How many tanks?

Discussion in '1940' started by MarkN, May 29, 2016.

  1. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    jhunt,

    Many thanks for the contribution.

    Your "nominal standard" is almost identical to 1ArmdDiv "interim organisation" planned to have in place as of 1 June (see the images I posted on 2 June above) except in two minor respects.

    First, the 1ArmdDiv "interim organisation" shows a single light tank in RHQ alongside the 3 A10 cruisers to make a total of 22 light tanks for the regiment. Your "nominal standard" seems to reflect how they actually departed for France with that light tank allocation empty - and this a total of 21 light tanks as evidenced in 2RTR and 3RTR.

    Second, the 1ArmdDiv "interim organisation" shows all 3 squadrons have a pair of A13 cruiser troops and a pair of light tank troops; 2 of the SHQ having 2 A13 and 2 A9 whilst the third SHQ is made up of 3 light tanks. Your "nominal standard" swops the SHQ with a cruiser troop in that third squadron. If you bear that in mind, it could answer the point you bring up in your third paragraph regarding light tanks noted in SHQs

    Using your pointers, I've googled and found the census numbers. Did you spot that it is missing perhaps the most well known number of all: T9143 AGILITY? However, having 19-20 tanks as that list suggests is bang on the money. Except that it includes three numbers that went to France with QBays and only make the last as part of the combined Bays/10H B squadron of the Composite Regiment.

    Your 3RTR organisation is interesting in that it completely excludes any A10. Something I too have long considered to be a possibility. However, if correct, it pushes the weight of evidence towards both 9L and 10H have a full complement of their three. I'm also intrigued with your note of an A13 Mk.II in A Sqn HQ. That is a real oddity!!!

    Thanks again.

    I hope others can wade in with their contributions too.
     
  2. jhunt

    jhunt Junior Member

    Some more information

    The Queens Bays organisation listed by Peter Brown in Part 2 of his A13 article has 21light tanks MkVIc. Also the number of MkVIc Light Tanks listed as lost is 62, as far as I can ascertain the three Regiments of 2nd Armoured Brigade were the only ones that used MkVIc, i.e. no MkVIb (Although HQ 2nd Armoured Brigade did have MkVIb). My understanding is that no MkVIc tanks returned. Therefore, as Queens Bays had 21MkVIc that leaves 20 and 21 for 9L and 10H. Note the QB organisation quoted by Peter Brown is exactly in line with the “Standard”.

    I had picked up T9143; but with this and other information, that I would need to reconstruct, I could only get to 19 Cruisers in 10H.
    Regarding the actual strength of 10H its probably worthwhile looking at the stats for the Battle of Happy in Part 3. 10H started the battle with 12 Cruisers and 18 Light Tanks. Given that they would have arrived with 20 or 21 light tanks, i.e. 2 or 3 dropped out on the approach march, it is hard to believe that they could have started with anything like 30 cruisers, the attrition rate is pretty much out of the question, given that a fair portion or the journey from Cherbourg was by train and the relatively new nature of the equipment. Even if they started with 19 A13 Cruisers, seven dropping out seems a lot. Finally, in the same Section Peter Brown notes that the RHQ had 3 Tanks and two dropped out. I think that rather than supporting a 66% attrition rate that this supports the proposition, despite a lack of photographic evidence that RHQ of 10H had 3 A10, probably the most chronically unreliable British Tank (ever?).

    There is clear photo evidence that 9L had 3 A10 in their RHQ, T5918, T5921 & T9201.

    To explain the below establishment status of 9L and 10H I’m thinking that perhaps some SHQ’s had less that their establishment, for instance less than 2A9CS. Given that 18A 9CS ware lost and 1 survived there was clearly not enough to provide 4 per regiment i.e. 24; at least 5 short. I also think that there is a possibility that these Regiments may have been missing troops from some of their Squadrons, i.e. Squadrons that should have had 4 troops, may have had 3, though this is total speculation at this stage.

    Regarding 3RTR, the RHQ tank may be an A9 or and A10, I have only seen one photo of this tank, it is one of a number of tanks (the 6 tanks that were prematurely burned on 24th May) in the photo and it is not totally clear if it is an A9 or A10. I based my assumption that it is an A9 on some of the accounts of the incident, however looking at it again it’s could easily be an A10. Also you can’t see detail of squadron marks on this tank, but it is amongst other 3RTR tanks and an A9/A10 (i.e. non CS tank) simply does not fit in in any other position.

    The proposition that the HQ A Sqn includes an A13MkII is based on three of photos, Imperial War Museum photo KID 770, another that was in a Japanese Magazine years ago and the same photo as the A9/A10. Markings are clear on the first two photos, although there is no clear evidence that they are in Calais, markings on the third are not visible, however it is an A13MkII and most probably the same vehicle.

    Just some notes on 2RTR, the organisation seems to almost exactly mirror that of 3RTR except that A9 tanks seem to replace some of the A13 tanks in the various SHQ’s.

    Jamie
     
  3. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Hi,

    Are you sure? When I add them up I only get to 18.

    [​IMG]

    Here's the original...

    [​IMG]

    It differs from the 1st Armoured Division planned "interim establishment" for 1 June in that it does not have a light tank in RHQ and that C Sqn is showing 3 cruisers in SHQ rather than 3 light tanks which are also missing completely.

