July 1940- Operation Catapult; was it necessary?

Discussion in 'The War at Sea' started by Warlord, Dec 7, 2007.

  1. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Was it really necessary to stab the already one-foot-in-the-grave french in the back with this kind of operation, and all the related ones, in those dark days of 1940? Or was it just some sort of revenge (punishment) for not staying in the brawl?
     
  2. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    I think it was a very pragmatic approach to a particular problem. It was cold and heartless but in the Summer of 1940 Britain was staring at a possible invasion, her armies had been routed (Yes, Dunkirk was a rout) and she had no allies anywhere. The British Government went into "survival" mode and were determined that in the area of naval supremacy Britain would remain superior. I'll bet if you were to interview anyone who supported Catapult now they would express regret at what had happened but as I say Britain needed to do what was necessary.
     
  3. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    Warlord,

    Britain is really an island nation, traditionally our navy has 'been' the armed forces, A small professional land army and recently a competent airforce. Britain knew its navy was everything, if the French Warships where lost to the Germans/Italians the balance would have shifted.

    I used to think it really was a kneejerk reaction, but if you look into it, the RN was pretty much forced to act.

    Kev
     
  4. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    I think it was a very pragmatic approach to a particular problem. It was cold and heartless

    Not really that wel lup on the subject much my understanding is that the French ships had plenty of options, to either put their ships or guns out of service or come over to the allies (technically we where not at war with Vichy France so not sure about the absolute legaltiy of it), they chose not too. Not cold or heartless.

    Kev
     
  5. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    sorry Kev if I gave the impression that the RN was cold and heartless. The decision taken was cold but it needed to happen. I have no doubt that it was the right thing to do in Britain's interests but remember that it is a decision that can be described as Cold especially if you are not British!
     
  6. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    I just wanted to know opinions, since I personally and definitely agree with the fact that the operation was necessary, the kind of regrettable but your-only-choice decision that so usually has to be taken during war.

    The Empire was fighting for survival pretty much alone, and even though Catapult created a rash that lasts in some instances up until today, it was better than have the Dunkerque and sisters covering the landings at Dover.

    Now, that arises another question, which I allow myself to ask:

    Why didn´t the French do as the Czechs, Poles or Norwegians, and keep the fight against the Axis based on their own colonies or Britain?

    I mean, Vichy shouldn´t have even existed, since you owe your loyalty to your sovereign country, not to a bunch of politicians; De Gaulle had to fight against his own countrymen to establish the FREE French regime, Syrian tragedy included.
     
  7. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Excellent concise summary of the Mers-el-Kebir business with maps.
    H.M.S. Hood Association-Battle Cruiser Hood: H.M.S. Hood Reference Materials - Mers el Kebir

    Allowing those ships to fall into German hands was surely impossible to even consider. I suppose the big question is whether they would have been scuttled as ordered. If the French Admiral Gensoul had allowed negotiations in person and actually signalled his superiors of the options he'd been given rather than just the demand to scuttle then maybe the outcome would have been somewhat different.

    And propaganda's a funny thing... yes the Germans could make much of this event, but what a hell of a signal to the rest of the world that an apparently beaten Great Britain was still prepared and capable of prosecuting the war to the nth degree.

    War is awful, and throws up awful dilemmas. I can't see that there was much choice.
     
  8. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    sorry Kev if I gave the impression that the RN was cold and heartless. The decision taken was cold but it needed to happen. I have no doubt that it was the right thing to do in Britain's interests but remember that it is a decision that can be described as Cold especially if you are not British!


    No Im sorry GH. Not much gets my goat but Vichy France just something about it. The avereage German I have every sympathy with, but Vichy France, it makes me sick. What the hell where the officers thinking.

    Kev
     
  9. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    There was no confidence as to the future intentions and uses of these warships given the climate that existed at the time.

    Once this fleet was bottled up it could not be allowed to threaten the RN under any circumstances.

    A sad end however the old adage was put in place, "You are either with us or against us".

    We have had 67 years to ponder the situation however Vichy intentions in those dark days could not be trusted.
     
