How close were the Soviets to collapse, if at all

Pure speculation. BTDT.

 

Yes and no. Being of exactly same breed both regimes and both fuhrers could only survive in expansion, so I don't doubt for a second that both Stalin and Hitler had been preparing for an offensive campaign sooner or later. Hitler's position though was more vulnerable to the external threats than Stalin's (and resource-wise Germany is no match to Russia). So it was a pre-emptive strike as it had occured first but it would've happened anyway (even if Stalin had not been planning his moves but then again it wouldn't be Stalin then).
The trigger was probably Soviet troops moving inside Romania dangerously close to Ploesti oil fields...


And I always thought one needs to feel threatened to launch a preventative strike...

Can you back up your assumptions?

 

And I always thought one needs to feel threatened to launch a preventative strike...

Can you back up your assumptions?
How do you expect me to back them up? To break into the still locked up CPSU/KGB secret archives?
Well, some day, I guess...
But plenty of indirect support. The agressive nature of communism and stalinism in particular, the purges running out of steam inside the USSR and the need for new "enemy", the rhetoric of Stalin and his henchmen and the whole hype about "taking the war into enemy's territory", "liberation of the working class of Europe". I personally knew people who had attended pre-war meetings with speakers like Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Stalin himself. Everybody knew then that the Red Army was getting ready to "liberate" Europe. And, by the way, the NKVD was getting ready too to deal with millions of fresh Gulag inmates.
The new communist "Finnish" government was prepared in anticipation of easy victory over Finland - never happened. Polish "Liberation Army" was being built by Stalin in 1939 - what was it supposed to "liberate"?
Again, closing in on the only oil fields available to Nazis, amassing ridiculous numbers of men, armor and aircraft so it cannot be protected (but naturally can attack).
You can google plenty of historians' views on the matter such as Magenheimer.
Without the access to the archives it is just speculation. But looks credible.

 

If you bring up a new hypothesis based on documents that will be found some day in some archive but locked away still you should declare it as what it is: A hypothesis (yours, namely) based on assumptions and ex-post views.

And instead of quoting one historian that speaks in favor of the Präventivkriegsthese I'd be happy if you could provide me only one valid contemporary German source that states Germany felt threatened by the SU and planned Barbarossa as preventative strike.
That will indeed be groundbreaking. Because the documents - available in the archives! - are so far stating the very opposite.

 

Mods, I think this thread has outlived its usefullness. Please do the charitable thing.

What next, History research by the Ouija board method?

 

Za, I don't see any need to end this discussion. This poster has stated his position, and others have pointed to different conclusions. As long as forum rules are respected, I don't see any problems.

 

If you bring up a new hypothesis based on documents that will be found some day in some archive but locked away still you should declare it as what it is: A hypothesis (yours, namely) based on assumptions and ex-post views.

And instead of quoting one historian that speaks in favor of the Präventivkriegsthese I'd be happy if you could provide me only one valid contemporary German source that states Germany felt threatened by the SU and planned Barbarossa as preventative strike.
That will indeed be groundbreaking. Because the documents - available in the archives! - are so far stating the very opposite.
All along I have said that I have no documental proof and this is my view on the events, but thanks for the tip. I don't see how this "hypothesis" is new though.
I have not quoted any historian directly and contrary to your post have not attempted to make a groundbreaking discovery. Everybody knows now that the war was started in 39 by both Germany and the USSR. USSR has invaded pretty much every Western neighbor. So the aggressive Soviet intentions are obvious. Do you suggest that these intentions somehow were curbed by the newly established German borders which Stalin would all of a sudden respect? What corroborates that view? What was so sacred for him about German borders that apparently wasn't about Finnish or Romanian?

There are some researches, suprisingly, by the Russian historians (Nevezhin in particular) concluding that around April-May 1941 the true intentions of Stalin's clique to launch an offensive into Europe were showing. And the way the Soviet propaganda works it woud have probably taken Stalin another year before striking.
But yes, since you you are so sensitive - it is my personal opinion that both monsters were preparing for a strike. Now, I am not going to pour a bucket of hypertext links on you as I don't see this as a valid argument unless they depict factual historical proof. And the proof is so far locked away.