    Nevertheless, please remember that this is dated 3 May not the day they departed and arrived in France. Later in their WD their is a multi-page handwritten note of all of the tank commanders etc etc. In that note RHQ is shown as having four 4-man tanks (ie cruiser A10 or A13). Just to show the 3 May note was not the final word on the matter!

    As regards the number of drop out tanks before going into action, yes it was that bad!!! 9L lost the equivalent of over a full squadron without even going into action. The numbers you note for 10H shows they did likewise.

    Maj General Evans' report to CIGS dated 31 May states that the division had already lost to enemy action 31 cruiser and 34 light tanks. They had also lost 38 cruiser and 17 light tanks to wear & tear and mechanical defects. Of those 38, 22 were A13, 12 were A10 and 4 A9.

    On the same day he penned a note to Brigadier Swayne at No.2 Military Mission. In that note he states he has "only 65 cruisers and 64 light tanks left running". Remember, he states that he arrived in France with 150 cruiser and 134 light tanks. The numbers don't tally - I know!

    He also notes the following which you may be interested in ...

    He also writes in his reports that a significant number of his tanks didn't even start the "forced march" to the Somme because they still had yet to be fitted with appropriate equipment to get them battleworthy.

    ***

    And finally, isn't that IWM picture KID770 a publicity photo taken in Britain? 2, 3 and 5RTR certainly held A13 Mk.II until April when the consolidation took place. The 5RTR transfered their three to 10H.
     
  4. jhunt

    jhunt Junior Member

    Queens Bays

    I need the check my sources and not rely based on memory. When commenting on the QB organisation I was of course thinking of “A History of the Queens Bays 1929-1945, Beddington. I think this was quoted in an earlier post? By the way thanks for the original documentation.

    I guess one or the other or maybe something else is true. If the number of MkVIc is 18 then it lends greater credibility to the theory that 10H and 9L replaced Cruisers with light tanks, if it’s 21 the we are back where we before.

    Attrition Rates 10H.

    I have read many accounts of France in 1940 and understand the huge attrition rates (maintenance and battle casualties; but mainly maintenance) suffered by 1AD in France. My point was the discrepancy in 10H between Light Tanks attrition and Cruiser attrition on the approach march, while this relativity may be evident in some of the published numbers for later dates it’s certainly not in all. I only quoted this as a pointer to a possible explanation of the cruiser tank numbers in France. One thing for certain is that I understand the losses suffered; I just think that the relative discrepancy in this case is worthy of some comment.

    3RTR A13MkII

    While to have an A13MkII in a 3AB regiment is uncommon it is not without precedent, 5RTR certainly had one, there are a number of verifiable photos of this vehicle complete with AOS plate lost in France, why not 3RTR? While there were indeed lots of changes prior to embarkation, the markings on this tank are absolutely consistent with A Sqn tanks lost in France, down to the size of the number 9 on the AOS plate. Tank markings in France were very consistent at Sqn level, so I think that is more likely than not, this tank went to France with 3RTR. More than happy to be wrong and determine the real second A13 in HQ ASqn as there is no indication on the WD census number on the KID Photo’s.
     
  5. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    jhunt,

    I have not done a systematic collection and analysis of photos. If I come across an image and it helps in my understanding, great! Thus I will not dispute what you have and seen. Oddities to the norm were normal. Expect the exception to prove the rule. :)

    However, please bear in mind a couple of things. First, there are WD entries which show last minute exchanges of tanks. I have an example of tanks going from 2RTR to 9L the day before they sailed. In effect, 9L would initially be operating sime tanks with 2RTR AoS. Second, I also have a document from the 9L WD dated 4 June regarding the Composite Regiment (effectively HQ 9L) issuing orders for a repainting to remove embarkation numbers and to apply 9L AoS to the tanks now held with differing AoS. Whilst this is the only one I have found, who is to say other units didn't also do a repainting job?

    I think the idea that QBays took 21 light tanks to France is credible. I suggest that document dated 3 May, and reproduced faithfully by Peter Brown, suggesting just 18 is in error. Errors are standard fair!!!! They appear to have missed a troop off their list.

    More on attrition rates in a later post.

    Please keep you thoughts and comments coming.
     
  6. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Production data for tanks will not give us definitive answers to how many tanks were taken to France nor how many returned. How analysing that can give us a bit better understanding of the likely numbers.

    Here is a table I've created summarising the data. This data is based on MoS production figures not WO.

    [​IMG]

    Column A is the total production of tanks in the UK up to 30 April 1940.
    Column B is the production during May 1940 of which some, but not all, would have been available to go to France.
    Column C is the number of tanks lost according to SD.7 at the WO - see my earlier post.
    The date represents the month of the first issue of that type to a unit.

    A9
    A total of 89 A9 tanks were produced of which 68 had been sent to the Middle East. Thus 21 remained in the UK.

    A9CS
    These were in mid-production. They were being built at the Belfast factory of Harland and Wolff which means there was a significant time lag between record of completion and acceptance by the MoS at the factory and the arrival at either COD Chilwell or a unit. However, one can reasonably expect a couple of the May production to have been available to go to France.

