.

The commanders of Casualty Clearing Station, Field Dressing Stations and Casualty Evacuation Point were to report to the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services at Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area to inform him of their exact location and the time at which they would be ready to receive casualties. He could then co ordinate the activities of the medical units.

Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Embarkation) at Headquarters 102 Beach Sub Area informed the Naval Officer in Charge of the number of casualties to be evacuated. Naval Officer in Charge passed the information to Naval Force Commander who decided how many LST to retain for casualty evacuation. LST fitted for evacuation flew flag H and showed two vertical blue lights.

All casualties who were fit to travel were evacuated to the UK and were embarked at the Casualty Evacuation Point or Beach Dressing Station. LCTs could carry walking wounded, but numbers were very limited and prior arrangements had to be made with the Principal Beach Master. Medical LSTs were normal LSTs which were fitted with stretcher racks which were erected as necessary. Arrangements were made to retain as many such LST as were thought necessary by DADMS and these did not return until loaded, usually next day. Initially they were loaded by the medical platoon of DUKWs but when LSTs were routinely beached and dried out they could be loaded by ambulance on the beach.

Later hospital carriers, ex cross Channel ferries some of which had been used as small LSIs, arrived and anchored off the beach. There was always one available, being replaced when the previous one sailed. These carried their own water ambulances, LCP(S) converted to carry six casualty litters. The water ambulance could beach for loading but for preference they used Courseulles harbour at high tide.

Elaborate arrangements were made to ensure that there was an adequate supply of stretchers and blankets. A Beach Sub Area reserve of 750 stretchers and 2250 blankets was landed. All Beach Group vehicles landing on D day carried one stretcher and three blankets which were dropped off at the Vehicle Transit Areas to be collected by Casualty Evacuation Point and Beach Dressing Station personnel. In addition each Ordnance Beach Depot held stocks, each depot receiving 2000 stretchers and 6000 blankets on D day and 750 stretchers and 2250 blankets on D+1. Evacuation LSTs carried a stock of stretchers and blankets to replace those being embarked.

Medical stores were held in Ordnance Beach Depots under the supervision of the Port Detachment RAMC. Two and a half tons of such stores were landed each day in standard packs. They were issued through the Casualty Clearing station, the largest medical unit, until the arrival of an Advanced Depot of Medical Stores.

One Field Sanitation NCO was attached to Field Companies RE in each Beach group to advise on water supply. The Field Sanitation Section was also responsible for advising on sanitation arrangements in the sub area. Due to the shortage of accommodation many units remained in makeshift bivouacs for weeks. In the beach area bivouacs sanitation soon caused concern.

The red cross against air attack was not displayed by medical units although small vertical red cross signs could be displayed. RAMC personnel wore a red cross brassard. Pioneer stretcher bearers wore a SB armband.

The Field Dressing Station consisted of one Heavy Section and two Light Sections. Each beach sector, Mike and Nan arranged these in an identical manner setting up a Field Dressing Station with a Heavy Section and a Light Section serving the Beach Group area and one Light Section detached to form a Beach Dressing Station near the beach.

At the Field Dressing Station the Heavy Section had a Major plus two other officers who were medically qualified plus a subaltern for administration. Other medical personnel included a serjeant dispenser, serjeant and a private hospital cooks, two serjeants, a lance corporal and twelve private nursing orderlies plus a serjeant nursing orderly for duty as storeman for stewards store, a nursing orderly as barber, a linen storeman and a stewards storeman. Two nursing orderlies were provided for duty with the two 4 stretcher ambulances. There were also twelve administrative personnel plus attached RASC drivers.

The Light Section added another two medical officers, seven nursing orderlies and four stretcher bearers plus four administrative personnel. The Field Surgical Unit added a Major who was a specialist in surgery and a Captain or Lieutenant who was a Graded Anaesthetist, three nursing orderlies and two operation room assistants. The Field Transfusion Unit consisted of one medical officer plus two transfusion orderlies. Each of the specialist units had a specially equipped 3 ton lorry and driver.

Chaplains were on the establishment of the Beach Sub Area and they were initially allocated to medical units.

1 and 2 Field dressing Stations, with their attached Field Surgical Units and Field Transfusion Units, established themselves in the village hall at Graye sur Mer and received 209 cases by midnight. 107 wounded were evacuated to the UK during the day.

On Nan the BDS was set up in a concrete gun bunker right on the shore.

Mike.

 

Burials.
The Beach Groups selected suitable burial grounds. One, immediately inland of the beaches, was for those killed on the beaches or immediately inland. One immediately inland of the Beach Maintenance Area was for those killed in the Beach Maintenance Area. All sites were fenced and clearly marked ‘Burial Area’.

Burials were in individual graves except in exceptional circumstances. The red circular identity disc was collected for forwarding to GHQ 2nd Echelon and the green hexagonal disc was left. Pegs with labels giving details were attached and placed on the grave. A supply of prefabricated crosses was landed on D+1 but there were shortages due to late delivery and many were locally made.

A Chaplain of officer conducted a burial service and was responsible for marking the grave and for reporting the burial on the appropriate form. Three copies were required with the original going to DAD Graves at Army Headquarters and two copies to GHQ 2nd Echelon which maintained personnel records.

Personal effects were held until the registered parcel service started on D+6 when they were sent to GHQ 2nd Echelon. Any money was handed to the nearest Field or Area Cashier and a receipt obtained.

The first Graves Registration personnel landed on Mike on D+2.

Mike.

 

Prisoners of War, Refugees and Civil Affairs.
Since Mike was responsible for personnel it assumed responsibility also for Prisoners of War. 3 Canadian Division established a Prisoner of War cage well forward and on the boundary of the Beach Maintenance Area. This was manned by two sections of 601 CMP (VP) Company. 3 Canadian Division, and later I Corps, was responsible for the evacuation of Prisoners of War from the front line to the cage. Prisoners who were captured on or near the beaches were held there, first by the troops capturing them and then by Beach Group personnel including provosts.