 

...
Why did you cut short your nickname? There was a second half you know

 

"What next, History research by the Ouija board method?"

We have that feature available?

What'll they think of next....

 

Sorry matey, you're barking up the wrong tree.

 

No, matey, that is the tree

 

If Stalin was ready to invade Europe, his military would not have been so poor at 1941. One does not purge the army if one plans on starting a major war against the one of the most powerful state in Europe, especially if was a premeditated strike that is an inherent part of national strategy.

 

Well, Stalin did invade Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and then seized Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania, which raised the anxiety of the Germans concerning the Ploesti oilfields. And Russia was in the process of modernizing it's tank forces with newer T-34s, with the 85mm main gun, which would out-class anything the Germans had in the AFV inventory at that time. Who knows what was going on in his mind, but Stalin did give the appearance of gearing up for some sort of action, and it did look like Russia's momentum was easing westward.

 

All along I have said that I have no documental proof and this is my view on the events, but thanks for the tip. I don't see how this "hypothesis" is new though.
I have not quoted any historian directly and contrary to your post have not attempted to make a groundbreaking discovery. Everybody knows now that the war was started in 39 by both Germany and the USSR. USSR has invaded pretty much every Western neighbor. So the aggressive Soviet intentions are obvious. Do you suggest that these intentions somehow were curbed by the newly established German borders which Stalin would all of a sudden respect? What corroborates that view? What was so sacred for him about German borders that apparently wasn't about Finnish or Romanian?

There are some researches, suprisingly, by the Russian historians (Nevezhin in particular) concluding that around April-May 1941 the true intentions of Stalin's clique to launch an offensive into Europe were showing. And the way the Soviet propaganda works it woud have probably taken Stalin another year before striking.
But yes, since you you are so sensitive - it is my personal opinion that both monsters were preparing for a strike. Now, I am not going to pour a bucket of hypertext links on you as I don't see this as a valid argument unless they depict factual historical proof. And the proof is so far locked away.

Come on, don't be ridiculous.

Mind-reading Stalin and analyising his would-be aggressions towards Germany aside - you still owe me an answer as to how the Germans felt about it. And what is the point discussing how threatening SU might have been in their actions and intentions if Germany didn't think of it that way? You can't take an ex-post view and say it was a pre-emptive strike just because the Soviets behaved like this or that if you don't consider what the reasons were for the German attack (look, I'm making it bold and red so you can't miss it again)!

Alright, you named Magenheimer. There's a few more I know, but I do hope for your sake that you did not only read their books but also cared to investigate their background. You know what is striking? All these historians and so-called historians that speak in favor of the Präventivkriegsthese have a very similar political background. Impressive, isn't it. I also suggest you read about the history of the Historikerstreit concerning Barbarossa.
And if you're into a more balanced view, you could read - instead of Magenheimer et al. - Ueberschär, Wette, Weinberg, Trevor-Roper, Hillgruber, Benz... Oh yeah, and contemporary sources, too.

So I suggest you deal with the German side (after all they started Barbarossa, yes?) before you bring up secondary aspects that are based on assumptions. Assumptions, anger and falsification of history, actually.

*edit*
Btw, in case you are unfamiliar with Russian - За родину means nothing else than 'for the motherland'.

 

Can I just remind people debate is fine, personal insults and bickering are not. Stick to debate, please.

 

No, but prefacing your assertions with "in my opinion" or "I believe" at least lets the reader know that you are making assumptions rather than stating fact (and all we ever ask is that if it is fact, prove it)

Everybody knew? I would disagree with this. I have yet to see records or documents (and I stand corrected on this) to show that the Germans feared a Soviet intrusion into Western Europe. I have yet to see anything that proved that. Of course they made territorial gains in 1939-40 but to say that "Everyone Knew" is a bit sweeping. Have you seen any Western Intelligence documents warning of Soviet Aggression to Western Europe? Because if everyone knew then of course the intelligence agencies would be the first to know, or at least would know more than the man in the street.