    A10
    A total of 35 of these were produced by three separate firms in different parts of the country. It seems highly likely that the last 3 produced in May were also available to go to France. Indeed, the last one from Vickers, produced in May, is identified as one taken by 5RTR.

    A10a
    I have seen no evidence that any of these went to France. However, WD entries show that quite a few had been sent direct from the factory to unit lines having bypassed COD Chilwell. They arrived without any of the warlike elements having been fitted guns, sights etc etc (a process done at COD Chilwell). Some of these were cannibalised to source spare parts for A10s held by units that were non-runners awaiting spares.

    A13 Mk.I
    All 65 tanks produced were in the UK.

    A13 Mk.II
    The last tank, the 64th, produced in May was taken to France by 10H. The implication being that all 64 have a theoretical possibility to have gone to France.

    A13 Mk.IIa
    5RTR took to France the 16th and 17th tank from this production series (T.9175 and T.9176). Indicating that there must be the possibility for up to 17 to have been available to go to France.

    Production data on the light tanks indicate no restrictions in numbers from this source.

    ***

    There was a concerted effort to provide 1st Armoured Division with as many cruiser tanks as was possible. As mentionned above, a significant number were delivered direct to the units from the factory and had to have a fair amount of work done on them to make them battle worthy. This includes a fair few taken to France but held back from initial operations until this was complete. In some cases, they even went to the front line. One troop commander from Queen's Bays went into action on the Somme near Amiens with a sheet of plywood where his guns should be to keep out the wind and rain!

    In effect, as many cruiser tanks were taken as possible. The only ones left behind were a handful held by training units, those not mechanically fit to move and a handful of brand new tanks such as the A10a left behind with no armament.

    Excluding the A10a from this calculation, as there is no indication that any went to France, the following approximate cruiser tank totals are theoretically available in the UK: 227 total: 21 A9, 25 A9cs, 35 A10, 65 A13 Mk.I, 64 A13 Mk.II and 17 A13 Mk.IIa.

    There is a large difference in the A9 and A13 Mk.I figures for those theoretically available and those noted as lost in France. For the other types, the numbers are less divergent.

    How many is it realistic to subtract from 227 to allow for training units and those in workshops under repair?

    More to follow.....
     
  7. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    No time today to add to the narrative, but here is a small excerpt from Colonel Brigg's report of his adventures south of the Somme.

    I hope it highlights the degree to which tanks fell out in the route march from detraining to the front line.

    Captain Hibbert was 2IC of A Squadron, Queens Bays

    [​IMG]

    From a single squadron, they left 1 x A9 (prob A9cs) at the detraining area, their only other one enroute. In addition, 5 out of their 6 or 7 A13s also left by the wayside!!! No mention of their light tanks, so they probably made it through.

    No doubt similar was exxperienced by the other two squadrons and then 9L and 10H a day or so later.
     
  8. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Previously, I've tried to demonstrate that the interim establishments documented suggest that at least 177 cruiser tanks went to France. I've also shown that as many as possible were taken and the available stock from which they were taken was at least 227 in total.

    Now, I'll turn to how many returned from France.

    There are 3 different numbers specified in the source documents I've seen.

    The first is a bare statement of fact written in AFV Branch WO (SD.7) Half Yearly Report No.1: 7 cruiser and 6 light tanks. This data offers no help as to where the numbers came from or how they were calculated. It has widely been discredited and understood to be irrelevant.

    The second comes from a movement record of what was unloaded at Southampton. The movement staff count various totals which were transferred to a daily (24 hour period midnight to midnight) Progress Report. There is a single column for vehicles which thus includes staff cars, lorries, artillery tractors, tanks as well as motorcycles. There is no requirment to identify which type of vehicle it is. On one Progress Report, for 19th June, a footnote is made that of the 1,318 vehicles landed that day, 9 cruiser and 13 light tanks were included. This is the number that historians later decided was the more acccurate, and was thus used by Ellis in the Official History.

    The third comes from Major General Evans' report where he states that the division brought back 14 cruiser and 11 light tanks.

    One other source, the 3rd Armoured Brigade WD, states that they reached Cherbourg with 27 tanks and the wording implies all were loaded and returned the UK. Regrettably, it does not break down the types.

    Could there have been other tanks returning to the UK that have not been recorded?

    My personal opinion is yes. Why not?

    Movement staff were not required to identify the nature of the vehicle that they were counting. As 'historians' looking back, we are lucky that one movement officer added a footnote to his count which was then produced on the daily Progress Report. It does not seem a particularly large leap of understanding to consider that other tanks may well have been offloaded on other times or days and/or at other ports where the movement officer counting simply didn't record - remember he's not required to do so - the type of vehicle he's counting. The absence of footnotes about tanks does not prove the absence of tanks.

    Given that, the question then arises as to where and how many could have slipped back unrecorded.

    More to follow...
     
  9. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Just to give you a quick flavour of how dispersed the units and the tanks were of 1st Armoured Division. This degree of dispersion and constant rail movement from one location lead to the units and formations not knowing the location of many of their tanks.