It was permitted to keep some prisoners as labour but most were to be evacuated to the UK. The first such evacuation was by LST on the third tide and after that one LST per day was allocated for the purpose. This LST arrived with CMP (VP) personnel on board as escorts. The officer in charge of the escort reported the arrival to the Military Landing Officer who arranged for prisoners to be brought from the cage with an escort from 601 CMP (VP) Company. A LST could carry 800 prisoners, only on the tank deck.

Unwounded prisoners were not medically examined unless disease or infection was suspected. Any suspected cases of typhus were not to be evacuated. Wounded prisoners were treated and evacuated along with allied casualties.

On D+2 the remainder of 601 (VP) Company arrived to extend the cage. On D+5 603 (VP) Company arrived for duty as guards and escorts at Corps and Army cages when they were formed.

Civilian suspects were detained separately from Prisoners of War and were not evacuated to the UK. A civilian internee camp was established on D+9.


Escaped Allied Prisoners of War.
Until D+9 any escaped allied prisoners who reached allied lines were sent to 104 Corps Reception Camp where they were to be accommodated, fed and re equipped and be treated sympathetically. From D+9 they were sent to 101 Reinforcement Camp where they were medically examined and transferred to the UK.


Refugees.
A Refugee Transit Camp was established forward of the Beach Maintenance Area and control points on all forward routes directed refugees to it. ‘B’ Refugee Transit camp was formed from a detachment of one officer and twenty nine other ranks from 218 Prisoner of War Camp which landed on Mike on the second tide of D Day. A Civil Affairs Detachment landed with them and consisted of six officers, including two Medical officers, and eleven other ranks.

After the assault eight LSI(L) were held at Portsmouth for the evacuation of refugees if this was necessary. A further eight US LSI(L) were available to supplement the British flotilla if required. These craft were not to be used for transporting troops. It is not clear if they were ever called upon.

A party of 224 Prisoner of War Camp arrived on D+1 and on D+2 opened an Army Refugee Camp which received refugees from the transit camps. Three Civil Affairs Detachments each containing two medical officers and four medical orderlies arrived at the same time to handle refugees. If necessary civilian casualties could be dealt with by military medical units but any supplies used had to be replaced from Civil Affairs stocks.


Civil Affairs.
Apart from the Civil Affairs detachments mentioned above there were sections to work with the civil authorities in the organisation of civilian matters. In the Beach Maintenance Areas the need and scope for these was limited but there was a civilian population and there were civilian resources both of which were controlled on behalf of the military. According to the instructions Civil Affairs officers to work ‘pari passu’ with civilian authorities. I looked this up. Pari Passu means to rank equally or work with on an equal basis.

While certain civilian resources were to be left entirely to the French authorities Civil Affairs were to assist in the requisition or hire of vehicles, accommodation, garages, workshops and local labour. They were to organise the local police, fire and civil defence and coordinate their activities with army services. Civil telephone systems and power installations were taken over.

Accommodation was in great demand and limited supply. Certain rules were laid down but as always operational necessity overruled these. Civil medical installations could be taken over but due regard had to be taken of civil needs. Local government offices such as those of the Mairie, fire, police and civil defence were not to be taken over. Such accommodation as was available, including tents, was to allotted on the following priorities. First priority of course was for medical units followed by workshops and storage with personnel coming last.

Later a Hiring and Claims organisation was set up. Since France was an ally it was ruled that any resources requisitioned should be paid for. Claims could be made for damage but this was limited to damage caused by allied forces and excluded any battle damage or damage caused by the enemy.

Mike.

 

Postal.
A regular and speedy postal service was seen as being vital for morale. One detachment from RE Postal Service landed on D Day with 140 Detail Issue Depot and a second detachment landed on D+1 with 139 Detail Issue Depot. These established a Field Post Office at the Detail Issue Depot on D+1. Eleven tons of mail arrived on coasters on D Day for delivery on D+1, to be collected by the postal orderly of units when unit transport was collecting supplies. On the same day a daily letter mail service was established to and from the UK, and postal orders could be bought and cashed.

On D+6 a parcel and packet mail service was established. In addition to normal parcels four duty free parcels a year were allowed subject to certain restrictions. Parcels had to weigh less than five pounds, have a value of less than thirty shillings, contain no drinking spirit, no more than half a pint of scent, no more than 200 cigarettes and no more than two pounds of foodstuffs.

The postal service worked well in general. There was a period of delays which proved to be due to V1 attacks on London. Service post was re routed to avoid this. In the early days mail was put onto coasters but these were not identified. An officer in a DUKW was given the task of meeting each coaster and asking if they had mail.

Mike.

 

RAF Beach Units.
A considerable number of RAF vehicles and personnel passed through Juno. These were GCI, GCC, RAF Commandos and RAF Regiment. Airfield construction was not an RAF responsibility. There was also a considerable quantity of RAF stores being handled. RAF personnel, vehicles and stores were an RAF responsibility.

Headquarters No2 Beach Squadron controlled the activities of all RAF units in the 102 Beach Sub Area and landed on Nan on the second tide.

Each of the two beaches, Mike and Nan, had a Beach Flight and a Balloon Unit. On Mike there was 103 Beach Flight which landed 49 personnel and two vehicles on the first tide and 26 personnel and six vehicles on the second tide. On Nan there was 104 Beach Flight which landed 15 personnel and one vehicle on the first tide and 24 personnel and three vehicles on the second tide.

Following the pattern of the rest of the sub area 103 Beach Flight handled personnel and vehicles. In the first three days this amounted to some 400 RAF vehicles and 1400 personnel. These passed through the transit areas to the RAF Assembly Area No 3. 103 Beach Flight manned the RAF Assembly Area and RAF Provost were on duty in the Transit Area and the Assembly Area. RAF Provosts also took complete RAF units from the Assembly Area to their forward positions. They were responsible for the signing of RAF areas and routes and liaised closely with the Beach Sub Area Assistant Provost Marshal.

RAF Stores landed on Nan and delivered to RAF Dump. In the first three days some 150 tons of explosive ordnance, 15 tons of oxygen and 400 tons of 100 octane fuel were handled.