Well the NKVD was always getting ready to receive fresh "fodder"!! but are there any references to them actually looking at this issue of receiving millions of western europeans into the gulags? Otherwise it is just speculation and then we are back to your prefacing your answers with "In my opinion"

If you are amassing "ridiculous" number so of men, surely they can defend as well as attack. The Wehrmacht was schooled in the theories of Blitzkrieg and combined-arms attack but they were also well able to defend. Or you referring to the 1 million "paratroops"??
You can google plenty of historians' views on the matter such as Magenheimer.
Without the access to the archives it is just speculation. But looks credible.[/quote]Exactly. It is just speculation, its not fact.

 

All listed factors definitely played their role in Op Typhoon defeat - yet I would list the weather first and here is why.
Barbarossa was delayed by some 8 weeks by the Yugoslavian uprising. Hitler could not afford to go to war with Stalin with the Balkans up in arms against him. Should that not be the case the Battle of Moscow would have happenned 2 month earlier and given how close the Nazis came under far worse conditions of Russian winter (plus the fact that 2 months earlier Sorge could not advise with certainty on Japanese intentions hence reinforcements from Far East were unavailable) I would be inclined to think that Moscow would be doomed.
December is a whole lot different from October in Russia.
the importance of Sorge is a myth :the Japanese decision to attack PH was taken end of november,so there was no time for the SU to send reinforcements from the Far East to Moscow;the divisions from the FE constituted only a small part of the troops defending Moscow and beginning the winter offensive (10 % )
Even without the Yugoslavian uprising,Barbarossa would had been delayed ,due to the late winter:it was impossible for the Germans to cross the rivers in Western Russia

 

Well, Stalin did invade Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and then seized Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania, which raised the anxiety of the Germans concerning the Ploesti oilfields. And Russia was in the process of modernizing it's tank forces with newer T-34s, with the 85mm main gun, which would out-class anything the Germans had in the AFV inventory at that time. Who knows what was going on in his mind, but Stalin did give the appearance of gearing up for some sort of action, and it did look like Russia's momentum was easing westward.

Soviet military actions could also be interpreted as attempts to recover territories lost by WWI and creation of buffer zones versus Nazi Germany, which did profess its desire to invade and colonize Russia.

If Stalin wanted to launch an attack against Germany, he should have placed his mobile formations in Belorus or Poland. But actually, in 1941 the best Soviet divisions were deployed in MD Kiev/Ukrain, a region of limited usefulness as a springboard for offensive operations because the Carpathian barred access to Germany to the west. In contrast to its lack of offensive potential, however, Ukraine had a lot of defensive value because a force there could mask the economically vital Don-Bas Basin, which Hitler in fact coveted and devoted substantial forces to capture it.

The place to deploy for an attack against Germany should be in the north through German occupied Poland, not south.The weight of Soviet armor in Ukraine suggested that Hitler was the warmonger, not Stalin.

 

Soviet military actions could also be interpreted as attempts to recover territories lost by WWI and creation of buffer zones versus Nazi Germany, which did profess its desire to invade and colonize Russia.

If Stalin wanted to launch an attack against Germany, he should have placed his mobile formations in Belorus or Poland. But actually, in 1941 the best Soviet divisions were deployed in MD Kiev/Ukrain, a region of limited usefulness as a springboard for offensive operations because the Carpathian barred access to Germany to the west. In contrast to its lack of offensive potential, however, Ukraine had a lot of defensive value because a force there could mask the economically vital Don-Bas Basin, which Hitler in fact coveted and devoted substantial forces to capture it.

The place to deploy for an attack against Germany should be in the north through German occupied Poland, not south.The weight of Soviet armor in Ukraine suggested that Hitler was the warmonger, not Stalin.
The weight of Soviet armour in Ukraine could also mean for a suspicious one an attack on the Rumanian oil fields .