    Whilst the 3rd Armoured Brigade WD entry indicating 27 tanks making it to Cherbourg and loaded back to the UK is the only reference to tanks returning, 19 tanks (15 cruiser and 4 light) made it to BOW Nantes on 15th June. That is enough time for them to have been backloaded onto ships for the UK. Whether the WD for BOW Nantes records what happened to them subsequently I cannot say as I have not read that file. Could these have made it back to the UK? Could any other of the tanks recorded as "loaded on trains and never seen again have made it back"?

    Many photographs of destroyed tanks on trains exist, and a few of tanks on trains being returned to Germany. One picture exists of a line of tanks under German control but the location is unknown.

    ***

    All of the tanks arriving at Cherbourg were loaded onto trains and delivered to stations in and around Pacy-sur-Eure. This was the western point of a triangle of land that the French had handed over to the British as the BEF's RAC training and concentration area. From there, the tanks were either driven northwards (2ArmdBde HQ, QBays, 9L and 10H) or entrained again (3ArmdBde, 2RTR and 5RTR) after the prior experience of so many mechanical failures of the forced march. The divisional and corps workshops were established in Louviers.

    The forced march northwards of the 2ArmdBde 24/25 May had left over half their tanks, mostly cruiser tanks, stranded enroute. Have a read here how many QBays cruiser tanks were fit to take part in their attack on the Somme crossings, 24 May: http://www.qdg.org.uk/pages/WW2-Part-1-71.php Those stranded tanks were either recovered forwards to the brigade LRS or unit fitters, or backwards to div/corps workshops.

    By the time of the attack on the Abbeville bridgehead, 27 May, all three regiments of 2ArmdBde had been reduced by the equivalent of more than a squadron in strength even after 1-2 days of recovery and maintenance. 3ArmdBde begun the assault in better condition as their tanks had been brought much further forward by train, but then their mechanical problems kicked in during the attack.

    After the failed attack, the units spent 3 more days recovering broken tanks across the countryside. Then it was decided to withdraw all but a composite regiment to the rear to recover and try and bring some of their broken tanks back to service. Trains were brought forward to remove the cruiser tanks back to Louviers whilst the light tanks were expected to make the journey by road to the new locations north west of the Foret de Lyon.

    Three trains with a total of 102 tanks, and two Scammell transporters (total 104 tanks) arrived in Louviers 2-3 June. Corps workshops immediatly despatched runners with nil or 1st line repairs (minor defects) to the units by road for brigade LRS and unit fitters to deal with. Runners with 2nd line repairs were sent to divisional workshops and all the non-runners were retained by corps workshops.

    Here is how the 2RTR WD depicts its tank state on 4 June. Those cruiser tanks with the battalion and LRS equate to those tanks immediatly sent onwards by corps workshops in Louviers.
    [​IMG]

    MarkNote: notice that the total for the regiment is 53 tanks. This sits alongside the 5RTR total of 52 taken to France.

    After this date, things start to get really messy.

    The Composite Regiment (9L HQ reinforced) with approximately 50 tanks under 51 Division command repeatedly skirmishes with the enemy and by the 10th were reduced to just two troops of "strong runners". A handful, number unknown, which were not that fit were withdrawn.

    2nd Armoured Brigade with QBays and 10H was trying to rebuild, but was mostly providing dismounted infantry support.

    3rd Armoured Brigade with 2RTR and 5RTR were building a composite battalion to take up a defensive line on the river Andelle. The 3ArmdBde tanks state on 7 June consisted of:
    Brigade HQ : not stated
    2RTR : 7 A9, 10 A13 and 18 lights
    5RTR : 2 A9, 3 A10, 9 A13 and 10 lights
    The composite battalion under 2RTR command consisted on most of 2RTR, a composite squadron from 5RTR (2 A9, 7 A13 and 6 light tanks) and a light tank squadron from the QBays with an A10 from brigade attached. Soon there was to be Colan's Company with infantry tanks too!

    In effect, there were tanks strewn all over the countryside between the Somme and the Seine with composite units made up from a variety of sub-units and borrowed tanks as well as unit HQs with a handful in rear areas. Then there was the workshops in Louviers with a large number of tanks in various states of disrepair.

    When the Germans descended upon the Seine, it got really, really, REALLY messy. At this point several train loads of tanks, either fit or unfit were being despatched rearward, often unaccompanied - many to never be seen again.

    As I wrote above, one of these trains held 19 tanks in very poor order. Many were non-runners. This train made it to BOW Nantes where it was unloaded by a small train party from Corps Workshops 1st Armoured Division. After unloading, they departed, leaving the tanks in the care of BOW Nantes. Did they ever get loaded onto a ship?

    Did any of the other trainloads make it to a port and get loaded onto trains?

    Remember, movement staff logging loading and unloading are not required to note what type of vehicles they are counting, just the number of vehicles. Easy for some to have slipped through without being noted by the units themselves.

    And then there is Calais!

    3RTR never got all their tanks into operation. Moreover, it is well written about that the regiment's Adjutant had to force the captain of the tank ship - at gunpoint - to remain in dock BEFORE a single tank had been unloaded. Is it possible that the ship left harbour with some of the tanks onboard? I, for one, would not be suprised if this is so. And let's not forget, Peter Brown notes in his articles that 4/7DG got one of their light tanks home via Calais. A feat not recorded in any document, shipping list, movement report or anywhere - except their own WD. That tank had to be loaded. When, and on which ship. Is it that difficult a leap in understanding to think some of 3RTRs tanks also made it home?
     