RAF Balloon units arrived on the landing craft of the first tide. Each balloon had a crew of two who flew the balloon on the craft and then took it ashore to fly on the beach under the orders of commander 80 AA Brigade.
For a time balloon units were asked not to fly them as it was thought they were being used as aiming points for enemy artillery. This was never the problem that it was on Sword but there was some shelling.

RAF Beach Squadron personnel wore red RAF brassards so that passing RAF units could recognise them. Beach Squadron Headquarters, Beach Flight Headquarters and RAF Assembly Area flew the RAF ensign.

Mike.

 

That is all for the time being.

More will follow someday. In April I will have been studying the beaches for four years. Not nearly finished yet.

Remember that there is more detail on the organisation and operation of most types of unit on the Sword Beach thread.

Mike

 

Congratulations on a wonderful piece of work Mike. I am sure that a great many forum members are as impressed as I have been with all your research. Thank you for sharing it with us.
Noel

 

My father was in the 12 Field Regiment, RCA. I know he was in 11 Battery but I do not know what troop. I have read his military records very carefully, also the regiment's War Diaries (in the National Archives in Kew) but nowhere is his troop mentioned.
Any suggestion as to how I can find out his troop would be very welcome. As he was in 11 Battery does that give a hint as to his troop?
Joan A.

 

Apologies for not replying earlier. I have just spent March tidying my computer files, discs etc so that I may be able to find things now.

Thank you for your kind words Noel.

With regards to Joan's enquiry, 11 Battery do not seem to have been present on D day but they do seem to have been part of 12 Field Regiment RCA later in the campaign. Troops were usually lettered throughout the regiment in order of seniority. In late 1944 12 Field Regiment had 11, 16 and 43 Batteries. One would expect that the senior battery (the lowest number), No 11 to have A, B and C troops. the second battery would have D, E and F troops and the junior battery would have G, H and I troops.

Mike.

 

Juno Anti Aircraft Defence.
Anti aircraft cover was arranged on the assumption that enemy air effort would be directed against the beaches and shipping. It was assumed also that high and medium level enemy aircraft could be dealt with by Allied aircraft and that the main tasks of anti aircraft artillery would be defence against low level attacks by day and high flying bombers at night. In order of priority the tasks of anti aircraft protection were

- Shipping and craft unloading off the beaches.
- Beach Maintenance Areas.
- Beach exits.
- Bridges over the River Seulles at Reviers, Colombiers and Courseulles.
- Gun areas.

General Principles.
It was planned that there would initially be an AA Assault Group to each Beach Group and that each such assault group would have three HAA troops and four or five LAA troops. LAA guns were to be landed as soon as possible. They would initially be tracked SP vehicles since these were the only vehicles allowed on the beach in the early LCT waves. Each tracked vehicle towed a trailer mounted gun. HAA guns would necessarily land later when the beaches were sufficiently prepared. It was planned to land the first on the second tide and have them in place in time to provide defence against night attack on D day. Searchlights were to land to provide illumination of low flying enemy aircraft and to provide illumination on the beaches if required. An Anti Aircraft Operations Room was to be landed to coordinate AA defence and to give air raid warning.

On D Day ‘O’ AA Assault Group landed in support of 7 Beach Group on Mike and ‘P’ AA Assault Groups landed in support 8 Beach Group on Nan. ‘O’ Group was commanded by Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment and ‘P’ Group was commanded by Headquarters 86 HAA Regiment. On D day both groups would be under the command of CRA 3 Division. Sometime on D+1 they would come under command of 80 AA Brigade at which time Headquarters 114 LAA Regiment assumed command of all LAA units and Headquarters 86 HAA assumed command of all HAA units.

‘O’ AA Assault Group (Mike)
had the following units.
RHQ, 114 LAA Regiment RA.
Acting as Headquarters ‘O’ AA Assault Group.
372 Battery, Headquarters and ‘A’ and ‘B’ Troops, 114 LAA Regiment RA.
Twelve 40 mm LAA. Six Crusader SP 40mm towing six 40mm.
321 Battery, Headquarters and ‘D’ and ‘F’ Troops, 93 LAA Regiment RA.
Twelve triple 20mm LAA. Six Crusader SP towing six 20mm on trailers.
274 Battery, 86 HAA Regiment RA.
Eight 3.7” HAA guns.
383 Battery, E troop, 86 HAA Regiment RA.
Four 3.7” HAA guns.
114 LAA Regiment Workshop.
Composite workshop with elements of LAA, HAA and SL workshops.
Two and a Half sections 112 Pioneer Company (smoke).
To lay smoke screens using Smoke Generators No 24.
Three Landing Barge Flak.
Each with two 40mm LAA manned by 139 LAA Regiment.

‘P’ AA Assault Group (Nan).
had the following units.
RHQ, 86 HAA Regiment RA.
Acting as Headquarters ‘O’ AA Assault Group.
375 Battery, Headquarters and ‘G’ and ‘H’ Troops, 114 LAA Regiment RA.
Twelve 40mm LAA. Six Crusader SP 40mm towing six 40mm.
‘E’ troop 321 Battery, 93 LAA Regiment RA.
Six triple 20mm LAA. Three Crusader SP towing three 20mm on trailers.
273 Battery, 86HAA Regiment RA.
Eight 3.7” HAA guns.
383 Battery, F troop, 86 HAA Regiment RA.
Four 3.7” HAA guns.
One troop 474 SL Battery.
Eight 90mm searchlights.
86 HAA Regiment Workshop.
Composite workshop with elements of LAA, HAA and SL workshops.
112 Pioneer Company (smoke) (less two and half sections).
To lay smoke screens using Smoke Generators No 24.
Two Landing Barge Flak.
Each with two 40mm LAA manned by 139 LAA Regiment.

Also landing were:
HQ 80 AA Brigade.
Commanding all AA units in I Corps Area, including Sword and Juno Beaches.
155 AA Operations Room.
Responsible for the operational control of AA units on Juno.

32 Battery, 4 Canadian LAA Regiment.
This did not come under an AA Assault Group but was tasked with protecting the crossings of the River Seulles at Colombiers and Reviers.