  10. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Something Jeff (Slipdigit) mentioned on a not specifically related matter on WW2f piqued my interest.
    There's a lesser known aspect to Operation catapult which is the forced boarding of French Ships laid up in Plymouth, Portsmouth, and other UK ports at the same time in 1940. There were several vessels seized and something of a fight.
    This from: Naval-History.Net
    French Navy in Britain - The two World War 1 French battleships "Courbet" and "Paris" and several destroyers and submarines, including the giant "Surcouf" were in British ports. On the 3rd they were boarded and seized, but not before there were casualties on both sides including three British and one French dead.
    & from here, again on the excellent Naval History.net (My bold):
    French ships in England

    Plymouth (Amiral L. M. G. Cayol, all ships were under repair) - battleship PARIS, large destroyer LE TRIOMPHANT, destroyers MISTRAL and OURAGAN, torpedo boat BOUCLIER, sloops COMMANDANT DUBOC, COUCY, and BELFORT, submarines SURCOUF, JUNON, and MINERVE, and submarine chasers CH.8, CH.11, CH.12, CH.15.

    Portsmouth (Amiral R. M. A. Gaudin de Vilaine, all ships were under repair - battleship COURBET, large destroyer LEOPARD, sloops CHEVREUIL, AMIENS, ARRAS, DILIGENTE, EPINAL, QUENTIN ROOSEVELT, SAVORGNAN DE BRAZZA, and LA CAPRICIEUSE, corvette LA MALOUINE, torpedo boats BRANLEBAS, CORDELIERE, INCOMPRISE, FLORE, and MELPOMENE (these torpedo boats and BOUCLIER at Plymouth were later formed into the 23rd Destroyer Flotilla), minelayer POLLUX, armed patrol vessel REINA DES FLOTS, submarines ORION and ONDINE, and submarine chasers CH.5, CH.6, CH.7, CH.10, CH.13, CH.14, CH.41, CH.42, CH.43, C 98, C 106.

    Southampton - auxiliary minelayer INGENIEUR CACHIN and armed patrol vessels PATRIE, LA NANTAISE, and L'ORANAISE.

    Falmouth - target vessel L'IMPASSIBLE, sloops COMMANDANT DOMINE, LA MOQUEUSE, SUIPPE, and CONQUERANTE, hydrographic sloop PRESIDENT THEODORE TISSIER, and VTB.11.

    Swansea - submarine CREOLE (she had only been launched on 8 June 1940 at Le Havre and was towed to La Pallice. She departed La Pallice under tow on 18 June for Swansea)

    Dundee - submarine RUBIS

    Hythe - motor torpedo boats VTB.8, VTB.12, VTB.23, VTB.24, VTB.25, VTB.26, VTB.27.

    Barry - armed patrol vessel ARMENIER

    Greenock - armed patrol vessel LEOVILLE

    Sheerness - armed patrol vessels LE VAILLANT and VIKINGS.

    The only resistance was at Plymouth.

    Destroyer MISTRAL was partially scuttled by opening of the sea valves by her crew.

    Submarine SURCOUF, berthed alongside Submarine THAMES, was the scene of armed resistance. Cdr D. V. Sprague, commanding officer of the THAMES, Lt P. M. K. Griffiths, from submarine RORQUAL, a British rating from battleship REVENGE, and a French guard were killed in the take over of the French ship.

    These from CWGC are the named men killed:
    Name: SPRAGUE, DENIS VAUGHAN
    Initials: D V
    Nationality: United Kingdom
    Rank: Commander
    Regiment/Service: Royal Navy
    Unit Text: H.M.S. Thames
    Age: 38
    Date of Death: 04/07/1940
    Additional information: Son of Alfred Ernest and Ella Sprague; husband of Rosemary Sprague, of Alverstoke, Hampshire.
    Casualty Type: Commonwealth War Dead
    Grave/Memorial Reference: Sec. C. Cons. Grave 3716.
    Cemetery: PLYMOUTH (WESTON MILL) CEMETERY


    Name: GRIFFITHS, PATRICK MAULE KERR
    Initials: P M K
    Nationality: United Kingdom
    Rank: Lieutenant
    Regiment/Service: Royal Navy
    Unit Text: H.M.S. Rorqual
    Age: 27
    Date of Death: 05/07/1940
    Additional information: Son of William Arthur Griffiths and of Frances Dorothy Beresford Maule Griffiths (nee Kerr), of Alverstoke, Hampshire.
    Casualty Type: Commonwealth War Dead
    Grave/Memorial Reference: Sec. C. Cons. Grave 3700.
    Cemetery: PLYMOUTH (WESTON MILL) CEMETERY


    And with a bit of help from Geoff's search engine I think I've got the other Navy man who died that day:
    Name: WEBB, ALBERT
    Initials: A
    Nationality: United Kingdom
    Rank: Leading Seaman
    Regiment/Service: Royal Navy
    Unit Text: H.M.S. Revenge.
    Age: 38
    Date of Death: 03/07/1940
    Service No: P/J 112872
    Additional information: Husband of Lilian May Webb.
    Casualty Type: Commonwealth War Dead
    Grave/Memorial Reference: Sec. C. Cons. Grave 3518.
    Cemetery: PLYMOUTH (WESTON MILL) CEMETERY
    I wouldn't know where to start on the Frenchman's details.