  10. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    The final approach I took to trying to calculate the numbers was to consider how many tanks there were remaining in the UK at various points in time. The total number built, less the numbers in the UK and Middle East equals the number sent to France. Not so?

    Earlier SDP wrote: "The only number that really mattered was surely the number of serviceable tanks in the UK." This is of course true AFTER France has fallen. Until then, the UK was still feeding its best troops and the maximum equipment it could, into France. After France had fallen, not only was that a key concern, it was one that was being actively pursued and the time and thus a fair amount of primary documentation exists.

    According to MoS accounting, the total number of cruiser tanks produced to...
    - 30 April 1940 was 273,
    - 31 May 1940 was 342, and
    - 30 June 1940 was 401.

    Each of this figures needs to be reduced by 68 to allow for those sent to the Middle East. Thus: 205, 274 and 333 respectively are the total number of cruiser tanks available in the UK and France combined.

    1.) The first point of reference that we have is the infamous SD.7 (AFV Branch at the WO) and their Half Yearly Reports. Although written well after the events, the date in the reports refer to the timeframe before 1st Armoured Division actually left for France. Half Yearly Report No.2 states that only 6 cruiser tanks "excluding training vehicles" remained in the UK. This is refering to the timeframe "early May" so is not that much help given that a total of 69 cruiser tanks were produced in May.

    However, if we assume, for the purposes of demonstration, the date 1 May 1940, then: 205 available less the 172 "under orders for BEF France" and the 6 (to remain) in the UK; we have a difference of 27. This is not too excessive given the numbers are "excluding training vehicles".

    Although this looks quite good, the truth is that approximately 20 tanks from May's production went to France too. Ie. in addition to this data. So, if these numbers are accurate, then the total number going to France is pushed over 190!

    2.) The second document is one I posted earlier on 1 June. Dated 11 June 1940, it refers to the timeframe after Dunkirk, but when the bulk of the 1st Armoured Division is still busy south of the Somme. On the right side it lists those tanks assumed to still be active, on the left it details the numbers remaining in the UK. The level of detail suggests that it is based on some research rather than complete guesswork (which is evidenced on the right!). Perhaps the compiler did a ring round of the various units.

    This document, from the 4th War Cabinet Defence Committee (Supply) meeting, presented by General Carr to Churchill as the first in a serious of 'what have we got left to defend ourselves' meetings, states that 103 cruiser tanks existed in the UK: 82 in depots under maintenance or preparation for issue and 21 held in training units. In another part of the same document, it is stated that 14 of number were tanks that were produced in June. ie. we can extrapolate that the total number in the UK on 31 May was 89: 68 in depots and 21 with training units.

    By the end of May, 342 cruiser tanks had been produced in total of which 274 and not sent to the Middle East. If 89 remained in the UK on that date, the implication is that 185 were in France.

    3.) The third contemporary indication comes from a later War Cabinet Defence Committee (Supply) document submission which states 118 cruiser tanks "in the hands of the troops" on 1 July 1940. This refers to a timeframe after 1st Armoured Division has returned from France. In my notes, with this information I have pencilled in that there were also 29 in depot at the same time. That is a calculation that I made based on other documents in my posession.

    By the end of June, 401 cruiser tanks had been produced in total of which 333 and not sent to the Middle East. If we accept that 158 had been lost in France, that leaves a difference of 28: 333 less 158 lost in France less 118 (units) and 29 (depot) held in the UK. That 28 is not an excessive amount to consider to be held by training units. Remember, SD.7 data suggested 27 and General Carr's document to Churchill stated 21 precisely. In otherwords, a total of 175 cruiser tanks in the UK as of 30 June. Given the timeframe, this number represents tanks in the UK that never went to France PLUS any that may have returned.

    During June, 59 off cruiser tanks from new production were added to the total. However, the number now available has increased during the month from 89 to 175. That's 86 more. The difference represents, according to the logic, 27 cruiser tanks returning from France during the month.

    Nearly finished....
     
  11. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    The calculations that I have presented so far are unfortunately not entirely robust - but they are the best that can be made. What I mean by this is that there are potentially two major hazards in the process.

    First, I have been compelled to compare unlike data: apples with oranges so to speak. The production data is from the Ministry of Supply (MoS), whereas the remaining data is from various War Office (WO) records. The problem here is one of time factor. There is a time delay, an unknown time delay, between the MoS recording a tank produced and the WO recording it as in the inventory. The MoS recorded a tank as complete after inspection at the factory. The WO recorded the tank on the inventory at some point with the tank at COD Chilwell. Whether it was when the factory freesh tank arrived at Chilwell, or when it was finally fitted and completed at Chilwell and ready for operational use is unknown. There could be several days delay between the data records. The impact of this can be seen in the General Carr document presented at the 4th War Cabinet Defence Committee (Supply) on 11 June 1940. It is stated that the totals presented include 14 tanks added in June - added according to WO accounting. But how many of those 14 - none, some or all - were actually recorded by the MoS as part of the May totals? The point is that for every 1 that is actually part of the May MoS accounting, that is 1 less that could be in France. I hope that makes sense.