63 Battery of 20 LAA Regiment manned a total of nine 40mm LAA guns and twenty four 20mm LAA guns on the three British Gooseberries. Logically this would give three 40mm and eight 20mm per Gooseberry.

At sea the navy had seven Landing Craft Flak and five Landing Barge Flak. The latter carried army LAA guns which would later land.

In addition to their AA tasks Light Anti Aircraft guns were to be sited with regard to likely enemy tank runs and Heavy Anti Aircraft guns might be called on to fire predicted concentrations in a ground role.


Headquarters 80 AA Brigade.
80 AA Brigade Headquarters controlled the AA defence of I Corps area, including Sword and Juno Beaches. It had a modest increase of three jeep trailers and one 20cwt trailer and the signals section had an additional 15 cwt FFW, two operators and a signal officer. The Brigade Headquarters Reconnaissance Group landed on the first tide with the main party landing on D+1.

Landing On Mike.
H+135 minutes.
Reconnaissance party of two jeeps and 6 men.
Jeep 1.
Brigadier, Commander 80 AA Brigade, driver/batman.
Jeep 2.
Anti Aircraft Intelligence Officer, Signals Officer, lance serjeant RE, driver/batman.

D+1.
Car 4 seater 4 X 4,
Brigade Major, driver/batman, two operator wireless and line, staff serjeant.
No22 set.
15cwt Wireless House.
Staff Captain, driver mechanic, two operator wireless and line.
No 22 set.
15cwt Office.
Warrant Officer I, two operator wireless and line, driver mechanic.
No 22 set.
15cwt GS.
Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer, driver IC, two cooks.
Cooks equipment and stores, bren, PIAT.
3 ton 4 X 4 GS.
Signals serjeant, driver mechanic, two despatch rider, two cipher operator.
4 X motorcycle.
Tows water trailer.

Main HQ arrived off coast on time but could not land. At 2130 June 7 the Brigade Major and Staff Serjeant landed on Mike by LCP as the LSTs were still waiting to be unloaded. They reported to 114 LAA Regiment RHQ which directed them to Tactical Head Quarters where they reported at 0130 June 8th. Part of Main HQ landed on Mike at 0630 and arrived at Tactical Headquarters at 1030. The remainder of Main HQ arrived landed early on 9th June and deployed in an orchard at Beny sur Mer.




155 Anti Aircraft Operations Room
155 AAOR was organised on War Establishment III/189/2 which was different to that used in the UK for AA units. The following includes signals on War Establishment III/188/2. These were in force by January 1944 and formed the basis for planning. Some modifications were made in the light of experience gained in exercises and as equipment became available.

R Group.
The Reconnaissance Group consisted of a jeep with the Officer Commanding, Fire Control Officer, Serjeant Operator Fire Control and a driver/batman. It landed on Nan White at H+75 and ensured that the sites selected for the radars were suitable.

A Group. These were vehicles and personnel that it was considered must be landed on D Day to enable the unit to be operational for at least four days.

It was originally planned that A1 Group and A2 Group should be identical. They were to land at different points and set up some quarter mile apart to reduce the risk of both becoming casualties. Later it was hoped to replace the Light Warning Set NoI Mk4 with Radar Type 14. In the event one Light Warning set was replaced and the other remained as originally planned.

A1 Group.
One Radar AA No4 MkII, Light Warning Set, of 155 AAOR landed on the first tide and broadcast warnings and information to 80 AA Brigade units via a No 22 set. This sub unit consisted of a jeep and batman driver for the Fire Control Officer and the 15cwt Wireless House carrying the Light Warning set , three Operators Fire Control (including a corporal), a telecommunications mechanic and a No22 set.

A2 Group.
One Type 14 radar of 155 AAOR also landed on the first tide, together with 14 men, but this took some time to set up. It was operational when the remainder of the Operation Room vehicles arrived on the second tide. When the Type 14 was in action the No 4 Mk IV set was used to form a sub AAOR. The Type 14 was trailer mounted and was towed by a HAA Tractor with a driver IC. It carried a Serjeant Fire Control, three Operator Fire Control (including a corporal) and a No22 set.

On the second tide the AAOR landed the main part of the operations room, again in two groups. These included two 3 ton 4 X 4 Bedford QL with RAF Type 145 body (Operations Room)

A3 Group.
3ton 4 X 4 RAF Type Operations Room towing a 20cwt trailer.
Signals Officer, Serjeant Instrument Mechanic, Corporal Electrician Signals, six Operator Wireless and Line
including two corporals and a Driver Mechanic.
No36 set, 2 X R109 set, 2 X Generator, 2 X Plotting Boards, 2 X 10 line exchanges, 6 X line poles, 6 X
batteries tables, chairs and a Motorcycle.
15 cwt Wireless House.
Driver Mechanic, 3 X Operator Wireless and Line including a corporal, Lineman.
No22 set.
15cwt GS.
Gun Defence Officer, 3 X Operator Fire Control.
Marching party.
Gun Defence Officer, Serjeant Gun Defence Officers Assistant, 4 X Plotter, 3 X Driver Operator, Corporal
Operator Fire Control.

A4 Group.
3ton 4 X 4 RAF Type Operations Room towing 20cwt trailer.
Captain, Second in Command, Corporal Vehicle Mechanic, Serjeant Gun Defence Officers Assistant, 3 X
Plotter, Batman/Recorder, 3 X Corporal Fire Control Assistant, Operator Fire Control, 3 X Operator Wireless
and Line including corporal, Electrician Signals.
No36 set, R109 set, R107 set, Generator, 6 X line poles, 6 X batteries, Tables, Chairs and a Motorcycle.
15cwt Wireless House.
Captain (Sector), 3 X Operator Wireless and Line including a corporal, Driver Mechanic.
No22 set.
15cwt GS. Tows 20cwt trailer.
Gun Defence Officer, Driver IC, 3 X linesman including corporal.
10 miles of cable.
15cwt GS. Tows 20cwt trailer.
Gun Defence Officer, Driver IC, 3 X linesman including corporal.
10 miles of cable.