    Does anyone have any more on how these chaps died fighting their allies in home ports? Or any more detail of the British boarding incidents as a whole?

    Cheers,
    Adam.
     
  11. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Just read this too,
    Surcouf (N N 3 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
    The acrimony between the British and French caused by these actions escalated when the British attempted to repatriate the captured French sailors: the British hospital ship that was carrying them back to France was sunk by the Germans, and many of the French blamed the British for the deaths.


    The only officer not repatriated from the original crew, Louis Blaison, became the new commander. Because of the British-French tensions with regard to the submarine, accusations were made by each side that the other was spying for Vichy France the British also claimed that Surcouf was attacking British ships. Later, a British officer and two sailors were put on board for "liaison" purposes.
     
  12. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Aha,
    uboat.net - Discussion Forums :: General Discussions :: Re: Surcouf & Project CA.35, Part.1
    Meanwhile, two British ratings were left to guard five French officers in the ward room while Sprague escorted martin up to the casing. One of the Frenchmen asked if he could go to the (heads) and here, evidently a number of pistols were hidden, a few moments later Sprague heard a shot. He drew his pistol and ran back down towards the wardroom where he recieved six bullets before the Gunnery Officer, Bouillaunt, shot him fatally in the head. Griffiths, following Sprague, fired at Bouillant and wounded him in the shoulder, tripping over Sprague's body as he turned to run for help. As he fell, he in turn was shot in the back by the submarine's doctor who then fired his pistol at one of the British ratings, who suceeded in bayonetting another member of the crew before he too, died.
    Sprague, Griffiths, one British leading seaman and one french sailor were killed in the scuffle )or died soon afterwards) and two men were wounded before the remainder of the baording party gained control. It was a sad, secretive affair.


    Sad indeed.
     
  13. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    'Interesting' looking beast;
    The Submarine Surcouf:
    [​IMG]
    Some good shots here:
    Plan de bateaux#
     
  14. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Not really that wel lup on the subject much my understanding is that the French ships had plenty of options, to either put their ships or guns out of service or come over to the allies (technically we where not at war with Vichy France so not sure about the absolute legaltiy of it), they chose not too. Not cold or heartless.

    Kev

    The Frensh ships at Alexandria were interned peacfully mainly due to the actions of the British Admiral (Cunningham) and the French Admiral.

    The French Navy at Mers-el kebir was given several options, 1.) join the Allies, 2.) internment, 3.) depart under escort for USA or French Caribbean ports, 4.) scuttle, or 5.) be attacked

    The French admiral reported (untruthfully) to Paris that he was instructed to surreder or be attacked. {The subsequent attack killed many French sailors}

    I just wanted to know opinions, since I personally and definitely agree with the fact that the operation was necessary, the kind of regrettable but your-only-choice decision that so usually has to be taken during war.

    The Empire was fighting for survival pretty much alone, and even though Catapult created a rash that lasts in some instances up until today, it was better than have the Dunkerque and sisters covering the landings at Dover.

    Now, that arises another question, which I allow myself to ask:

    Why didn´t the French do as the Czechs, Poles or Norwegians, and keep the fight against the Axis based on their own colonies or Britain?

    I mean, Vichy shouldn´t have even existed, since you owe your loyalty to your sovereign country, not to a bunch of politicians; De Gaulle had to fight against his own countrymen to establish the FREE French regime, Syrian tragedy included.

    There was a vote in the French Cabinet to retreat to Algeria and continue the war from there {with the full French Navy intact} the decision failed by one vote!
     
  15. Arsenal vg-33

    Arsenal vg-33 Member

    Perhaps I will be the lone voice of dissent on this topic, and say that Operation Catapult was not necessary. I would also like to ask if anyone on this thread has bothered to read any French accounts of this event, either in it's original lanugaue or translated. Believe me, it makes for interesting comparison.

    On the question of the actual options given to the French fleet at Mers el Kebir, most French sources state that the options given to Admiral Gensoul were somewhat vague, especially in it's option to "Join the Allies and continue the fight", specifically under what flag.