    Second, there are some documents and data that I have chosen to read as accurate and reliable, and others which I have dismissed. And yet the truth remains that we cannot be sure that any document or data set is 100% on the ball. The problem is, if you don't have something solid to start with, there is no point in continuing. Given the generally poor quality of the record keeping, I have had to restrict my 'solid' points to just three. I'll give my reasons why I feel they are credible, but am always alert to the reality that they too may be out. You can decide for yourself whether the data is 'solid' or not.

    The MoS production figures are comprehensive and without arithmatical flaw. ie., the numbers actually add up! Unless somebody in their record keeping process has deliberately massaged the figures from one month to another, it seems reasonable to accept their data as reliable and accurate. I have been unable to find any evidence to question this assumption.

    The SD.7 WO list of tank losses in France is pretty comprehensive; it lists each model and type separately and the losses of each. It is detailed and looks solid. However, SD.7 made no statement as to how the numbers were generated - where they got their information from. If the data is based upon a thorough check of census numbers missing from the inventory post BEF return, then the data is likely to be spot on. On the otherhand, if it is based upon a ring round of units asking somebody to let them know ASAP how many they each lost, it is likely to have the standard donkey wallopper / tankie guesswork heavily influencing the end result. We simply don't know.

    The document presented by General Carr to Churchill on 11 June 1940 provides two data sets: the number of tanks remaining in the UK on the left and the number of tanks remaining in France with units south of the Somme. The data on the right is plain guesswork and has little value. It is merely a statement of WO establishment and known interim establishment and does not take reality into consideration. It also includes 3RTR data when they had already lost everything a week earlier, and excludes all the tanks held in reserve south of the Somme - think Colan's Company! On the otherhand, the data on the left looks comprehensive and well researched. But like the SD.7 list of losses, its true quality and accuracy depends upon how thorough that research was: a careful physical count and check of census numbers or a lax ring round asking the adjutant how many tanks he thinks he has parked outside. Again, we simple cannot be sure which, but I have felt it worthy of being termed 'solid'.

    Given all of the above, it seems to be impossible that we will ever know the exact answers to the questions. However, I feel the analysis has demonstrated sufficiently that the numbers currently assumed are, perhaps, a bit light in respect of the cruiser tanks, but probably pretty accurate for the light tanks. Nobody seems to dispute the infantry tank numbers.
     
  12. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Mark,

    You'll be pleased to hear that lessons appear to have been learned on the importance of correct reports and returns on vehicle and gun types and numbers. This is from the War Diary of 1 RANGERS for March 1941 and seems to be issued preparatory to their departure to Greece (WO169/1739):

    "VEHICLE AND ARMAMENT CENSUS.
    14. All units with M.T. and/or Artillery equipment on their charge will render a return to G.H.Q., M.E., with copies to their Command Headquarters, before embarkation, under the following headings:-

    a. Vehicles by types and numbers.

    b. Artillery equipment by marks and numbers.
    [Tech O send to 2 A.D. - pencil annotation]

    Unless this information is received it will be impossible to ensure the subsequent despatch of the correct spare parts."

    Regards

    Tom
     
  13. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Thanks Tom,

    You highlight a very interesting point: the front-line fighting units were expected to make these detailed reports.

    Similarly, 5RTR WD records on 16 March 1941: "GSO III from CYRCOM to obtain tanks states, armament states etc..."

    At that time, 5RTR was under direct command GHQ BTE. But can be considered a 2nd Armoured Division asset like 1 Rangers. At that time, 5RTR had also taken posssession of all 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ's cruiser tanks and had previously, if not still (it is unclear from the records whether they had relinquished them), taken possession of 4 of 2nd Armoured Division HQ's cruiser tanks and several of 2RTR's too (see late Feb WD entries).

    The problem is, what the guys back in Cairo did with these equipment state reports....

    A census of tanks was produced by Q Stats ME dates 1 April 1941 - possibly based upon the data resulting from these requests. This census states 85 off A13 cruiser tanks in the ME. This appears to be two GREATER than have actually arrived in the ME and takes no account of those lost by 2RTR in their efforts during Operation Compass. Their WD records two lost at Beda Fomm in February.

    Additionally, AFV Branch GHQ ME was asked to provide a statement on tank losses of 2nd Armoured Division in Cyrenaica. This was presented on 11 June 1941 signed by Brigadier Jerram then head of AFV Branch GHQ ME. The statement is nothing short of guesswork and pure invention and bears little if any relationship to reality. Which seems strange since it comes several weeks after the events when the details could/should have been known without error or inaccuracy.

    What's the point?

    Why are front line fighting units being bothered to supply this data if those back in Cairo tasked to actually record and use that data strategically are using it so unwisely or ignoring it completely?
     
  14. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Whilst it remains impossible to state exactly how many tanks went to France, there is sufficient documentation to have a jolly good estimate. And that estimate is not necessarily where various authors have suggested it is. Ellis in the official history didn't omit this information without good reason.

    In respect of cruiser tanks, the total number likely to have been in France seems to me to be in the 180-185 range. On the basis that 158 were lost in France, the implication is that up to 27 may well have returned. This is considerably more than most people presume. But I do not believe it should be disregarded.