Group B landed n D+2..
3ton RAF Type Operations Room. Tows 1ton trailer.
Signal Serjeant, Driver IC, 6 X Operator Switch Board including 2 corporals, Instrument Mechanic.
Motorcycle, 2 X Multiphones, Amplifier, 10 line switchboard, 2 X generator,
15cwt GS. Tows 10cwt trailer.
Driver IC, 3 X cooks, Driver Batman.
4 miles of cable, Cooks stores.
Marching.
5 X Plotter, Batman Recorder, 2 X General Dutyman.

Y Group landed in the next week.
3ton 4 X 4.
Driver IC.
Gas Stores and 1098 stores.
3ton 4 X 4.
Driver IC.
Gas Stores and 1098 stores.
15cwt GS. Tows 10cwt trailer.
3 X private..
1098 stores.

1730. OC arrived at Tactical Head Quarters 80 AA Brigade and reported the safe arrival of all equipment. At 1900 reported AAOR in action.

The Bedford QL with a Mobile Operations Room body was a house type with a large flap on the nearside which was opened upwards when in use. There were tents on both sides of the vehicle, and sometimes over the rear door. In the tent on the nearside there were map displays. Controllers sat inside the vehicle overlooking the displays. Information regarding hostile aircraft was displayed on a map display so that the Controller could quickly assess the situation and send alerts and orders to batteries. Information was received from both Army, Navy and RAF sources.

Normally one would expect that the Mobile Operations Room lorries would be assigned one to the central Operations and Plotting Room and one each to the two sector warning sets. In this case it seems that the vehicles for the Type 14 Radar and the central room were situated together while the third vehicle formed the sub AAOR with the Light Warning set. It was the task of the two radars to plot aircraft and report to the central room where information was filtered and decisions made.


86 HAA Regiment.
86 HAA Regiment landed Regimental Headquarters to act initially as headquarters for ‘P’ AA assault group, and two battery headquarters, 273 and 274, to control the gun troops. The third battery headquarters, 383, was not landed and its two troops were attached one each to the other batteries. Ten extra personnel per troop were to be landed with the reconnaissance groups to act as pioneers.

Officers Commanding cars carried extra No22 wireless sets in their cars and these were to be set up at headquarters. Extra trailers were issued to carry equipment. Regimental Headquarters had one 20cwt trailer. Battery Headquarters had four 20cwt trailers and two jeep trailers.

The HAA troops would land reconnaissance parties some three hours before the main body was expected to land. These parties were to see that the sites selected from maps and air photographs were suitable, and free of he enemy. If necessary changes would be agreed with beach group commanders. Each reconnaissance party included ten men to act as pioneers and prepare the sites as far as possible. High priority was given to siting the troops radars as these were essential to the operation of the troop. Radar needed a minimum of 100 yards clear all round. Reconnaissance Groups were to ‘preserve’ the radar sites (leave personnel to make sure no one else moves onto it). When the guns arrived it was expected that the site would be laid out and ready for them to go straight into action.

It was expected that HAA units would be available to fire in a ground role in support of ground forces. In fact they spent much of their time in this role. HAA troops carried a small amount of anti tank AP shell which was not used.

Apart from the various reconnaissance parties this regiment was much delayed. When the guns were landed several were further delayed when the towing pintles broke due to an excessive angle between ramp and beach.

86 HAA Regiment.
H+90 minutes.
RHQ. Car 4 seater. 22 set. 5men landed from LCT on time.
‘A’ troop 273 Battery. 16 men landed by ferry service from LSI.

H+4 hours.
RHQ. Jeep and 5 men.
273 Battery HQ . Jeep and 5 men.
274 Battery HQ. .Jeep and 5 men.
‘A’ Troop 273 Battery. Jeep and 15 men.
‘B’ Troop 273 Battery. Jeep and 15 men.
‘C’ Troop 274 Battery. Jeep and 15 men.
‘D’ Troop 274 Battery. Jeep and 15 men.
These from LST. Time given was time to be ready to discharge.
Battery HQs land reconnaissance party.
Troop HQs land reconnaissance party and 10 men pioneer party.

All troops were identical, the only variations being in the reconnaissance groups for ‘E’ and ‘F troops which landed at the same time as the main body.
Troops consisted of
7 X AEC Matador 4 X 4 HAA Tractor
4 X 3.7” HAA gun.
1 X Radar AA No3 MkII.
2 X Radar AA No1 MkII.
2 X 3ton 4 X 4 GS.
15 KVA Generator. Towed by 3ton GS
111 men.
A jeep and 15 men had already landed.

At H+9 hours ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ and ‘D’ Troops should have landed plus:
From RHQ.
Jeep
15cwt
3ton GS
Water trailer
15cwt FFW.
30 men.

From 273 and 274 Battery HQ each:
Car 4 seater 4 X 4.
2 X 15cwt GS
15cwt water.
3ton GS.
3ton Machinery I30.
24 men.

At H+16½ hours. ‘E’ and ‘F’ troops from 383 Battery should have landed. Battery Headquarters did not land. One ‘E’ troop was placed under 274 Battery on Mike and ‘F’ troop under 273 Battery on Nan. ‘E’ and ‘F’ troops land reconnaissance party and main party at the same time.


LAA.
The first LAA units ashore were the troops equipped with Tracked Self Propelled 40mm LAA guns. These were Crusaders with 40mm mounted on them. Each troop had three such vehicles and each one towed a standard 40mm LAA on its trailer. Each Crusader landed towing a 40mm and moved into the dunes where it positioned the towed gun and then moved to its own position. The Crusaders carried ammunition and gun stores for the towed gun and dumped them at the towed gun position. The troop Commanders wireless set was also carried on a Crusader and the Troop Headquarters was set up at this Crusaders gun position.

The LAA troop with tracked 20mm LAA guns were similarly organised and equipped, having three Tracked Self Propelled Crusader triple 20mm AA guns and three triple 20mm on trailers. The vehicles deployed separately and one vehicle carried the troop wireless set for the Troop Headquarters which was situated with it.