    Most are of the opinion that a more specific statement such as "Continue the fight as Free French" may have produced a different outcome. They also point out that technically, Admiral Muselier outranked Gen. de Gaulle when he joined the Free French cause, and that perhaps we may have seen a Free French leader under the overall auspices of Muselier. A very recent and very interesting publication by Dominique Lormier "Mers el-Kebir: Juilliet 1940" (2007) indicates that many French sailors and officers were fully expecting that the fleet would sail to England. Whether they wanted this or not would not matter, it's what they believed would soon happen.

    It is also well known that the attack pushed many in the new Vichy camp further into the German camp, in particular Laval and Adm. Darlan. When Laval wanted Petain to make a formal declaration of war against England for the attack, Petain backed off. This would lead Laval to begin to pull the string from behind Petain and become the real power broker of Vichy, not to mention the complete dissolution of the Third Republic.

    As with most non-English language accounts, I am inclined to conclude that the tragedy of Mers el-Kebir was the result of British paranoia. It's my firm belief that the French admiralty had no intentions of letting the Germans take their fleet. In fact, the French were more than willing to sink their own ships rather than see them being seized by anyone else. I would also like to point out that the events at Alexandria and later Toulon negates any justification for Operation Catapult. As for the British seizure of key French ships at Plymouth, that was an act of sheer stupidity and short-sightedness.

    I scoff at any suggestions that the French would have willingly handed over their fleet to either the Germans and/or the Italians. It was an important caveat within the terms of the June 1940 armistice, upon French demands, and there's no evidence to suggest the French would suddenly change their minds on this issue.
     
  16. 4th wilts

    4th wilts Discharged

    oh come along,we were alone in the war,the commonwealth,that is.a world war,the french were given a chance,they did not take it,so they were sunk.yours,4th wilts.
     
  17. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Perhaps I will be the lone voice of dissent on this topic, and say that Operation Catapult was not necessary. I would also like to ask if anyone on this thread has bothered to read any French accounts of this event, either in it's original lanugaue or translated. Believe me, it makes for interesting comparison.

    On the question of the actual options given to the French fleet at Mers el Kebir, most French sources state that the options given to Admiral Gensoul were somewhat vague, especially in it's option to "Join the Allies and continue the fight", specifically under what flag.

    Most are of the opinion that a more specific statement such as "Continue the fight as Free French" may have produced a different outcome. They also point out that technically, Admiral Muselier outranked Gen. de Gaulle when he joined the Free French cause, and that perhaps we may have seen a Free French leader under the overall auspices of Muselier. A very recent and very interesting publication by Dominique Lormier "Mers el-Kebir: Juilliet 1940" (2007) indicates that many French sailors and officers were fully expecting that the fleet would sail to England. Whether they wanted this or not would not matter, it's what they believed would soon happen.

    It is also well known that the attack pushed many in the new Vichy camp further into the German camp, in particular Laval and Adm. Darlan. When Laval wanted Petain to make a formal declaration of war against England for the attack, Petain backed off. This would lead Laval to begin to pull the string from behind Petain and become the real power broker of Vichy, not to mention the complete dissolution of the Third Republic.

    As with most non-English language accounts, I am inclined to conclude that the tragedy of Mers el-Kebir was the result of British paranoia. It's my firm belief that the French admiralty had no intentions of letting the Germans take their fleet. In fact, the French were more than willing to sink their own ships rather than see them being seized by anyone else. I would also like to point out that the events at Alexandria and later Toulon negates any justification for Operation Catapult. As for the British seizure of key French ships at Plymouth, that was an act of sheer stupidity and short-sightedness.

    I scoff at any suggestions that the French would have willingly handed over their fleet to either the Germans and/or the Italians. It was an important caveat within the terms of the June 1940 armistice, upon French demands, and there's no evidence to suggest the French would suddenly change their minds on this issue.
    Well this is an interesting post and well done for putting this opinion across. I think that we can all agree that whatever the justification, it was tragedy for all concerned. Hindsight can be a very misleading thing though and whilst the British were quite heavy-handed in their dealings on this, how could they know the French Navy's intentions.
     
  18. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    Perhaps I will be the lone voice of dissent on this topic, and say that Operation Catapult was not necessary. I would also like to ask if anyone on this thread has bothered to read any French accounts of this event, either in it's original lanugaue or translated. Believe me, it makes for interesting comparison.

    On the question of the actual options given to the French fleet at Mers el Kebir, most French sources state that the options given to Admiral Gensoul were somewhat vague, especially in it's option to "Join the Allies and continue the fight", specifically under what flag.