    Movements staff had no reason or requirment to specifically record the number of tanks being loaded and unloaded. Thus the lack of information is neither surprising nor proof on non-returns. We have only limited information regarding tanks returning and one of the only pieces of first hand information is in the 3rd Armoured Brigade WD which notes 27 tanks (all types) reaching Cherbourg and implies all were loaded and thus returned to the UK. A handwritten note by Brigadier Crocker hints that this likely included up to 12 cruiser tanks - probably 11.

    However, there are three pieces of information to be found in the documentation that give a solid hint that tanks returned to the UK by routes/dates/means other than those with Brigadier Crocker.

    First, A13 Mk.II serial T.9104 is notes has having been to France and subsequently returned. It is highly unlikely that this tank was with Crocker's contingent. Thus, where and when did it return? And did it return alone?

    Second, one of the six A9CS that 2RTR took to Egypt in August 1940 had previously been taken by 5RTR to France. Whilst the possibility exists that this tank was one that returned with Brigadier Crocker, it is also noted that this tank was given to the Composite Regiment being formed around 9L at the end of May. There is no evidence it ever returned to 5RTR or 3AB prior to Brigadier Crocker's dash to Cherbourg. Thus, where and when did it return? And did it return alone?

    Third, as mentionned previously, 4/7DG managed to evacuate one of their light tanks via Calais just before it fell. Did it travel home alone? Or was it accompanied by some of 3RTRs tanks that were either backloaded or never offloaded? Remember, of 4 A9cs sent to Calais, there is photographic evidence of 3; of 3 A13 Mk.IIa sent to Calais, there is photographic evidence of 2. Have you ever seen evidence of a single A10 in Calais? There should have been 3!

    1st Armoured Division sent several trainloads of tanks rearwards during their brief excursion to France. Several of these are noted as not having reached their destination. Some certainly did. Is it possible that one of these trainloads made it onto a ship and back to Blighty? I suspect it is.
     
  15. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Hi Mark,

    Another snippet re the expectation that units would supply this sort of information, again from the 1 RANGERS war diary but this time from Feb 41:

    "
    A statement will be forwarded to Units to-morrow setting out what is believed to be the vehicle position in each unit, after the transfers referred to in para 1 of this letter have been carried out. If this statement contains any errors Units will please notify the D.A.Q.M.G. by telephone as soon as possible.
    10. Units are reminded of the necessity for forwarding to this H.Q. complete lists of W.D. Numbers by types and makes of all vehicles which are accompanying Units in triplicate.

    [sgd: ?? Major for]
    Colonel,
    A.A. & Q.M.G.
    2nd Armoured Division.
    24 Feb 41.

    It would be interesting to see whether any of these returns survive in the diaries of GHQ ME - I would guess they would be in something like the QMG files?

    There was a similar inquiry in the War Office into the numbers of tanks and guns lost in Greece. I was thinking how much this was driven by Churchill's obsession with this level of detail whereas the somewhat less detailed record of equipment taken to France reflected the lack of this central driving force?

    Regards

    Tom
     
  16. jhunt

    jhunt Junior Member

    So observations on your questions.

    “First, A13 Mk.II serial T.9104 is notes has having been to France and subsequently returned. It is. highly unlikely that this tank was with Crocker's contingent. Thus, where and when did it return? And did it return alone?”

    This tank could easily have been with 3AB? T9106 definitely went with 5RTR and photographic evidence shows it remained in France, why could this A13MkII not have been with 2RTR and returned. Given that A13MkII were not unknown in 3AB I think this is as lightly as not. Also I still think that 3RTR had one.

    “Third, as mentionned previously, 4/7DG managed to evacuate one of their light tanks via Calais just before it fell. Did it travel home alone? Or was it accompanied by some of 3RTRs tanks that were either backloaded or never offloaded? “

    This is a story, that although recorded in a War Diary, seems implausible unless evacuation took place very early on. When evacuation from Calais seemed likely, rather than loading tanks for return 3RTR, burned them, therefore it seems that evacuation of vehicles was never really an option. Also based on the difficulty 3RTR had with electricity supply and French stevedores when unloading tanks before the siege proper commenced, it would seem that the prospect of loading tanks at the last possible moment under direct and indirect fire, even if an appropriate ship was available, would have been extremely daunting. Finally, if an extra tank turned up would 3RTR not have pressed an additional tank into service rather than evacuating it?

    Based on the above I believe that it is extremely unlikely that any 3RTR tank that served at Calais was reloaded and returned. I think the only possibility of a 3RTR return is that tanks were never unloaded. If this proposition is correct then the accounts mention at one stage that all but 2 MkVI and 3 Cruisers were unloaded (All tanks but these seem to have been knocked out earlier or deployed on the abortive attempt to reach St Omer), later Capt Howe leads 2 MkVI and 2 Cruisers on a patrol (These tanks not included in those sent to St Omer) therefore there is only, possibly, 1 cruiser that might not have been unloaded and returned?

    “Remember, of 4 A9cs sent to Calais, there is photographic evidence of 3;”
    There are verifiable Photo’s of all 4.

    “of 3 A13 Mk.IIa sent to Calais, there is photographic evidence of 2.”

