Other authors accept the version of the conversation given above, including John Buckley (Monty's Men) and Tim Saunders (The Island), so Nijmegen is in good company. According to Buckley, Sosabowski was relieved shortly therafter under pressure from the British. Quite aside from whether or not Horrocks was 100%, several other things were involved. Sosabowski had been dealing with Ivor Thomas, a difficult man even for Briitsh officers to get along with. Sosabowski was also very unhappy with the cock-up that Market-Garden had become by that point, which is understandable, and he had not liked the plan to begin with. Also, there was the national factor. This was just a month after the crushing of the Warsaw uprising by the Germans, which took place while the Soviets (mostly) looked on. Britain and the USA had not complained loudly enough for fear of offending the Soviets, and many Poles were angry and upset over what they regarded as an Allied betrayal. The Poles had a very strong sense of national pride anyway, and they could not be handled like ordinary British or Commonwealth troops. Sosabowski may have felt that his brigade was being thrown away in a disastrous operation led by foreigners with no regard for Polish lives or interests. Given the situation and the emotions of the time, I can see his point of view even if I don't fully agree with it. Some diplomacy was called for, and neither Thomas nor Horrocks provided it.
This argument seems to ignore the fact that anyone with a few bullets from an aircraft - in his lungs which tend to wander around the body in the same manner as shrapnel of any sort also does - becomes a lifelong problem and has a tendency to affect anyone's life style In the case of Horrocks - he was given up for dead in Bizerta before being shipped home for FOURTEEN MONTHS of treatment and finally returned to active service at a time when Monty was having trouble replacing other Generals to high command - but Monty knew his worth and kept an eye on him. Even to-day - some 70 years later - I am still leery of sitting down suddenly on any hard surface in case I should trap an errant piece of shrapnel which causes me some pain etc - and that is after less than six months treatment… Oh - and yes - I was RUNNING AWAY from the enemy at the time as my Churchill Tank was being riddled by an 88mm - as neither the Artillery - Royal Navy nor the Air Force could find him - they needn't have bothered as he found five of us - in minutes Horrocks was NOT running away - so take it easy on him at least until you have some bullets wandering around your body… Cheers
As per 51 Highland's attachment, in this article Horrocks also mentions his difficulty sleeping, but further elaborates on how his previous experiences helped him. http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/23293-a-full-life-sir-brian-horrocks/?p=680479 .One general observation of Horrocks, from a review of his book http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/23293-a-full-life-sir-brian-horrocks/?p=680475
It can hardly be surprising that all those involved in Market Garden were under pressure at this point. All the accounts of the Driel meeting seem to me to be compatible with an essentially shared appreciation of the position refracted through the individuals' (wholly understandable) personal and organisational views. Sosabowski was focussed on his brigade and their recent experiences. Horrocks had taken XXX Corps through a violent, costly, linear battle which, as well as an operation designed to relieve the airborne troops, had represented an ordeal in its own right, . This was a perspective which Ivor Thomas would have shared. At this point, therefore, all concerned would have recognised that they had reached a reckoning. The airborne troops that they were on the point of defeat, XXX Corps that Operation Market had essentially failed, and that "the position held by the Airborne Division had no military value." (p132, "43 Wessex at War", Essame, pub. Clowes, 1952). It is with deep reserve that one questions Lt Dyrda's eye-witness report of the Driel meeting, but the picture of Thomas's polished boots and vivid scarlet accoutrements rather goes against the established accounts of his faded hat-band, dull oiled boots and overall eccentric dress - he actually appears to be wearing puttees in the photographs of this particular time. All this supports an interpretation of a fairly rational decision, made in the most stressful of circumstances by a group of men under immense pressure. Horrocks may well have been under par - and he was temporarily replaced by Thomas as Corps Commander while on sick leave - but there is, it seems to me, no evidence that his condition led to military misjudgements.
Some coverage on the state of Horrocks in... XXX Corps (From Sept 22 2019) XXX Corps In September 1944 the Allied ground troops of Operation Market Garden smashed their way north towards the beleaguered British troops holding on in Arnhem. Seventy five years later James Holland rides in a Sherman tank up the same road outside Nijmegen and towards the Groesbeek Heights.
One aspect that has not been mentioned is how bloody rude people can be in British Army HQs. It is a testosterone charged environment. Senior officers under pressure do not conform to British stereotypes of understatement courtesy and restraint. Generals may project an outward appearance of calm confidence for the outside world, but within their home HQs they can behave like big kids bawling out people who disagree with them or do anything that annoys. Ask any Royal Signals soldier who has served in an HQ. Horrocks might well have been bloody rude and offensive in his manner.
I hadn't even thought about British understatement... What came to my mind were thoughts about "grip" and how in the desert things got very lax. Orders got received more like suggestions. Monty and O'Connor would not have accepted that. (IIRC Pip Roberts recorded that in answer to his concerns about the Goodwood plan, O'Connor would have had a different unit lead if Roberts wasn't willing) Also, when I have been short on sleep it has definitely made me prone to anger. I don't take Horrocks' comment as a sign of mental instability.
Orders as the basis for negotiating orders was (and may still be ) a characteristic of the British Army. There is a rational reason for allowing this to happen. War is inherently chaotic. The situation at the front can be very different to the situation discussed further back. The German army's doctrine allowed subordinates to use their initiative in situations where a changed situation made orders impractical. (This was a framework for mission oriented tactics or a licence for disobedience... L'Archivio "storia - history") British Field Service regulations required the subordinate to report back, which would lead to a pattern of renegotiation. In the Normandy Campaign Commander 4th Armoured Brigade Michael Carver refused to obey radio orders from Thomas the GOC of 43 Wessex Division to advance over Hill 112.