The tracked vehicles landed as early as possible. Troops of Self Propelled 40mm guns on wheeled chassis (Morris 4 X 4) landed later and deployed forward of the tracked troops. The remaining LAA troops arrived later still with 40mm guns towed by Bedford QL Tractors. These deployed in the forward part of the Beach Maintenance Area.

Each 40mm tracked troop also landed a Bedford QL LAA Tractor to carry ammunition and gun equipment, and to reposition the towed guns using their winches if necessary.

114 LAA Regiment landed Regimental Headquarters to act initially as headquarters for ‘O’ AA assault group, and two battery headquarters, 372 and 375, to control the gun troops. All LAA units came under the command of these batteries. In the assault phase only one of the two LAA Battery Headquarters landed and was responsible for all the LAA guns in the Assault Group. The nucleus of the second LAA Battery Headquarters landed at the same time but was used as a reserve and for reconnaissance until control passed from the Assault Group.

Until the AAOR could be set up the LAA units relied on Visual Observer Posts for early warning. These were manned by LAA personnel. It was planned that they should have Loyd Carriers but no evidence of their use has yet been found.

114 LAA Regiment.
375/114 Battery.
Landing Crusader Tracked SP 40mm towing 40mm on trailers.
H+60 Nan White.
Battery HQ landed a reconnaissance party of a 15cwt FFW and 7 men. At the same time G and H Troops each landed a reconnaissance party of a Jeep and six men. marching . NW.
H+75 Nan Red.
G troop landed G troop two Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 12 crew and towing two 40mm. There was also a marching party of 28 men for the guns and a LAA Tractor with 5 crew. Each of G and H Troops landed three men for the AAOR.
H+90 Nan Red.
G troop landed its third Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 6 crew and towing a 40mm towed. There was also a marching party of 11 men. H troop landed as a complete unit of three Crusader tracked SP 40mm with 18 crew, three towed 40mm, a marching party of 39 men and a LAA Tractor with 5 crew.
H+9 hours.
Battery HQ landed a 3ton GS, a 15cwt FFW, a 15cwt water and 9 men.


93 LAA Regiment.
321/93 LAA.
Landing Crusader tracked SP triple 20mm and towed 20mm on trailers.
H+60
‘E’ Troop lands a reconnaissance party of a Jeep and 6 men.
H+4 hours.
‘E’ Troop lands three Crusader tracked SP 20mm towing three 20mm on trailers, a tractor LAA and 66 men.
H+16½ hours.
‘F’ Troop lands a reconnaissance party of a jeep and six men, three Crusader tracked SP 20mm towing three 20mm on trailers, a tractor LAA and 71 men.


220/73 LAA.
All of this unit was delayed.
H+9 hours.
Battery Head Quarters landed a3ton 4 X 4 GS, a 15cwt FFW, a15cwt water and 15 men.
‘D’ Troop lands a Jeep, two Tractor LAA, six 40mm SP and 68 men.
H+16½ hours.
‘E’ Troop lands a Jeep, a Tractor LAA, three 40mm SP and 50 men.
‘F’ Troop lands a Jeep, two Tractor LAA, six 40mm SP and 70 men.
H+23 hours.
‘E’ Troop lands a Jeep, a Tractor LAA, three 40mm SP and 20 men.

218/73 LAA.
H+9 hours.
‘B’ Troop lands a Jeep, two Tractor LAA, six 40mm SP and 70 men.


Searchlights.
Searchlight batteries landed two reconnaissance parties each since they had a large area to cover. They were deployed in sections of four with some designated to carry out beach illumination duties if required. The remainder established communications with the LAA and cooperated with then in the canopy role. Searchlight Battery Headquarters was positioned alongside the AAOR.

Troop organisation was straightforward.
R1 Group.
Car 5cwt 4 X 4 Jeep.
Troop Commander, clerk, two despatch riders.

R2 Group.
15cwt FFW.
Subaltern, three driver operator.
No22 set, No17 set, Bren, motorcycle.

A Group.
15cwt GS.
Motor mechanic, telephonist.
Stores, spares, tools.
8 X Leyland Retriever 6 X 4 SL Lorry.
8 X 90mm Searchlight with SLC (Elsie) Radar..
Troop Leader, Troop serjeant, equipment repairer, two fitter electrical searchlight, four radio mechanic, 24 NCO searchlight numbers, 74 private searchlight numbers.
8 X No 17 set.
5 X motorcycle.

Y Group.
8 X 15cwt GS.
Eight driver IC, eight cooks, eight drivers IC searchlight plant, despatch rider, driver/batman.

The organisation allows searchlight detachments to operate independently. Communication within the troop was by No17 set and when so ordered detachments used the Searchlight Control Radar fitted to the light to detect and track enemy aircraft. The light would be ordered to be exposed when the guns were ready to fire. LAA guns were not radar controlled and depended on visual gun laying.

At this date it was usual for the 90mm Searchlight to be carried by a Tilling Stevens 3ton lorry which had its generator mounted under the bonnet with the engine. This could not be waterproofed so the older Leyland was issued instead.


REME.
For the assault stage each assault group was to have a composite workshop with a combination of personnel and equipment from HAA, LAA and SL Workshops. These were not due to land until D+4. In the meantime AA units were to land 3ton 4 X 4 I30 (battery charging) and 15cwt T (telecommunications workshop) vehicles. In the early stages wireless sets would be vital and they required a lot of battery power.


Balloons.
RAF Barrage balloons were flown on available LCT and LST. They were not flown on the first waves of LCT, those carrying DD tanks were not intended to beach and those carrying Breaching Teams and RMASR Centaurs did not fly them as they would have breached security. 200 balloons were transported across the Channel on D day, 60 for each beach and 20 as a reserve. Those balloons which were to be established on the beach were accompanied by a hand winch and two RAF personnel. Reserve balloons were not accompanied by RAF personnel. Beach Group personnel were required to assist with carrying the winch since, except for short distances, it required four men.