    Most are of the opinion that a more specific statement such as "Continue the fight as Free French" may have produced a different outcome. They also point out that technically, Admiral Muselier outranked Gen. de Gaulle when he joined the Free French cause, and that perhaps we may have seen a Free French leader under the overall auspices of Muselier. A very recent and very interesting publication by Dominique Lormier "Mers el-Kebir: Juilliet 1940" (2007) indicates that many French sailors and officers were fully expecting that the fleet would sail to England. Whether they wanted this or not would not matter, it's what they believed would soon happen.

    It is also well known that the attack pushed many in the new Vichy camp further into the German camp, in particular Laval and Adm. Darlan. When Laval wanted Petain to make a formal declaration of war against England for the attack, Petain backed off. This would lead Laval to begin to pull the string from behind Petain and become the real power broker of Vichy, not to mention the complete dissolution of the Third Republic.

    As with most non-English language accounts, I am inclined to conclude that the tragedy of Mers el-Kebir was the result of British paranoia. It's my firm belief that the French admiralty had no intentions of letting the Germans take their fleet. In fact, the French were more than willing to sink their own ships rather than see them being seized by anyone else. I would also like to point out that the events at Alexandria and later Toulon negates any justification for Operation Catapult. As for the British seizure of key French ships at Plymouth, that was an act of sheer stupidity and short-sightedness.

    I scoff at any suggestions that the French would have willingly handed over their fleet to either the Germans and/or the Italians. It was an important caveat within the terms of the June 1940 armistice, upon French demands, and there's no evidence to suggest the French would suddenly change their minds on this issue.

    Good post Arsenel, Ive head this debate on the exact wording before, why was the message not delivered in by Cunningham in person. I am right in thinking it was done my Radio or by mee mortal?

    Was Toulon a clear cut thing, I know the results where but how close where the Germans in taking the ships (there was a big standoff I seem to remember), Also there where no German's in Morocco to seize the ships, where there?

    Kev
     
  19. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    Sadly the peace time political niceties went out of the window when Britains back was to the wall.

    Even though you have an opinion to the contrary of which you are entitled, action was taken by the British on what they felt was the right decision at the time.
     
  20. Arsenal vg-33

    Arsenal vg-33 Member

    Well this is an interesting post and well done for putting this opinion across. I think that we can all agree that whatever the justification, it was tragedy for all concerned. Hindsight can be a very misleading thing though and whilst the British were quite heavy-handed in their dealings on this, how could they know the French Navy's intentions.

    This is a very valid point. One thing I always try to remeind people when discussiing the past, is that it is a bit unfair to go to far when making assumptions based on post-war knowledge, and then applying it to the past. It simply doesn't work.

    As for my assertions to British fears vis-a-vis the French fleet, I use the term "paranoia" because I feel there was no merit behind it. The fear was genuine to be sure, but what evidence was there to suggest that the French were about to turn their ships over to the Germans? I cannot see anything that could used as definate proof to justify a massive attack such as Catapult. I'm afraid the British allowed Fear to get the better of them in this instance.

    Was Toulon a clear cut thing, I know the results where but how close where the Germans in taking the ships (there was a big standoff I seem to remember), Also there where no German's in Morocco to seize the ships, where there?

    Kev

    One of my books, which I unfortunately do not have at hand at this very moment, speaks of high ranking officers of the French navy communicating with the head Vichy officials, namely Laval. One of their biggest concerns was Adm. Darlan, and the approaching Germans forces headed towards Toulon. There seems to have been a lot of confusion as to who's order were be followed, when it seems someone made the decision that the ships would not fall into German hands, and would be scuttled. The scuttling was in full swing by the time the Germans arrived to the port, and dock workers did their best to prevent the Germans from getting past dock gates to reach the ships. One such ship (name escapes me) had Germans on the quai trying in vain to convince French sailors to leave the ship, and the sailors playing for time in order to set the charges or open the flood valves.

    A few small ships managed to escape and joined the Allies, but the best of the fleet was now sunk/scuttled. I think it's fair to say that the Germans were quite amazed and upset at this whole scene. I've heard the question: "Why didn't the French make a run for it?". Realistically, it would have been impossible to do so on such short notice. Many of the crews were on land, and most of the ships had too little fuel, though a few hoarded it and falsified records to obtain more. I believe there was also a fear that German U-boats were outside the harbor ready to sink any ships attempting to escape, though I cannot find anything to suggest there were U-boats lying in wait. Given the little time they had, I think they made the right choice to scuttle the fleet, as difficult and terrible as it was.

    Another interesting question also, had the German captured a fair number of French ships, would they have had the men to properly man them on short notice as well? Personally, I doubt it they would have been very successful impressing these ship into the Kreigsmarine in a timely way.
     

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