    Do you have any information on the Census number of the third tank, I know we have T9161 and T9163. Is there some detail on the third A13MkIIa?

    “Have you ever seen evidence of a single A10 in Calais? There should have been 3!”
    See my previous post on this. Also if 3RTR took, as is mostly reported, 48 tanks to France on the balance of probability they were in a similar position to 2RTR with only one tank in RHQ, not 3.

    “Second, one of the six A9CS that 2RTR took to Egypt in August 1940 had previously been taken by 5RTR to France”
    Photos indicate that this would have been T7249, that’s the only 5RTR A9CS not verifiable as lost in France. I don’t have full details of those that went with 2RTR, was this one of them?

    Finally I remember reading that 9L went to France under strength in tanks with Light Tanks in place of some cruisers. I think that this confirms that 9L were below strength and indicates a possibility I have considered likely for some time, that the number of MkVIc lost is understated and perhaps the number of MkVIb understated????????? I.e. some MkVIc have been confused with MkVIb. If you look at the records for 10H information posted by Roddy De Normann on Missing Lynx he lists some tanks that were MKVIc as MkVIb, indicating, perhaps, some confusion in the records?
     
  17. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Hello again jhunt,

    Regarding T9104: I wrote that the words "highly unlikely" for the very reasons you present. I am not a betting man. But if it was the only A13 Mk.II with 2RTR, and it managed to survive given the failure rate of the other 57 or so held by other units to survive, that's one hell of set of odds to come through. Hardly "easy" as you put it. ;)

    Now, I have not done the collection and collation of photos that you have. The MoS PR photo of a A13 Mk.II in 3RTR marking was undoubtably taken in the UK and is no evidence of the unit taking it or any other to Calais. You say you have other pictures which indicate they did, and I do not doubt you.

    Also, you say you have a photograph of T9106 with 5RTR in France. Again, I do not doubt your word, but I have not seen this evidence and only have the serials list presented by Roger Brown in his articles. As you have previously noted, those lists contain double entries and/or typo type errors originating somewhere in the evidence chain. Is it possible that it was a typo for T9166 or T9160? Of course not, you have a photo of T9106 with 5RTR in France. But that is news to me.

    Nevertheless, I think you will agree that any A13 Mk.II in 3ArmdBde are a bit like hen's teeth. And thus the odds of one of them lasting is very small given the reality of the mechanical reliability of the fleet. Hence, "highly unlikely" as opposed to 'impossible'.

    Regarding 3RTR in Calais: I have no evidence that any tanks were backloaded nor any evidence that any were not unloaded and thus just returned straight back to the UK. The evidence of what tanks and how many were landed is fragmentary at best and hardly conclusive. I think the odds of some of 3RTR's tanks surviving is no less than T9104 returning with Brigadier Crocker. It is probably greater.

    Regarding 9L: As of April 1940, the 'light' and 'heavy' designations for the armoured brigades fell away. This necessitated a change in the establishments of all 6 tank battalions/regiments under our spotlight. They establishment of each became identical with 52 cruiser tanks (46 gun and 6 close support). When you read that 9L (or any of the others) had light tanks in lieu of cruisers, it is a reference to the reality that there were simply not enough cruisers to go around. Full stop. I do not believe that it is a reference to 9L having even less cruisers than it sister units. The evidence that exists suggests that every effort was made to ensure each battalion/regiment went to France equally equipped without favour to one or another. Of course it was not perfect but there is no evidence to demonstrate that 9L was underequipped (or differently) relative to the other battalion/regiments.

    I do not have a third serial number for an A13 Mk.IIa of 3RTR in Calais nor can I confirm the serial number of the A9cs going to both France and Egypt.
     
  18. Richelieu

    Richelieu Well-Known Member

    According to Liddell Hart, Brigadier Crocker left Alençon midnight 16/17 May with 29 tanks (14 x A13, 1x A9, 14 x Mk VI). All the A13s together with 12 Mk VIs made it to the quayside and, it is implied, all were recovered to Britain. The A9 “was only abandoned just outside” Cherbourg.

    Perhaps 3AB’s war diary includes the A9 in its total of 27, and perhaps there had been no room for the last Mk VI which had to be left behind on the 18th, giving the 14 + 11 that Major General Evans reported. More ships were due 19 May but the operation had to be abandoned, along with most of the transport, due to Rommel’s proximity.
     
  19. morrisc8

    morrisc8 Under the Bed

    burnt tank 1940 bef.jpg tank burnt out.jpg tanks on train 1940.jpg Some of my original war time photos 3RTR taken on 23.5.40. Captured Tanks on a train . Can add more photos if you would like.
    Keith.
    tank  1940 back of photo 23 5 40.jpg tank  1940 back of photo 23 5 40.jpg tank  1940 HQ.jpg tank 1940 bef.jpg tank 1940 bef on fire.jpg
     
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  20. morrisc8

    morrisc8 Under the Bed

    A few more from my collection.
    Keith
    tank in house 1940.jpg tank with german.jpg tank bef 1940 5.jpg tank bef 1940 T 7251.jpg 1940 bef tank (2).jpg BEF captured tanks 1940.jpg
     
    Juha, JERICHO, Richelieu and 2 others like this.

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