A balloon barrage was established along the coast and extending some 1500 feet inland. They were to be flown at 2000 feet except near airfields. In order to avoid interference with two Rearming and Refuelling Strips the following restrictions were imposed. There were to be no balloons within 2000 yards of an airstrip. There were also funnel shaped zones leading to the airstrip runways. In these zones there were to be no balloons for 3000 yards beyond the existing 2000 yard restriction. Between 3000 yards and 6000 yards balloons were to fly at 1000 foot, between 6000 yards and 9000 yards balloons were to fly at 1500 foot and between 9000 yards and 12000 yards there was a limit of 2000 foot even if the normal 2000 foot limit was at any time increased.

The restrictions applied to Emergency Landing Strips from D day and to Rearming and refuelling strips from D+3. Initially each of the strips had only one runway. When a second runway was later added additional restricted funnel zones were imposed

102 Beach Sub Area had balloons operated by No2 Beach Balloon Squadron, consisting of 51 and 52 Beach Balloon Units.

Balloons were also flown on Gooseberry breakwaters.

Replacement balloons were flown by LCT and LST of the Shuttle Service as required. These were unaccompanied and 102 sub area provided personnel to unload them and the winches..


Smoke.
The pioneer smoke detachments were distributed along the shore and along the landward boundary of 102 Beach Sub Area. They were to be ready to use No24 smoke generators to create a screen along those lines as required and to maintain the screen for up to three hours.


Decoys.
Decoy sites were planned for the gaps between beaches in the hopes of misleading enemy aircraft into bombing them instead of the active beaches. A site was established on the boundaries of Sword and Juno and occupied part of Oboe beach. Little information has been found on these sites, probably because they were established by RAF camouflage units which had established similar decoys in the UK.


Early Warning.
Initially early warning came from headquarters ships. Largs provided air raid warning for I Corps. There was an air section with air staff officers and an AA liaison staff. 155 AAOR provided a small liaison party of two officers, two plotters and two orderlies. These received information from the AAOR when it was operational and sent warnings to 80 AA Brigade units. Air raid warnings were broadcast, and were received on R109 sets.

Communications were initially by wireless with the gun batteries using No22 sets and the searchlights No17 sets. Each heavy troop and section of light guns will have a R109 receiver for picking up early warning from the Anti Aircraft Defence Commander Headquarters. In addition certain troop headquarters will have R208 receivers for picking up early warning from the Anti Aircraft Operations Room. Line communications were laid as soon as possible.


AA Deployment 21 June.
This date is chosen both because the information is available for that date and because it illustrates the deployment of AA units two weeks after the initial landings and after various reorganisations.

The six HAA troops of 86 HAA Regiment were so organised that the two batteries each had three troops, two located inland of the beaches and one on the edge of the Beach Sub Area. 273 Battery on Nan had ‘A’ and ‘B’ troops near the beaches and ‘F’ Troop inland. 274 Battery on Mike had ‘C’ and ‘D’ troops near the beaches and ‘E’ Troop inland.

The LAA troops of 114 LAA Regiment and 93 LAA Regiment were distributed along the beaches and with two troops covering Courseulles and the headquarters inland of it. On Nan 375 Battery of 114 Regiment controlled its own ‘G’ and ‘H’ troops plus ‘E’ troop of 93 Regiment. On Mike 372 Battery of 114 Regiment controlled its own ‘A’ and ‘B’ troops plus ‘D’ and ‘F’ troops of 93 Regiment.

Headquarters 86 HAA Regiment and 155 AAOR were situated inland near Beny sur Mer. REME workshops were at Tailleville.

Other units which had been deployed on Juno and 102 Beach Sub Area had been redeployed by this date.


Air Attacks.
The greater number of air attacks were against Sword Beach. These were generally made by aircraft flying from east to west. Dawn and dusk were relatively quiet and most raids were made in the early hours of the morning or in the afternoon. The night raids were generally made by single bombers dropping high explosive and anti personnel bombs from altitudes up to 7000 feet. Day time raids were generally by formations of fighter bombers attacking from shallow dives. Where attacks were made on Juno they came from the south.

Anti aircraft units, including LBF, claimed 15 enemy aircraft destroyed, all but one in daylight. It was reported however that radar controlled LAA fire, assisted by radar controlled searchlights deterred many attackers.

After the first week, although air raids continued, the enemy concentrated on attacking shipping, mainly by laying mines at night.

D day.
1550. Four Ju 88 attack from east to west over Q AA Assault Group area. Low level bombing raid.
1700. Six Ju 88 in two groups of three from east to west over Q AA Assault Group area. Low level bombing raid.

D+1.
23.45 to 0500. Approximately twelve aircraft from east to west and circling over the beach area. Aircraft launched individual attacks diving from 4000 foot to 500 foot, mainly against shipping but some ant personnel bombs on the beaches and forward areas. LAA engaged with an undirected barrage in which the Navy joined. No radar was as yet available.
2315. One Ju 88 dropped one bomb on Nan.

D+2.
0001 to 0430. Approximately six aircraft attacked Queen and Nan. More aircraft attacked shipping offshore.
0430. A Do 217 made a machine gun and bombing attack on Mike.
0600. Three Me 109 flew east to west offshore of nan.
1645. Ten Me 109 and FW 190 attacked shipping from east to west.
2300. One Ju 88 made a bombing attack on Nan from the south.

D+3.
0024 to 0424. Seven aircraft made low level bombing attacks on the beach. They attacked separately and from different directions.
Queen.
2315. A Me 210 made a low level bombing attack.
2340. There were several attacks by single aircraft bombing from 3000 feet.

D+6.
1400. A number of FW 190 attacked Mike from the north east.
2320. A single aircraft attacked Mike from the north east.

D+7.
0001 to 0050. Fifteen to twenty aircraft attacked Queen and Mike from all directions, The greatest concentration was on Colleville which was bombed from 7000 to 8000 feet.
2315. One fighter flew from north to south against Mike. It glided in with engine cut off and bombed without being detected.

Mike.

 

A Plan of the AA Defence of Juno.



Mike

 

The Gale.
On D+13 the gale that was to last for two days and destroy Mulberry A started. At 0330 the wind suddenly increased and it soon became impossible to continue unloading. By 1030 all discharge in the anchorage had ceased and ferry craft took shelter inside Gooseberry 4. Three loaded Rhino ferries were still alongside MT ships and tugs were sent to tow them to safety inside the Gooseberry. One broke adrift before a tug arrived and it drifted ashore. A second Rhino was towed safely in but the third broke lose from the tug that was towing it and it drifted alongside the outside of the Gooseberry.

At 0900 Twelve LCT of the Shuttle Service had arrived. Since it was then impossible to beach them they were ordered to shelter inside the Gooseberry. Owing to the congestion inside the Gooseberry not all the LCT could get in and seven drifted ashore, six of them breaking their backs.
Shortly after midday four LST were beached, dried out and unloaded. They successfully unbeached again at 2040. As conditions were still worsening a signal was sent at 2100 ordering that no more LST should be beached. Three coasters were beached during the day but they were soon broadside on to the beach. They were still there a week later although they had been discharged.

At 1240 a MT ship dragged its anchor and drifted into HMS Diadem, holing her in four places above the waterline. At 1915 the MT ship Fort Poplar ran aground but was later pulled off.

At 2000 NOIC reported that the beach resembled D Day. Apart from the larger vessels mentioned above there were many small craft aground and damaged. All convoy sailings were suspended.

On D+14 the storm worsened and the wind reached Force 8 in the early afternoon. At 1315 HMS Hilary began to drag her anchors, she had put two down, and sailed further to seaward to give room to manoeuvre.

Apart from many small craft casualties LST 386 dragged her anchor and drifted ashore on Nan White. She was damaged and was later towed back to the UK, after being unloaded. Tasajera dragged alongside the Gooseberry and was holed. She sailed back to the UK for repairs. Chant 26 dragged ashore.

Despite all the difficulties 544 personnel and 15 vehicles were landed from the beached LST and 1354 tons of stores were unloaded from the beached coasters.

On D+15 the weather remained unfavourable with a Force 6 wind and heavy seas. At 1500 fourteen LSTs were ordered to try and beach, which they did successfully. They unloaded and unbeached again. Chant 7 capsized and was lost. The only stores landed this day were from the stranded coasters.

On D+16 wind and sea conditions gradually improved. The beaching and unloading of LSTs continued successfully. Ferry Craft were unable to secure alongside the MT ships so they could not be unloaded. No stores were landed. Hilary returned and a start was made on clearing up the damage.

D+17 saw a great deal of activity on the part of staffs on both sides of he Channel. The unloading programmes had been seriously interrupted at a crucial time in the build up. LSTs were being unloaded but the unloading of MT ships and stores coasters was at a standstill. Furthermore the number of beached and damaged craft were obstructing the beaches.

The first important decision to be implemented was the use of LSTs to discharge MT ships and clear the backlog. All those LSTs which had unloaded and unbeached were ordered to go alongside MT ships at first light. Port Operating personnel, using the MT ships own derricks as normal, lifted the vehicles onto the upper deck of LSTs. They were then lowered on the LSTs lifts to the tank deck. Vehicles were reversed into the tank deck so that they were correctly positioned for rapid unloading after beaching. When the tank deck was full further vehicles were parked on the upper deck. LSTs then beached and unloaded as normal. This was very successful with British LSTs which had a lift. Two LSTs could discharge a MT ship. The US LSTs which had ramps instead of lifts were not so successful. It was not possible for them to carry vehicles on the tank deck so that only the upper deck could be used. This method of unloading MT ships did not delay the LSTs and all were ready for sailing for the UK at the usual time.

Later in the day it was possible to resume the unloading of coasters, first by beaching and then as the weather improved by ferry craft.

There were still difficulties to come. HMS Scylla, the flagship of Naval Commander Eastern Task Force, was mined and incapable of moving. The Naval Commander and his staff moved to HMS Hilary. This was inconvenient to say the least at this time of renewed activity. Scylla was towed to the UK on D+18.

On D+18 it was reported that all convoys were running and the normal unloading routine was resumed. However much time had been lost.

Gooseberry 4 stood up to storm very well. It protected large numbers of small craft and these were secure throughout. There was a two foot swell inside the breakwater but although uncomfortable this did not cause concern or damage. It was found that three of the Corncob ships had subsided into deeper water as a result of the storm but the protection was not compromised.

As a consequence of the storm and the extra work it had made necessary for the staffs it was decided to delay the return of the Naval Commander Force ‘J’ to the UK.

Much work remained to be done in clearing the beaches of beached and damaged craft. The Landing Craft Recovery Units and the heavier repair units were fully occupied. Sections of Port Repair Parties were landed from the depot ships to carry out repairs on the small craft stranded on the beach. Additional hull repair personnel were sent from the UK together with stocks of materials and electric welding sets which had been kept in reserve for such an emergency. Repair ship LCE1 and a reserve port repair party were sent from the UK. Although some of the small craft could be refloated many, plus some larger craft, had to wait until the next spring tide on 8 July before they could be refloated. The stranded coasters were also refloated at this time.

Additional repair facilities and personnel were also found on the UK side of the Channel to repair craft and ships that were returned there.

Mike.

 

I have just about finished Juno. Gold will not be ready for a long time yet. If anyone is interested I can upload some material on Force L, pre loaded coasters and motor transport ships and the loading schedules at Tilbury and London Docks.

Force L was the British Follow Up Force carrying 7 Armoured Division, 51 Division and the tail of the divisions already ashore. It contained ships and craft for all three British beaches.

The information on preloaders was acquired by accident as it was included in files on other subjects.

Mike

 

Another fantastic thread completed Mike! Many thanks for this unique "summary", if this term may be used for such an in-depth and detailed account.

Of course we want more, what kind of info do you have on Force L? Loading Tables would be great !

Michel

 

My thanks to Mike as well for compiling all of this, a terrific reference.

 

Mike

Great work!!! Thank you for that.

Michel has said it all.

Please go ahead with force L!

Aixman

 

All right. I forgo the traditional show of reluctance. Force L etc will follow as time allows.

Mike.